The aircraft was issued with an airways clearance to climb straight ahead from runway 34 and maintain 3000 feet. The pilot called airborne and reported on climb to 3000 feet. There was no Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) altitude readout evident. The pilot was then cleared to climb to 4000 feet but still no SSR readout was displayed. At approximately 10 nautical miles north of the airport the height readout appeared, indicating 4400 feet. When the pilot was queried he reported on descent to 4000 feet.

The pilot later reported that he had set 4000 feet on the assigned altitude indicator and subsequently noticed that he had inadvertently climbed to 4200 feet.

The pilot also reported that he had noticed the encoding altimeter on the co-pilot panel had not been set to QNH and was indicating 200 feet higher than the pilot's altimeter.

The aircraft was issued with a take-off clearance, with a requirement to maintain 3000 feet. On departure, the pilot reported on climb to 3000 feet. The aircraft was then observed on radar to be approaching 3800 feet. When queried, the pilot confirmed his altitude was 3800 feet. The aircraft was then cleared to maintain 4000 feet to ensure separation with crossing traffic arriving at Sydney. The pilot later stated that he understood his initial clearance limit to be 4000 feet.

The pilot, who was relatively inexperienced, had a series of dual check flights prior to going solo. On his second solo flight he allowed the glider to drift too far downwind and on returning was committed to landing short of the airfield. During the landing the glider was substantially damaged when it ran through a drainage ditch.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot had limited flying experience.

2. The pilot misjudged his distance from the runway while on downwind.

3. Landing on unsuitable terrain.

At about 400 feet on climb after take-off the engine began to run roughly and lose power. The pilot was forced to attempt a landing in a cane field. During the landing one wing struck the cane and the aircraft nosed over coming to rest inverted.

Inspection of the aircraft found that the internal timing of the magneto was incorrect and that the magneto was also in a poor state of repair. In addition, the spark plugs were of different types and in varying condition. It was the opinion of the maintenance engineers who inspected the ignition system that the loss of power was a result of the overall condition of the system.

The helicopter was hovering about 30 feet over a swamp when the pilot heard a noise and the helicopter began to vibrate. The pilot flew the helicopter towards dry land, but it began to rotate around the main rotor mast. A tail rotor failure procedure was carried out and the machine landed in the water.

The helicopter suffered damage to the tail boom, drive shaft, uprights and cross tubes.

Subsequent examination revealed that the tail rotor extension shaft drive pin had failed at the tail rotor gearbox.

The pilot landed on the landing strip. He was aware that the landing strip was wet, covered with grass and probably soft under the surface. The aircraft felt sluggish during the landing roll. Before attempting to take-off, the pilot walked along the length of the strip to inspect its condition. He assessed the strip as suitable for his operation. There was a slight across-strip slope and during the back-track taxi for take-off, the pilot moved to the up-slope, left side of the strip where the surface appeared firmer. Whilst watching out the right side of the aircraft at the take-off path, the left wing hit a small tree. He did not see the tree prior to the impact.

The pilot was attempting a 50 kilometre flight. En route the glider was getting low and the pilot realised he had to do an outlanding. On late final approach an area of smoke was flown through. As this cleared the pilot suddenly saw four trees in front of him. He tried to roll the wings to go between two of them. A wing struck branches, and the glider then descended and struck the ground.

The aircraft experienced a sudden uncommanded left yaw 10-15 knots below the V1 speed of 130 knots. The crew controlled the aircraft and rejected the take-off. The flight attendants seated in the rear of the aircraft confirmed the yaw was very abrupt. The FDR while recording the event did not disclose any information as to the origin of the signal that commanded the input that initiated the yaw. However, the FDR did disclose that the yaw was not a result of flight control input, therefore it is suspected that brake or nose wheel steering inputs may have been responsible. Parameters for these systems are not recorded on the DFDR. The company has introduced a strongly worded briefing to passengers about the dangers of operating electronic equipment during critical stages of flight although there was no evidence that this was the cause of this incident.

The pilot was carrying out a test flight in the aircraft. At the completion of the flight the aircraft was landed unintentionally with the landing gear retracted.

Inspection of the wreckage found that the landing gear and associated position indication system was operating correctly. However, the landing gear warning horn was in the "override" position, apparently having been placed in that position during the test flight.

The pilot reported 17 minutes earlier than his original estimate at Taroom. No confliction.