The student pilot was conducting solo circuits on runway 11 right. The sky was clear, and the wind was from the east at about 10 kts, with a slight crosswind component.

The pilot flew several circuits without incident. The final approach and touchdown were normal, but during rollout, the aircraft veered to the left and the pilot was unable to regain directional control. The nose landing gear collapsed, and the propeller and right wingtip struck the runway.

It is likely that the pilot relaxed elevator control back pressure after the mainwheels contacted the runway, causing a rapid weight shift to the nose gear. The slight crosswind may also have contributed to the loss of directional control.

After take-off from runway 34L VH-CZB was tracking outbound from Sydney on a West Maitland One, Standard Instrument Departure (SID).  On this SID the aircraft was maintaining a track of 335 degrees outbound on the localiser at an altitude of 5,000 ft.  The crew were in contact with Sydney Departures Control.

VH-CZK was inbound on a Letti One Standard Arrival (STAR), heading 160 degrees, on a track that was close to the reciprocal of the track of VH-CZB.  The crew were in contact with Sydney Approach Control and were cleared to descend to 7,000 ft.

A third aircraft, VH-TCH, was also inbound and ahead of VH-CZK. Because VH-CZK was faster than VH-TCH and expected to overtake it, the approach controller obtained approval from the departures controller to turn VH-TCH left.  The purpose of this was to allow VH-CZK to get ahead of VH-TCH and also to allow it to descend through the level of VH-TCH.

Under existing procedures, the approach controller was not permitted to descend VH-CZK below 6,000 ft. However, when contacting VH-CZK, the controller inadvertently cleared VH-CZK to descend to 4,000 ft which was consistent with procedures previously in place. The crew acknowledged and commenced descent.

A short time later the crew of VH-CZK saw an approaching aircraft which was directly ahead and slightly below them. They queried the controller on whether they were cleared to 4,000 ft and were instructed to maintain 6,000 ft. They were then advised that the other aircraft, VH-CZB, was maintaining 5000 feet. The crew stopped the descent and climbed to 6,000 ft.

The radar recording showed that separation between these two aircraft had reduced to 1.1 NM horizontal and 600 ft vertical.

At Sydney there have been a number of ongoing changes affecting air traffic control. These include the introduction of a new Interim Radar Display System (IRDS), and a new parallel runway system requiring new procedures. STARs were recently introduced and sectors formally based at Sydney have been progressively transferred to Melbourne or Brisbane.

Because of noise complaints resulting from the new parallel runway system, aircraft at lower altitudes in the vicinity of the airport are now restricted to narrow corridors and are required to fly long approaches.  As a result, they remain under approach or departure control for a longer period than was the case, thus increasing controller workload.

To assist in minimising co-ordination between control positions a system of vertical airspace separation was introduced to assigned sections of the terminal area. In the section relevant to this occurrence the departures controller was able to assign altitudes up to 5,000 ft, without co-ordination and the approach controller could assign altitudes down to 6,000 ft, also without co-ordination.

The adjacent section of airspace outside the corridor was managed by departures control, which was the reason the approach controller co-ordinated with the departures controller to divert VH-TCH left of track. However, had the approach controller waited a short time, both VH-CZB and VH-CZK would have entered an area of airspace controlled by approach control and in which the approach controller could have arranged the separation and passing, without co-ordination. Due to the enforced long approach flight path there was ample time remaining for the approach controller to arrange separation and descend VH-CZK.

The workload at the time was moderate.

Significant Factor

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the incident:

The approach controller inadvertently reverted to procedures which were no longer in place.

The pilot of VH-JZU contacted Essendon Tower approaching Williamstown, requesting a clearance to enter the control zone on track to Essendon. The tower controller was unable to establish radio communication with VH-JZU and so no clearance was issued.

An IFR aircraft, VH-UJV, was on descent into Essendon and communicating with Melbourne Approach Control. The Essendon tower controller noticed an unidentified aircraft entering the control zone at West Gate, on track for Essendon. He advised the approach controller and the descent of VH-UJV was stopped at 2000 feet. VH-UJV was climbed back to 2500 feet.

