The pilot was spreading mineral fertiliser on two irregular shaped properties. The first property was finished on the previous load. The second property had two wires within it and a third adjacent to the eastern boundary. A run was made from south to north passing under the first wire and over the second. At the end a turn was made and a west to east run started, the first in the area. The aircraft passed over the lower wire by 150 feet as a climb was made with the terrain. Crossing the eastern boundary at 50 feet the nose gear leg struck the third wire. Full power was applied and a descent initiated to keep control. Enough control was maintained to allow the aircraft to be put down on a hillside. A heavy touchdown ensued followed by a violent right yaw. During the ground slide the aircraft rolled inverted, losing the right wing, then hit a fence post and finally came to rest the right way up.

At 1529 EST 4 January 1993, the Brisbane Flight Service Centre monitored a Mayday call from an aircraft in the area of Jumpinpin on North Stradbroke Island. The caller was difficult to understand but indicated that he was having problems with the elevator control, that the aircraft was going down and he was switching everything off. The call sign of the aircraft was not determined.

A search was commenced immediately and about 30 minutes later the wreckage of VH-JUJ was sighted lying inverted in a swamp on North Stradbroke Island.

An inspection of the accident site revealed that after the landing gear contacted the ground the aircraft nosed over and came to rest inverted.

Examination of the wreckage found no evidence of any pre-existing fault with the aircraft or its systems which may have contributed to the accident. The elevator was found to be trimmed nose down, halfway between the neutral and full down positions. The magnetos were in the off position, the battery and alternator switches were on, and the wing flaps were selected to, and in the up position.

The pilot last completed a flight check in the aircraft type three weeks prior to the accident. The purpose of this flight was reported to have been to conduct practice forced landings.

The pilot last completed a medical examination on 9 September 1991, and the medical records gave no indication of any illness being identified at that time. However, the specialist medical evidence obtained during the investigation showed that the pilot was suffering from an advanced terminal illness at the time of the accident. Medical advice suggested that one of the effects of this illness may have been that the pilot could at times experience a degree of confusion and/or physical impairment.

The injuries received by the pilot in the accident were of a minor nature. However, he subsequently died in hospital of complications resulting from the terminal illness.

It is likely that the health of the pilot was a significant factor in the development of the accident. While no evidence of a mechanical defect or obstruction with the elevator control, as reported by the pilot, was found, the elevator was trimmed considerably nose down. This would have the effect of making the elevator control feel heavier than usual. However, it would normally be expected that a pilot of similar experience would have quickly identified and corrected this situation. The indication that he did not suggests some degree of confusion/impairment on his part.

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

It is likely that the pilot suffered some form of incapacitation during the flight as a result of his medical condition.

The pilot of PAL210 was issued with a runway 07 Mudgee 1, standard instrument departure (SID). This was subsequently amended to a runway 34 Radar 3 Mudgee Departure SID after the pilot required that for take-off. On departure, PAL210 was instructed to maintain runway heading but was observed to commence a left turn onto a heading of about 300 degrees shortly after becoming airborne. The Aerodrome Controller (ADC) advised the Departures North controller as soon as the turn was observed.

Conflicting traffic was a helicopter, VH-AGL at 1000, feet holding at about one mile north of Canterbury in anticipation of crossing the runway 34 departure path behind PAL210. The pilot of VH-AGL had the DC10 in sight from the time it began the take-off roll. The Departures North controller instructed PAL210 to turn right heading 350 as soon as the advice from the ADC was received, and requested altitude. This was reported as 2000 feet. Because PAL210 had reached 2000 feet prior to infringing the 3 nautical mile separation standard between aircraft, a breakdown in separation did not occur.

On selecting the landing gear up after take-off, the pilot reported hearing an unusual noise from the nose gear area. Cockpit gear position indicators did not illuminate and the nose gear mechanical indicator showed the gear leg to be in the three-quarter down position. The position of the landing gear was checked from the ground on arrival overhead the destination and the observer advised the pilot that the nose gear appeared to be trailing, and the main gear legs did not appear to be fully extended.

The pilot elected to divert to Weipa to avail himself of emergency services at that location. The aircraft was subsequently landed with the landing gear retracted. All the occupants evacuated the aircraft uninjured.

Subsequent inspection of the aircraft, by a company engineer, found that all three legs of the landing gear were in the up position. The nose gear actuator rod-end fitting was broken (the failure of the rod-end probably caused the noise heard by the pilot on gear retraction). The gear was cycled several times using both the normal and emergency systems, but no fault was found with the main gear or the position indicators when the gear lever and gear position were the same.

It would appear possible that the pilot inadvertently raised the gear using the emergency extension system prior to landing at Weipa.

VH-SMH was on a positioning flight from Camden to Sydney at the conclusion of an instrument rating flight check. The aircraft was instructed to contact Sydney Approach on departure for airways clearance into controlled airspace but was subsequently observed on radar tracking towards Sydney, approximately one mile north of the 062 localiser, climbing through 3000 feet. VH-SMH continued to track parallel to the localiser, reaching 4200 feet by 18 miles from Sydney before contact was established with Sydney Approach. Conflicting traffic was VH-TJN, also inbound to Sydney on the 062 localiser, on descent to 3000 feet. VH-TJN was passing 5000 feet and was about 2 miles ahead of VH-SMH, as it reached 4200 feet.

