Although most runway incursions do not result in accidents, the potentially catastrophic consequences of runway incursions place them high on the agendas of aviation safety agencies internationally. The majority of runway incursions in Australia have a low potential to result in an accident. Australia has never experienced a large scale accident due to a runway incursion but vigilance is required to maintain this safety record. Data described and analysed in this report were sourced from the ATSB's OASIS database. The data have been reviewed and analysed to better understand runway incursions in Australia.

To facilitate comparisons between rail safety in each of the jurisdictions in Australia, comparisons between rail safety in Australia and in other countries, and comparisons between the safety of the different modes of transport (air, water, road and rail), the ATSB has referred wherever possible to national and international standards. The Australian standard AS 4292, Railway safety management, includes an appendix titled 'Incident definition and recording requirements'. State rail safety regulators have also devised a national standard called 'Occurrence categories and definitions'. Both of these standards are an important first step, but they fall far short of defining a 'minimum common dataset' as this is understood in the field of quantitative research.

(a report produced and published by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Canberra, Feb 2004)

The purpose of this publication is to examine trends in the numbers of railway accident deaths in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s in the light of comparable data from other countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Overall, the data indicate that in the period from 1980 to 1999 Australia's rail safety improvement compared favourably with that of other OECD countries and performance reached OECD median levels in the 1990s.

Data for this publication have been obtained from the World Health Organisation's 'Mortality Database' but responsibility for the analyses presented here rests solely with the ATSB.

The OECD was formed in 1961 to promote economic cooperation and development among its members. Current member states are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In addition to those on the ATSB web site under Rail Safety / Statistics, other publications by the ATSB on related topics include:

• Transport accident fatalities: Australia compared with other OECD countries, 1980-1999
• Cross-modal safety comparisons

The purpose of this publication is to examine trends in the numbers of railway accident deaths in Australia in the 1980s and 1990s in the light of comparable data from other countries that are members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Overall, the data indicate that in the period from 1980 to 1999 Australia's rail safety improvement compared favourably with that of other OECD countries and performance reached OECD median levels in the 1990s.

This report has been produced by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) using data supplied by the rail safety regulators in each State and the Northern Territory of Australia since 2001. The ATSB does not collect the data itself and depends entirely on the efforts of the rail safety regulators to provide accurate and reliable information.

Train kilometres

Note: Excludes tram kilometres. Figures for Tasmania are not available.

Passenger train kilometres

Note: Excludes tram kilometres. Figures for Tasmania are not available.

Freight train kilometres

Note: Figures for Tasmania are not available.

Tram kilometres

Train passenger journeys

Note: The railways providing passenger journey figures to the rail safety regulators are currently able to provide only estimates. Figures for Tasmania are not available. Excludes tram passenger journeys.

Tram passenger journeys

Notes

The definitions provided below are selected excerpts from the definitions of terms used by State and NT rail safety regulators in Australia. The definitions have been developed by them, in consultation with the rail industry, as part of their administrative role in providing government oversight of the safety of the rail industry in Australia.

Train kilometres: the number of kilometres travelled by trains, both freight and passenger.

Train: one or more units of rolling stock coupled together, at least one of which is a locomotive or other self-propelled unit that is designed to run on a railway. Both track maintenance machines and trams (streetcars or light rail) are included in this definition. However, in this national report tramway activity is disaggregated from railway activity as a whole since most of the tramway activity in Australia is concentrated in Melbourne, Victoria.

Passenger train kilometres: the number of kilometres travelled by passenger trains (in this national report, excluding trams).

Freight train kilometres: the number of kilometres travelled by freight trains.

Tram kilometres: the number of kilometres travelled by trams.

Train passenger journey: a journey made by a passenger, all or part of which was on a train. A passenger journey is calculated as follows: urban areas - a point-to-point journey irrespective of the number of vehicles or modes used for the trip; non-urban areas - a point-to-point journey but each change of vehicle along the route is counted as a separate journey. In this national report, tram passenger journeys are excluded.

Tram passenger journey: a journey made by a passenger, all or part of which was on a tram. A passenger journey is calculated as follows: urban areas - a point-to-point journey irrespective of the number of vehicles or modes used for the trip.

Railway employees: persons (whether full or part time) who work for or at the direction of a railway organisation, including contractors and volunteers. In this national report, excludes tramway employees.

Tramway employees: persons (whether full or part time) who work for or at the direction of a tramway organisation, including contractors and volunteers.

Additional statistics on Australian railways are available from the Australasian Railway Association (see http://www.ara.net.au(Opens in a new tab/window)).

Disclaimer

The data in this report are supplied to the ATSB by State and NT rail safety regulators. Data quality and national consistency, in particular, thus depend on the efforts of these regulators. The ATSB accepts no liability for any loss or damage suffered by any person or corporation resulting from the use of these data.

