The pilot was contracted to spray three areas of sorghum of 160, 200, and 44 acres on adjacent properties. He was not familiar with the areas. The owner of the 44 acre area had arranged his spraying through his neighbour who owned the larger areas. The owner of the larger areas spoke to the pilot by telephone about his and the 44 acre areas. However, he spoke in detail only about his areas and the directions the pilot should follow to locate them from the air. The pilot was given a comprehensive briefing by radio by the property owner of the larger areas when he arrived overhead before he began spraying. This briefing included detailed information on power lines in the immediate vicinity of the areas. Mention also was made that one of the power lines continued through the property containing the 44 acre crop. The pilot completed spraying of the larger areas and was then told to follow a road to the property containing the 44 acre area. Radio communications between the owner of the 44 acre area and the pilot were difficult because of intermittent transmission problems with the property owner's radio. Nevertheless, the information about which contours were to be sprayed was passed to the pilot. There was no reference to power lines by either the pilot or the property owner during this exchange. The contours to be sprayed curved from a south-easterly through to a westerly direction. A single power line ran approximately east-west along the extreme southern edge of the contour area. Immediately beyond the power line was an area of tall trees. The pilot began spraying north-east/south-west and completed about three quarters of the task with runs in this direction. To spray the final southern-most section of the crop, the pilot changed the direction of his runs to approximately north-south. As the aircraft pulled up at the completion of the second run, it suddenly rotated to a near 90 degree nose-up attitude. The nose then pitched forward and the aircraft entered a steep dive to the ground, coming to rest inverted and bursting into flames. The power line across the southern edge of the crop had been severed. Marks were found on the right main landing gear leg of the aircraft indicating that the wire had contacted the leg some 30 cm above the wheel and then slid down the leg, possibly becoming entangled in the wheel before breaking. The aircraft impacted the ground 123 metres beyond the wire. No fault was found with the aircraft or its systems which might have contributed to the accident. The wire and poles were not hazards for the initial north-east/south-west runs. For the final run, the pilot would have had to pull up early, i.e. before the end of the crop, to avoid the wire. The pull-up appears to have been made in relation to the trees beyond the crop rather than the wire. The single pole which might have warned the pilot of the presence of the power line was of natural colour and against a background of tall trees. It was to the right of the flight path and therefore not in his direct field of view.

The pilot planned two flights from Tyabb to Melbourne Airport and return. Prior to DEPARTURE he refuelled the left tank of the aircraft to full and estimated that fuel onboard was then 88 litres. He nominated a fuel endurance of 150 minutes. The planned total flight time was 92 minutes. No problems were encountered on the first return flight which took a total flight time of 59 minutes. On the second flight to Melbourne the aircraft was held for about 15 minutes, due to other traffic. When taxying for DEPARTURE from Melbourne the pilot noticed the fuel gauges were reading empty, but because these do not read accurately in the ground attitude he did not accept the indications as reliable. After take off the aircraft was climbed to again cruise at 3000 feet. When in the vicinity of Williamstown the pilot noticed both fuel gauges were indicating near empty. The aircraft was rolled and the pilot noted the gauges moved, indicating to him that there was some fuel in each tank. The pilot decided that there was no need to declare an emergency. A decision was made to refuel at Moorabbin but a descent clearance was not available. After vacating controlled airspace, just south of Moorabbin, he advised that the aircraft would divert to Moorabbin. Just as he did so the engine failed and a forced landing was carried out onto a racetrack. The aircraft ran through a fence during the landing roll. Draining both fuel tanks produced about half a litre of fuel. The pilot stated that the mixture had been leaned for all the flights. The total flight time up until the time of engine failure was approximately 125 minutes. In doing his fuel consumption calculations the pilot did not allow for fuel used on taxy/takeoff and the higher consumption rate on climb. Instead he worked on a lean mixture consumption rate for cruise. Calculations using the manufacturers consumption figures found that all usable fuel would have been consumed at the time of the engine failure. There was no reason why the pilot could not have started the flights with full tanks or have refuelled in between them.

The pilot was making the return leg of a flight to his home base when the engine commenced to run roughly and a strong fuel odour was detected in the cabin. He immediately changed fuel tanks, returned the mixture control to rich and turned the fuel pump on. This aggravated the situation and caused the engine to rich cut. While preparing for the inevitable forced landing and carrying out the emergency checks, the pilot turned the fuel off. The engine immediately regained power before cutting again. By moving the fuel selector between the off and on positions he was able to keep the engine operating until he had positioned the aircraft over a more hospitable, but not ideal, area for a forced landing. During the approach the pilot turned all systems off and stopped the engine. The landing was towards the west into the setting sun, which obscured his vision and caused him to overshoot his selected landing area. He then had to land in the next paddock which was uphill with windrows built across it. During the landing, the pilot was able to dodge two windrows, but failed to see another one further up the hill and collided with it, causing damage to the nose area of the aircraft, and possibly dislodging the battery from the firewall. The pilot was able to exit the aircraft before a fierce fire broke out and consumed the aircraft. The Civil Aviation Authority has published material relating to the possibility of aromatics in low leaded Av gas and motor spirits affecting composite material carburettor floats, which can cause carburettor flooding. Although the aircraft's carburettor had been badly burnt it was possible to identify that the charred remains of the float had been of a composite material, but not if it had been affected by the fuel. These types of floats are no longer available as replacement items.

The pilot was making a landing on a dirt strip 822 metres in length. The conditions were calm and the temperature was 37 degrees Celsius. The aircraft floated for some distance before touchdown. Although heavy braking was commenced the pilot reported it was apparent the aircraft would not stop before the end of the strip. A ground loop was initiated during which the aircraft entered soft ground. The nose leg was bent as the aircraft tipped onto a wing tip.

