The amphibian aircraft landed on relatively smooth water in a lagoon. As soon as the floats touched the water the aircraft slewed to the left, nosed into the water, and turned over. The aircraft came to rest upside down in about three feet of water. The occupants evacuated the aircraft within half a minute, and the pilot activated an emergency beacon. A helicopter responding to the emergency arrived at the scene at about 0940.

Visual inspection of the aircraft after the accident revealed that the left main gear was extended. The pilot stated that he had the correct gear-up indications before landing. An inspection of the aircraft did not reveal any reason for the extended left main gear.

One passenger received minor injuries when fuel affected skin on her legs whilst standing in fuel contaminated sea water.

The pilot taxied out for take-off on strip 36. Run up and pre-take-off checks were normal. Full power was applied for take-off and the aircraft accelerated. However, by two thirds to three quarters of the 1000 metre length the aircraft was not airborne. The pilot applied back pressure on the control column and lifted off. The airspeed then decreased so the pilot lowered the nose. The left wing dropped, and the aircraft descended, striking the ground nose down and overturning.

The pilot had inadvertently taken off in strong gusty downwind conditions.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot did not pay adequate attention to ascertaining the direction of the wind.

2. The pilot attempted a take-off in strong downwind conditions.

A Boeing 747 had just landed on runway 19 and was in the process of vacating the runway. At the same time, a King Air aircraft was given a clearance to cross the runway at taxiway "M".

The pilot of a Beech 99 requested a take-off clearance from the intersection of runway 19 and taxiway A4. The ADC (aerodrome controller) assessed that both the B747 and King Air would be clear of the runway in time and issued a take-off clearance to the Beech 99. As that aircraft entered the runway, and commenced the take-off run, the crew observed the King Air about to cross the runway. They rejected the take off and queried the take-off clearance. The ADC saw no safety risk and recleared the aircraft for take off.

The ADC was probably surprised to a minor extent about the rolling take-off, however he judged that there were no safety implications in allowing the take off to continue. The distance between taxiway A4 and taxiway "M" was 1410 metres.

The aircraft did not accelerate normally during the take-off roll. The pilot elected to reject the take-off but the aircraft overran the end of the runway. During the overrun, the nosewheel was torn off.

The pilot reported that post-accident inspection indicated the strip surface was softer than expected. This retarded the aircraft's acceleration.

The pilot reported that on commencing descent at 50 nautical miles from Cairns, engine power was reduced to 3,000 pounds of torque. At approximately 40 nautical miles a further reduction was made to 2,700 pounds. When the next reduction was made at 30 nautical miles the left engine did not respond to throttle movement and remained at 2,700 pounds. Right hand engine response was normal. The crew considered shutting down the left engine, but with weather and terrain circumstances taken into account, it was decided to leave the engine going. After arrival in the circuit area, speed was reduced, and movement of the power lever was checked. The torque on the left engine had then reduced to approximately 2,400 pounds. After selection of landing gear and flap, propellor revolutions per minute were reduced to 1,400, and a normal approach profile was maintained. After selection of maximum propellor revolutions per minute, engine torque reduced to approximately 2,000 pounds, and as a normal profile could be maintained, it was decided not to shut the left engine down. Power was reduced on the right engine to maintain profile on the approach.

After touchdown on the damp runway, the power levers were retarded by the pilot and the aircraft immediately swung to the right. Corrective action was taken with flight controls and brakes. Directional control was regained and as the aircraft decelerated the crew became aware that the right main tyre had blown. The aircraft was stopped on the runway and rescue and fire services attended the aircraft.

Investigation revealed that the left engine power control cambox had jammed and this had prevented the power lever from transmitting movement to the fuel control unit via a teleflex cable. The cam mechanism appears to have been sticking due to inadequate lubrication, and hardened grease. The power lever could still be moved due to the flexibility in the Teleflex cable.

The student pilot was conducting solo circuits on runway 11 right. The sky was clear, and the wind was from the east at about 10 kts, with a slight crosswind component.

The pilot flew several circuits without incident. The final approach and touchdown were normal, but during rollout, the aircraft veered to the left and the pilot was unable to regain directional control. The nose landing gear collapsed, and the propeller and right wingtip struck the runway.

It is likely that the pilot relaxed elevator control back pressure after the mainwheels contacted the runway, causing a rapid weight shift to the nose gear. The slight crosswind may also have contributed to the loss of directional control.

After take-off from runway 34L VH-CZB was tracking outbound from Sydney on a West Maitland One, Standard Instrument Departure (SID).  On this SID the aircraft was maintaining a track of 335 degrees outbound on the localiser at an altitude of 5,000 ft.  The crew were in contact with Sydney Departures Control.

VH-CZK was inbound on a Letti One Standard Arrival (STAR), heading 160 degrees, on a track that was close to the reciprocal of the track of VH-CZB.  The crew were in contact with Sydney Approach Control and were cleared to descend to 7,000 ft.

A third aircraft, VH-TCH, was also inbound and ahead of VH-CZK. Because VH-CZK was faster than VH-TCH and expected to overtake it, the approach controller obtained approval from the departures controller to turn VH-TCH left.  The purpose of this was to allow VH-CZK to get ahead of VH-TCH and also to allow it to descend through the level of VH-TCH.