The safety of fishermen and people in small boats is a continuing concern in terms of safety at sea. In the course of your voyages, you encounter many types of fishing operations from dug out canoes, with sometimes a candle or oil lantern, to large fishing/factory ships. In and around the Australian coast fishing vessels tend to be less than 20 m in length with a crew of two or three. They often exhibit very bright working lights, though these should be shielded in order to ensure that the fishing lights required by the Colregs can be seen clearly.

This report examines what, if any, trends may be emerging as a result of the introduction of NAS stage 2b from 27 November 2003. Four indicators - airprox, breakdown of separation (BOS), resolution advisories (RA) and violation of controlled airspace (VCA) - were analysed to assess any net effects resulting from NAS 2b changes. There was no significant change in the rate of airproxes per aircraft movement in the 180-day period after NAS 2b was introduced relative to the 180-day period immediately before. There was also no significant change in airproxes involving RPT aircraft. There was a reduction in the rate of BOS incidents per aircraft movement in the post-NAS 2b period compared with the period immediately before, but this was not statistically significant. Analysis of RA incidents indicated no statistically significant change in the rate per movement reported after NAS 2b was introduced compared with the period immediately before. Overall, the report concludes that data currently available do not enable reliable conclusions to be drawn about NAS 2b safety trends.

Hughes 369HS, ZK-HCC Accident near Fox Glacier, New Zealand, 30 November 2003

FACTUAL INFORMATION

On 30 November 2003, a New Zealand registered Hughes 369HS, ZK-HCC, was operating on a standard scenic flight over the Fox Glacier, New Zealand. The intended track was over Fox Glacier, around Mount Cook and Mount Tasman, returning via the Fox Glacier to land at Fox Glacier township.

After a normal climb to 9,500 ft and commencing level forward flight, the pilot noticed the power turbine speed and main rotor speed reduce. The pilot descended to 6,500 ft where power was restored. Several minutes later a second power loss occurred. The pilot then carried out an emergency landing at the base of Fox Glacier. During the emergency landing the helicopter sustained damage to a landing gear skid and rolled onto its side. The pilot and passengers vacated the helicopter with no serious injuries.

A passenger had been photographing the scenic flight using a video camera. Sounds relating to the operation of the main rotor gearbox had been recorded on the video. The Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) of New Zealand was responsible for investigating this accident and requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) to analyse the sounds recorded on the video camera. It was requested that the data be presented in tabular and graphical format. The Executive Director of the ATSB approved the request and the examination was conducted in accordance with the Australian Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

A copy of the video recorded during the accident flight was forwarded to the ATSB by the TAIC aviation investigator in charge. The video was received at the Bureau on 24 February 2004 and examined by an ATSB recorder specialist. The audio signals were downloaded and analysed using the Bureau's audio software and graphical and tabular presentations of the data were prepared.

Information relating to the operation of the helicopter's main rotor system was provided to the TAIC investigator in charge for consideration in preparing their report.

A copy of the TAIC investigation report (03-007) may be found at: www.taic.org.nz(Opens in a new tab/window) or by contacting the Transport Accident Investigation Commission, PO Box 10-323, Wellington, New Zealand.

(Cessna 404, VH-ANV Jandakot WA, 11 August 2003)

Introduction

At 0735 UTC on 11 August 2003, VH-ANV was cleared on a MANTL 1 departure from runway 24R at Jandakot airport. Onboard were the pilot and five passengers. The aircraft called ready and was cleared to climb to 3,000 feet. The aircraft rotated and the tower staff noticed a sound similar to an asymmetric operation. The aircraft was turned left and subsequently impacted the ground to the southeast of the tower near the NDB site. This Technical Analysis Investigation report should be read in conjunction with ATSB report BO/200303579.

(RB211-524 Turbofan Engine)

Examination brief

During the landing at Johannesburg International Airport on 15 March 2003, the flight crew of the Boeing 747-400 aircraft, registered VH-OJO, noted an "ENG 2 REVERSER" message displayed on the engine indication and condition alerting system (EICAS) after the application of reverse thrust. Airport personnel subsequently found debris on the runway and taxiway used by the aircraft.

An engineering examination of the number-2 engine nacelle by the operator's ground staff established that both panels from the integrated nozzle assembly (INA) drive fairing had been lost, as well as two thrust reverser blocker doors, with a third door substantially damaged. The core assembly of the engine (an RB211-524G/T model) was not damaged.

The operator reported the incident to the South African Civil Aviation Authority, who took the liberated debris into their possession for an engineering investigation of the failures. The components were subsequently sent to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) for further study and engineering analysis. The ATSB commenced a technical analysis investigation into the failure of the components on 1 July 2003. This report presents the findings of the ATSB analysis and conclusions drawn as to the mechanism of failure.