The pilot was conducting a landing on a grass strip. During the landing roll the glider overran the strip end and struck a wire perimeter fence.

A report by the Gliding Federation of Australia indicated that the pilot did not compensate for the prevailing wind when executing the approach.

The pilot had initially planned to land to the north on a strip which was about 950 metres long. When he saw that a formation flight was preparing for a take-off to the west on the 400-metre strip, he decided land to the west. The wind was a light north westerly. He reported that his aircraft touched down near the 270 threshold at 60 knots with full flaps and then bounced a couple of times before he attempted a go-around. The local chief flying instructor (CFI) witnessed the accident from one of the formation aircraft and said that the aircraft looked to be faster on touchdown, more like 65 knots.

During the attempted go-around, the pilot selected flaps fully up and full power but almost ran out of strip before becoming airborne. While attempting to avoid a tree near the end of the strip, he stalled the aircraft which then settled onto a fence.

The CFI believed that the go-around would have been successful if the pilot had selected the flaps up in stages rather than going from full flap to zero flap while attempting to become airborne in a short distance.

The pilot reported that the flight departed from an agricultural strip located in a valley surrounded by hills. The aircraft carried a full load of superphosphate to be spread on a property approximately one mile from the strip. The pilot had previously surveyed the property and the flight path. He had selected a route that took him up through a valley between hills and then over a low ridge to the property.

After take-off the pilot set climb power and selected climb flap in order to follow his predetermined route to the property. The pilot advised that as the aircraft flew towards the low ridge it appeared to be descending rather than climbing. He elected to carry out a partial dump and to apply extra flap to clear a clump of trees. The speed deteriorated to 60 knots from the initial climb speed of 70 knots. The pilot did not increase power.

Some 300 metres later another partial dump was carried out to clear another tree. As that tree was cleared the pilot again initiated a partial dump and turned to the right in an endeavour to escape from a rapidly deteriorating situation. Immediately the turn was initiated the right wing dropped and the aircraft stalled, impacting the ground onto the right wing and cartwheeled to a stop some 50 metres from the initial impact.

The company chief pilot examined the accident site and advised that the flight path through the valley was in a classic false horizon situation whereby the surrounding hills caused the pilot to consider that the flight path was over flat terrain whilst in reality the terrain was rising approximately 5 degrees up to the ridge. The chief pilot also advised that the aircraft would not have been able to outclimb the terrain at high gross weight with only cruise power set.

Examination of the wreckage did not disclose any pre-impact factors that may have contributed to the accident. Weather and pilot workload were not considered to be factors in this accident.

The pilot had flown approximately 1200 hours on agricultural operations and 244 hours on the type. His loss of situational awareness could be due in part to his relatively low experience.

Significant factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident.

(1) At high weight, and with climb power applied, the pilot flew the aircraft on an inappropriate flight path into rising terrain.

(2) The pilot did not take appropriate remedial actions when the aircraft could not outclimb the terrain and the aircraft speed deteriorated.

(3) The pilot lost control of the aircraft while attempting a turn at low speed.

The pilot was positioning the helicopter for the first spray run.  As he lowered the collective lever and commenced a turn, he noticed that the rate of descent was higher than usual and that the dual tachometer needles had split. Realising that the engine had lost power, he performed an autorotative descent from less than 100 ft above ground level (agl).  During the touchdown on slightly sloping terrain, the right front skid tube broke, and the helicopter rolled on to its right side.

During the helicopter retrieval, the engineer estimated that he drained 4 to 5 litres of AVGAS from the helicopter's undamaged fuel tank.  The drained fuel was not accurately measured. The pilot's estimate of drained fuel was 6 to 8 litres.  No evidence was found of fuel having leaked onto the ground prior to or during the retrieval.  The engineer found no evidence of fuel leaks, blockages, water or significant foreign matter in the helicopter's fuel system.  His opinion was that the engine lost power due to fuel starvation.

The pilot cannot remember the fuel gauge reading immediately before the accident.  The failure occurred about 1.5 minutes after take-off from the loading base and 34 minutes flight time since the last refuel.

