On arrival over the aerodrome the pilot noted that the wind sock was indicating a strong gusty wind from about 290 degrees and elected to land on runway 27. Final approach was made at about 70 knots, the aircraft being tracked to allow for the crosswind. The aircraft contacted the runway nosewheel first, then came to a stop. Upon inspection the pilot discovered that the nosegear had been damaged during the landing. This accident was not the subject of an on scene investigation.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was carrying out a short familiarisation flight before beginning the day's powerline inspection program. On board were the pilot and the owner of the property being used as a temporary base for operations. The aircraft took off toward the east over a flat paddock, the pilot's intention being to turn north from a point near the centre of the paddock then to intercept an east-west powerline and to follow that line westwards. While still tracking east, at about 20 feet altitude, the aircraft struck and snapped a north-south powerline crossing the take-off path. The aircraft then continued forward for about 60 metres before impacting the ground and coming to rest five metres beyond the impact point. An eyewitness to the accident stated that he was 'almost certain' that he had informed the pilot of the existence of the north-south powerline when the aircraft had first arrived at the property, seven days before the accident. The pilot stated that he had no prior knowledge of the line. The aircraft had taken off from the pad at least three times and had landed at the pad at least four times since first arrival. All prior movements had been to the west of the pad, and the pilot had not been reminded about the line. Prior to take-off on the day of the accident, the pilot briefed the passenger about the proposed profile of the flight and asked the passenger for any comments. The passenger agreed with the proposed profile but did not mention the north-south powerline. The pilot looked to the east to note any obstructions but did not see the line which was very difficult to see from the take-off point. In addition, due to the relatively low position of the sun in the north-eastern sky, glare may have adversely affected his vision. Further, the flat, open terrain did not provide any visual cues to alert him to the requirement for obstruction clearance. However, the pilot did not closely inspect the take-off path from the ground. Examination of the wreckage did not reveal any defects in the aircraft which may have contributed to the accident. The performance capability of the aircraft was such that the climb gradient required to clear the powerline could have been easily achieved.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not closely inspect the proposed DEPARTURE path for obstructions prior to take-off.

2. The line was very difficult to see from the take-off point. Glare may have aggravated this problem.

3. The flat, open terrain, without obvious obstructions along the take-off path, provided no cues alerting the pilot to the need for obstruction clearance.

Circumstances:

The pilot was operating from an agricultural airstrip which was aligned north-south. A powerline, approximately 6 m above ground level and located 220 m from the northern threshold, crossed the approach path at an angle of 60 degrees. The pilot elected to take off into the light northerly breeze, flying under the powerline, and to approach over the wires, landing into the south. He determined his descent point by sighting along the run of the power poles, the nearest of which was partially obscured by trees. During his third approach to land, the pilot had forgotten the powerline until sighting it as it was about to pass under the aircraft nose. He applied full throttle and raised the aircraft nose too late to prevent the main landing gear from contacting the powerline. The aircraft impacted the ground in a near-level attitude, 108 m from the point of contact with the powerline and travelled a further 29 m before coming to rest. Both cables of the powerline were dislodged from 9 poles, 1 of which was broken. One cable was broken but remained caught in the left main landing gear. The pilot vacated the aircraft as a fire quickly spread from the engine area to the wings and fuselage.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident.

1. The pilot did not adopt an appropriate procedure for avoiding the powerline.

2. The pilot forgot the presence of the powerline. 3. The pilot saw the wires too late to avoid colliding with them.

Circumstances:

After completing a number of parachute dropping flights under supervision, the pilot refuelled the aircraft from drums using a hand pump which he understood delivered a specific volume of fuel per stroke. He then flew the aircraft on a short solo flight to drop parachutists from 3000 feet. On his return he was asked to conduct another flight ahead of an approaching rainstorm. On reaching jump height the jump coordinator decided that the descent would be conducted to the north of the strip, away from the drop zone, due to the rain. As the parachutists descended, the aircraft was observed to fly to the north west of the strip and shortly after was obscured from view by heavy rain. The aircraft failed to return and was subsequently located by search aircraft approximately six kilometres to the west of the strip. It had impacted the ground in a right wing low attitude at slow speed. The investigation revealed that the fuel on board prior to the last take off was less than statutory reserve requirements. The engine had lost power due to fuel exhaustion. The fuel pump being used for the refuelling operation was found to be delivering less fuel per stroke than stated and the pilot had not use the dipstick to check the aircraft fuel quantity prior to the accident flight. The times being used by the pilot to determine fuel quantity required were taken from the aircraft tachometer. These times were substantially less than real time. It is considered that the pilot's decision to rely on a predetermined fuel quantity and allow himself to be rushed into departing ahead of a rainstorm of unknown duration contributed to the development of this accident.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not adequately carry out pre-flight preparation and planning duties.

2. The pilot did not follow approved procedures.

3. The loss of engine power was due to fuel exhaustion.

Circumstances:

After becoming airborne the aircraft was climbed steeply in order to clear a 15 metre high powerline. As the aircraft cleared the powerline the passenger indicated that he wanted to proceed towards the left. The pilot turned the aircraft sharply and, as he did so, he noted a decrease in main rotor rpm. The pilot continued the left turn, until he was pointing towards a clear area, opened the throttle, lowered the collective control and dived towards the ground in an attempt to regain the lost rpm. The attempt was unsuccessful and the pilot elected to land. He raised the nose and increased collective pitch in an attempt to cushion the touchdown. The pilot's actions caused the main rotor blades to enter an overpitched condition and the aircraft touched down heavily.