The pilot of VH-JZU, which was the unidentified aircraft, continued to Essendon and on receiving a green light from the tower, landed. The pilot of VH-UJV was able to sight and follow VH-JZU. A loss of separation may have occurred, due to the unapproved entry into the zone by the pilot of VH-JZU.

The inexperienced pilot of VH-JZU later said he thought he had received a clearance, but in hindsight realised this was a mistake on his part. When he later tried to contact Essendon Tower, he could not do so but continued, thinking he had received a clearance.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. VHF radio communication equipment failure in VH-JZU.

2. Misunderstanding of communications by the pilot of VH-JZU.

The pilot reported that he had an electrical failure whilst enroute to Albany. He elected to continue the flight on battery power. The pilot reported the night landing at Albany was normal but that the nosewheel had collapsed during the landing role and the aircraft had slid to a stop on its nose.

An engineer who inspected the aircraft reported that the aircraft had suffered a heavy landing damaging both the nosewheel retraction/extension rod and the rear, lower fuselage tie down point. The nosewheel had collapsed because the retraction/extension rod had failed in overload.

It is possible the pilot, deprived of normal cockpit illumination by low battery power, misjudged the approach and allowed the aircraft to land heavily.

After engine start, with the engines idling, and his feet resting on the brakes, the pilot turned his attention to the inside of the cabin to complete some checks. A short time later the pilot realised that the aircraft was moving. He reduced the power and applied the brakes but before the aircraft was brought to a stop, the left propeller hit a tyre that was being used as a marker at the edge of the parking bay.

The pilot shut the engines down and inspected the left propeller. He could find only very slight damage so decided to run the engine. He ran the engine through a range from idle to 2300 RPM and noted no vibration. He then decided the aircraft was fit to fly back to Moorabbin.

The return flight to Moorabbin was without incident. After landing the pilot experienced vibration from the left engine. Subsequent engineering inspection revealed the following damage:

• One blade bent one degree at the 32 inch station. Blade circlip out of its groove and the groove damaged with rolled edges.
• One blade bent one degree at the 30 inch station and twisted two degrees.
• One blade bent two degrees at the 30 inch station. Blade circlip out of its groove and the groove damaged with rolled edges.
• All circlips, blade preload shims, shim plates and shim carriers damaged beyond repair. There was no damage to the hubs or pitch change mechanisms.
• In addition, some counterbalance weight retaining screws had broken, allowing liberation of the weights.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

During the descent, the second officer was the pilot flying from the right seat. The pilot in command was in the left seat, and he was monitoring and performing support duties including communication with air traffic control (ATC). The co-pilot was monitoring the approach and assisting with support duties.

The aircraft had been cleared by the Cairns Sector Controller for descent to 7,000 ft tracking inbound on the Cairns VOR 153 radial. After communications were transferred to Cairns Approach, the aircraft was cleared to continue descent to 6,500 ft. The controller told the crew to expect a straight-in approach to runway 33, and to report when in visual meteorological conditions (VMC).

At 32 DME the pilot in command requested further descent "as per the DME steps." The controller then issued a clearance "from two zero DME descend to three thousand not below the DME steps." The clearance was correctly acknowledged. (The clearance required the aircraft to remain at 6,500 ft, the last cleared altitude, until reaching 20 DME.)

The pilot in command said that after receiving a clearance to descend to 3,000 ft "not below the DME steps", he had set 5,400 ft in the altitude-select window and permitted the second officer to commence the descent in VMC. The pilot in command stated that the aircraft was maintained in VMC, but because he could not see the runway, he instructed the second officer to return the aircraft to 6,400 ft. ATC also issued a climb requirement at the same time. The pilot in command stated that at no time was the aircraft in instrument meteorological conditions.

The co-pilot had been absent from the flight deck when the clearance to descend to 3,000 ft was issued. When he returned he noted that the altitude alert window had been set to 5,400 ft, and he queried the flight engineer. The flight engineer replied that they had been cleared for a visual approach. The co-pilot was satisfied with the situation as the aircraft was in VMC. The flight engineer later said that he had some difficulty hearing the flight deck conversation and monitoring the radio transmissions at the same time.

