On 5 May 2009, two Robinson Helicopter Company R22 Beta II helicopters, registered VH-PHT and VH-HCB collided midair about 15 km south-east of Springvale Station, WA. Both helicopters had departed the station just prior to sunrise that morning to conduct mustering operations.

The first helicopter was observed departing to the east in order to make radio contact with an adjoining station prior to heading for the mustering area. The other helicopter departed about 10 minutes later and was observed heading to the south-east, the general direction to the area that was to be mustered.

The helicopters were due to refuel at about 0830 at a place to be arranged, depending on the progress of the mustering operation. When the pilots failed to respond to radio calls from ground personnel, a pilot from a nearby station was tasked to conduct a search by helicopter. The helicopters were subsequently located about 15km to the south-east of Springvale Station and about 2km north of the planned mustering area.

The circumstances of the accident were consistent with a midair collision while the pilots were positioning to commence the muster. The converging flight paths of the helicopters, pilot fatigue and sun glare from the rising sun are identified as contributing safety factors.

On 20 April 2009, a Robinson Helicopter Company R44 (Raven II) helicopter, registered VH-EZT (EZT), was conducting aerial spraying operations near Langkoop, Victoria. Spraying commenced at 0800 Central Standard Time with a load of 300 L of foliar fertiliser. There were two helicopters spraying the pine paddocks that morning and the operating crews were to break for lunch at about 1300 at a pre-arranged meeting place. Just prior to lunch, the pilot of EZT was tasked with a number of unplanned spray runs and a cleanup run to complete the morning's spraying. When the helicopter did not arrive at the pre-arranged meeting place, the pilot of the second helicopter commenced searching and located the wreckage of EZT in a paddock, near a powerline. The pilot of EZT was fatally injured.

Helicopter EZT contacted a powerline that intersected the northern half of the final spray paddock before colliding with the ground. An examination of the wreckage of the helicopter did not find any mechanical abnormalities that might have contributed to the accident.

Recorded data from the helicopter's satellite navigation system showed that after completing the planned spray runs, the pilot did not conduct a reconnaissance of the unfamiliar area to the south of the plantation to identify any hazards. A reconnaissance flight may have alerted the pilot to the presence of the previously-identified powerline.

The investigation found that an additional hazard identification check prior to the conduct of a cleanup run was not routinely practiced by the pilots, or monitored by the operator. In response to that safety issue, the operator has advised that they will enhance the wire avoidance procedures in their operations manual and mandate that an additional hazard identification check shall be completed prior to any cleanup run.

In addition, the investigation determined that there were no fluid quantity markings on the helicopter's spray tank, and that the spray system included unapproved modifications that increased the risk of overweight operations.

On 3 May 2009 at approximately 0620 Eastern Standard Time, a Bell Helicopter Company model 47G-2A-1 helicopter departed Rolleston aircraft landing area, Queensland, on a private flight. At an altitude of approximately 200 ft above ground level during the climbout, the pilot reported hearing a very loud bang and feeling a jolt through the airframe. The helicopter immediately started descending and the pilot noted that the forward/aft cyclic control was unresponsive. The helicopter subsequently landed heavily, resulting in the main rotor blades severing the tail boom and causing some structural damage to the airframe. The pilot reported suffering a minor back injury as a result of the heavy landing.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau's (ATSB) examination of the helicopter revealed that two blades had separated from the engine cooling fan as a result of fatigue fracture. The fan cowling had fractured and separated from the engine and there was impact damage to the flight control linkages.

The ATSB examination determined that the fan unit had not been correctly assembled in accordance the Bell 47 aircraft maintenance manual, and that this probably had an effect on the vibration and resonance characteristics of the fan, which in turn may have increased the susceptibility of the fan to fatigue failure.

As a result of this occurrence, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority released Airworthiness Bulletin AWB 63-007, reminding operators and maintainers of the importance of adhering to all current manufacturer's approved data for sheet metal cooling fans and their drive assemblies.

On 7 April 2009, at about 1210 Eastern Standard Time, the flight crew of a Boeing 737-800 aircraft, registered VH-VYL, received an enhanced ground proximity warning system alert during an approach to land at Sydney Airport, NSW. At the same time, the autopilot disconnected, and the engine thrust levers moved towards idle. The handling pilot corrected the engine thrust levers immediately and conducted an uneventful landing.

