The pilot had arranged to take some friends for a flight and to have a flight check with a flying instructor beforehand. Initially the instructor was unhappy with the pilot's circuit planning and landings. The pilot was given some information on the aircraft and a circuit diagram and another check was scheduled for the following day. On the next day the instructor gave the pilot a substantial briefing prior to the flight. The pilot's flying had improved significantly and the instructor assessed him as competent to fly the aircraft. After a scenic flight in the local area the aircraft joined the circuit on right downwind for runway 12. Surface wind at the time was 120` at 15 knots. The aircraft was observed to touchdown aligned with the centreline, near the runway threshold, and a short time later was seen to bank left. It touched down on the grass within the left hand side flight strip heading about 40` to the left of the runway direction. At around this time the pilot elected to go-around and he applied full power. From this point the aircraft made a gentle left turn until it was tracking 330`. Initial impact with the ground occurred when the aircraft was descending at an angle of approximately 15` and banked at least 30` to the left. Indicated airspeed at this time was 35 knots. The aircraft landed heavily on the nosegear and rolled backwards before coming to rest 20 metres from the point of initial impact.

Because of the load carried the pilot could not take a full load of fuel. The aircraft was not equipped with a calibrated dipstick or a ladder. Due to the position of the tank caps on top of the high wing the absence of these items of equipment made it difficult for the pilot to make an accurate visual assessment of the fuel contents. After checking the tanks the pilot arranged for 30 litres of fuel to be added to the right tank. The reported fuel gauge indications at engine start were 30 US gallons (113 litres) in the left tank and 35 US gallons (132 litres) in the right tank. His planned fuel consumption rate was 60 litres an hour, indicating a total endurance of just over four hours. The flight plan time for the flight was slightly under three hours. The flight proceeded normally initially and the pilot said he used a power setting of 23-24 inches of manifold pressure and 2400 RPM. The cruise fuel flow was set to 90 pounds per hour (57 litres). Near Henty while cruising at 4000 feet the pilot became concerned when the total indicated fuel contents had fallen to 25 US gallons (95 litres) and he advised Melbourne Flight Service that he would land at Mangalore which was on his planned track. Not long afterwards the total gauge indications fell to under 10 US gallons (38 litres) and he told flight Service he was diverting to Shepparton, with an estimate of 0950 hours for arrival there. At about 10 miles from Shepparton the engine misfired and the pilot changed the tank selection from right to left. He entered the circuit at Shepparton on mid downwind at about 1800 feet and tracked for left base runway 18. On base leg the engine failed completely and the pilot realised he could not reach the runway. He selected a grass area into wind and touched down firmly while tracking approximately west. The nose wheel detached on the soft surface and the right main gear leg was damaged as the aircraft slid to a stop. Inspection of the fuel tanks revealed there was no fuel left in either tank. Testing of the fuel flow gauge showed it was accurate. No evidence was found to show that there had been any fuel leakage or loss in flight. Having regard for this it was likely that on DEPARTURE Bankstowm the fuel contents were somewhat less than the pilot thought. A calibration check of the fuel gauges showed significant errors. At an indicated contents of 30 US gallons the left tank held 22.5 gallons, and when the right gauge indicated 35 US gallons the right tank contents were 26.4 gallons.

The pilot was herding a bull along a shallow valley and he decided to hover behind it. He entered the hover about 20 feet above the trees from a slight descent and with some right lateral movement. The heading of the helicopter was westerly in a wind from the south at 10 knots. The pilot then initiated a pedal turn into wind. The helicopter stopped turning when nearly into wind and the pilot added almost full left pedal to complete the turn. The helicopter then began to rotate smoothly and rapidly to the right, and the pilot applied full left pedal in an attempt to stop the yaw. As the application of full left pedal had no effect, the pilot closed the throttle but there was no perceptible reduction in the rate of turn. The helicopter rotated through at least 360 degrees before striking the trees and crashing on its side. The on site investigation did not reveal any mechanical defects or anomalies that would have contributed to the loss of tail rotor control.

The flight was intended to provide a dual check for a pilot to satisfy company and insurance requirements, and to enable a test flight to be carried out, following extensive maintenance on the aircraft. After a normal takeoff, the aircraft made a brief flight to the training area before returning for landing. The landing gear was selected down and normal safe gear down indications were obtained (three green lights and no warning horn). The safe indications were again confirmed during the final approach phase. The aircraft touched down normally on the maingear, but as the nose was lowered, the nosegear collapsed. The subsequent investigation revealed that the nosegear actuator had been incorrectly assembled. The nosegear downlock switch had been adjusted to compensate for the error in the actuator. This resulted in the failure of the nosegear to fully extend to the locked position, while providing a false gear down indication in the cockpit.

