The pilot intended refuelling at the previous landing point but he found that fuel was not available. After re-checking his fuel requirements he was satisfied that the flight could be accomplished with almost full reserves. The weather deteriorated and groundspeed reduced during the flight, causing the pilot to become concerned about flight visibility and fuel endurance. He elected to make a precautionary landing near a homestead but during the landing roll the aircraft ran through a fence and collided with a ditch. Although the pilot had lost time on earlier legs of the flight he made no similar allowance for the subject leg, nor did he divert to a suitable refuelling point. Having decided to carry out a precautionary landing, the pilot did not make a low-level inspection of the area. The approach to land was made downwind and the aircraft did not touch down until it was less than 220 metres from the end of the 2000 metre paddock selected.

The RF5 glider pilot was taxiing for take off with the intention of passing to the right of a Blanik glider which was bogged in muddy ground. He feared moving too far to the right because there was a risk of bogging the RF5 also. Initially the pilots in charge of both gliders thought there would be enough clearance. As the RF5 neared the Blanik, the Blanik pilot began waving to stop the RF5 but it was too late. The left wing tip of the RF5 struck the nose of the Blanik. At the time of the collision the RF5 was taxiing at a brisk walking pace. This accident was not the subject of a formal on-site investigation.

Circumstances:

The pilot of VH-BLX had planned to fly from Tully direct to Cooktown via Cairns. However, due to unsuitable inland weather the pilot changed the planned route before DEPARTURE to fly coastal at 1000 feet. The pilot reported DEPARTURE from abeam Dunk Island. He was later cleared to transit the Cairns control zone at 1000 feet, tracking initially from False Cape, (nine kilometres east of the aerodrome), to the control tower. As the aircraft was approaching the control tower from the east at 1000 feet, a Boeing 737 aircraft VH-CZL was approaching from the south at 2000 feet. VH-CZL overflew the control tower before being instructed to turn right and then make a left circuit for runway 15. The pilot of VH-BLX reported sighting the jet and was instructed to pass behind it. VH-BLX was then instructed to turn further right, to ensure that the flight path of VH-BLX would be to the east of the jet's flight path. After the pilot of VH-CZL had been given a landing clearance VH-BLX was instructed to turn left and was given the choice to track coastal or direct to Cooktown. The pilot was asked to report passing Double Island, 17 kilometres north-west of the airport. This was acknowledged by the pilot. The aircraft was last seen from the control tower tracking west towards Yorkeys Knob, eight kilometres to the north. No further transmissions were heard from VH-BLX, and an extensive search failed to locate the aircraft. The pilot’s body was found three days later in the entrance to Cairns harbour. An oil slick was seen south of Double Island on the same day, but it could not be confirmed that it was from the missing aircraft. A trawler has since reported netting an object south of Double Island which may have been the aircraft wreckage. The object was lost from the nets before it could be identified. Aircraft components have since been found in trawler nets at the same position, including the propeller and a section of wing structure. The structure shows evidence of being subjected to extreme impact forces. A search of the location has been conducted by Water Police without any success. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The pilot reported that he had landed at the mustering camp and prior to disembarking had placed a rubber strop over the collective lever. This was necessary as the lever would rise if no restraint was applied to it. He wanted a "relief break" and to deliver a parcel to one of the men at the camp. Having been out of the helicopter for a few minutes as he started to walk back to it the aircraft lifted off the ground rolled and came to rest on its left side. When he was able to return to the cabin he found that the strop was no longer on the collective lever. The pilot claimed a total experience of 7500 hours including 200 on type. He has flown a total of 250 hours in the last 90 days 80 hours on the lst 30 days and 6 hours on the last 24 hours. These times included 17 hours on type in the last 30 days and 6 hours on type in the last 24 hours. During conversation the pilot reported that he was aware of three incidents in Queensland and two in Western Australia where R22's without the pilot in the aircraft had performed a similar manoeuvre. There is no manufactured collective lever restraint system in the aircraft and each operator makes up his own means of tie-down because the practice of leaving the helicopter when the engine is running is quite common.

