Prior to departure the pilot rang the owner of the airstrip to get information on the strip and permission to land.  He was told that there were powerlines on approach to the 180 degree strip and the 090 degree strip.  He overflew the airfield on arrival and noted there was a light easterly breeze so decided to land on the 090 degree strip which has a published length of 910 metres in the AOPA directory.  The strip also has a displaced threshold which the pilot observed.

On final approach he noted that the strip seemed short.  The strip surface was grass, and the pilot thought it may have been wet.  He therefore slowed the aircraft and selected full flap while keeping power on, aiming to touch down as close as possible to the displaced threshold markings. Approaching the end of the strip the pilot believed he must have been past the powerline although he had not actually seen it.  He lowered the nose to touch down on the displaced threshold and at that point hit the powerline.  The aircraft then hit the ground heavily, sustaining substantial damage.

During the investigation the owner of the airstrip advised that the strip was 900 metres fence to fence.  Landing into the east there was 680 metres available due to the displaced threshold at the approach end.  After the accident the pilot said he noted that the powerline was in fact over the "turning area" at the approach end of the strip and the poles were some distance apart, remote from the final approach path.

The day after the accident the electricity supplier installed marker devices on the powerline.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot was warned about the presence of a powerline on the approach end of the strip he was using but did not ensure that he sighted it prior to making his landing approach.
2. Although he had not sighted the powerline, on short final approach he made an assumption that he must have passed it and so lowered the nose to touch down as close as possible to the displaced threshold markers.
3. The pilot "dragged the aircraft in with power" on a low final approach profile instead of flying a normal glidepath.
4. The powerline was not fitted with any warning marker devices.

Due to crossing traffic at flight level 180 the pilot of N103GC was asked if the aircraft could reach flight level 190 by 25 miles from Canberra. The pilot said this could not be done and air traffic control told the pilot to maintain flight level 170.

During the climb the controller observed the mode C read out increase above flight level 170. The pilot was told to maintain flight level 170, but the level read out increased to flight level 176 before decreasing back to flight level 170. N103GC passed three to four miles behind the other aircraft, VH-TCH.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot did not comply with the level restriction.

2. The precise reason for this happening was not determined.

The pilot reported that he was giving another pilot instruction for the purpose of endorsement on type. A few seconds into the landing roll the left wing lifted, and the aircraft veered sharply left towards the runway edge. Both the instructor and the student applied opposite rudder resulting in the aircraft turning quickly right. This was followed by a series of sharp turns left and right down the runway until the aircraft eventually entered a ground loop to the left before coming to a halt.

The aircraft was approaching Adelaide from Melbourne having received an airways clearance for descent to 3000ft, with a pilot's intercept of the runway 23 localizer.

Approximately 46km east of Adelaide the DME reading disappeared from the FMS CDU. The captain then selected the appropriate "FMS fix" page to reinsert the data which caused a "time out resynch" message to appear on the FMS CDU.

It was the crews first flight into Adelaide and a correct approach briefing had been given. Weather conditions were perfect, the wind calm with no cloud and unlimited visibility. The captain stated that due to the FMS problem, both he and the first officer, who was apparently hand flying the aircraft, had had a momentary lapse in monitoring the approach, and allowed the aircraft to pass through the localizer.

The first officer noticed the runways of an aerodrome immediately in front of them, notified Adelaide Approach that the aerodrome was in sight, and reacted instinctively by commencing a right turn for base leg to what he believed was runway 23, without descending below the cleared altitude of 3000ft.

The error was immediately recognised by the crew, at the same time Adelaide Approach advised "wrong aerodrome". The aircraft had been positioning for Parafield, a general aviation airport situated 20km north-east of Adelaide, and was then turned back onto the localizer for a landing on runway 23 at Adelaide.

The captain said that if weather conditions had been different he would not have spent time rectifying the DME fault, but would have completed the flight monitoring the navigation instruments to Adelaide via the 23 ILS. He is to submit an ASIR to his company on return to the United Kingdom, with a recommendation that Parafield and Edinburgh airports be highlighted on company operational documentation.

The pilot reported that as he entered the circuit area light rain was falling, associated with a light and variable wind from the southeast. He carried out a right circuit for a landing approach to runway 07, reducing speed to about 90 kts as the aircraft passed over the threshold. However, the aircraft floated before touching down about a quarter distance along the strip. The brakes were applied but were ineffective in slowing the aircraft. Concerned that he would overrun the strip and the highway beyond, the pilot deliberately ground looped the aircraft to the right. The left main and nose landing gears collapsed during the turn, before the aircraft came to rest against the perimeter fence.

The pilot subsequently learned that it had rained heavily prior to his arrival and thought his aircraft may have aquaplaned on the wet runway surface.

At the completion of a fire spotting exercise VH-TTZ was passing 9000 feet on descent in controlled airspace (CTA) when a glider was sighted at the same altitude.  Air traffic control had no knowledge of glider operations in the area, for which the lower level of CTA was 6,000 feet. The glider was not identified.

Investigation disclosed that a gliding competition was being conducted from Bacchus Marsh airfield and the glider was most probably one of those taking part. The competition task was a triangular cross-country flight departing from Bacchus Marsh, tracking southwest to Derrinallum, then north west to Buangor, then returning to Bacchus Marsh.

