The pilot had been conducting spraying operations from the property during the day. Late in the afternoon he decided to position the helicopter to a new site located approximately 2 kilometres along the road to the south. He was joined by a passenger for the short positioning flight. There was no significant weather reported at the time of the flight and visibility was reported to be greater than 10 kilometres. The sun was setting and had descended below the hill tops to the west. The pilot stated that shortly after takeoff, glare from the setting sun obscured his vision. He descended until he was out of the line of sight of the sun and he then proceeded at that height until the helicopter struck power lines, which shattered the bubble and caused the nose of the helicopter to pitch up. The pilot was able to regain control sufficiently to carry out a run on landing. The pilot stated that there was no mechanical defect or malfunction which could have contributed to the accident. The investigation revealed that the bubble of the helicopter was slightly crazed but it was assessed as serviceable by the maintenance organisation and the pilot. The bubble was also found to be covered with a film of chemical spray. A witness who flew in the helicopter on the flight immediately preceding the accident flight stated that the condition of the bubble did not obscure vision through it. It is considered that the helicopter was being flown at an unsafe height and the pilot failed to see the power lines prior to impacting them. This accident was not the subject of an on scene investigation.

Enroute to collect his passengers, the pilot elected to practice some autorotational landings. He successfully completed an autorotation with a power recovery, then decided to carry out a power-off landing. After ensuring that the touchdown area was suitable, the pilot commenced the manoeuvre from about 400 feet above the ground. The pilot subsequently advised that during the flare he misjudged his height above the ground and the aircraft landed heavily. The main rotor blades flexed and struck the tail boom.

Circumstances:

The pilot-under-training was undergoing type familiarisation. After some time in the training area, the pilot returned for circuit work. After one normal circuit and landing, the pilot was attempting a glide approach. The instructor reported that although the aircraft was slightly low, everything else appeared normal. At about 300 feet above the ground, the aircraft started to sink, well below the desired glide path. The pilot did not react immediately, so the instructor commanded a go-around, at the same time reaching for the controls himself. The engine responded with full power, but the aircraft continued to sink and landed heavily on the mainwheels, approximately 450 metres short of the runway threshold. It bounced onto the nosewheel and became airborne again. The instructor took over full control and went around, unaware that the nose leg had broken off just above the fork. On the subsequent approach, the instructor saw a wheel on the ground and was advised by another pilot that it was his nosewheel. The instructor later carried out a landing on a grass flight strip. During the landing roll, the broken nose leg dug in and the aircraft tilted onto its nose before falling back onto the mainwheels. The wind was reported as generally straight down the runway at 10 to 20 knots, with a slight sea breeze component and a small amount of sink on final approach.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot misjudged an attempted gliding approach to land.

2. The pilot evidently did not maintain a stabilized approach.

3. The instructor had limited experience on type.

4. The instructor did not initiate timely and suitable recovery action.

Circumstances:

The pilot reported that he had flown to the destination area but was experiencing difficulty in locating the strip. He located an area that he thought might be the strip and carried out an inspection from a low height with full flap selected. About halfway along the paddock the pilot decided that the area was not the strip he was looking for and applied power to climb and retracted the flaps. The aircraft stalled and struck the ground in a nose down attitude.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot made an improper decision to conduct the inspection using full flap.

2. He did not maintain adequate airspeed.

3. He retracted the flaps prematurely during the go around. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

Circumstances:

As the aircraft was making an approach into a confined area, it was struck by a local wind condition known as "willy willy". The aircraft began to rotate in a clockwise direction, and the pilot was unable to obtain a response from any of the controls. The aircraft touched down heavily, causing damage to the right hand skid and the tail rotor.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot lost control of the helicopter when it was affected by a "willy willy".
2. The aircraft collided with the ground before the pilot was able to regain control.

The pilot had limited experience in night operations. Until this flight, all night take-offs since obtaining his Command instrument rating had been conducted from airports in well lit areas. This particular take-off was conducted into an area devoid of external visual cues. The aircraft become airborne at the normal speed, and the pilot reported that after lift-off the aircraft was held parallel to the runway until the two-engine best rate of climb speed was acquired. The aircraft was then rotated so that a nose up attitude and positive rate of climb were indicated, whereupon the landing gear was selected up and the landing lights were selected off. The pilot stated that he then checked that the airspeed was 120 knots, the desired climb speed, and was commencing to adjust the throttles when the aircraft struck the ground. The initial propeller strikes indicate that the aircraft had a groundspeed of approximately 136 knots at impact. No faults were found with the aircraft or the aircraft systems that may have contributed to the occurrence. It was likely that the pilot had hurried the after takeoff checks, and had not adequately monitored the attitude of the aircraft.

Circumstances:

After arrival at the destination aerodrome near the End-of-Daylight the pilot was making his second approach to land. The aircraft subsequently touched down with the undercarriage retracted and slid for 150 metres. The pilot initially reported that he had landed without selecting the landing gear down but later inferred that it had collapsed when landing. A subsequent examination and engineering report revealed that the landing gear had been selected down after the aircraft had come to rest on the runway.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot failed to select the landing gear down and confirm a down-and-locked indication prior to landing.

