On return to Moorabbin from the training area the pilot attempted two crosswind touch-and-go landings on Runway 31 right using 20 degrees of flap and normal approach speeds. The first was successful. On the second approach the aircraft touched down well into the runway and he had difficulty keeping the aircraft straight during the landing roll. After a ground roll of about 250 metres the pilot decided to make the landing a full stop because he thought that there was insufficient runway remaining for a touch-and-go. In reality there was still about 600 metres of runway available for a go-around. As the aircraft slowed down the pilot had increasing difficulty keeping the aircraft straight. With the wind of 250 degrees gusting from 12 to 19 knots, the aircraft veered left. He decided to try to bring the aircraft to a controlled stop on the grass with the intention of taxiing back on to the runway. A short distance after leaving the sealed runway the nosewheel sank in soft damp ground and the aircraft slowly tipped up on to its right wing tip before settling back on to its wheels. During his previous training the pilot had completed one lesson in crosswind landings with an instructor. However the gusty crosswind conditions on the day of the accident were more severe than he had encountered before and he was unaware that the grass surface was soft. This accident was not the subject of a formal on scene investigation.

Circumstances:

The pilot completed some dual flying earlier in the morning in another pilot's gyrocopter. About 10 hours dual flying had been completed with this other pilot over recent weeks. He then decided to make a solo flight in his own single place gyrocopter. The intention was to fly eight to ten circuits and low passes along the airstrip to get the feel of the aircraft. The first circuit appeared to proceed smoothly at an altitude of about 250 feet above the ground until the turn onto final approach. When that turn was started the aircraft assumed a reasonably steep nose down attitude. Engine noise remained constant until the aircraft hit the ground tracking about 15 degrees to the left of the landing direction. A detailed wreckage inspection did not reveal any pre-existing defect that may have contributed to the accident.

Significant Factors:

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The investigation did not determine why the aircraft hit the ground in the manner that it did.

Circumstances:

The aircraft was being used for a pleasure flight for the owner and some friends. The Captain calculated the landing distances required for both runway 28 and 10, based on weather reports obtained at briefing, which indicated a strong northerly wind component. An updated report received some 30 minutes before descent confirmed the wind as 290 degrees at 7 knots. Approaching the island and becoming visual, the crew noted the windsock near the western end of the runway to be indicating a slight headwind component in the 10 direction and decided on a straight in approach to runway 10, to avoid an approaching squall/shower. The aircraft touched down firmly a short distance beyond the threshold. Speed brakes were immediately extended and wheel braking applied. About four seconds later the Captain called for the drag chute to be deployed. Although the co-pilot correctly activated the handle, it became obvious that the chute had not deployed as no increase in retardation occurred. When the Captain realised that the aircraft could not be stopped on the runway remaining, he attempted to turn the aircraft towards a clear grass area to the right. However, the aircraft was aquaplaning on the wet surface and did not respond to steering inputs for some distance. The aircraft left the bitumen tracking to the right. It collided with a gable marker, passed through a fence, continued down an embankment, across a road, through a second fence and came to rest approximately 90 metres from the runway end and 70 metres to the right of the extended centreline. The left main and nose gear legs were torn off. Witnesses to the accident said that when the aircraft landed, the runway was very wet, and the wind was westerly at 5 to 10 knots. It was determined that the Captain had made some miscalculations in his pre-flight assessments. He had noted the landing distance available as being the same for both runways, whereas runway 28 has a reduced length due to terrain clearance requirements on the approach. Under the conditions both forecast and prevailing, and using the criteria applicable at the time for an aircraft fitted with an alternate means of retardation, i.e. drag chute, the landing distances required for both runways were greater than the landing distances available. The Captain had also evidently applied incorrect techniques during the landing. He had not attempted to deploy the drag chute immediately the nosewheel was on the ground and had not applied unmodulated pressure to the anti-skid braking system. These measures are required by the manufacturer to obtain maximum performance. It was found that the drag chute canister lid had been sealed with tank sealant and painted over. The latch assembly had operated but the drogue chute spring was insufficiently strong to break the seal. When the sealant was prised away from around the lid, the system operated normally. This error had not been found during a check of the aircraft immediately following repainting. The lid had the appearance of an oblong radio antenna and was not marked in any distinguishing manner. The problem should also have been noticed during a subsequent inspection of the drag chute for moisture. The inspection is required every 90 days if the drag chute has not been deployed and requires the removal of the lid and drogue chute in order to feel the main chute for moisture. The condition of the sealant would indicate that this had not been carried out.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Inadequate pre-flight planning and preparation by the flight crew. The runway distance required was in excess of the distance available on either runway.

2. Adverse runway and weather conditions - wet surface and downwind component.

3. Improper sealing of drag chute canister.

4. Inadequate maintenance of the drag chute system. 5. Improper operation of wheel brakes.

Recommendations:

1. It is recommended that where a drag chute is fitted, the Civil Aviation Authority considers requiring some type of appropriate marking be applied to the canister lid to clearly identify its purpose.

The pilot reported that the first flight of the day commenced at 0700 hours and landed to refuel after one hour and forty five minutes. She stated that before refuelling, she dipped the tank and noted that there was 15 to 20 litres of fuel remaining. The next flight commenced at 0900 hours, and at 1040 hours the helicopter departed the muster area to return to the refuelling point, which was about five minutes away. About two minutes later, the engine coughed once and then stopped. The aircraft was autorotated onto a cleared track, and during the landing the mainrotor struck the tailboom and the skids were bent. Inspection of the wreckage revealed that the fuel supply had been exhausted. This occurrence was not the subject of an on-site investigation and the above information was provided by the pilot and passenger.