One skid collapsed and the main rotor struck the fuselage and the ground. No evidence was found that would indicate that the aircraft systems or components contributed to the accident. The steep climb out, to clear the powerline, required the pilot to use most of the excess power available. When the pilot entered a sharp left turn the additional aerodynamic load caused the main rotor rpm to reduce. There was no known reason why the pilot elected to turn abruptly under the particular circumstances. It is probable that the pilot, who had considerable experience on helicopters with low inertia rotor systems, expected the rpm to recover without difficulty. As a result, he misjudged the height and performance change required and was forced to make a rushed decision to convert his attempt at rpm recovery to a landing.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot carried out an abrupt manoeuvre, which resulted in a decrease in rotor rpm.
2. The pilot misjudged the performance change required to recover from the low rpm situation.
3. The excess rotor performance available was insufficient to cushion the landing.

The pilot was carrying out a spray run near the edge of a cotton crop. He was aware of a powerline crossing his intended flight path and had originally intended to fly over the powerline. At the commencement of the spray run he sighted the pole from which the wires were suspended. The pole was close to the edge of the crop, and assessing that there would be adequate clearance, the pilot decided to fly beneath the wires. However, as he neared the wires he lost sight of them due to poor background. The pilot descended the aircraft as close to the crop as possible in an attempt to sight the wires, and to gain maximum possible clearance. The wheels entered the crop and caused the aircraft to decelerate. The pilot was unable to prevent the aircraft from settling into the crop. The aircraft came to rest after tipping onto its nose and ground looping.

Circumstances:

During the day the pilot, who was at Boulia, had arranged to conduct a charter flight from Bedourie to Boulia. He had earlier been seen drinking beer with a friend in a hotel, but he then conducted the outward leg of the flight, arriving at Bedourie at about 1830 hours. The passengers had expected to make the flight to Boulia the next day, but the pilot was insistent that the flight would take place that evening. The reason for the pilot's decision was not known, however, Civil Aviation Regulations prohibit charter passenger operations at night in single engine aircraft. The aircraft departed at last light. At about 2045 hours an aircraft was heard overhead Cravens Peak Station, which is 115 kilometres west of the track between Bedourie and Boulia. Station lighting was turned on, and the strip was illuminated with vehicle headlights. The aircraft did not have any navigation lights illuminated and was seen to make several low passes before it then disappeared. At about 2130 hours the aircraft reappeared at Cravens Peak, and was seen flying very low, parallel to the strip. The strip was again illuminated with vehicle headlights, but the aircraft disappeared from view in a southerly direction and did not reappear. At the time, a line of active thunderstorms was visible to the north of Cravens Peak, and there was a 25 to 30 knot easterly wind at ground level. Early the next morning, the aircraft wreckage was discovered 730 metres south-south-west of the homestead. It had struck the ground during a shallow descending turn to the right. The sounds of the impact were not heard by station residents, probably due the noise of wind. The reason for the gross navigational error could not be established, but the pilot was subsequently found to have a high blood alcohol reading, which could have significantly impaired his ability to conduct the flight safely. There were no aircraft defects found which may have contributed to the development of the accident.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot attempted an operation which was in contravention of published regulations.

2. The pilot became lost during the flight.

3. The pilot had consumed alcohol before the flight, which could have impaired his ability to conduct the flight safely.

During the approach, the aircraft gear struck a set of three power lines. The pilot said that he misjudged the clearance over the second set of power lines located at the north-western end of the strip.

The aircraft was operating a freight carrying flight from Alpha to Barcaldine. Weather conditions at the destination were such that it was necessary for the pilot to conduct an instrument approach. He reported that he elected to leave the extension of the landing gear until after the completion of the approach. He further stated that he completed the prelanding checks but does not recall observing the gear position indicator lights. The aircraft was subsequently landed on runway 01 with the landing gear retracted. An inspection of the aircraft did not reveal any fault with the landing gear system that could have contributed to the occurrence. The pilot believes that he was distracted during the approach and landing sequence by the operation of the radio and the need, because of a 20 knot crosswind on runway 01, to decide on which runway to land. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Circumstances:

The pilot stated that while in the cruise at 3500 feet, approximately ten minutes after take-off, the engine began to lose power and run roughly. Remembering that he had flown over a cleared area a short time before, the pilot elected to attempt to return to this clearing. During the descent he noticed that even with the throttle closed a rough vibration was being transmitted through the airframe. A decision was then taken to make a power-off landing. Approximately ten metres into the landing roll the right main wheel assembly separated from the strut when it impacted a small gully. The aircraft then came to halt without further incident. The investigation revealed that the piston assembly in the number five cylinder had failed due to prolonged and severe detonation. The exact cause of the detonation was not determined.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The number five piston assembly failed due to severe and prolonged detonation.

2. The aircraft was forced to land in unsuitable terrain.