The pilot reported that he had completed two touch-and-go landings on runway 22 left and had been cleared for a touch-and-go on runway 22 right which had a displaced threshold. The approach, which was being flown with 20 degrees flap and about 1500 rpm engine power, was shallower than the earlier approaches. The pilot said that, about two metres above the ground, as he was about to increase power slightly to ensure that the aircraft did not touch down before the displaced threshold, the nose dropped. The nosewheel struck the ground firmly and the aircraft nosed over. The pilot could not recall hearing the stall warning sound during the approach, although it had tested serviceable before the flight.

The pilot reported that the landing was being conducted directly towards the setting sun. This affected his ability to see the strip and the aircraft touched down on the clearway beside the strip proper. During the landing roll, the nose wheel entered a depression which crossed the clearway and collapsed. Damage was also caused to both propellers and the forward underside of the fuselage.

The aircraft was engaged in crop spraying operations. The spray runs were being conducted in a north-south pattern across the area which was intersected by a three-strand power line running east to west.

The pilot advised that due to the crosswind conditions, it was necessary to fly close to the power line on each pass to adequately control the spray pattern. On the sixth spray run, the main wheels struck the uppermost strand of wire, causing the aircraft to descend into the crop. The pilot was not injured in the impact and was able to exit the aircraft safely.

The pilot stated that on the last spray run he either misjudged the height of the wires, or the aircraft encountered a down draft in the lee of tall timber growing along the paddock boundary.

The student pilot reported that during the landing at Kingaroy the aircraft became airborne again after touchdown. The right wing dropped and contacted the ground causing damage to the aileron and wingtip.

The pilot advised that shortly after the aircraft entered the first of what was to be a series of aerobatic manouvers, the aircraft's left rudder cable failed. After establishing what degree of flight control was still available, the pilot was able to make an uneventful landing.

Later examination found that the rudder cable had pulled through the rear swage fitting at the rudder horn end. The investigation found that both the left and right rudder cables were replaced at the last periodic maintenance inspection only three flight hours prior to the incident.

An examination of the manufacturers cable making processes revealed that the clamping tool used in the manufacture of the failed cable was not adjusted correctly. It was also found that there were significant wall thickness variations for the type of swage sleeves being used. All cables previously manufactured by the particular method used for the failed cable were identified and withdrawn from service. The manufactures cable making process for the failure type are currently under review by the CASA.

Two Cessna 150s, VH-MHD and VH-KMC, were conducting visual flights from Canberra at the same time. 

VH-MHD was commencing circuits on runway 30 and VH-KMC was departing on a city joy flight from runway 35.  At 1533 (all times are EST) VH-MHD was cleared for take-off from runway 30 with a requirement to maintain runway heading.  At 1535.20 VH-KMC was cleared for take-off from runway 35 and cleared for a left turn after take-off.

At 0535.55 VH-MHD was instructed to make a right circuit, early turn onto crosswind and downwind, traffic to sight is a Cessna heading for the racecourse, airborne off 35 over the old farmhouse.  At 0536.30 VH-MHD was instructed to continue the right turn to the tower and asked do you have that traffic now, it’ll be coming up in your 10 o’clock position. The pilot of VH-MHD responded uh MHD looking, do you want us to turn right now.  VH-MHD was then instructed continue the right turn to track to the tower, that will put you well inside the traffic

At 0536.55 VH-MHD was again asked if the traffic was sighted.  The pilot replied MHD negative.  VH-MHD was then instructed to......tighten the turn thanks, it’s in your 12 o’clock position half a mile continue the right turn now thanks straight to the tower.  At 0536 VH-MHD was advised ... you are clear of that traffic now continue downwind........

Meanwhile, after becoming airborne from runway 35, the pilot of VH-KMC contacted Canberra Departures Control at 1536.42 and advised .......KMC in a left turn on climb to 4000 left 2500.  VH-KMC had not been given any traffic advice by Canberra Tower on VH-MHD and there had been no coordination with Canberra Departures Control to pass any traffic advice.

At 1537.08 the pilot of VH-KMC advised departures we seem to have an aeroplane in the circuit area still heading towards us, do you have anything on it.  Departures advised VH-KMC of traffic in his 12 o’clock position and to maintain separation with that traffic.  VH-KMC then advised he’s just passed over me at about a 100ft.

When the aerodrome controller instructed VH-MHD to make a right circuit off runway 30 this put the aircraft in the same quadrant of airspace as VH-KMC making a left turn off runway 35.  The controller thought that instructing VH-MHD to tighten the right turn would resolve any potential conflict.  However, VH-KMC turned left earlier than expected whereas VH-MHD turned right later than expected.  The controller continued to give traffic to VH-MHD and instructed the pilot to track towards the tower but at no time passed traffic to VH-KMC nor instructed VH-KMC to remain on tower frequency.  The pilot of VH-MHD never sighted VH-KMC.