2. Pilot anxiety to be on the ground prior to End-of-Daylight. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The pilot had flown that morning from Bringelly to Kincumber to visit his brother and family. The flight was reported as normal and the helicopter as serviceable. Following lunch the pilot agreed to take his nephew for a ride "to wave a cheerio to friends at Wamberal". After takeoff he climbed to 1200 feet and set heading over Empire Bay. When he had passed Terrigal he descended quickly to 200 feet, and then flew north along the beach towards Spoon Bay. He observed that the sea was very rough, with large waves breaking on the headland and a strong southerly wind blowing. When he arrived over the headland, abeam Wamberal, the pilot initiated a turn to the right away from the land, and commenced to climb using cyclic control. His intention was to gain sufficient height during the turn so as to recross the coast and a built up area. The pilot increased the angle of bank to approximately 40 degrees, which he maintained during the climbing turn, allowing the airspeed to decrease to best climb speed. When the helicopter had climbed about 50 feet and turned through 120 degrees the pilot increased the collective pitch and power to continue the climb. He reported that the machine then appeared to buck and tend to corkscrew, without any accompanying unusual noises. It then lurched violently to the right and assumed a steep nose down attitude. There was no apparent response from application of left pedal which made the pilot believe that he had suffered a tail rotor failure. He lowered the collective control and pulled back on the cyclic in an attempt to raise the nose, which slowly came up and the lurching stopped. The helicopter was now facing towards the land, but too low and not close enough for the pilot to make an auto-rotational landing on the beach. The helicopter descended rapidly, and the pilot moved the cyclic control full back in an attempt to flare the machine for a ditching in the sea. At the same time he raised the collective and applied some power. The helicopter touched down relatively gently on the water, but sank almost immediately. Both occupants were able to evacuate through the cabin bubble and stayed together for about half an hour. When help did not appear to be forthcoming, the pilot, who was the stronger swimmer, decided to to swim against the current and surf to the shore to find help. After assuring himself that his nephew was alright, and floating satisfactorily, he set off for the beach, where he was assisted by police and other people who had witnessed the accident. An immediate air search by helicopters failed to locate the passenger in the sea. His body was eventually washed up on the shore about a week later. Attempts to locate and salvage the wreckage of the helicopter were unsuccessful, except for the recovery of the tail rotor and part of the tail boom. An inspection found no evidence that these components had suffered any pre-impact malfunction or failure. As the helicopter was in a steep turn to the right the pilot may have failed to recognise and then compensate, by applying left pedal, for the yaw, also to the right, which would have occurred as he increased the collective pitch. It is likely that he did not apply left pedal until the roll was well developed. Recovery should have been possible by rolling the helicopter level with cyclic and balancing with the pedals. When the pilot decreased the collective pitch, torque to the main rotor was reduced, slowing the yawing motion. As he was still applying full left pedal the tail rotor would have now taken effect, slowing or stopping the turn just prior to the helicopter entering the sea. The wind would have been creating a considerable amount of turbulence over the headland, but not enough to cause loss of control. Mechanical and/or tail rotor failure was considered unlikely. Without the tail rotor anti-torque effect the fuselage should have rotated at a fast rate to the right, and still been rotating at impact, even with the collective lever lowered. This accident was not the subject of a formal on-scene investigation.

The pilot had decided to discontinue the flight due to deteriorating weather conditions. As he was approaching Port Douglas the visibility decreased to the extent that he was unable to maintain visual contact with the coastline. The pilot said that he decreased power to reduce forward speed in an attempt to maintain visual contact, and shortly after this he felt a bump and directional control was lost. The aircraft landed in about 1.5 metres of water some 600 metres from the shoreline. Damage to the tailrotor blades and gearbox, which had separated from the aircraft, indicated that the tailrotor had struck the water before separation.

Circumstances:

The pilot reported that, soon after completing the pre-landing checks during the descent to land, the engine lost power. After checking that the mixture was full rich, he called Hamilton Tower to advise of his situation and was cleared for a straight-in approach. The pilot then changed the fuel selector from the left to the right tank for a short time, but did not actuate the electric fuel boost pump. When the engine did not respond, he re-selected the left tank and again attempted unsuccessfully to restart the engine. Moments later the aircraft made a forced landing into the sea approximately 2 km short of the runway. No fault was found with the aircraft which might have contributed to the accident. Only minute quantities of fuel were found in the fuel system and both tanks contained only sea water. The pilot stated that the aircraft departed Maroochydore with full tanks (337 L) with the left tank selected, and that he changed tanks every 30 min during the flight. He said he had not personally refuelled the aircraft but had noted the fuel level in both tanks prior to DEPARTURE to be at the bottom of the filler tubes. These tubes extend downward into each fuel tank from the filler caps a distance of approximately 10-12 cm. The pilot advised that much of the flight was conducted below 2000 ft with the mixture full rich or only slightly lean. Investigation determined that the actual fuel quantity on board at DEPARTURE was 270-280 L (135-140 L per tank). This meant that 55-65 L remained on board at the time of the accident. Judging from the duration of the flight and the tank selection procedure used by the pilot, the left tank should have been selected for 120 min (4x30 min periods) and the right tank for 90 min. Total usage from the left tank should therefore have been 110-120 L, still leaving 20-30 L in the tank when the power loss occurred. However, had the pilot missed a tank change and had the left tank been selected for 150 min instead of 120, the fuel quantity used from the tank would have been around 150 L, close to the calculated quantity in the tank of 135-140 L. It is likely, therefore, that the pilot missed a tank change, thereby draining the left tank, and that the engine lost power as a result of fuel starvation. Because the electric boost pump was not actuated when the pilot selected the right tank after the power loss, it would have taken more time for the fuel to flow from the right tank to the engine. The left tank was probably reselected before this had time to take place.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident

1. The pilot did not have adequate knowledge of the aircraft fuel system.

2. The aircraft fuel tanks were not filled to capacity prior to DEPARTURE.

3. The pilot probably missed a tank change, thereby draining the left fuel tank.

4. The pilot did not actuate the electric fuel boost pump when attempting to restart the engine.