The student and the instructor pilot began a period of cross wind circuits using the 230 strip. The wind was an afternoon sea breeze from the south-southeast of decreasing strength closer to the ground due to the sheltering effect of gum trees. The wind is reported to have been between 15 and 10 knots about 15 feet above the ground lesser at ground level. This was to be the student's first experience of a significant cross wind during the takeoffs and landings. The instructor intended to have the student do all the flying. He had briefed the student to initiate recovery action if needed. The takeoff was made without incident. The aircraft was lower than normal as the final approach was commenced. No corrective action for this was taken during the final approach and the need for the flare and round out came sooner than was usual. Wing down adjustment for the cross wind was cancelled by the student pilot as the flare point was approached. After the flare the aircraft ballooned with the left wing rising. Limited power and aileron input was made by the student to correct the situation. When the right wing continued to drop the instructor applied full power and left rudder. A series of left and right wing drops followed during which the aircraft turned 20-30 degrees to the landing direction. The right main wheel contacted the ground heavily and the right spring gear-leg was torn from the fuselage attachment point. The aircraft then slid to a stop facing opposite to the landing direction. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

It was after sunset when the pilot was doing clean up runs after spraying a pea crop. Sufficient light remained to complete the job, however the pilot had the floodlights on. The spray runs had been in a north/south direction but the clean up runs were made east/west. A powerline ran obliquely through the paddock in a southwest/ northeast direction. A smaller SWER line ran south from the main line, above the eastern fence of the paddock. After turning west to fly along the southern fence of the paddock, the aircraft struck the SWER line. The pilot advised that he had known of the presence of the two powerlines. He had temporarily forgotten about the smaller SWER line because he was concentrating on the main powerline that he had been avoiding all afternoon. He saw the SWER line, pulled up and thought he had missed it, but when he landed he discovered that one of the floodlights was missing. The distance between powerpoles was 100 metres with a minimum clearance of 5.5 metres from the top of the fence. The aircraft struck the SWER line 40 metres from the nearest pole.

In order to avoid thunderstorms in the immediate vicinity, the pilot requested take-off from a runway direction giving a slight downwind component. Light rain was falling at the time, but increased in intensity shortly after the aircraft commenced to roll. The initial stage of the take-off run was normal, but the aircraft then failed to accelerate. The take-off was abandoned at about 65 knots Indicated Air Speed, however braking effectiveness was reduced because of the wet runway conditions. A ground loop was attempted, the nosegear subsequently became detached and the aircraft slid sideways into the aerodrome boundary fence. No fault or defect was subsequently found with the aircraft engines, propellers or braking system which might have contributed to the development of the accident. A detailed engineering study revealed that under the existing conditions the wind velocity, rainfall rate and runway slope combined to prevent normal drainage off the runway. As a result, water tended to pool on the runway to a greater depth than anticipated. Quantitative estimates indicated that under these conditions, the rate of acceleration of an aircraft could be reduced by up to 50 percent. When the pilot abandoned the take-off attempt and applied the brakes, the depth of water present was such that the aircraft commenced to aquaplane.

The pilot had been carrying out spraying operations for most of the day. The flight in question was to be the first for the day from this particular strip. The pilot had pumped 644 litres of water based spray into the hopper, having previously carried this sized load from the 604 metre strip. Normal take-off procedures were employed, however the aircraft failed to become airborne as expected. Almost immediately after lift-off, the left gear leg struck and severed the top wire of a fence. The left flap, horizontal stabiliser and elevator collided with a fence post. The pilot was able to retain control of the aircraft, dumped the load and returned for a successful landing on the strip. Although the pilot had previously operated with a water based spray load of 644 litres from this strip, he had overlooked the fact that the loads had different specific gravities. On this occasion, the specific gravity of the load was significantly higher and resulted in the aircraft being about 190 kilograms above the gross weight permitted for agricultural operations. Under the conditions there had been insufficient strip length available to permit a safe take-off.

The pilot was conducting a scenic flight in the Hope Island area when the engine lost power. He was able to find a suitable area and carry out a successful forced landing. On inspection of the aircraft the pilot found that the spark plug lead had become detached. He reconnected the lead and after checking that it was secure commenced a takeoff. On climbing through 100 feet the engine again lost power. The pilot was forced to attempt a ditching, but during the approach the aircraft struck trees and spun into the water. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was engaged in spraying herbicide. The particular paddock being sprayed consisted of several north/south oriented strips. Earlier in the day the pilot had sprayed the strips in the western section of the paddock. A powerline ran approximately east/west across the northern boundary of the area being treated. The spray runs were aligned south to north, with the aircraft pulling over the powerlines at the end of the northward runs. The pilot then departed to spray another area, with the intention of returning later to complete the small eastern section of the paddock. On return to the area about an hour and a half later, the aircraft was observed to make a spray run from south to north. At the end of this run, the aircraft collided with the powerline and dived to the ground some 180 metres further north. The aircraft had struck the powerline at a height of about ten metres above ground. Only one of the two conductors was broken. The aircraft had struck the cable with the outboard right wing and tail. Marks on the severed section of the right wing indicated that the aircraft was in an estimated 40 degree left bank at the time. The top of the fin and rudder were also torn off, and the fin and rudder were bent to the right, jamming the rudder.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Pilot failed to see or avoid the powerline.

2. Flight controls buckled/ jammed.

3. Pilot encountered unforeseen circumstances beyond his capability.