On 16 September 2006 at 0038 Western Standard Time, an Airbus Industrie A330 landed on runway 21 at Perth Airport in weather conditions that were below the applicable landing minima. The aircraft, registered VH-QPJ, was being operated in accordance with the instrument flight rules (IFR) on a scheduled passenger flight from Singapore to Perth, WA.

Before departure from Singapore, the aerodrome forecast (TAF) for Perth Airport predicted a 30% probability of fog after 0200. The aircraft was due at Perth at 0020 so in accordance with the operator's fuel policy; fuel was not specifically carried for a diversion from the destination to an alternate aerodrome. While the aircraft was in cruise, the TAF was revised to forecast fog from 2400, but the trend type forecasts (TTF) which superseded the TAF trended fog from 0030.

At about 2350, when the flight crew commenced descent, the aircraft passed the point where it had the fuel to divert to Learmonth, WA. About 10 minutes later, the TTF was amended to forecast fog to occur before the aircraft's arrival time. The fog occurred at about 0015. The crew attempted two Instrument Landing System (ILS) approaches before they used auto land to land on runway 21 in weather conditions that were below the prescribed landing minima for the ILS

The ILS at Perth (and other Australian airports) was approved to the Category I standard that did not allow landings where the visibility was less than 800 m. The Perth runway 21 ILS glide path critical area was not fully protected from multipath effects during low visibility operations.

Perth and Learmonth were the only aerodromes in Western Australia that could be classified as suitable for the A330, and Learmonth was 599 NM (1,110 km) from Perth.

As a result of this occurrence, the operator implemented an interim flight planning fuel policy specifically for Perth.

On 7 September 2006, a Boeing 717-200 aircraft, registered VH-NXI, was being operated on a scheduled service from Perth to Port Hedland, WA. Approximately 10 minutes after takeoff, the crew became aware that both the pilot in command's and copilot's computed airspeed displays had become erratic. The pilot in command's computed airspeed rapidly dropped, while the copilot's airspeed gradually increased. During the event, the pilot in command's displayed airspeed dropped as low as 115 kts, while the copilot's computed airspeed reached a maximum of 348 kts. Both the stall warning and overspeed warning sounded. The crew assessed the accuracy of the Integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS) and used it for air data information.

The crew carried out the non-normal checklist from the Quick Reference Handbook. As part of the checklist, the crew cycled the air data heat switch. Approximately 15 minutes after the first signs of irregularities, both the pilot in command's and copilot's airspeed displays returned to normal and both airspeeds matched. The aircraft returned to Perth and conducted a normal approach and landing.

Analysis of the recorded data indicated that both the pilot in command's and copilot's pitot probes had iced up, which resulted in erratic airspeed indications and erroneous altitude and Mach numbers. The accuracy of the ISIS could not be determined from the recorded data.

The air data heat switch was removed from the aircraft and examined by the switch manufacturer. The switch manufacturer concluded that the latching mechanism in the switch was damaged, when the lamp capsule was forcibly opened while the switch was in the latched position.

It is possible that a piece of the broken latching mechanism jammed the switch in the OFF position, which resulted in no heat being supplied to the air data sensors, including the pitot probes.

Preliminary report released 2 November 2006

The pilot with four passengers on board, was conducting a private flight within the station property. The aircraft was later discovered destroyed after it had impacted the ground. Two of the passengers were fatally injured.

On 6 September 2006, a Boeing Co 717-200 (717) aircraft, registered VH-NXI, departed Perth, WA on a scheduled passenger service to Karratha. Approximately 100 NM (185 km) from Karratha, there was an automated thrust reduction, and the aircraft commenced the descent into Karratha.

Shortly after leaving the top of descent, the flight crew observed that the right engine had failed. During the completion of the relevant non-normal checklist items, the crew noticed that the main fuel switch for the right engine was selected to OFF. The engine failure checklist was carried out and a successful restart made as the aircraft continued to Karratha.

An examination of the throttle module and main fuel switches by the aircraft operator found no fault with their operation.

As a result of this incident, the aircraft operator issued a Safety Alert to all of its 717 operating crew advising of the possibility of selecting the aircraft's main fuel switches to ON without their correctly engaging the locking detent. That alert also warned flight crew of the possibility of inadvertent in-flight selection of the switches to OFF by catching wristbands or long sleeve shirt cuffs. In addition, flight crew were advised to not pass technical manuals or other similar items across the throttle quadrant in the vicinity of the main fuel switches.

The operator is evaluating the possible fitment of a physical guard to protect the main fuel switches against their inadvertent unlock from the ON position.

On 25 August 2006 at 1610 Eastern Standard Time a Fairchild Industries Inc SA227-DC Metroliner (Metroliner) aircraft, registered VH-KEX, commenced its take-off roll on runway 29 at Hervey Bay Aerodrome, Qld. The aircraft was being operated under the instrument flight rules (IFR) on a scheduled passenger service to Brisbane, Qld. After reaching 60 kts, and while still on the runway, the pilot in command observed a Eurocopter EC 135 P2 (EC 135) helicopter, registered VH-ESZ, on final approach to land on runway 11 at Hervey Bay Aerodrome. The EC 135 was being operated under the visual flight rules (VFR) on a short flight from the Hervey Bay Hospital to Hervey Bay Aerodrome to refuel. The pilot in command of the Metroliner rejected the take-off.