Under existing procedures, the approach controller was not permitted to descend VH-CZK below 6,000 ft. However, when contacting VH-CZK, the controller inadvertently cleared VH-CZK to descend to 4,000 ft which was consistent with procedures previously in place. The crew acknowledged and commenced descent.

A short time later the crew of VH-CZK saw an approaching aircraft which was directly ahead and slightly below them. They queried the controller on whether they were cleared to 4,000 ft and were instructed to maintain 6,000 ft. They were then advised that the other aircraft, VH-CZB, was maintaining 5000 feet. The crew stopped the descent and climbed to 6,000 ft.

The radar recording showed that separation between these two aircraft had reduced to 1.1 NM horizontal and 600 ft vertical.

At Sydney there have been a number of ongoing changes affecting air traffic control. These include the introduction of a new Interim Radar Display System (IRDS), and a new parallel runway system requiring new procedures. STARs were recently introduced and sectors formally based at Sydney have been progressively transferred to Melbourne or Brisbane.

Because of noise complaints resulting from the new parallel runway system, aircraft at lower altitudes in the vicinity of the airport are now restricted to narrow corridors and are required to fly long approaches.  As a result, they remain under approach or departure control for a longer period than was the case, thus increasing controller workload.

To assist in minimising co-ordination between control positions a system of vertical airspace separation was introduced to assigned sections of the terminal area. In the section relevant to this occurrence the departures controller was able to assign altitudes up to 5,000 ft, without co-ordination and the approach controller could assign altitudes down to 6,000 ft, also without co-ordination.

The adjacent section of airspace outside the corridor was managed by departures control, which was the reason the approach controller co-ordinated with the departures controller to divert VH-TCH left of track. However, had the approach controller waited a short time, both VH-CZB and VH-CZK would have entered an area of airspace controlled by approach control and in which the approach controller could have arranged the separation and passing, without co-ordination. Due to the enforced long approach flight path there was ample time remaining for the approach controller to arrange separation and descend VH-CZK.

The workload at the time was moderate.

Significant Factor

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the incident:

The approach controller inadvertently reverted to procedures which were no longer in place.

The pilot of VH-JZU contacted Essendon Tower approaching Williamstown, requesting a clearance to enter the control zone on track to Essendon. The tower controller was unable to establish radio communication with VH-JZU and so no clearance was issued.

An IFR aircraft, VH-UJV, was on descent into Essendon and communicating with Melbourne Approach Control. The Essendon tower controller noticed an unidentified aircraft entering the control zone at West Gate, on track for Essendon. He advised the approach controller and the descent of VH-UJV was stopped at 2000 feet. VH-UJV was climbed back to 2500 feet.

The pilot of VH-JZU, which was the unidentified aircraft, continued to Essendon and on receiving a green light from the tower, landed. The pilot of VH-UJV was able to sight and follow VH-JZU. A loss of separation may have occurred, due to the unapproved entry into the zone by the pilot of VH-JZU.

The inexperienced pilot of VH-JZU later said he thought he had received a clearance, but in hindsight realised this was a mistake on his part. When he later tried to contact Essendon Tower, he could not do so but continued, thinking he had received a clearance.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. VHF radio communication equipment failure in VH-JZU.

2. Misunderstanding of communications by the pilot of VH-JZU.

The pilot reported that he had an electrical failure whilst enroute to Albany. He elected to continue the flight on battery power. The pilot reported the night landing at Albany was normal but that the nosewheel had collapsed during the landing role and the aircraft had slid to a stop on its nose.

An engineer who inspected the aircraft reported that the aircraft had suffered a heavy landing damaging both the nosewheel retraction/extension rod and the rear, lower fuselage tie down point. The nosewheel had collapsed because the retraction/extension rod had failed in overload.

It is possible the pilot, deprived of normal cockpit illumination by low battery power, misjudged the approach and allowed the aircraft to land heavily.

After engine start, with the engines idling, and his feet resting on the brakes, the pilot turned his attention to the inside of the cabin to complete some checks. A short time later the pilot realised that the aircraft was moving. He reduced the power and applied the brakes but before the aircraft was brought to a stop, the left propeller hit a tyre that was being used as a marker at the edge of the parking bay.

The pilot shut the engines down and inspected the left propeller. He could find only very slight damage so decided to run the engine. He ran the engine through a range from idle to 2300 RPM and noted no vibration. He then decided the aircraft was fit to fly back to Moorabbin.

The return flight to Moorabbin was without incident. After landing the pilot experienced vibration from the left engine. Subsequent engineering inspection revealed the following damage:

• One blade bent one degree at the 32 inch station. Blade circlip out of its groove and the groove damaged with rolled edges.
• One blade bent one degree at the 30 inch station and twisted two degrees.
• One blade bent two degrees at the 30 inch station. Blade circlip out of its groove and the groove damaged with rolled edges.
• All circlips, blade preload shims, shim plates and shim carriers damaged beyond repair. There was no damage to the hubs or pitch change mechanisms.
• In addition, some counterbalance weight retaining screws had broken, allowing liberation of the weights.