The captain complained of an instance where Brisbane Flight Service passed so much traffic to the aircraft during the taxiing phase and during the take-off that the crew could not monitor the mandatory traffic advisory frequency (MTAF) adequately. All the traffic was assessed by the flight crew on the basis of the planned track but an amended clearance requiring a different track was issued when the aircraft had reached 500 feet soon after take-off.

The pilot reported that he selected gear down when established inbound on the approach and noted three green lights. He stated that he rechecked the gear indications on short final and again confirmed three greens. After a normal touchdown was accomplished, the nosewheel was lowered onto the runway and braking was commenced. The right hand side of the aircraft dropped slightly, the aircraft veered right, and the pilot assumed that the right hand tyre had blown. The right hand gear then collapsed and the propellor hit the ground.

The gear collapse was due to mechanical failure of the bell crank fitting, which then allowed the side brace locking mechanism to become unlocked.

Cessna 150, VH-WXS, was conducting dual instructional circuits on runway 17 when Harvard, VH-OVO, gave an inbound call. Cessna VH-WXS was climbing through 300 feet having done a touch-and-go when the instructor in VH-WXS heard the inbound call; he considered there was ample time for the student to continue the circuit for another touch and go prior to the arrival of VH-OVO. VH-WXS touched down near the 17 threshold. The instructor was retracting the flaps, and the student was about to apply take-off power when the Harvard passed about 50 feet overhead and touched down about 40 metres in front of VH-WXS. The instructor in VH-WXS immediately transmitted on the radio that the Cessna was on the runway and rejected the take-off. VH-OVO applied power and took off.

Neither the pilot-in-command nor the student in the Harvard saw the Cessna. The Harvard had performed a fairly steep approach whereas the Cessna had made a normal approach. The Cessna was below and in front and hidden from the Harvard pilots' view during the final approach. The Harvard was probably in such a position on the final approach that it was also hidden from the view of the Cessna pilots.

Significant Factor

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilots in the Harvard did not confirm the whereabouts of the Cessna before making an approach to land.

A report was received from the pilot of VH-SKB saying a Navajo type aircraft had passed about 100 feet above the top of his aircraft, on a reciprocal track. He expressed concern that although the other aircraft was on the radar advisory frequency it had not been passed advice on his aircraft which had the transponder on code 2000. VH-SKB was on a visual flight rules flight. The other aircraft, VH-KGN, was on an instrument flight rules flight. No report was received from the pilot of VH-KGN.

The close proximity took place 10 kilometres south of Moorabbin Airport. This area is in a buffer zone, which extends from 5.5 kilometres to 14.8 kilometres, around the Moorabbin control zone. Within this airspace radar advisory service traffic information is only passed to aircraft operating under instrument flight rules, about other aircraft operating under instrument flight rules.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot of VH-SKB did not see the other aircraft in time to allow for an increase in separation.

2. The aircraft were operating in an area where the radar advisory service did not give advice to aircraft operating under instrument flight rules, about aircraft operating under visual flight rules.

The aircraft was being flown by a student conducting solo circuit practice. During the ground roll following the second landing the pilot lost directional control of the aircraft. The aircraft ran off the right of the runway into soft ground and turned through 90 degrees before coming to rest against a ditch. The propeller and nose gear received damage.

A number of Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) aircraft, one at Devonport and two others inbound to Devonport, were unable to contact a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) aircraft, VH-CGH, which called seven miles inbound to Devonport. The weather was marginal with the cloud base at 600 feet. After two unsuccessful attempts to land, VH-CGH departed for Wynyard.

The pilot of VH-CGH had recently passed a biennial flight review. He had recently returned to flying after a considerable lapse. At the time of the incident, he was having trouble with selection switches on the VHF radio. He had selected audio to headphones instead of the speaker such that he could transmit but not hear any replies from other aircraft.

There was no known breakdown in separation between aircraft.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot was unfamiliar with the radio selection switches installed in the aircraft.

2. The pilot operated at Devonport in non-visual meteorological weather conditions.

The aircraft climbed to Flight Level (FL) 120 without an airways clearance. A clearance had been requested by the pilot. Phraseology used by ATS was misinterpreted by the pilot as a clearance to climb to FL120.

The Flight Service Officer (FSO) coordinating the clearance for VH-CSV failed to immediately recognise that the aircraft would enter controlled airspace when climbing above 10000 feet. The FSO was recently rerated in the position and lacked recent experience. The airspace divisions marked on the FSO's map were difficult to read. Phraseology used by the FSO was misleading.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The FSO lacked recent experience.

2. The FSO's workstation map was difficult to read.

3. The FSO did not immediately realise that the aircraft would enter controlled airspace.

4. Phraseology used by the FSO was misleading to the pilot.

The pilot had flown the aircraft to Cape Capricorn with the intention of landing on the beach. He had been landing on the beach there for about ten years. Prior to the landing he had carried out a low level inspection of the area and satisfied himself that it was suitable. The aircraft touched down about 40m from the waterline. However, during the landing roll, when the aircraft was about 20m from the waterline, the pilot became aware that the area in front of the aircraft was covered in water. When the aircraft entered the water, which was estimated to be 50-75mm in depth, the nose leg was bent backwards and the aircraft nosed over and came to rest inverted. Neither of the occupants received any injuries. The pilot reported that local fishermen advised him that a couple of times each day a larger than normal wave causes the beach to be covered in water to a greater extent than the normal action of the waves.

The pilot noted the presence of sheep adjacent to the strip as he joined the circuit. When the aircraft was on final approach, the pilot did not see that the sheep had strayed onto the flight strip. Visibility was partially reduced by passing showers and the sheep were difficult to see due to their colouring being similar to that of the airstrip. The aircraft hit and killed 7 sheep.

Smoke and flame was observed issuing from the engine exhaust area during start up from a medivac operation. The pilot shut down, broadcast a Mayday and evacuated the patient and crew.

The subsequent investigation disclosed that one engine had not lit off properly and the pilot had not accomplished the correct blow out procedure prior to attempting another start. When the engine lit off on the next start some excess fuel had overheated and ignited. This is the normal result following an over rich start and inadequate blowout.

This occurred at night at a road accident location which was surrounded by lights and flashing beacons, which caused ground based personnel to conclude that the helicopter was on fire.

Examination of the helicopter showed that no damage had occurred.

Significant factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident.

1. The pilot failed to carry out the correct blow out procedure after one engine failed to start.

2. During the subsequent start attempt residual fuel ignited generating smoke and flame.