The pilot had refuelled approximately every 30 minutes of flight time during the previous four hours of spraying. 

After refuelling, he did not dip the tank to measure the fuel accurately. He advised that the last refuel consisted of 60 turns of a rotary hand pump.  He believed that every turn of the handle had pumped 0.8 litre into the fuel tank. In his opinion, the fuel gauge reading compared with the estimated amount of fuel pumped into the tank at each refuel.

A warning in the Hiller 12E flight manual states: - "Operating with fuel indicator in the yellow arc during sideward or rearward flight may result in loss of power", because the fuel tank pickup pipe may be exposed and cause the fuel pump to momentarily suck air in lieu of fuel.  The helicopter was not flying sideways or rearwards when engine power was lost.  The unusable fuel listed in the flight manual was only 1 litre for normal level flight.

The pilot thought that the engine did not stop completely during the descent but ran down to idle and that it idled very briefly after touchdown because he saw a small post-crash fire caused by the drift marker oil, a very light oil, dribbling into the exhaust.  Engineers were doubtful that the engine could have run on the ground with the helicopter steeply on its right side with the two carburettor float bowls side uppermost.

The pilot did not dispute that the helicopter appeared to have experienced fuel starvation.  However, he believed 48 litres of fuel were added at the last refuel before the accident. Since the helicopter had consistently used 60 to 62 litres per hour in recent times and because its tank was not empty at the commencement of the last refuel, in excess of 13 litres of AVGAS should have been in the fuel tank when the power loss occurred.

Several litres of AVGAS have not been accounted for.  No evidence was found to indicate that the drum refuelling pump was unserviceable.

It has not been possible to resolve discrepancies in fuel since the accident; nor has any fault been found with the aircraft which may have contributed to the accident.

The pneumatic system on this aircraft type operates the landing gear, flaps and brakes. The aircraft is equipped with a castering nosewheel and steering is achieved by differential braking. The pneumatic system normal operating pressure is 450 to 600 psi. The minimum pressure for engine start is 90 psi. Prior to engine start, the pilot noted that the pneumatic pressure was about 250 psi. He anticipated the pressure would increase to normal operating pressure after engine start.

The engines were started and the aircraft commenced taxiing. Shortly afterwards the pilot noted that pneumatic pressure had not increased to normal operating pressure as anticipated. At about this time he recalled that he had activated the pneumatic system drain valves during a ground inspection of the aircraft. He suspected that he may not have tightened the valves and that this could be the reason for lack of pneumatic pressure. He therefore decided to return to the parking area and investigate.

As there was still over 100 psi pressure, he considered it safe to taxy back to the hangar (bearing in mind that 90 psi is the minimum for start which infers that the brakes should work at that pressure). Approaching the hangar which involved taxiing on a downhill slope, he applied differential braking but there was no response. Realising that he would be unable to turn the aircraft he quickly shut the engines down. The aircraft rolled slowly towards a hangar where it collided with a scaffolding fence, incurring minor damage to the nose gear doors and skin areas of the nose and one wing.

During a post incident inspection, the pilot noted that the pneumatic system drain valves had not been properly tightened. This explained the reason for the lack of normal system pressure build up after engine start. However, the pilot said he believed there should still have been enough pressure for differential braking/steering. Accordingly, he would have a complete check made of the pneumatic system after the damage sustained in the incident had been repaired.

Prior to departure the pilot rang the owner of the airstrip to get information on the strip and permission to land.  He was told that there were powerlines on approach to the 180 degree strip and the 090 degree strip.  He overflew the airfield on arrival and noted there was a light easterly breeze so decided to land on the 090 degree strip which has a published length of 910 metres in the AOPA directory.  The strip also has a displaced threshold which the pilot observed.

On final approach he noted that the strip seemed short.  The strip surface was grass, and the pilot thought it may have been wet.  He therefore slowed the aircraft and selected full flap while keeping power on, aiming to touch down as close as possible to the displaced threshold markings. Approaching the end of the strip the pilot believed he must have been past the powerline although he had not actually seen it.  He lowered the nose to touch down on the displaced threshold and at that point hit the powerline.  The aircraft then hit the ground heavily, sustaining substantial damage.