The pilot of VH-SMH later said that, as with other departures from Camden that day, he had called Camden Ground prior to engine start to advise that he would be taxiing shortly and requested airways clearance. He did not recall what altitude this flight was planned at but said that he would have set 4000 feet on the assigned altitude indicator as this was the lower limit of controlled airspace overhead Camden. Once airborne from runway 26 a simulated engine failure was initiated by the check pilot. Recovery time was minimal, and Camden Tower advised the pilot to call 123.4 (Sydney Approach) for airways clearance. This was accomplished but the pilot said he could not now recall the actual clearance instructions. The controller then asked the pilot if Camden Tower had asked him to call Sydney Approach for a clearance, and did the pilot recall what Camden Tower had said. The pilot advised that Camden Tower had told him to expect clearance at 4000 feet and to call Approach.

Air Traffic Control were expecting VH-SMH to call Sydney Approach and had planned to hold the aircraft for traffic sequencing.

VH-LHD was on a flight from Sydney to Gunnedah and had commenced descent from 10,000ft. The pilot was advised by Flight Service that there was no Instrument Flight Rules [IFR] traffic which was the correct information at that moment. Immediately after this transmission information was received by the Flight Service Officer on VH-ASO [Mooney 20J] departing Tamworth on climb to 6,000ft on a track that conflicted with VH-LHD.

The Flight Service Officer [FSO] was performing co-ordination tasks at the time and did not immediately recognise the confliction, preferring to complete these tasks before assessing the changes due to the presence of VH-LHD. As soon as the FSO realised the situation, traffic information was passed to both pilots but as these transmissions were taking place the aircraft passed with approximately 500ft vertical separation and no horizontal separation with the top aircraft VH-LHD descending.

Significant Factor

• The Flight Service Officer did not realise the implications of the departure of VH-ASO in sufficient time to alert the pilots to the conflict.

The search and rescue helicopter was called out to a potential rescue and medical retrieval of a man who had fallen from a waterfall at Barrington Tops which is a mountainous/wilderness area. Due to extensive cloud cover, approaching last light and a lack of contact with ground personnel, the pilot-in-command elected to land near Barrington Guest House. 900 metres south-east of the guest house was a paddock apparently suitable as a helipad.

While flying a right downwind leg at about 60 knots and 500 feet in very light drizzle, the pilot and crew/passengers searched for powerlines and other potential obstructions. Powerlines parallelling the intended landing direction were seen. One of the crewmen searched for wires by looking out through the only sliding door fitted, which was on the left side of the helicopter. A normal approach was flown. When the helicopter was about 20 knots and 25 feet above the ground, the crewman sitting in the left front seat suddenly detected a spur line running across the approach path. He called out a warning to the pilot, but it was too late. The helicopter struck two wires. The pilot immediately lowered the collective in an attempt to land as soon as possible. The landing was heavy. The helicopter impacted the ground in a slightly nose down attitude while banked slightly to the left.

The wire strike was at the level of the rotating swashplate. Cyclic control was probably lost when the control rods above the swashplate were damaged by the wires.

The spur line was particularly difficult to see. Rising ground ahead of the wires, in the direction of landing, camouflaged the wires. The pole at the end of the spur line was somewhat hidden by trees and light drizzle reduced visibility.

A wire strike protection device was not fitted on the helicopter.

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS 

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The powerline was particularly difficult to see because of its location, the surrounding terrain and foliage.

2. Visibility was reduced due to light drizzle.

The student pilot had been authorised to carry out a period of solo revision in the training area. The Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) for departure from Bankstown was "Information India", wind 040/08, visibility 10 kilometres or greater, cloud 3 Octas strato-cumulus at 3000 feet. When reporting inbound to Bankstown, the pilot advised having copied "Information India" and was told to expect a straight in approach for runway 11 Left. Soon after, the ATIS was changed to "Juliet". The pilot reported that he checked the windsock at 300 feet on final but detected no indication of a crosswind component and continued the approach. The aircraft subsequently touched down heavily on the nosewheel, collapsing the nose landing gear. The change in the ATIS indicated an increase in the crosswind component from 8 kts or less to 12-16 kts. The accident was consistent with the pilot using an inappropriate landing technique for the prevailing conditions. The pilot said he was aware that the ATIS had changed but did not copy the amended information.

The purpose of the flight was to complete the training for an aircraft endorsement. Two circuits were flown after the initial take-off, during which all radio communication equipment progressively failed. No alternator failure light was observed. When the landing gear was finally selected down neither the instructor or the trainee could determine if the landing gear had correctly extended. They assumed it had extended however as the landing gear warning horn did not sound when the throttle was retarded. The aircraft subsequently landed with the landing gear retracted. No fault could be found with the landing gear or radio systems after the accident. The reason for the apparent loss of electrical power could not be established.

During approach the pilot was distracted by the proximity of trees and wires near the threshold. He allowed the speed to deteriorate and an excessive rate of descent to develop which he did not arrest. The aircraft landed heavily dislodging the nose wheel. The nose wheel mount tube dug into the surface of the strip and the aircraft overturned. The two occupants escaped without injury.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident.

1. The pilot was not aware of the degrading airspeed, possibly due to channelised attention.

2. The aircraft developed a high rate of descent.

3. The pilot did not arrest the high rate of descent.

4. The aircraft landed heavily and the nosewheel broke off.