Circumstances:

The pilot reported that on joining the circuit, he checked the windsock and elected to land on runway 29 into an estimated wind of 330 degrees at five knots. He recalled that he made a steeper than normal approach and then he levelled off too high. The aircraft then bounced twice and swung to the left, skipped several times and was on the gravel edge of the strip by the time the pilot applied full power for an attempted go-around. The aircraft lifted off the ground and flew along the alignment of a drainage ditch before it hit the edge of the ditch. The nose gear folded back, and the aircraft stopped abruptly. It tipped up on its nose before falling back into the ditch on its tailplane. Subsequent discussions with the pilot revealed that the apparent width of the runway upon which he landed was greater than the runway with which he is most familiar - Camden. In these circumstances, a runway that is wider than expected will present the same visual cues as if the pilot was lower than he should be, that is, he will level off at a greater height to compensate. The usual result of levelling off too high without some corrective action is a bounced landing. This eventuated in this case and the pilot then failed to take the correct action for recovery from the bounced landing.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Misleading visual cues. Wider runway than the pilot was used to gave perception of being too low.

2. Pilot levelled off too high.

3. Pilot did not take correct action to recover from a bounced landing.

After landing, a 180 degree turn to the right to backtrack along the runway was planned. As the aircraft was being slowed to taxi speed a gentle left turn to position the aircraft near the left side of the runway was commenced, but the right main gear collapsed. A gear down indication remained on after the aircraft came to a halt. The right main gear retraction push-pull tube bellcrank had developed a fatigue crack in the area of the bushing hole. The bellrcrank failed in overload at this crack causing insufficient downlock tension to be maintained on the extended main landing gear. The aircraft had flown 9336 hours at the time of the failure and the left bellcrank had previously been strengthened.

The student pilot had been authorized to carry out two solo circuits before proceeding to the training area to practise steep turns. Runway 16 was in use with a wind from the South South-West at about 12 kntos. On her first landing approach the student misjudged the flare. The aircraft ballooned and then landed heavily. It then became airborne for a short distance before again landing heavily, resulting in the nose gear collapsing. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

The aircraft was operating as Singapore Airlines flight SQ31A, enroute from Singapore to Melbourne, with an intermediate stop at Adelaide. On arrival in the Melbourne area the aircraft was vectored by Air Traffic Control (ATC) to a left base position for an approach to runway 34. At a point 5 nautical miles (9.2 kilometres) south of the airport, and 1 mile (1.7 kilometres) to the left of the extended centreline of the runway, the aircraft was instructed to turn left to take up a north-easterly heading. The crew reported at this time that "we have the field visual." The aircraft was then instructed to make a visual approach, and to turn further left for a direct approach to the runway. The crew acknowledged this instruction, but the aircraft was observed to pass through the extended centreline. ATC advised the aircraft that it was now to the right of the centreline, and instructed it to turn left onto a north-westerly heading to intercept this line. The aircraft landed without further incident. The Captain of the aircraft later advised that he was familiar with the Melbourne/Essendon area. Appropriate navigation aids had been selected to monitor the approach. The Captain reported that he had initially mistaken Essendon for Melbourne, because the latter had been obscured by rain and low clouds. However, the crew became suspicious when the navigation aids did not confirm the visual indications. They were in the process of correcting the situation when ATC instructed the aircraft to turn to the left as it had passed the extended centreline. The crew had then sighted the Melbourne runway complex and had proceeded visually. Recorded radar and communication data revealed that the aircraft had been instructed to turn towards the north-west 13 seconds after it had passed through the runway centreline. Less than one minute later the crew reported that the aircraft was intercepting the centreline. The maximum deviation from the centreline had been about 1.5 miles (2.8 kilometres). However, it was also apparent that ATC had given the instruction for the aircraft to make a visual approach at a point where it was almost inevitable that the aircraft would pass through the runway centreline. The minimum height reached by the aircraft during the excursion from the centreline was approximately 1000 feet above the ground. Conclusions. 1. The crew initially mis-identified Essendon Airport for Melbourne, because of cloud and rain in the area. 2. The tracking error was noted by ATC virtually as soon as the aircraft passed through the extended centreline of runway 34. Immediate corrective action was taken. 3. ATC had given tracking instructions such that the aircraft would have passed through the runway centreline regardlesss of the flight conditions. 4. The crew had realised the error in aerodrome identification at about the same time as ATC passed track correction instructions to the aircraft. 5. At no time was there a possibility of the aircraft landing at Essendon.

Shortly after lift-off the pilot heard several loud bangs and saw pieces of fibreglass from the cowls fly past the canopy. Believing the cowlings may have come adrift he decided to land in a small paddock, just outside the aerodrome perimeter fence. The aircraft landed heavily on the soft, wet surface and the propeller struck the ground after only five metres of ground roll. The aircraft came to rest after travelling 34 metres. Investigation revealed that the upper and lower sections of cowling had come apart, following failure of the fibreglass at the connecting screw holes. This allowed the upper cowl to move forward and contact the propeller. The failure was partly due to incorrect placement of the screw holes.

Circumstances:

The pilot reported that following a normal landing the aircraft was taxied for some distance. During a left turn the right main landing gear collapsed, resulting in the right propeller and wing contacting the ground. Investigation revealed that the right main gear strut had failed at the lower welded joint. A metallurgical examination determined that the failure was due to the propagation of a fatigue crack along the weld. A weld repair had been effected in the area previously because of a crack and it appeared the crack was not completely removed during the repair procedure. This was not positively confirmed as the owner would not permit destructive testing of the component. The manufacturer's service manual limits repair of the main landing gear to replacement of parts.

The pilot was engaged in a mustering operation on his own property. During the operation he saw a truck departing from the property. He had an urgent messsage for the driver, so he elected to land on a road near the truck's route which he knew was suitable as a landing area. During the landing roll the left wing hit a steel pole which was off the edge of the road. The pilot did not see the pole because he was landing to the East and the rising sun was in his eyes.

After installing his passenger in the aircraft, the pilot hand swung the propeller, the normal means of starting the engine. When the engine fired it ran up to high power and the aircraft jumped the chocks. The pilot attempted to stop the aircraft but it continued forward and collided with the side of a hangar. The nose gear collapsed and the wooden propeller shattered as the aircraft came to rest on its nose. During the pre-start checks the pilot believes he set the throttle almost fully open by mistake. The aircraft handbrake was unservicable.

The aircraft was engaged in defining swarms of locusts as part of a control programme. The helicopter was being flown at about 35 feet above ground level, when one of the main rotor blades struck a powerline. Control of the aircraft was lost and it struck the ground in a nose down attitude, 111 metres beyond the powerline. The pilot had flown over the area earlier in the day, but had not sighted the wire. On this occasion he did not make a specific search for wires before commencing the low level operation. The span of wire between the support poles measures 610 metres and although the support poles were easy to see, the wire was not. The pilot was not aware that the helicopter had collided with the wire until some time after the accident.

The student had completed a dual check flight, and was carrying out a period of solo circuits in calm conditions. On the third landing, the aircraft bounced, then touched down in a three-point attitude, skipped, and shortly after touching down again the nosewheel leg collapsed. The nosewheel leg oleo collars had failed in overload. Investigation revealed that the failure occurred due to touchdown occurring at a higher than normal airspeed, following an incorrectly judged landing flare.