During the investigation the owner of the airstrip advised that the strip was 900 metres fence to fence.  Landing into the east there was 680 metres available due to the displaced threshold at the approach end.  After the accident the pilot said he noted that the powerline was in fact over the "turning area" at the approach end of the strip and the poles were some distance apart, remote from the final approach path.

The day after the accident the electricity supplier installed marker devices on the powerline.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot was warned about the presence of a powerline on the approach end of the strip he was using but did not ensure that he sighted it prior to making his landing approach.
2. Although he had not sighted the powerline, on short final approach he made an assumption that he must have passed it and so lowered the nose to touch down as close as possible to the displaced threshold markers.
3. The pilot "dragged the aircraft in with power" on a low final approach profile instead of flying a normal glidepath.
4. The powerline was not fitted with any warning marker devices.

Due to crossing traffic at flight level 180 the pilot of N103GC was asked if the aircraft could reach flight level 190 by 25 miles from Canberra. The pilot said this could not be done and air traffic control told the pilot to maintain flight level 170.

During the climb the controller observed the mode C read out increase above flight level 170. The pilot was told to maintain flight level 170, but the level read out increased to flight level 176 before decreasing back to flight level 170. N103GC passed three to four miles behind the other aircraft, VH-TCH.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot did not comply with the level restriction.

2. The precise reason for this happening was not determined.

The pilot reported that he was giving another pilot instruction for the purpose of endorsement on type. A few seconds into the landing roll the left wing lifted, and the aircraft veered sharply left towards the runway edge. Both the instructor and the student applied opposite rudder resulting in the aircraft turning quickly right. This was followed by a series of sharp turns left and right down the runway until the aircraft eventually entered a ground loop to the left before coming to a halt.

The aircraft was approaching Adelaide from Melbourne having received an airways clearance for descent to 3000ft, with a pilot's intercept of the runway 23 localizer.

Approximately 46km east of Adelaide the DME reading disappeared from the FMS CDU. The captain then selected the appropriate "FMS fix" page to reinsert the data which caused a "time out resynch" message to appear on the FMS CDU.

It was the crews first flight into Adelaide and a correct approach briefing had been given. Weather conditions were perfect, the wind calm with no cloud and unlimited visibility. The captain stated that due to the FMS problem, both he and the first officer, who was apparently hand flying the aircraft, had had a momentary lapse in monitoring the approach, and allowed the aircraft to pass through the localizer.

The first officer noticed the runways of an aerodrome immediately in front of them, notified Adelaide Approach that the aerodrome was in sight, and reacted instinctively by commencing a right turn for base leg to what he believed was runway 23, without descending below the cleared altitude of 3000ft.

The error was immediately recognised by the crew, at the same time Adelaide Approach advised "wrong aerodrome". The aircraft had been positioning for Parafield, a general aviation airport situated 20km north-east of Adelaide, and was then turned back onto the localizer for a landing on runway 23 at Adelaide.

The captain said that if weather conditions had been different he would not have spent time rectifying the DME fault, but would have completed the flight monitoring the navigation instruments to Adelaide via the 23 ILS. He is to submit an ASIR to his company on return to the United Kingdom, with a recommendation that Parafield and Edinburgh airports be highlighted on company operational documentation.

The pilot reported that as he entered the circuit area light rain was falling, associated with a light and variable wind from the southeast. He carried out a right circuit for a landing approach to runway 07, reducing speed to about 90 kts as the aircraft passed over the threshold. However, the aircraft floated before touching down about a quarter distance along the strip. The brakes were applied but were ineffective in slowing the aircraft. Concerned that he would overrun the strip and the highway beyond, the pilot deliberately ground looped the aircraft to the right. The left main and nose landing gears collapsed during the turn, before the aircraft came to rest against the perimeter fence.

The pilot subsequently learned that it had rained heavily prior to his arrival and thought his aircraft may have aquaplaned on the wet runway surface.