VH-ITQ was approaching Mudgee at 6000 feet tracking 203 degrees from Tamworth. Flight Service (FS) advised that VH-UJX was conducting Airwork at Mudgee up to 6000 feet and would be departing for Tamworth in about six minutes. The pilot of ITQ was unable to contact UJX on either FS or the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF). UJX was subsequently sighted in close proximity, proceeding in the opposite direction to ITQ and entering cloud. At that time UJX was about 100 feet higher than ITQ. Monitoring of the FS tape showed that at the time ITQ changed to CTAF to contact UJX, UJX had left CTAF to call FS. UJX gave a departure call to FS indicating the aircraft was maintaining 6000 feet.

FS then gave UJX traffic on ITQ and UJX then corrected part of the departure call saying they were on climb to 7000 feet which was the flight planned altitude for UJX. In a discussion about the incident, the pilot in command of UJX said that the aircraft was equipped with only one VHF radio set which meant that it was not possible to monitor both FS and CTAF at the same time. Had this been possible then this incident could have been avoided. The aircraft was about to have a second VHF set fitted. He also said that they had departed the CTAF before requesting traffic which was an error on their part, and which would not normally be done.

It is worth noting that the same incident could still have occurred even if UJX had not departed the CTAF without first getting traffic from FS. This is because UJX was airworking in the CTAF up to 6000 feet (the cruising altitude of ITQ) and could just have easily been in almost the same position at the same time and missed making contact with the overflying aircraft due to simultaneous frequency changes. This would be particularly true if ITQ did not change to CTAF until close to the CTAF boundary.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the occurrence:

1. The two aircraft missed communicating with each other because they were not on the same frequency at the time ITQ called UJX.

2. UJX was fitted with only one VHF radio set and therefore could not monitor both the CTAF and FS frequencies at the same time.

3. The present design of the airspace system contributes to this type of occurrence.

4. UJX departed the CTAF before getting traffic information.

The pilot reported that both engines operated normally as he commenced the take-off roll on runway 10. He said that at about three quarters of the way down the runway, as he raised the nose, the aircraft immediately veered to the left from what he recognised as a partial loss of power from the left engine.

The landing gear was retracted but the aircraft climb performance was insufficient to prevent a collision with the top of a sand dune beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft continued over the dune and came to rest on the beach beyond.

A subsequent visual inspection of the aircraft determined the left propeller blades were in fine pitch and the right propeller blades were in the feathered position. The reason for the reported loss of power from the left engine was not determined. However, only about 3 litres of oil remained in the right engine, with no obvious signs of oil leakage.

The pilot was landing the aircraft on a strip beside a paddock of barley. The right wing tip became entangled in the barley causing the aircraft to ground loop.

The aircraft was crewed by a captain from another company base who was inexperienced on the route and a first officer who was very experienced on the route. The first officer told the captain he would take complete responsibility for clearances, tracking etc and give any support required by the captain. The aircraft was told to call Melbourne Control approaching 10,000 feet (the lower limit of controlled airspace) on the climb for further clearance. Preceding traffic on this track meant that the aircraft would be subject to a step climb. The aircraft called Melbourne passing 10,800 feet on climb to flight level (F160). The aircraft was already in controlled airspace without a clearance and was instructed to maintain F130 due to the preceding traffic having just left F140.

The first officer reported that he called prior to 10,000 feet but got no response. He then found that he had selected an incorrect frequency on the VHF radio. He selected the correct frequency and made contact but during this time the aircraft had entered the lower limit of controlled airspace. The first officer realised that he should have told the captain to level at 10,000 feet until they got a clearance but he had anticipated they would have the clearance prior to reaching 10,000 feet and accordingly he had not briefed the captain to maintain 10,000 feet until they got a clearance. The preceding traffic was a Dash 8 which was climbing faster than their aircraft. There was no breakdown of separation.

Significant Factors

The following factors contributed to the development of the incident:

1. The captain was inexperienced on the route.

2. The first officer was experienced on the route and briefed the captain that he would take responsibility for clearances, tracking etc.

3. The first officer did not advise the captain as the aircraft approached controlled airspace.

4. The first officer inadvertently selected an incorrect radio frequency. By the time he had corrected this error the aircraft had penetrated controlled airspace.

Envoy 606 (Falcon 900) was arriving at Canberra from Sydney and was assigned 7,000 ft on descent on the Wollongong - Canberra track. The pilot had been given a requirement to reach 7,000 ft by 20 DME Canberra due to conflicting traffic and reported at 7,000 ft when 25 NM from Canberra. VH-IEL (Cessna 172) had departed Goulburn for Canberra on a VFR training flight with the student performing all the functions and the instructor engaged in an examining role. The aircraft was outside controlled airspace at 6,500 ft and was tracking via Lake Bathurst.