At 1745 Western Standard Time on 29 August 2006, a BAE SYSTEMS BAe 146-100 (BAe146) aircraft, registered VH-NJE, departed Ravensthorpe Aerodrome, WA for Perth.

The flight crew recalled noticing a smell on the flight deck as the aircraft climbed through about FL130 but commented that it was different from the oil-like smell historically associated with the operation of the BAe 146, and to the normal smells associated with the operation of the aircraft's galley. The pilot in command recalled that, shortly after, there were a number of 'popping noises' accompanied by a series of bright yellow flashes and some glowing behind the escape rope panel on the copilot's side of the flight deck.

Shortly after, the smoke and related symptoms dissipated, and the flight crew donned their emergency oxygen equipment and returned to the departure aerodrome. The crew stated that the aircraft's emergency oxygen equipment adversely affected their communication during the remainder of the flight.

The investigation determined that the aircraft's 'A' windscreen electrostatic filter had failed. That failure was consistent with an electrical arcing event.

In response to this and a number of other similar failures in the UK and in Europe, the aircraft manufacturer undertook a number of safety actions, including issuing a Service Information Letter advising operators to check the correct positioning of the insulation blankets in the vicinity of their aircraft electrostatic filters at the next available opportunity. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has issued two safety recommendations that seek to reduce the likelihood of electrical arcing events in 'A' windscreen filters in BAe 146 aircraft.

The flight crew of the Boeing Company 737-76N aircraft reported that during descent and taxi operations, they felt several rudder 'kicks' in the pilot in command's rudder pedals, accompanied by an audible noise.

Subsequent examination of the pilot in command's rudder pedal jackshaft assembly revealed two bearings and a universal joint were worn excessively.

The wear of the components of the jackshaft assembly, although not desirable, was not an immediate safety of flight concern for the operation of the aircraft.

The operator issued a flight crew operations notice and an engineering notice to highlight the occurrence to personnel.

Discontinued Investigation

Statement of Reasons

Occurrence investigations commenced from 1 July 2003 are initially categorised as category 4 unless agreed by the ATSB Executive to be above this level at the outset. As detailed in Section 21 (2) of the TSI Act 2003, the Executive Director in empowered to discontinue an investigation at any time. Section 21 (3) of the TSI Act 2003 requires the Executive Director to publish a statement setting out the reasons for discontinuing an investigation (commenced from 1 July 2003) within 28 days of discontinuing the investigation.

Preliminary investigation was undertaken into a level 4 occurrence involving a SAAB 340 aircraft that had been cleared for takeoff and an aircraft tug that entered the runway strip at Sydney Airport on 27 August 2006. Safety action relevant to this occurrence has been taken in response to an earlier incident of a similar nature. Details of that safety action are contained in ATSB safety investigation report 200505170, published on 6 December 2006 and available on the ATSB website. Given the safety action already taken, there was limited safety benefit in continuing the 27 August 2006 investigation compared with other priorities.

Status: Downgraded the occurrence to level 5 and investigation discontinued.

Discontinued Investigation

Statement of Reasons

Occurrence investigations commenced from 1 July 2003 are initially categorised as category 4 unless agreed by the ATSB Executive to be above this level at the outset. As detailed in Section 21 (2) of the TSI Act 2003, the Executive Director in empowered to discontinue an investigation at any time. Section 21 (3) of the TSI Act 2003 requires the Executive Director to publish a statement setting out the reasons for discontinuing an investigation (commenced from 1 July 2003) within 28 days of discontinuing the investigation.

On 19 August 2006, the pilot of a Tecnam Costruzioni Aeronautiche P2002 aircraft, registered VH-JFV, was tracking from Bankstown Airport to a flying training area, west of the airport. The flight was being conducted under the visual flight rules (VFR) and the pilot intended to remain in non-controlled airspace (OCTA) for the duration of the flight. The upper limit of OCTA on the intended track was 2,500 ft until 37 km west of Sydney Airport. At 1137, the aircraft was observed on air traffic control radar to be above 3,000 ft and climbing, inside controlled airspace (CTA). That placed the Tecnam in potential conflict with a Fairchild Industries Inc SA226-T Merlin aircraft, registered VH-SSM, which had departed from Bankstown for Wollongong. The Merlin was being operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight.

At 1138, the Sydney Departures South controller received a short-term conflict alert on the air situation display (ASD). At the time of the alert the aircraft were separated by 900 ft vertically and 3,150 m (1.7 NM) laterally. The controller issued heading instructions to the pilot of the Merlin to avoid the Tecnam. A radar controller established radio communications with the pilot of the Tecnam and instructed the pilot to leave CTA. The pilot complied with the instruction by descending the aircraft and it left CTA at a position about 35 km west of Sydney Airport.

The pilot of the Tecnam had misidentified the aircraft's position in relation to the CTA boundary and consequently inadvertently entered CTA without a clearance. The pilot subsequently undertook additional training to ensure that he could visually identify the CTA boundaries in and around the Bankstown area