The student had been briefed to carry out a series of solo circuits and landings. The instructor observed the first circuit, and reported that it appeared to be normal. On touchdown, the aircraft bounced then pitched nose down. The subsequent touchdown was heavy and the nosegear was torn off. The student had accumulated 1.5 hours of solo operations on 4 previous flights, and had received a dual check on her last flight, which was 8 days prior to the accident. When the aircraft bounced she had evidently been unable to take suitable corrective action to prevent the subsequent heavy touchdown.

The helicopter was flying at 40' above ground level to enable the cameraman to film a vehicle. The crew heard a loud bang and the pilot suspected an engine failure so he commenced an autorotation. However, he quickly found that the engine responded normally to power changes but not knowing what had caused the noise, he decided to land on suitable terrain just ahead. After they had exited the helicopter, the cameraman reported to the pilot that he saw a wire just prior to hearing the noise. Inspection of the machine confirmed that it had suffered a wirestrike. The task required a high degree of attention on the movements of the vehicle in order to position the helicopter as required by the cameraman. The pilot did not have a low flying approval and his supervisor had instructed him not to descend below 100 feet above ground level, however he complied with the cameraman's request to fly as low as possible. The person occupying the left seat was not trained as an observer for this type of operation. The supporting poles for the wire struck by the helicopter were widely spaced and one was obscured by a stand of trees.

The helicopter was heading in a westerly direction following takeoff from the pilot's property. The track was to take the aircraft directly over Mount Gayndah so the pilot decided to track to the south of the mountain to provide better terrain clearance. When the helicopter was abeam the mountain, at about 500 feet above ground level, it struck two power lines suspended between a pole on top of the mountain and a pole 1100 metres to the south in the foothills. The pilot was unaware the aircraft had struck the wires, but immediately lowered the collective and turned the aircraft towards the only available cleared area. Approaching the area it became obvious to the pilot that the aircraft would not clear trees on the approach path and he increased the collective. The helicopter cleared the trees and turned right through 180 degrees before touching down in a level attitude while travelling rearward. The landing skids collapsed and the aircraft slewed to the right before coming to rest. The two 90 tonne breaking strain wires had been broken when they were struck by the main rotor blades of the helicopter. The wires then severed the tail rotor drive shaft, a substantial portion of one tail rotor blade and almost severed the tail boom just in front of the vertical stabilisers.

The helicopter was engaged in an inspection of the oil pipeline between Jackson and St George. The inspection involved landing at various points along the pipeline to allow the technicians to check the pipeline. As the aircraft took off after an inspection stop the front seat passenger warned the pilot about the position of a power line. The pilot attempted to take avoiding action but the aircraft struck the power line. Control of the aircraft was lost and it struck the ground in a nose low attitude and rolled onto its right side. A section of the helicopter's transmission was torn from the aircraft and struck the front seat passenger. During the day the flight had been delayed by problems with the inspection schedule and aircraft fuelling. While waiting in the aircraft for the technicians to complete their task, the pilot was involved in flight planning the next stage length to St George in order to arrive there before last light. The pilot reported that he had seen the power line during the previous landing sequence but had forgotten about its presence on takeoff.

The pilot was positioning the helicopter before carrying out a medical evacuation from a ship. Prior to DEPARTURE he had arranged to land on the school oval at Lancelin, to refuel, and to have two vehicles positioned at the oval to provide lighting for the landing. During the subsequent night approach to the oval the helicopter collided with sand dunes. Witnesses reported that during the approach the aircraft descended to a low altitude and disappeared from sight behind the sand dunes before impact. An inspection of the wreckage revealed that apart from the altimeter no other faults were found with the aircraft that could have contributed to the occurrence. Examination of the altimeter found that it was outside operating limits and during operation in the aircraft was likely to have been erratic in its indications. No such erratic indications were reported by the pilot or his passenger, who was also monitoring the altimeter. The weather at the time of the occurrence was reported as overcast with light drizzle and a light wind. The visibility was 20 kilometres although the night was dark and the only source of light in the area was from the town and the headlights of the two vehicles being used to light the landing area. These conditions are conducive to the pilot suffering from visual illusions and it is possible that these illusions caused the pilot to misjudge the altitude of the helicopter during the approach.

After a normal approach, the pilot was surprised when the aircraft bounced on initial touchdown. A second bounce occurred, during which the pilot applied power to cushion the next touchdown. The power application seemed to have little effect and the nosewheel and propeller struck the ground heavily. The aircraft then ran off the side of the runway and collided with a fence. The pilot had been given a check flight on the aircraft two days previously. During this check, he was advised to use less flap for landing than that specified in the Flight Manual. At the time of the accident, the aircraft was being operated in excess of the maximum permitted all-up-weight. The pilot advised that he had not carried out a weight and balance calculation because the hiring organisation had assured him that the aircraft could be operated with full fuel tanks and four persons on board. Following the bounced landing the pilot had not initiated a go around and directional control had been lost after the nosegear suffered damage on heavy contact with the runway.

The pilot had been requested to carry out an aerobatic display over a fair being conducted at the local racecourse. During the display three spins were completed, with each being entered at about 1500 feet agl and recovery effected by 500 feet agl. The display appeared to be finished when the pilot made a low pass from behind the crowd at approximately 100 feet agl and then climbed out for what looked initially like a normal entry to the circuit at nearby Wyndham Airport. However, as the aircraft approached 1000 feet agl it was observed to carry out a spin entry similar to that used on the three previous spins. A spin to the left started and four turns were completed before recovery appeared to commence at about 200 feet agl. The aircraft struck the ground before recovery was complete, still yawing to the left and with the nose attitude about 24 degrees below that required for level flight. Whether or not the entry to the final spin was delibrate could not determined. The pilot was not approved to carry out aerobatic manoeuvres below 3000 feet agl, however, reports indicate that he had previously conducted low level aerobatic displays.

Due to a loose seat belt banging against the fuselage of the helicpoter, the pilot slowed the aircraft and commenced an approach to land as soon as possible. The chosen approach path had a tailwind of between 15 and 20 knots. Shortly after commencing the approach, the rate of descent increased rapidly and the pilot's application of collective pitch to correct the situation further increased the descent rate. During the approach, both the audio and visual annunciators indicated that the engine had failed. The pilot lowered collective but then had to flare as the aircraft was about to impact a small mulga tree. The aircraft cleared that tree but was damaged as a result of a collision with a nearby tree. The rapid rate of descent experienced whilst descending downwind with a low forward speed is typical of an aircraft which has settled in its own main rotor downwash, i.e in a Vortex Ring State. No defect was found in the engine which might have explained the reported engine failure. It is possible that the pilot inadvertantly selected the throttle to the engine shut-off position as he commenced autorotative flight.

The pilot, who had not previously flown this type of aircraft, intended to carry out a circuit and landing. The take-off was reported to be normal, but at a height of about 20 feet agl engine noise ceased and the aircraft nosed down steeply. It struck the ground heavily in a nose low, wings level attitude. It was determined that the fuel tap was still turned off when the take-off commenced and the engine had failed because of fuel starvation. The pilot had been unable to prevent the subsequent stall and had insufficient height remaining to regain control before impact with the ground.

The pilot had not flown for some time and was practicing circuits with her husband who was also a pilot. On downwind, her pre-landing checks were interrupted by a radio call. The aircraft was subsequently landed with the gear retracted. The gear warning horn was not serviceable prior to the flight. After the aircraft was established on final the pilot's husband commenced to stow the headsets and other loose items which were in the cockpit. He did not monitor the approach and therefore did not notice that the pilot had omitted to lower the landing gear.