The aircraft was parked on the aircraft loading area. There were flood lights on the southern side, but the light from these only dimly illuminated the northern side. After engine start the pilot turned on the taxi and landing lights and started to taxi towards the northern side. There was a taxi line along the northern side, leading out of the area in a westerly direction. This line was not seen by the pilot, possibly because he was changing the radio frequency selection from Clearance Delivery to Surface Movement Control.

The aircraft left the sealed area, tracking about north-west and ran onto the grass. This was outside the limit of the marked movement area. Realising he was now on the grass the pilot turned the aircraft left, but the right main wheel struck an exposed concrete slab. The right main gear leg collapsed.

The pilot did not follow the correct procedure while performing a Radar One departure from Essendon. Investigation revealed that the pilot flying was doing his first flight for endorsement onto the aircraft type. The PIC was busy monitoring the pilot flying in terms of aircraft handling and as a result he did not closely monitor compliance with the departure procedure. The pilot flying was not familiar with the Standard Radar Departure procedures out of Essendon.

Significant Factors

The following factors were relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot flying was not familiar with Standard Radar Departure procedures out of Essendon.

2. The PIC did not properly monitor the pilot flying.

The aircraft was being flown to calibrate the stall warning device. The pilot closed the throttle and as the airspeed reduced to about 70 knots the propeller stopped. Attempts at restarting the engine were unsuccessful. The pilot elected to land on the beach where the aircraft struck soft sand. The right main gear collapsed and during the subsequent swing to the right the aircraft struck bushes at the edge of the beach.

External examination of the engine revealed that rotation of the crankshaft was rather stiff, however this could have been the result of striking the beach sand during the landing. The engine was not stripped as the owner indicated that he would not return it to service.

This accident was not subject to an on-site investigation.

The aircraft had operated a normal scheduled service, arriving in Adelaide early that afternoon. 100 litres of avgas was added to its fuel tank from the airport refuelling facilities for the return flight to Port Augusta.

The aircraft departed with the pilot and five passengers on board, but about five minutes into the flight, climbing through 4000ft, the pilot noticed the left-hand fuel pressure gauge flickering and immediately turned the left fuel boost pump on which momentarily restored the fuel pressure back to normal. Several seconds later the fuel pressure indication dropped below the red line (minimum pressure) and the engine began to surge and lose power.

The pilot commenced a descent and advised air traffic control that the aircraft was returning to Adelaide. His attention was now directed to the right-hand fuel pressure gauge which had also fallen to a low pressure. Turning the boost pump on failed to rectify the problem, and this engine also surged and lost power.

With almost no power available the pilot realised that the distance to Adelaide Airport was too far, so positioned the aircraft for an emergency landing along the coast. He attempted to gain more power by opening the throttles, but this only resulted in erratic surging from both engines with a further decrease in power.

It now appeared that the aircraft would not reach the shoreline, so the pilot shut down both engines and feathered the propellers to extend the glide. When a landing on the beach was assured, he prepared and briefed the passengers for the landing, and to avoid a group of people on the beach delayed extending the landing gear and flaps until the aircraft was clear of their position.

Because of insufficient time for the landing gear to fully extend, the aircraft touched down on the firm sand with the landing gear trailing and skidded for approximately 200 metres along the beach on its belly.

The pilot and passengers were uninjured, and the aircraft received some damage to the rear cabin area lower fuselage skin panels.

The aircraft had been carrying sufficient fuel for the flight, the fuel tank caps were correctly secured, and the fuel tank vents were not blocked. Fuel samples taken from the fuel tanker which had recently refuelled the aircraft showed that the correct type of fuel had been supplied and was not contaminated.

The fuel filters were removed and fuel samples taken from the aircraft for analysis. The filters were found to be blocked by a considerable amount of foreign matter restricting the fuel flow.

Analysis of the fuel samples and sediment indicated that there were no obvious contaminants present which may have been cause for concern.

The particulates present in the samples are always found during testing, being present in the environment and probably introduced during different stages of the fuel handling. The overall amount did not exceed the specification limits.

The particles present in the fuel would not have been responsible for blocking the filters on their own but would have resulted from the combined effort of a large quantity of individual particulates.

All fuel samples met the specification requirements.

This type of aircraft is unique in that it has only one interconnected fuel tank feeding both engines. Each engine has a 5-micron fuel filter, and a fuel vent system which can allow the ingestion of dust into the fuel tank when the aircraft is operated in dusty conditions.

The aircraft often operates through the channel countries of South Australia and Queensland, a lot of the time in dusty conditions. Refuelling is carried out using drum stock when contaminants could easily be introduced into the fuel system.

The rapid blockage of the fuel filters, which occurred after the aircraft departed, was probably the result of the aircraft fuel system being contaminated over a period of time with an accumulation of extremely fine particles which would have been difficult to detect during water drain checks, and settled forming a sediment at the bottom of the tank. These remained relatively undisturbed until fuel was added to the low level of fuel in the tank, stirring the particles into suspension. This may have concentrated the contamination so that the filters, already partially degraded by contaminants, were further degraded quickly to a point when fuel flow to the engines was severely restricted.

