The pilot had intended to enter the circuit for Runway 05 however when he arrived he found that the circuit for Runway 23 was active. One of his passengers asked to fly over a specific area which was located below a wide downwind position. A preceding aircraft was also making a full-stop landing and would require time to backtrack to clear the runway. As a result of these distractions, the pilot forgot the pre-landing checks and landed with the landing gear retracted. He said that he did not use a written checklist while operating the aircraft. The reason the automatic gear system did not operate was not determined. This accident was not the subject of a formal on scene investigation.

The pilot had only recently acquired the hanglider from an acquaintance and was being assisted by two friends to learn to fly the aircraft. Neither the pilot nor his friends had any previous flying experience and there was no evidence that the pilot had joined or contacted the local hangliding association for assistance. Permission of the landowner was gained for use of the property and the pilot chose a hill which had a large dam, fence and power lines at the bottom. Several short flights were made by the pilot prior to the accident flight and his friends helped him carry the glider to the top of the hill for launching. On the final flight, the pilot was seen to be taken higher than before by a gust of wind and to have some difficulty with directional control. As a result, the pilot was seen to make a controlled landing but in the centre of the dam. His helpers ran to his aid and reported seeing movement under the wing fabric of the glider before it sank. This activity they assumed was the pilot attempting to free himself from the harness of the glider. The helpers dived into the water to attempt a rescue but were forced to return to the bank for fear of being overcome by the intense cold of the water. The glider was recovered soon after but the pilot was not in the harness which was still attached to the frame of the glider. The body of the pilot was recovered later by the police and the post mortem found that the pilot had died from freshwater drowning.

Conditions were reported to be very hot with considerable turbulence on the approach to land. On short final the pilot twice had to lower the nose and reduce airbrake. After a larger than normal control movement on roundout the tailwheel touched first, throwing the glider on to the mainwheel which collapsed. Notification of this accident was not received until 16 November 1988 and no on-site investigation was carried out.

Circumstances:

Earlier in the day the pilot had flown from Bankstown to Taree with an intermediate landing at Warnervale. Before departing Taree, the pilot said the oil quantities were checked for both engines and found to be adequate for the return flight to Bankstown via Warnervale. The track to Warnervale was via the coastal route of the Williamtown military control zone (CTR) at 500 ft. Leaving the CTR, the pilot initiated a cruise climb to 3,000 ft. Passing 700 ft, the left engine began to vibrate and lost power. The engine was shut down and the climb continued to 1,500 feet. The pilot decided to continue to Warnervale rather than divert to RAAF Williamtown which was closer. He unsuccessfully attempted to restart the left engine whilst tracking to Warnervale. On arrival, the aircraft was positioned to join the circuit on an oblique left base for runway 20. As the aircraft passed over the threshold with the landing gear and full flap extended, the pilot applied full power and commenced a missed approach when he assessed the aircraft was too high and too fast. The rate of climb was less than anticipated following gear and flap retraction and when it became apparent the aircraft might collide with trees beyond the southern boundary of the airstrip, the pilot elected to land wheels-up on the overrun. The aircraft slid along swampy ground and collided with a large eucalypt log. During a subsequent strip examination, it was determined the left engine oil quantity was low. Glazing was also observed in several cylinder bores. As the engine design incorporated hydraulic tappets, it is considered probable that the low oil quantity affected the operation of the tappets and caused the vibration and loss of power. The reason for the apparent rapid loss of oil from the left engine after DEPARTURE Taree was not determined.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident

1. Vibration and loss of power in flight from the left engine which required the engine to be shut down.

2. The pilot failed to divert to the most suitable airport.

3. The pilot misjudged height and speed on approach to runway 20.

4. The pilot attempted a single engine missed approach from an unsafe height.

The takeoff from Honolulu was being performed by the Second Officer from the right control seat. This pilot was receiving promotional training under the supervision of the Captain. Weather conditions were reported as being fine. Because of a more favourable power decrement, the Captain had elected to use a Flaps 10 setting. Appropriate reference speeds as calculated for this particular takeoff were V1=148 knots; Vr=168 knots, and V2=176 knots. The body angle required at the completion of rotation was calculated to be 13 degrees. This target angle was expected to be reached by V2 as the aircraft passed through a nominal height of 35 feet. The stabilizer trim was set to 8.1 units nose-up, which was in accordance with a forward Centre of Gravity (CG) position. The subsequent flight was conducted without recorded incident. However, during a post-flight inspection at Vancouver, it was found that the aircraft had sustained damage to the undersurfaces of the rear fuselage. The damage was consistent with a tailstrike, although the flight crew had been unaware of such an occurrence. Flight Data Recorder analysis indicated that a tailstrike had occurred at Honolulu. Rotation for takeoff had been initiated at an airspeed of 157 knots. The elevator control input was initially held at an average setting, but the aircraft did not respond by lifting off at about 8 degrees as would have been expected. A further control input was made to achieve liftoff, during which a maximum body angle of 15 degrees was momentarily recorded. The average pitch change rate was calculated to be 3.1 degrees per second. It is estimated that with the mainwheels on the ground, the rear fuselage will contact the runway at a body angle of approximately 12 degrees. It was determined that although the initial elevator control input was consistent with a normal takeoff, the rate of pitch change was almost double the normal rate. It is considered that this was due to a characteristic of the aircraft which results in reduced elevator control pressures at forward CG positions, particularly when combined with a Flaps 10 setting. Company Operations Manuals note that elevator forces encountered during rotation when 8.5 or more units are required, will be approximately 40 to 50 percent of the elevator force experienced at lighter weights and mid or aft CG positions. The Second Officer had not previously experienced a takeoff under the existing weight and flap conditions, and was unaware of the comments in the Operations Manual relating to lighter elevator forces. It is possible that the tailstrike would not have occurred if rotation had been initiated at the correct speed. However, the reason that rotation was commenced 11 knots below the target speed could not be established.