The investigation determined that spurious data from the left radio altimeter (RA) provided an indicated altitude of minus 7 ft, resulting in the autopilot disconnecting and the thrust lever movement.

An examination found that the left RA receive antenna displayed rubbing wear adjacent to the attachment screw inserts. A bonding check of the antenna indicated that the antenna's resistance was outside the aircraft manufacturer's limits. The antenna was replaced, and the aircraft was returned to service.

Three months after the occurrence, a further RA warning flag event was experienced by another crew in this aircraft. As a result of that event, the left and right RA transceivers were removed and tested with internal faults found on the left unit.

The ATSB has completed its technical analysis report of the cockpit voice recorder download from Boeing 747-4U3 aircraft, registration PK-GSH, on behalf of the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC). The aircraft was operating a scheduled international flight between Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and Jakarta, Indonesia. When the undercarriage was extended for landing at Jakarta, the left wing landing gear failed to extend. Following a number of flypasts, the crew landed the aircraft smoothly on runway 07R. The aircraft canted to the left during the landing and an emergency evacuation was carried out.

The NTSC is responsible for investigating this occurrence. The NTSC requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in the recovery and analysis of information from the cockpit voice recorder. In accordance with clause 5.23 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the ATSB appointed an Accredited Representative to assist the NTSC and initiated an investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

The ATSB's Technical Analysis Report has been sent to the NTSC to assist its ongoing investigation. The NTSC is responsible for releasing a final investigation report regarding this occurrence.

National Transportation Safety Committee
Ministry Of Transportation Republic Of Indonesia
Transportation Building 3^rd Floor
Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur No. 5
Jakarta Pusat 10110
Indonesia

Phone  :  +62 21 384 7601
Email    :  knkt@dephub.go.id

Website: http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

______________

Released in accordance with section 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

On 2 April 2009, a flight instructor and student pilot in a Robinson Helicopter Company R22, registered VH-YDA, were conducting normal circuit and autorotation training at Proserpine/Whitsunday Coast Airport, Qld. At 1400 Eastern Standard Time, the helicopter collided with terrain on the grass at the side of the departure end of runway 11. The helicopter was seriously damaged, and the instructor was seriously injured.

After the accident, neither pilot could recall any of the flight sequence immediately before the impact. There were no witnesses to the accident and no relevant recorded data. An examination of the helicopter wreckage indicated that there were no pre-impact defects. Due to a lack of information, the investigation was unable to determine why the helicopter collided with terrain.

The investigation found that the use of safety helmets would reduce the risk of pilot injury during door(s)-off operations.

The investigation also found that the helicopter was about 11 kg overweight on take-off for the flight.

On 7 March 2009, an Indonesian registered Fokker 50 aircraft, PK-RAR, on a flight from Batam - Hang Nadim airport to Matak Island, Indonesia, overran the runway during landing. The weather was reportedly poor with heavy rain.

The National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia was responsible for investigating this occurrence. The NTSC requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in the recovery and analysis of information from the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder.  In accordance with clause 5.23 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the ATSB appointed an Accredited Representative to assist the NTSC.

To protect the information supplied by the NTSC to the ATSB and investigative work undertaken to assist the NTSC, the ATSB initiated an investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

The ATSB provided information to the NTSC during the course of the investigation and the ATSB's Technical Analysis Report has now been provided to the NTSC. The NTSC is responsible for releasing a final investigation report on this occurrence.

National Transportation Safety Committee
Ministry Of Transportation Republic Of Indonesia
Transportation Building 3^rd Floor
Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur No. 5
Jakarta Pusat 10110
Indonesia

Phone  :  +62 21 384 7601
Email    :  knkt@dephub.go.id

Website: http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

______________

Released in accordance with section 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

The ATSB has completed its technical analysis report of the flight recorder data from a British Aerospace BAe146-300 aircraft, registered PK-BRD, on behalf of the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC). The aircraft was operating a cargo transport flight from Jayapura to Wamena, West Papua, Indonesia when it collided with terrain following a rejected landing approach (go-around) at Wamena on 9 April 2009. All six people on board were fatally injured.