The control area (CTA) step passes through the north eastern corner of Lake Bathurst and is 30 NM from Canberra. However, the reporting point is an island in the centre of the lake, and this is 28 NM from Canberra. The student was approaching Lake Bathurst and prepared to contact Canberra Approach to request an airways clearance but for some reason delayed the call until at the CTA boundary.

The instructor was allowing the student to conduct his own operation as a test was in progress and although mindful of the requirement to remain outside controlled airspace until obtaining a clearance, he elected to let the situation continue up to the last instant. The instructor was about to instruct the student to make an orbit when the student made contact with air traffic control (ATC). At the time of the call by VH-IEL, ATC observed the aircraft to be 28 NM and Envoy 606 25 NM and therefore considered that a breakdown in separation had occurred.

By the time altitudes were checked and VH-IEL positively identified, the aircraft were 5 NM apart and a radar separation standard existed. The tracking tolerances were 4 NM for VFR flight and 1.2 NM for the radar at that distance. The required separation standard was 5 NM by radar or 1,000 ft vertically. To remain in controlled airspace the pilot of Envoy 606 would need to be 9,000 ft at 30 NM. The descent profile of Envoy 606 was steeper than normal due to the requirement to reach 7,000 ft by 20 NM.

Significant Factors

1. The student pilot allowed his aircraft to proceed to the CTA boundary before initiating an airways clearance request to ATC.

2. The instructor on VH-IEL allowed his aircraft to penetrate CTA prior to obtaining an airways clearance.

The aircraft was being ferried from Bankstown to Perth, a journey expected to extend over several days. During the first sector, the pilots became aware of non VMC weather at Wagga and decided to divert to Cootamundra. It was reported that at about the time this decision was taken, they noticed the left fuel tank was not feeding and that fuel was being drawn from the right tank only. Assuming a fuel system malfunction, and a reduced endurance of about 15 minutes, the pilot-in-command decided to carry out a precautionary landing.

A section of gravel road was chosen for a landing site, as nearby paddocks were unsuitable. Although the touchdown was normal, the aircraft began to veer to the right on the heavily cambered road surface. When the pilot was unable to regain directional control, full power was applied for a go round. The aircraft became airborne, still diverging to the right, and collided with a boundary fence before nosing over into an adjacent paddock. The Skyfox CA 22 aircraft has two fuel tanks, one in each wing, which feed into a common collector tank via a two position, on/off fuel selector. Each tank is vented via a port in each fuel cap.

Asymmetric fuel flow from the tanks is known to occur occasionally and one tank is exhausted first, upon which the remaining tank feeds normally. The manufacturer is expected to soon issue an amendment to the Flight manual by which pilots will be warned by a cautionary note of this phenomenon.

The aircraft was cleared via Kinglake and Epping for a landing on runway 27 at Melbourne. The aircraft proceeded south of the cleared track and did not comply with heading change instructions from Melbourne Tower to get the aircraft back on track. The aircraft was transferred back to approach control where it was vectored and descended for a landing on runway 34. There was no breakdown in separation.

Investigation determined that on the approach to Melbourne there was confusion in the cockpit between the two crew members. En route the captain had asked the first officer to request runway 34. This had not been done. From some distance out the captain was planning to land on runway 34 but the first officer was basing his actions on a landing on runway 27.

It was established that the ILS selectors were tuned to 109.3 which is the runway 27 ILS frequency, but it was not established exactly how communication between the captain and the first officer broke down to the extent that they both thought they were going to land on different runways.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

• There was confusion between the captain and the first officer as to which runway they were going to land on.

The pilot, on his eighth solo flight, was conducting touch and go landings. On the third landing, the aircraft was observed to bounce several times before the nose gear collapsed and the propeller contacted the runway.

The pilot advised that the paddock was sprayed in north south runs starting on the eastern side and progressing to the west. After completing the north south spray runs the pilot did not orbit the paddock and re-familiarise himself with the hazards before commencing the clean-up run.

Before reaching the end of the clean-up run, he remembered a power line that he was approaching. He pulled up but the main landing gear struck the power line. The aircraft rapidly slowed and the power line broke. The aircraft then crashed through trees and hit the ground.

Significant Factors

The following factors contributed to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not re-familiarise himself with the hazards in the paddock, prior to commencing the clean-up run.

2. The pilot forgot about the existence of a power line until it was too late to avoid it.

The pilot was conducting solo circuit training. During a touch-and-go landing the aircraft landed heavily and bounced. The pilot attempted unsuccessfully to go-around, but the aircraft ran off the runway before coming to rest. The pilot was inexperienced on tailwheel aircraft.