The pilot, returning to his home base, decided to conduct an inspection of the paddocks around a property with which he was familiar. He completed two higher level circuits before selecting a suitable landing area. He had noted wires along the edge of the chosen paddock and elected to conduct an approach and a low-level inspection. After satisfying himself that the approach and landing area were suitable, the pilot commenced a missed approach with the intention of continuing the flight to his destination. He planned to return by car to inspect the paddock at ground level for suitability at a later date. As the pilot applied power, the landing gear caught on a wire across the paddock. The wire, which had a span of 400 metres, did not break immediately and the aircraft was pulled to the ground.

During the low level inspection, the pilot had removed his shoulder harness so that he would have a better view of the edges of the paddock as he flew along it. In the ensuing impact, he suffered serious injuries which were considered to have been potentially fatal, because of the lack of upper body restraint.

The Aero Commander was cleared to descend to 5,000 ft, on track from Richmond to Bankstown. Shortly after, the pilot was instructed to contact Sydney Approach, who then gave him a radar vector to track south of Richmond direct to Westmead.

The controller subsequently observed the radar height display of the aircraft indicated 4,400 ft and informed the pilot that he had descended below his assigned altitude. After being instructed to maintain 4,000 ft the aircraft was processed normally to Bankstown. The pilot later reported that he descended below his assigned altitude when he misread his assigned altitude indicator, whilst changing frequency to Sydney Approach. He was also expecting a requirement to be at 2,000 ft by 22 DME Sydney, as he had experienced on previous approaches into Bankstown.

A group of four aircraft was inbound to Brisbane on the same air route. Three of the aircraft were in close proximity with the lowest cruising at Flight Level(FL) 270 and the other two cruising at FL 350 and FL 370. The fourth aircraft was about 20 miles ahead cruising at FL 330.

The aircraft cruising at FL 370, a Douglas DC-10, requested a clearance to descend when the aircraft was clear of traffic. The air traffic controller immediately cleared the aircraft to descend. The pilot did not respond to the transmission by the controller and the controller again cleared the aircraft to descend. The pilot advised the controller that there was another aircraft three miles ahead at FL 350. The controller apologised to the pilot and issued an instruction to the aircraft, a Boeing 737, cruising at FL 350 to turn right. The pilot of the aircraft at FL 370 then advised that he had the other aircraft in sight and that his aircraft had left FL 370 for FL 350. The controller immediately instructed the aircraft to maintain FL 370.

Examination of the radar recording revealed that the higher aircraft had descended to FL 368 before commencing a climb to FL 370. At that time the aircraft were laterally separated by between four and five miles. As a result there was an infringement of the required separation standard of either 2,000 feet vertical or five miles horizontal separation between the two aircraft.

The controller who issued the descent instruction was a trainee air traffic controller under training for the issue of her initial sector rating. At the time of the occurrence she was being supervised by a rated controller. The rated controller had instructed the trainee to issue the descent instruction to the aircraft and advised that he believed that when doing so the aircraft at FL 350 was in fact at FL 330. He was unaware why he had made that assumption as the altitude of the aircraft was correctly labelled by use of a 'shrimp boat'.

VH-HPL was on track from Perth to Rottnest Island, maintaining 2000 ft when VH-EAJ departed Perth for Singapore. The pilot of VH-EAJ had requested a clearance to enable the aircraft to initially track north along the coast, visually, at 2000 ft. VH-EAJ was cleared initially at 3000 ft. When the aircraft reached 3000 ft the pilot advised that they "would like 2000 if its available .....3000 is just above cloud". VH-EAJ was then cleared to descend to 2500 ft which was the lowest assignable altitude to keep the aircraft 1000 ft above the base of controlled airspace.

At this time VH-EAJ was on radar vectors, heading 280 deg, which was keeping the aircraft to the south of VH-HPL but on a converging track. VH-EAJ was then asked to "report sighting a Britten Norman Islander (VH-HPL) in your two o'clock.....four miles maintaining 2000 ft.......". The crew of VH-EAJ were unable to sight VH-HPL. They were then instructed to climb to their planned cruising level of flight level 350. They were then asked again if they had the traffic sighted but reported "negative we're in cloud". They were then asked their present level and reported they were at 3100 ft.

Separation between the two aircraft reduced to two miles with less than 1000 ft vertical separation.