The traffic information passed to VH-MHD may not have been sufficient for the pilot to sight VH-KMC as it pre-supposed that the pilot was familiar with local landmarks and no relative height was passed. Additionally, the controller did not think it was significant that the pilot of VH-MHD may have had difficulty seeing VH-KMC in that he was flying a high wing aircraft, in a right turn, with the traffic approaching from his four to five o’clock position.

When it became apparent that VH-MHD could not sight VH-KMC and was not tracking towards the tower, the controller failed to issue a positive control instruction to VH-MHD, such as turn right immediately, to ensure that separation was maintained between the two aircraft.

An examination of the recorded radar data for Canberra terminal area indicated no apparent traffic reason why VH-MHD was instructed to make a right circuit.  The controller advised that he thought there was inbound traffic which may have conflicted if VH-MHD flew a left circuit.  At the time of the occurrence the aerodrome controller was under a moderate workload.  There were two aircraft operating in the circuit, VH-KMC departing on a scenic flight and a BA146 on final for runway 35.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The aerodrome controller placed two VFR aircraft in the same small quadrant of airspace and on different radiofrequencies, when an alternative was available.
2. The aerodrome controller did not pass mutual, timely and effective traffic information.
3. The aerodrome controller did not take positive steps to ensure separation.
4. The pilot of VH-MHD was slow in complying with an instruction to make a right turn.
5. The pilot of VH-KMC made an earlier than expected left turn.

The pilot submitted a plan for a flight from Moorabbin to Corowa via Melbourne and Mangalore. When the aircraft was approaching Melbourne, air traffic control (ATC) issued a clearance to track direct to Corowa. About 15 minutes later the pilot reported that he entered intermittent instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The aircraft was cruising at 7000 feet and no icing was present. Shortly afterwards, the aircraft entered continuous IMC and a short time after that ice started to form on the windscreen.

The pilot requested descent. Before ATC responded to his request, he adjusted the directional gyro (DG) to correspond with the magnetic compass. The autopilot had been engaged for some time before the DG adjustment was made. The pilot made the adjustment by pressing in on the heading bug knob while he pressed and turned the DG adjusting knob. This procedure was intended to prevent the aircraft from turning while the DG was adjusted.

The pilot said that immediately after the two knobs were released, the aircraft turned sharply to the right. He attempted to correct this manoeuvre, principally with rudder, but the aircraft persisted with the turn and began a rapid descent. From that point the pilot probably became disorientated. He made a mayday call and advised that the aircraft was inverted and that he had lost control. ATC assisted by providing advice on aircraft present position, lowest safe altitude, ground elevation and cloud base.

ATC then asked the pilot if the aircraft was autopilot equipped. This prompted the pilot to disengage the autopilot and shortly afterwards he regained control. Until that point, he had unwittingly been trying to override the autopilot. The aircraft was close to 4000 feet when control was regained. Recorded radar data and communications showed that the aircraft had executed a series of left turns and descended from 7000 feet to 4200 feet in about two minutes. Three and a half minutes after the mayday call the pilot advised that control had been regained. Altitude varied up and down during that time.

The pilot then elected to proceed to his destination, initially accepting ATC vectors via Mangalore. When the aircraft was later inspected by its home base maintenance organisation, no fault could be found with the autopilot. The aircraft had not been overstressed during the incident.

Factors

The following factors were relevant to the development of the incident:

• Control of the aircraft was lost in IMC for undetermined reasons.
• The autopilot was engaged when control was lost and the pilot neglected to disengage the autopilot, until prompted by ATC, while trying to regain control.

The pilot advised that, during the take-off roll, the aircraft's left main wheel entered a soft, muddy area and he lost directional control. The aircraft entered a ground loop during which, the right wing contacted the ground.

The pilot reported that the aircraft was hit by a gusting cross wind during the landing roll. The aircraft then ground looped turning through 180 degrees before coming to a halt, on the western edge of the runway.

Later examination of the aircraft by a local LAME revealed that there was damage to the left landing gear, the left wing tip and wing strut and the windscreen had popped out.

Whilst climbing through 4,000 feet at about 400kts, the front canopy blew open and shattered but remained attached, hanging to the right side of the aircraft. The pilot reported that due to minor handling problems a minimum of 220kts approach speed was used. On touchdown the drag chute was deployed but separated from the aircraft, requiring heavy braking to be used. At about 100kts the nosewheel tyre failed and deflated. The aircraft was able to be taxied clear of the runway and shut down.

Ground investigation revealed that the front canopy lock was not in the fully locked position, allowing the canopy to open in flight. The drag chute operation could not be faulted, and it is suspected that the release button had been activated sometime prior to the flight. The button is lockwired and the lockwire was found broken. The checklist is to be amended to require this item to be checked before flight. The nose tyre probably failed as a result of the high landing speed, and heavy braking without drag chute assistance.