Bacchus March is situated under the 2,000 foot step of Melbourne CTA. On the day of the competition "Area Alpha", a specially released block of airspace over Bacchus Marsh with a 4,000 foot ceiling, gave pilots a higher start level over the airfield.  The south-eastern boundary of the 4,000 foot CTA step is located one mile to the west of the airfield. The competition track progressed under the 4,000, 6,000, 8,000 and 10,000 foot CTA steps.

Prior to take-off the pilots were briefed by the contest organiser who had arranged the task based on the weather forecast for the day, which indicated that thermals would go to 8,000 feet. The briefing covered task details, weather, safety and some airspace considerations. Pilots were not provided with airspace maps by the organiser, nor did the briefing involve airspace higher than 8,000 feet.

The weather for the day was much better than forecast with reports of some gliders taking part in the competition reaching 12,000 feet in thermals.

At the time of the airspace incursion the gliders were returning from the task. The incursion occurred south of Ballarat within the area of the 6,000 foot CTA step. Had the glider been observing the limitation and flying below the 6,000 foot CTA step, it would have been required to climb in thermals to have reached Bacchus Marsh. This would have slowed the glider's progress.

One aim of pilots in such competitions is to gain as much height as possible and, on the final glide, trade that height for speed to arrive over the airfield with just sufficient height to finish, conduct a circuit, and land. The pilot involved in the incursion would probably have been taking advantage of the strong conditions to maximise his competitive advantage and was either not aware of, or was not respecting, the airspace boundaries of the area in which he was flying.  Because of the smoke from the bushfire, it is doubtful that the glider pilots were able to achieve the visual navigation accuracy needed when flying close to CTA step boundaries.

Glider pilots do not receive training in airspace to the same extent as the pilots of powered aircraft. They also do not hold a licence issued by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and consequently do not receive advice from the CAA in regard to availability of airspace maps and associated information.

The gliding fraternities' understanding and respect of airspace, and the quality of briefings, has been the subject of a previous accident report. (Ref 9303898 VH-AYB, GMN, Benalla 24 November 1993).

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. Glider pilots taking part in the competition were inadequately briefed in regard to airspace requirements.
2. Glider pilots do not receive formal training in airspace considerations.
3. The pilot was either not aware of or was not respecting the airspace limitations.
4. Smoke from a bushfire would have made visual identification of CTA step boundaries difficult.
5. The glider was flown in controlled airspace without a clearance.

Safety Action

This ASOR is to be referred to the Gliding Federation of Australia to reinforce the need for increased awareness of these matters. (Ref SADN 950070).

The pilot had undertaken a private flight from Port Pirie intending to land at a property. When he arrived in the general area, he saw an airstrip with a vehicle parked nearby and believing that he had arrived at his destination commenced an approach for landing.

After the aircraft had touched down the pilot realised the airstrip was not suitable for the operation but was committed to continue with the landing.

The aircraft over-ran the end of the airstrip with the left wing striking a tree causing damage to the wingtip and displacing the spar rearwards. The pilot being the only occupant was uninjured.

The helicopter was being operated on a wildlife survey flight, and while manoeuvring near a crocodile nest the pilot reported an apparent loss of engine power, with a subsequent decay in main rotor RPM. He attempted to regain rotor RPM by opening the throttle fully, applying right anti-torque pedal, increasing forward speed and reducing collective pitch as much as possible but was unable to arrest the descent. When ground impact became inevitable, he levelled the helicopter and applied up collective to cushion the impact, but the resulting heavy landing caused the landing gear skids to collapse and the main rotor blades to strike the ground. The engine was still running and stopped by the pilot.

A brief inspection of the helicopter was made at the accident site, but with some difficulty due to crocodiles in the area. A more detailed inspection was carried out after it was recovered to Darwin. No evidence was found to suggest that it was other than serviceable prior to impact.

The pilot stated that he had departed from Jabiru for the 58km flight with 32 litres of fuel on board the helicopter and was to refuel at a nearby airstrip for the return flight. Inspection revealed that the amount of fuel remaining in the tank at the time of the accident was 65-70 litres, and the helicopter's all up weight was estimated as being just below the allowable maximum.

The pilot later revised his statement to agree that there would have been about 65 litres of fuel on board at the time of the accident and suggested that he may have over-pitched the rotor system when distracted by outside events as he attempted to find a place to land near the crocodile nest.

The pilot was landing at a station strip which is long but has a gutter running across it. The gutter is marked by vehicle tyres. The pilot planned to land on the second section of the strip and conducted a short field approach. Just before touchdown the left mainwheel struck a tyre which was thrown up into the left hand tailplane. The tailplane was bent upwards 15 cm and rearwards 2 cm at the tip.

The student pilot was conducting solo touch-and-go landings on runway 04 left. The aircraft was observed to touch down heavily on the nosewheel and become airborne again. The aircraft then touched down heavily on the main gear. The propeller struck the runway and the nosewheel fork was bent during the landing. The pilot stated that she was distracted by a gust of wind during the landing sequence.