A low level aerobatic display was being conducted over the lake. Towards the end of the display the pilot performed four snap rolls followed by a steep climb and stall turn. Although the display was to be conducted not below 500 feet agl the aircraft was recovered from the last snap roll at an estimated 150 feet agl. Despite this low recovery height the pilot persisted with the climb and stall turn manoeuvre. While attempting to recover from the subsequent dive he stalled the aircraft at too low a height to avoid impacting the water.

Circumstances:

The pilot reported the flight was uneventful until the landing gear failed to extend normally prior to landing at Quirindi. Normal and emergency procedures were unsuccessful. The aircraft then diverted to Gunnedah where ground observers reported the landing gear appeared to be extended, however, the right main gear collapsed during the landing roll. Investigation revealed an internal failure of the landing gear air/ground safety switch which rendered the gear door solenoid valve inoperative. The failure had apparently occurred during the initial landing gear extension cycle prior to the locking sequence of the right main gear. All subsequent hydraulic action was then directed to the selector handle lock valve, preventing completion of the landing gear extension cycle.

At the completion of a flight in the training area, the pilot returned for a full stop landing on the duty runway. A preceding aircraft in the circuit advised the Tower that sun glare would soon be a problem for landing aircraft. Immediate steps were taken by the Controller to change the duty runway, and VH-FST was to be the last aircraft to use the runway in question. The pilot later advised that as she flared the aircraft for landing, all forward visibility was lost because of sun glare. The aircraft touched down heavily and bounced several times, causing the nosegear to collapse. Although affected by the sun glare, the pilot had decided to continue with the landing, as she had not previously attempted a go around in conditions of limited forward visibility. The Tower Controller had been unaware of the sun glare hazard until the problem had been identified by the pilot of a landing aircraft.

During the landing roll the aircraft suddenly veered to the left. The pilot took corrective action but the nose gear collapsed and the nose section of the aircraft struck the strip surface. Although the strip was in regular use it was not being inspected. It was constructed on a dry lake-bed and the combination of no rain and regular use caused a soft patch to develop about 430 metres from the threshold. When the aircraft entered this area the nosewheel progressively turned left until it reached the stop. The sideload now imposed was too great and caused the noseleg bearing to fail.

Following a period of dual instruction the student was authorised to practice glide approaches. During the first of these approaches the aircraft bounced after touchdown. Several more bounces occurred and the nose gear leg collapsed. The aircraft slid to a halt 3 metres off the side of the runway. The aircraft was high on approach and touched down nosewheel first. The pilot stated that the rapid succession of bounces surprised her and no bounced landing recovery was attempted.

The aircraft was attempting a take off from Northam Airfield at the time of the accident. The student pilot was flying the aircraft and another student was acting as wingtip walker. The wingtip walker inadvertently held the left wing up against aileron control input from the pilot. When the wingtip walker released the wing, the aircraft rolled rapidly to the left. The wingtip, which was fitted with a combination metal tie-down point and skid, collided with the ground, the skid dug in and the aircraft ground looped. This accident was not the subject of an on-site investigation.

The helicopter was engaged in the transport of personnel for stream sampling operations. The pilot was to collect one of the samplers from a sloping area which had recently had trees cut down to facilitate the approach. To achieve the pick up, the helicopter was manoeuvred so that the left skid was resting on a slab of rock, and the right skid remained in the air, about 120 millimetres from a tree stump. As the passenger approached the aircraft, the pilot adjusted the position of the skid on the rock and the right skid contacted the stump. The helicopter then rapidly rolled onto its side. This accident was not the subject of an on scene investigation.

The pilot was conducting a solo circuit exercise. On the third landing of the exercise, the pilot stated that the aircraft touched down on all three wheels and bounced. The aircraft was then observed to land on the mainwheels then heavily on the nosewheel. The nosegear collapsed and the aircraft skidded for 33 metres on the lower engine cowl before coming to rest. After the aircraft bounced the pilot did not take any corrective action prior to the second touch down.

The pilot was taking part in a course designed to teach the techniques and practices of cross-country flying. He had been briefed to conduct a local soaring flight, but elected to carry out a cross-country exercise. An outlanding became necessary, however the pilot misjudged the approach to the selected paddock. The glider collided with trees and a power line at the upwind end of the paddock. The pilot had failed a previous cross-country check flight, and had been specifically briefed not to conduct flights away from the local area until he had received additional instruction. He declined to provide reasons for attempting the subject flight.

The aircraft was tracking direct from Brisbane to Coolangatta and reported over Jacobs Well at 0618 hours. The track from Jacobs Well to Coolangatta is 148 degrees magnetic and the Jacobs Well VOR (VHF Omni Range) is 26 nautical miles (47 kilometres) from Coolangatta. At 0622 hours the pilot was instructed by Coolangatta Tower to make a runway 14 VOR/DME approach (an instrument approach procedure). The weather conditions at Coolangatta were unsuitable for a visual approach with rainshowers, cloud at one thousand feet, and visibility reduced in rainshowers. As the pilot approached overhead Coolangatta he was advised that the conditions were now on the minima, which is a cloud ceiling of 629 feet and visibility of 3.5 kilometres. The pilot was then given instructions on the missed approach procedure, in the event that he may not have become visual by the minima. The pilot commenced the instrument procedure, but elected to not carry out the normal entry procedure due to the presence of heavy rain in the procedure turn area, and turned left to intercept the outbound track of 350 degrees magnetic. Brisbane Radar was observing this manoeuvre and advised Coolangatta Tower that the aircraft did not appear to be carrying out the normal procedure. The radar operator continued to observe the aircraft, and at about the time the aircraft return began to fade from his screen, he was of the the opinion that the aircraft was well west of the inbound radial (330 degrees magnetic) and may have been carrying out an incorrect procedure. Coolangatta Tower was immediately informed, and the tower operator, who could not visually sight the air ft, de cided that the saf est c ours e of action was t o have th e air craft aba ndon the appro ach. Acc ord ingl y, he gave i nstr uct ions to the pi lot to cli mb to 4 000 feet an d to trac k d irect to t he Co ol ang atta V OR. The p il ot a ck nowledg ed the instruc tion , a nd advised that h e was on the c orre ct i nboun d ra di al (3 30 degrees m agnetic) and c lim bing to 4000 fee t. Due t o the preva iling weather in the te rminal area the pilot decided to return to Brisbane rather than enter the holding pattern. The aircraft was then cleared to track from overhead Coolangatta to Brisbane via a left turn to intercept the outbound track. Brisbane radar observed the aircraft to make a right turn rather than a left turn as instructed. Subsequent examination of recorded radar returns showed that the aircraft had not carried out the normal entry procedure for the 14 VOR/DME approach. The aircraft track appeared to be as described by the pilot, and although a small divergence to the west of the inbound radial may have occurred during interception, there is no evidence to suggest that the aircraft was not tracking within tolerances on final approach. The pilot had decided not to carry out the normal entry procedure due to an engine consideration, which is a limitation imposed by the manufacturer on the operation of the engine in heavy precipitation. For the same reason, he had decided to make a right turn on his departure, but had unfortunately not advised air traffic control of his preference. The aircraft did not descend below published minimum altitudes during the instrument procedure. During the right turn, the aircraft remained above the minimum approach altitude, which is 3000 feet within a five nautical mile (nine kilometre) radius of Coolangatta. The aircraft was also above the lowest safe radar altitude, and was not likely to come in close proximity to terrain during the turn to intercept the outbound track.