The inherent design weakness of the fuel system in this type of aircraft, including the very fine mesh filters which are intolerant to any fuel contamination, is well known amongst operators, including the operator of this aircraft, who over a long period of time have developed successful control systems and methods for minimising the problem. Immediately following this occurrence the operator instigated more stringent controls and instructions to its pilots concerning the fuel system, and improved quality control for refuelling operations, especially from drum stock.

The pilot reported that he was mustering a herd of cattle and that he was aware of a powerline on the far side of the herd. Without realising that he had crossed the powerline in timbered country, he descended the helicopter in open country to turn the cattle. As he was pulling away from the herd, the skids of the helicopter struck the powerline. The main rotor struck the tail boom and the pilot lost directional control. The pilot closed the throttle and the helicopter landed heavily.

Circumstances

VH-OXC was proceeding on a flight from Williamtown to Coffs Harbour at 9,000 ft outside controlled airspace [OCTA]. The pilot made all position reports as required and was estimating Coffs Harbour at 0734 hours EST. Sydney Flight Service 5 [FIS 5] co-ordinated these details with Coffs Harbour air traffic control [ATC] and at 0724 hours the pilot contacted Coffs Harbour ATC prior to the control area [CTA] boundary for an airways clearance. ATC issued the clearance for VH-OXC to enter CTA on descent to 5,000 ft.

VH-CMR was proceeding on a flight from Williamtown to Coffs Harbour and was maintaining Flight Level [FL] 130 in CTA. The crew used a standard flight plan and the time intervals indicated an estimated time of arrival [ETA] over Taree of 0710 hours and Coffs Harbour 0744 hours. Sydney Sector 2 [ATC] identified VH-CMR 20 NM south of Taree and therefore there was no requirement for the crew to report over Taree. The aircraft passed Taree at 0707 hours.

Sector 2 then co-ordinated VH-CMR with Coffs Harbour ATC and gave the ETA as 0744 hours as per the flight plan times. The crew of VH-CMR elected to descend prior to the Coffs Harbour CTA steps and this necessitated flight OCTA for approximately three minutes. Sector 2 therefore co-ordinated the aircraft's position with FIS 5 giving the Taree position as 0707 hours, but again gave the ETA Coffs Harbour as 0744 hours.

The crew of VH-CMR reported leaving FL 130 to Sector 2 and were instructed to contact area frequency at that time. However they elected not to call on area frequency as they only had approximately three minutes OCTA and would need to contact Coffs Harbour ATC for a clearance prior to entry into the CTA step.

The Sydney Flight Service Officer [FSO] took the position report on VH-CMR from Sector 2 and wrote the information on the flight strip, but did not make a check of the time interval from Taree to Coffs Harbour or on the difference in the ETA and the actual time at Taree. This resulted in the FSO having a ten minute time difference between VH-OXC and VH-CMR at Coffs Harbour when in fact the information received indicated a time difference of seven minutes. The time standard for passing traffic is, within ten minutes at any particular point and the FSO decided that as there was ten minutes at Coffs Harbour there was no need to pass traffic to the aircraft.

At 0725 hours VH-CMR contacted Coffs Harbour ATC at 35 NM [the CTA step] and on descent through 8,000 ft to request an airways clearance. The controller immediately took action to establish vertical separation but this was not achieved until 0727 hours. During this two minute period the vertical difference between the two aircraft reduced to a minimum of 100 ft and the horizontal difference to a minimum of 2.3 NM. As VH-CMR had waited until the exact location of the CTA step to contact Coffs Harbour ATC, the controller was unable to establish separation until after both aircraft had entered the CTA step and therefore a breakdown in separation occurred.

Significant Factors

1. The crew of VH-CMR contacted Coffs Harbour ATC at the CTA boundary and not prior to that boundary.

2. The crew of VH-CMR entered the CTA without an ATC clearance.

VH-JRB approached the airport from the south and on right downwind for runway 17R was told he was number one in the sequence. VH-IRH came in via Point Ormond to the north, also for runway 17R, the pilot being told to report at Southland.

When he called at Southland the pilot of VH-IRH received an acknowledgement but no instructions or traffic information. The two aircraft came into close proximity at about the base leg position. Both pilots saw each other in just enough time to deviate and miss.

In nominating Southland as a reporting point for VH-IRH the controller selected a point close to the base position. He was initially unable to see VH-IRH when he called at Southland. As this was close to base leg position a conflict occurred before any further action was taken by him. Timely traffic information was not passed to both aircraft.

During a touch and go landing, the student pilot lost directional control and the aircraft veered off the runway to the right. The aircraft hit part of the TVASIS installation.

The pilot elected was making a landing approach in light wind conditions. A higher sink rate than normal occurred on final, leading to a heavy touch down at the threshold. The aircraft bounced, and on the subsequent touchdown the nosewheel assembly separated.

The aircraft was on final approach to land at night. At approximately 150 feet above the ground, it suddenly rolled to the left and a loud bang was heard.

The pilot applied full opposite aileron and rudder and was able to level wings prior to touchdown.

Investigation showed that the left "flap down" cable had snapped, allowing the left flap to retract rapidly while the right hand flap remained fully extended.

The right hand "flap down" cable was subsequently found to be corroded internally and failed on test even though it appeared serviceable.