The aircraft was observed approaching to land on Runway 21. It bounced on landing and then rocked from one mainwheel to the other before veering off the left side of the strip and running through a fence. The pilot reported that the wind was straight down the strip and that on touchdown the aircraft swung left suddenly. He was unable to control the swing. A witness on the ground reported that the wind at the time was from the south-east at 15-20 knots but favouring Runway 21. He saw the aircraft bounce a few feet before touching down again on one mainwheel and then the other and then veer off the strip. No fault was found with the wheel brakes which might have caused the swing. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

Circumstances:

The pilot was involved with a group of Venturer Scouts on camp in Tasmania. At the time of the accident, about 20 members of the group were involved in water skiing activities at Meadowbank Lake. The pilot had earlier arranged to make two scenic flights to Cox Bight in the State's south-west for members of the group. He had also told one of the scouts that he would fly past them at the lake. The lake was on the planned track to the south-west and the flight on which the accident occurred was the first of the two planned flights. The lake is approximately 13 kilometres long and lies generally in a north-west/south-east direction. The aircraft was seen approaching from the north-west over the lake at low level. It flew past the group which was located on the south-west bank of the lake. The occupants could be seen waving to those on the shore. Shortly after passing the group, the aircraft hit the top wire of a three wire powerline that was suspended across the lake at a height of about 12 metres above the water. The wire first impacted the left main wheel and then slid up the wheel leg. The wire broke at the poles from which it was suspended either side of the lake. It was then dragged some distance by the aircraft. The two poles were approximately 300 metres apart. The aircraft continued for about 500 metres before diving into the water. The powerline would have been very difficult to see from the aircraft. There were no hazard markers of any description on the powerline, and it would have blended into the background of cliffs on the edge of the lake.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The aircraft was flown on a low altitude across the lake surface.

2. The powerline would have been difficult to see from the aircraft.

The aircraft was engaged to spray pasture with insecticide. After a ground inspection of the treatment area, the aircraft was loaded, prior to its first take-off from the strip. Another company aircraft was also operating from the 800 metre long strip. Take-off direction was to the west, with a 2 uphill slope, and a 2 to 3 knot tailwind component. The first aircraft departed without problem. The pilot of VH-KNL, departing some three minutes later, reported that the aircraft's tail was slow to lift off the ground. Some 700 metres from the start of the take-off run, the aircraft encountered soft ground. The pilot selected 20 degrees of flap but this had little effect. The aircraft became airborne and he commenced to dump his load. The aircraft struck a ridge 30 metres from the end of the airstrip, bounced and came to rest on a second ridge 200 metres further on. The pilot reported that the engine had been operating normally, but that he had been late dumping his load, when the aircraft failed to perform. There had been insufficient strip remaining to abandon the take-off. This accident was not the subject of a formal on-site investigation.

On arrival overhead at the destination aerodrome, the pilot elected to land into a strong headwind on the grass strip. The nose landing gear failed when the nose wheel dug into the grass surface during the application of heavy braking, and the aircraft overturned. Investigation revealed that the approach speed had been higher than optimum for the weight, and skid marks on the strip indicated that a series of heavy brake applications had been made during the landing roll. The nose landing gear was inspected, and it was found to have fractured in torsional overload. It is considered that the combined effects of the aircraft not being flown at the optimum approach speed, the heavy application of brakes on a grass strip and the failure of the pilot to adequately compensate for the resultant pitch down of the nose contributed to the accident.

The aircraft was engaged on a coastal sightseeing flight in marginal VMC. The area was affected by a humid airflow. The pilot said the engine appeared to be affected by carburettor icing and, although he was able to restore power with carburettor heat, he was apprehensive about returning over the metropolitan area. He said he decided to make a precautionary landing on a nearby clearing. After a landing roll of about 100 metres, the landing gear struck a shallow ditch and collapsed. The aircraft slid to a halt a few metres beyond the point of impact.

The flight was a check for the pilot-under-instruction who had not flown since gaining a restricted private licence more than three months previously. This was also her first flight in a high-winged aeroplane. After some general handling practice, the instructor initiated a practice forced landing which was to conclude with a full stop landing on an authorised landing area (ALA). The pilot-under-instruction flew the aircraft with the instructor commenting as necessary. On late final, with full flap selected, the aircraft developed a higher than normal sink rate and subsequently contacted the ground in a right skid. This subjected the nosewheel leg to substantial sideloads, forcing it to the rear left and buckling the firewall. Late in the landing roll, the propeller and right wingtip contacted the ground. The instructor reported that he was aware of the high sink rate and placed his hands on the controls but felt that no control input was necessary as he had experienced landings from similar rates of descent many times. Had the aircraft been in balanced flight at touchdown, it is possible that no damage would have been sustained. Neither crew member reported hearing the stall warning operate. Conditions were such that the higher sink rate could have been induced by windshear.