The pilot reported that shortly after liftoff, as he retracted the flap, he felt the engine lose power. He commenced to dump the load but aircraft performance continued to deteriorate and he was committed to landing straight ahead in a field of young sugar cane. On-site investigation showed that the tailwheel and right mainwheel of the aircraft had struck a 40 centimetre high embankment some 8 metres beyond the end of the 700 metre strip. The aircraft remained airborne for a further 115 metres before the left wingtip contacted the ground. Evidence of load dump began at the same point. The right mainwheel then contacted the ground and the aircraft swung 130 degrees to the left and travelled a further 44 metres before coming to rest. Examination of the engine revealed evidence of loss of compression past the piston rings on four of the six cylinders and past the valves on five cylinders. These faults would have reduced the power output of the engine and resulted in a decreased takeoff performance. It is likely that the aircraft became airborne near the end of the strip, striking the embankment almost immediately afterwards. The engine was due to be changed after a further 15 hours of operation. The Aircraft Flight Manual indicated that, for the takeoff weight applicable at the time, the aircraft required a takeoff distance of 500 metres.

During the sortie the student overcontrolled the aircraft during the landings. Conditions were hot and humid with slight turbulence. On the fourth landing the aircraft bounced, the right wing dropped and the aircraft veered to the right. The instructor took over the controls and applied full power. She was able to regain straight and level flight but did not correct the veer because the airspeed was low and because she was confident that the aircraft would safely clear a fence ahead. The aircraft failed to gain sufficient height and the gear collided with the fence. The aircraft settled into an isolated pile of rubble a short distance beyond the fence. This accident was not the subject of a formal on-site investigation.

Circumstances:

During a period of circuit training, the instructor simulated an engine failure after take-off. The instructor disabled the landing gear warning horn system to reduce noise and to ensure that the student would remember to lower the landing gear, which he did when turning onto base leg. Assessing his approach to be high, the student conducted a go-around and retracted the landing gear. The subsequent circuit was abbreviated due to changing traffic and weather conditions. Final checks were completed without confirmation of landing gear position by either pilot. The aircraft was flared normally, but experienced an extended float, which the pilots attributed to a downwind component. After approximately 500-600m the aircraft settled onto the runway with the landing gear fully retracted.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The student forgot to select the landing gear down.

2. The instructor failed to adequately monitor the student's vital actions.

3. The crew failed to follow the check list.

4. The landing gear warning horn system was disabled.

5. The pilots were distracted by weather and circuit traffic conditions. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

Circumstances:

On arrival at Fanning River the pilot lowered the landing gear and obtained an indication that the landing gear was locked down. The aircraft subsequently touched down on the mainwheels and shortly after the pilot lowered the nosewheel to the ground, the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft slid to a stop on the strip, in a nose down attitude. An inspection of the aircraft revealed that the nose gear assembly showed signs of excessive freeplay. This resulted in an excessive load on the down lock bracket and its ultimate failure in overload during this landing. The strip surface was rough, consisting of sandy soil covered with tufts of grass. The nature of the surface probably contributed to the failure.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The strip surface was rough.

2. The nose gear assembly showed signs of excessive wear and had not been maintained adequately.

The pilot carried out one spray run at about 10 feet above the ground in an easterly direction over his own barley crop. The weather was fine with a north-easterly wind of about three knots. The area was very open with large, slightly undulating paddocks. About 40 metres beyond a fence marking the end of the spray run, the left wing struck a single strand power line about 18 feet above the ground. Without breaking, the wire severed a small portion of the upper surface of the wing, near the wing tip. Impact marks on the leading edge of the wing indicate that the aircraft was banked about 30 degrees to the right when it struck the wire. The wire was pulled off three adjacent poles which were about 400 metres apart. The aircraft collided with the ground inverted and nose first about 80 metres beyond the wire. At ground impact there was negligible ground slide. The engine partially dislodged from the airframe and the cabin was partially crushed. The sliding canopy slid open and the home-made hopper ruptured. An estimated 100 litres of herbicide spilled from the hopper. The pilot was not a trained, approved, agricultural pilot. The aircraft was not approved for agricultural operations, nor was the hopper installation. The wire was difficult to see because of the large distance between poles.