Prior to DEPARTURE the pilot had received a weather forecast which indicated that fog could be expected at the destination. Adequate fuel was carried in the aircraft tanks to allow for a considerable period of holding and/or a diversion to another aerodrome if required. After an apparently normal flight of 35 minutes the aircraft arrived in the Goulburn area and the pilot reported his intention to carry out a standard instrument approach. The manoeuvres associated with this procedure do not involve flight over the city of Goulburn, however witnesses observed the aircraft as it circled over the city several times at a relatively low height. It was then seen to roll and descend steeply before striking two houses. A fierce fire broke out which engulfed the aircraft and both residences. The three persons on board the aircraft and a person in one of the houses received fatal injuries. A detailed inspection of the wreckage revealed that the camshaft of the left engine had failed in flight and the pilot had apparantly feathered the propeller. The engine was not operating at the time of impact. No other defect or malfunction was discovered which might have contributed to the development of the accident. It was determined that the particular camshaft had failed from fatigue cracking, resulting from defective manufacture. It was considered likely that when the aircraft arrived over Goulburn, shallow fog obscured all or part of the aerodrome. The lights of the city would have been clearly visible and the pilot probably decided to use the city, rather than the nearby radio navigation aid, as a convenient holding point while waiting for conditions at the aerodrome to improve. During a series of left hand orbits, and after advising his intention to conduct an instrument approach, the pilot experienced a complete failure of the left engine. In order to realise the available single-engine performance of the aircraft the pilot had to perform a series of checks and actions which would result in the applicable propeller being feathered; any unnecessary aerodynamic drag being reduced; and an appropriate airspeed being established. It was determined that although the propeller had probably been feathered, the landing gear, which had evidently been lowered previously, had not been raised to reduce drag. In addition, an analysis of radar returns from the aircraft, recorded at Canberra, indicated that the airspeed at which the aircraft was flying shortly before radar contact was lost, was less than the optimum figure. The final manoeuvre described by witnesses was consistent with that which follows a loss of control in twin engine aircraft when power is being supplied by only one engine and the speed is below the minimum required for full control. The reason the pilot did not raise the landing gear and maintain the required minimum control speed could not be established.

Circumstances:

The pilot was conducting a travel flight over two days, from Lilydale to Essendon, Merimbula, Mallacoota and returning to Lilydale. Pre- DEPARTURE, he checked the fuel tanks and established they were full. The left tank gauge was indicating full, while the right tank gauge was showing less than half. On setting course for Essendon, he noticed the cylinder head temperature gauge was indicating a high temperature so decided he would use a cruise mixture setting richer than normal. He selected a fuel flow of 105 pounds an hour (68.6 litres per hour.) On the subsequent legs the pilot adopted a similar procedure. Before departing Merimbula the next morning, he checked the tank levels by putting his finger in the tank aperture and ascertaining the fuel was about 7.5 centimetres below the top. He decided there was adequate fuel for the rest of the flight and did not refuel. On the flight plan he recorded an endurance of 240 minutes, with a plan time for the two legs of 110 minutes. The flights proceeded normally, and the pilot again used the higher cruise fuel flow. After passing the East Sale area and when heading towards Warragul he noted the right tank fuel gauge was on empty and the left was on one quarter. He decided that the time flown, and his preflight determination of tank contents meant there was adequate fuel for the rest of the flight and continued. About 10 minutes out of Lilydale the engine failed, apparently due to fuel exhaustion in the left tank. The right tank was selected and the engine regained power. The aircraft approached Lilydale for an entry on the dead side of the circuit. While at circuit height for a landing into the north, the engine failed. The pilot manoeuvred the aircraft via an "S" turn onto a final approach to the right hand northern runway. The wind was from the north at 15-20 knots and on turning onto final the pilot realised the aircraft would not make the strip. The aircraft contacted the ground 50 metres short of the airfield boundary with the landing gear up. The VDO time meter recorded a total engine running time of 4.9 hours since departing Lilydale. There was no fuel left in the tanks. In his flight plan considerations for endurance the pilot did not make any allowance for the extra fuel required for each take-off and climb to cruise altitude. In addition, he did not revise his fuel endurance to take account of the use of a higher than planned cruise fuel flow. Calculations made during the investigation showed that when these factors were taken into account, planned fuel usage was consistent with actual fuel used.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot's fuel planning did not take account of the extra fuel required for several take offs and climbs.

2. The pilot used a different fuel flow in flight to that which he had used for calculating the flight plan endurance, but he did not recalculate endurance.

3. The pilot continued the flight after he had observed fuel gauge indications that were abnormal.

4. Engine failure due to fuel exhaustion.

5. The pilot misjudged the forced landing approach.

The pilot was conducting a sight-seeing flight and was returning to Jabiru at 6-700 ft above ground level. The pilot recalled seeing a bird just before it impacted the top of the windscreen. The bird did not enter the cockpit but the perspex was shattered. A large piece of windscreen attached to the compass electrical wires swung inwards and hit the pilot across the forehead, nose and mouth. He was wearing sunglasses at the time which may have protected his eyes from the debris. The pilot was able to control the aircraft normally although extra power was required to overcome the increased drag. The aircraft returned safely to the DEPARTURE airfield.

There had been rain on the strip and the surface was damp with muddy patches. A witness observed the aircraft become airborne after one half to three quarters of the strip length and climb to 5-7 metres above ground level. The witness looked away at this point but when he checked a short time later the aircraft had disappeared. The wreckage was located some 300 metres beyond the end of the strip in a tidal mangrove swamp. The pilot, who had limited experience in bush operations, reported that the first indication he had that all was not normal was when he crossed the upwind end of the strip at a height lower than expected. From this point on, the aircraft slowly descended into the mangroves. He did not detect any abnormality with the aircraft or its engines before or during the takeoff. An examination of the engines revealed that one and possibly both magnetos on the rear engine were not functioning correctly at impact. This would have reduced the aircraft's performance in the manner described by the pilot. The condition of the strip, coupled with the pilot's low experience level, could have reduced the prospect of him detecting a loss of performance much earlier than he did whether the magneto failure(s) occurred before or after liftoff. This occurrence was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

When the landing gear was lowered in the circuit normal down and locked indications were obtained. During the landing roll the right main gear collapsed. Investigation revealed that a damaged "O" ring in the right downlock actuator had allowed hydraulic pressure to be lost, causing the right gear to unlock and collapse. The actuators are "on-condition" items.