Both pilots had extensive time on DC3 aircraft earlier in their flying careers. The First Officer had been re-validated on type after recent asymmetric checking. On Saturday 20 March the Captain flew the aircraft to Warrnambool with 24 passengers and an engineer on board. A normal landing was made on runway 13 with a crosswind of about 10 knots. The following afternoon the crew went to the airport at about 1415 hours for the return flight to Melbourne. They loaded the luggage and completed a preflight inspection. There was plenty of time to do these tasks prior to the planned departure. The passenger load was similar to that on the previous day's flight. The First Officer was to fly the aircraft from the left seat. The wind was from about 020 degrees at 12-14 knots and the weather was fine. Runway 31 was selected for take-off. The tail wheel lock was engaged and the take off commenced with into wind aileron and leading with the into wind throttle. Initially the aircraft was tracking straight down the centre of the runway. As the tail was lifted a mild swing to the right developed. This was corrected with left rudder but an over correction followed with the aircraft veering towards the left side of the runway. Approaching the runway intersection, the Captain came on the controls and checked that the autopilot was switched off. A correction was made and the left wheel was in the air. The aircraft left the sealed area and leap frogged gables at the runway intersection. The Captain took full control and closed the throttles. The aircraft was steered back onto the runway where it was brought to a stop. On taxy back to the terminal area it was noted the tail wheel steering and brakes functioned normally. An inspection showed that the left wingtip and aileron had been damaged by ground contact. The First Officer had not done a cross wind take off on the type for 24 years.

The student was conducting supervised solo circuits. Runway 09 was in use, with a wind of 090 degrees at 10 knots. During the third session of solo circuits the student approached the runway higher than normal. The aircraft was subsequently observed to contact the runway in a nose down attitude, the nose gear collapsed, and the propeller struck the runway.

The crew of VH-TJG, enroute to Perth, made a position report at Kapna. The Melbourne air traffic controller was required to co-ordinate details of this report to the Perth Sector Two controller. This was not done. There was opposite direction traffic which could have come into conflict but there was no loss of separation.

After making the necessary radio calls and arranging separation with an inbound aircraft, VH-LNB taxied for take-off from runway 19. While taxiing the crew were busy completing the pre-take-off checklist and giving a safety briefing to the passengers on the aircraft public address system. The pilot of another aircraft, VH-DRG, made a radio call to advise VH-LNB that he was inbound to Port Lincoln. There was no response from the crew of VH-LNB.

After take-off, when established in a turn to the left, the crew of VH-LNB observed VH-DRG pass from left to right in front of and about 80 ft below their aircraft.

The pilot of VH-DRG stated that communications with all other aircraft had been satisfactory. When the departing aircraft had not responded to his transmission, he kept a lookout and first sighted VH-LNB when it was about 500 metres away. He turned his aircraft away, but the other aircraft turned towards him, and he was unable to avoid the aircraft coming into close proximity with each other.

The pilot reported that he was making an aerial inspection of the Benambra airstrip prior to landing. He overflew the strip at about 150 feet above the ground and then commenced a left turn at a bank angle of about 45 degrees. While turning, the pilot said he was looking at obstructions in the vicinity of the airstrip and neglected to monitor the airspeed. He felt the aircraft shudder and then it stalled. He managed to level the wings but was unable to arrest the descent. The aircraft struck the ground in a flat attitude in swampland immediately to the north of the strip.

The pilot said that the day was hot and the aircraft was heavier than usual, in that there were three persons on board. Usually he is the sole occupant. The elevation of the airstrip is 2250 feet.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot became distracted while manoeuvring in the circuit area and as a result the airspeed decayed and the aircraft stalled.

2. The pilot was operating the aircraft in a circuit area at a higher density altitude and higher weight than what he normally operated at.

Circumstances

At 1635 hours VH-TQK departed Port Macquarie for Sydney via a track of 221 deg from Port Macquarie. An airways clearance was issued by RAAF Williamtown Air Traffic Control [ATC] for VH-TQK to enter controlled airspace [CTA] on this track on climb to Flight Level [FL] 160.

At 1537 hours VH-AMS departed Port Macquarie for Williamtown on a track of 200 deg from Port Macquarie. An airways clearance was issued by Williamtown ATC for VH-AMS to enter CTA on this track to FL 140.

The clearances were issued when neither aircraft was identified on radar and with no vertical or longitudinal separation requirement. In such circumstances the only separation standard available is lateral which required 30 deg between the departure tracks in question. As only 21 deg existed, a breakdown in separation occurred.

Radar analysis indicates that the aircraft were 7.6 NM apart when they were established in CTA and that this distance increased before radar identification was complete. It also shows that the vertical difference was a minimum of 500 ft which occurred prior to identification.

Significant Factors

1. The Williamtown air traffic controller issued procedural airways clearances that were not in accordance with the appropriate separation standard.