At the time of the occurrence, the DME arrival procedure specified a lowest safe altitude of 6,400 ft from 32 DME to 20 DME and 5,500 ft from 20 DME to 16 DME. In this instance, the crew had been instructed to remain at 6,500 ft until 20 DME and then descend in accordance with the remainder of the DME Arrival procedure.

The radar data showed that the aircraft left 6,500 ft on descent at 33 NM, passed through the lowest safe altitude of 6,400 ft at 32 NM, and levelled at 5,600 ft at 29 NM. This altitude was maintained to 25 NM when the aircraft climbed to 6,500 ft.

When the aircraft was at 25 NM, the approach controller noticed that the transponder altitude readout indicated 5,700 ft. This placed the aircraft below the minimum safe altitude for the step of 6,400 ft and the controller instructed the crew to climb to 6,500 ft, which was carried out. When the crew subsequently reported "visual" approximately 30 seconds later, the aircraft was cleared to descend from 6,500 ft to 2,500 ft. The co-pilot resumed his position in the right seat when the aircraft was descending through 4,000 ft.

ANALYSIS

Crew resource management (CRM)

The first officer was absent from the flight deck during a period when crucial descent clearance information was received. The flight engineer was not adequately monitoring the situation as the exchanges between the pilot in command and the second officer were not clearly audible.

DME arrival

There have been reported occurrences where an error was made by the crew in reading and applying the DME arrival procedure such that a descent was initiated to the sector level one step too early, thereby descending below the lowest safe altitude. In this occurrence the aircraft followed a descent profile which was consistent with this error; specifically, the aircraft was descended towards 5,500 ft, which was the lowest level for the next sector.

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

1. The crew misinterpreted the clearance and initiated a descent below their cleared level.

2. The altitude alert window was incorrectly set to 5,400 ft.

3. The co-pilot was absent from the cockpit when the clearance to descend to 3,000 ft was issued and was told incorrectly that the aircraft was cleared for a visual approach.

4. The aircraft descended below the lowest safe altitude before the crew reported visual.

SAFETY ACTION

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation is currently investigating a perceived safety deficiency that has been identified as a result of this and a number of similar occurrences. The deficiency relates to the presentation of distance and descent altitudes on DME/GPS arrival charts that may be misinterpreted by flight crew.

Any recommendation issued as a result of this investigation will be published in the Bureau's Quarterly Safety Deficiency Report.

The aircraft was engaged in a powerline inspection. The crew had identified a downed powerline. During an approach to land, to carry out a closer inspection, the helicopter collided with a second powerline that was still in place. It crashed in a near vertical attitude.

Wreckage inspection indicated that one main rotor blade had made solid contact with the powerline.

The pilot indicated, before his injuries took full affect, that he had forgotten about the second line. He has been unable to provide any further information.

The pilot reported that the engine lost power shortly after take-off and he landed the aircraft in a ploughed field. During the latter stages of the approach, he saw smoke coming from the engine compartment. The aircraft subsequently burnt out.

The pilot was conducting a local flight in weather conditions which were fine, but with a gusty 20-25 kts south-easterly wind blowing.

On return a normal approach for landing was made at 85 kts, with the touchdown at 80 kts. About 250 metres into the landing roll a wind gust, combined with the aircraft canard design and undulation in the airstrip surface, caused the aircraft nose to pitch up through 45 degrees, and become airborne again.

Before the pilot could take recovery action the aircraft stalled and impacted the airstrip in a steep nose down attitude. It then bounced and skipped across the ground on its nose for about 28 metres before tipping over onto its back.

The aircraft had touched down, following the third circuit, when it began to yaw right into the crosswind. The pilot applied full left rudder and some power, but the aircraft did not respond. The aircraft continued to yaw right, and the left-wing tip touched the ground. The pilot closed the throttle, but the aircraft continued off the runway and on to the grass flight strip. The left wing struck a runway distance-to-run marker before the aircraft came to a stop.

It was reported that there was a five knot crosswind from the right at the time of the landing.