The National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) of Indonesia is responsible for investigating this occurrence. The NTSC requested assistance from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in the recovery and analysis of information from the aircraft's flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder. In accordance with clause 5.23 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, the ATSB appointed an Accredited Representative to assist the NTSC.

To protect the information supplied by the NTSC to the ATSB and investigative work undertaken to assist the NTSC, the ATSB initiated an investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

The ATSB provided information to the NTSC during the course of the investigation and the ATSB's Technical Analysis Report has now been provided to the NTSC.

The NTSC is responsible for releasing a final investigation report on this occurrence.

National Transportation Safety Committee 
Ministry Of Transportation Republic Of Indonesia 
Transportation Building 3^rd Floor
Jalan Medan Merdeka Timur No. 5
Jakarta Pusat 10110
Indonesia

Phone  :  +62 21 384 7601
Email    :  knkt@dephub.go.id

Website: http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_home/ntsc.htm

______________

Released in accordance with section 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.

Preliminary report released 30 April 2009.

At 2231 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, an Airbus A340-500 aircraft, registered A6-ERG, commenced the take-off roll on runway 16 at Melbourne Airport on a scheduled, passenger flight to Dubai, United Arab Emirates with 257 passengers, 14 cabin crew and four flight crew. The take-off was planned as a reduced-power take-off and the first officer was the handling pilot for the departure.

At 2231:53, the captain called for the first officer to rotate. The first officer attempted to rotate the aircraft, but it did not respond immediately with a nose-up pitch. The captain again called 'rotate' and the first officer applied a greater nose-up command. The nose of the aircraft was raised, and the tail made contact with the runway surface, but the aircraft did not begin to climb. The captain then selected TOGA on the thrust levers, the engines responded immediately, and the aircraft commenced a climb.

The crew notified air traffic control of the tail strike and that they would be returning to Melbourne. While reviewing the aircraft's performance documentation in preparation for landing, the crew noticed that a take-off weight, which was 100 tonnes below the actual take-off weight of the aircraft, had inadvertently been used when completing the take-off performance calculation. The result of that incorrect take-off weight was to produce a thrust setting and take-off reference speeds that were lower than those required for the actual aircraft weight.

The aircraft subsequently landed at Melbourne with no reported injuries. The tail strike resulted in substantial damage to the tail of the aircraft and damaged some airport lighting and the instrument
landing system.

As a result of the accident, the aircraft operator has advised the Australian Transport Safety Bureau that it is reviewing a number of procedures including human factors involved in take-off performance data entry.

On 6 March 2009, an Airbus A330‑303 aircraft, registered VH-QPJ, was being loaded for dispatch on a scheduled international passenger service between Sydney, New South Wales and Hong Kong. Operational changes prior to the aircraft's dispatch required an adjustment of the planned load, with the load controller electing to offload a pallet of freight originally scheduled for that flight, and substituting it with a lighter pallet in the load management system.

Following the pallet substitution in that system, the load controller did not amend the loading instructions that had been previously issued to the ramp staff loading the aircraft. That resulted in the ramp staff being unaware of the changed loading requirement and the loading proceeded as initially planned.

The discrepancy between the actual aircraft load and operator's load management system was not detected during the completion of the load controller's 'Final Distribution Check' prior to issuing the final load sheet to the flight crew. That resulted in the aircraft exceeding the structural maximum taxi weight by 384 kg and the maximum structural take-off weight by about 884 kg. It also resulted in the flight crew entering inaccurate centre of gravity and zero fuel weight data into a number of the aircraft's systems.

Due to a delay in the notification of the loading error to the operator's relevant departments, the aircraft operated another 10 sectors before maintenance inspections for an overweight taxi were completed.

As a result of this occurrence, the operator implemented several changes to the process for managing load control activities. Those changes included: implementing a procedure to ensure the immediate notification of loading-related incidents and changes to the operating procedures in load control, including the introduction of a read and sign process for important ramp and load control communications; the appointment of a load control standards officer; and the conduct of a training needs analysis for load control officers.