The pilot reported that at the time of the occurrence the aircraft was over water descending through 650 feet at 80 knots for a beach landing on Pelorus Island. Engine power was set at about 70 percent torque. A strong airframe vibration suddenly began, accompanied by a noticeable bang. The helicopter yawed left and the pilot saw the engine out light illuminate and the engine tachometer reading decreasing. He did not recall any other instrument indications. As the pilot corrected the yaw and lowered the collective pitch control, the vibration ceased. He transmitted a mayday call and then, with his left hand, operated the switch on the overhead console to arm the emergency floatation bags. As the aircraft approached the water, the pilot attempted to operate the float inflation trigger at the same time as he returned his hand to raise the collective pitch control to complete the forced landing. The floats did not inflate. However, the pilot was not sure as to whether he had operated the trigger properly. The pilot thought that the helicopter contacted the water in a slightly tail-low attitude. He kicked open his door and was able to egress from the helicopter as it rolled left. The front left seat pasenger and the rear right seat passenger escaped from the cabin without assistance as the fuselage became inverted. The passengers in the left and centre rear seat positions were assisted from the helicopter by the pilot. Attempts to locate and recover the helicopter were hampered by the water depth in the area, strong tidal currents, and an uneven, rocky sea bed. While some possible sonar contacts were identified, the position of the helicopter could not be positively determined. Consequently, the search was called off and the wreckage remains unrecovered. The descriptions of the occurrence provided by the passengers matched that given by the pilot and indicated that the engine probably suffered a complete power loss. However, because the wreckage was not recovered, no positive conclusion can be drawn as to the causal factors involved. The helicopter had flown some 7 hours since undergoing scheduled maintenance, during which a new engine compressor was fitted. The turbine was also removed and refitted to facilitate the compressor change.

The 700 metre long strip was covered with grass approximately 60 centrimetres long. Although the pilot had operated from the strip previously, on this occasion two passengers were carried. The pilot became concerned with the aircraft's rate of acceleration and decided to abort the takeoff. However, the aircraft overran the strip and the nose gear collapsed when it struck a log hidden in the long grass. This accident was not the subject of a formal on-scene investigation.

Circumstances:

Shortly after full power was applied for take-off, the pilot noticed that the aircraft was tracking to the left of the strip centre. He turned gently right to correct the situation, and the nose gear leg collapsed soon after. Metallurgical examination concluded that the nose gear leg mounting trunnions contained fatigue cracks. One trunnion had failed during this take-off. The aircraft had accrued almost 20,000 hours and an inspection recommended by the aircraft manufacturer less than one year prior to the accident had not been conducted. Had the inspection been conducted, the fatigue cracks should have been detected. Some time after this aircraft was manufactured the manufacturer altered the design of the mounting trunnions to make them stronger.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Nose leg mounting trunnions of weaker design than later versions.

2. The operator had not conducted inspections recommended by the manufacturer.

3. The aircraft was frequently operated on rough strips.

4. Fatigue fracture of the nose gear mounting trunnion.

Circumstances:

The left seat pilot was undergoing his second session of endorsement training in the aircraft. After a cross-country exercise under simulated instrument flight conditions, the aircraft returned for a landing on runway 11 Left. The pilots reported that the undercarriage was selected down on the downwind leg and confirmed by three green lights and the left engine nacelle mirror. The approach and landing were reported to be normal, with initial touchdown on the main wheels. Soon after the nosewheel contacted the ground, the nose gear collapsed. Examination of the nose gear down lock mechanism, indicated that it had been subjected to considerable forces which could only be attributed to a heavy landing or landings. These forces had dislodged the down lock roller and stop bolt away from the down lock hook. Subsequent forces then allowed the nose gear to retract and hence collapse.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Nose gear mechanism had been damaged by a heavy landing or landings. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

Circumstances:

The student pilot was receiving instruction in the procedures associated with an engine failure after take-off. At 1000 feet above ground level carburettor heat was applied, the throttle retarded to idle, and the aircraft configured for descent. At 800 feet the power was reapplied, carburettor heat was selected off and the aircraft climbed back to repeat the lesson. After the second exercise the engine would only develop 1500 rpm and was running roughly. The instructor took over, exercised the carburettor heat and left it on, but there was no improvement in engine performance. He then carried out a forced landing in a paddock. During the latter part of the landing run the nosewheel dug into the soft surface, and the right wing was damaged. The weather conditions at the time (ambient air temperature 16-17 with a dew point of 11 and overcast) were favourable to the formation of carburettor ice. The engine had recently been overhauled. The operator reported that the aircraft normally gave only a very small drop in rpm when carburettor heat was applied. The spark plugs were found to be heavily sooted with a fresh carbon deposit, which indicated that the engine had suffered a rich cut. This is consistent with the effects of ice accumulating in the carburettor. The carburettor heat box was found to be loosely fitted to the carburettor, and one side of the box had a rubber seal missing. This resulted in a loss of effectiveness of the carburettor heating system.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Inadequate maintenance and inspection of the carburettor heat box.
2. Weather conditions were favourable for the formation of carburettor icing.
3. The operator and pilots did not recognise the significance of the very low drop in rpm when testing the carburettor heat system.
4. The pilot was forced to land on unsuitable terrain.

The student pilot was attempting a full stop landing while under instruction. The wind was light and variable with occasional gusts producing 6 knots of crosswind from the left on runway 23. The approach, flare and touchdown were reported to be uneventful. About two seconds after touchdown the aircraft was hit by a wind gust and swung suddenly to the left. The student pilot immediately applied full right aileron which pitched the aircraft on to the right wingtip. It then pivotted heavily onto the nose gear which collapsed. The aircraft skidded to a halt on the sealed surface.