Pilot reported that the aircraft encountered sink soon after take-off. The main wheels contacted the crop (tea) and the aircraft nosed over. The pilot indicated that there were no mechanical problems with the aircraft of which he was aware. The aircraft had been operating with similar loads throughout the day. The wind was gusting at the time of the accident, and there was a possibility of windshear being present. In addition, the pilot had conducted more than 80 flights on the day of the accident, for about 6 hours flying time. It is possible, therefore, that he was suffering some fatigue at the time of the accident.

The pilot assessed the wind as from 180 degrees at 10-15 kts. On the take-off roll on strip 09 the tail was raised, and the aircraft appeared to accelerate normally. It then encountered a wind gust. The right wing rose, and the aircraft diverted left. The left main wheel contacted a drain on the left side of the strip and the aircraft overturned and came to rest inverted.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Decision by the pilot to operate in a gusty crosswind.

2. Probable encounter with a wind gust.

3. The pilot was unable to maintain directional control.

The pilot reported that when he returned to the airfield after a short local flight, the windsock was indicating a strong southerly wind. He therefore elected to land on the 180 degree strip. The approach and flare were normal except for some turbulence. However, during the hold off the aircraft encountered a particularly strong gust. This resulted in the aircraft ballooning with the right wing low and substantial right drift.

The pilot said he immediately applied power to go around but was unable to stop the drift. As the aircraft was now tracking towards a nearby hangar, he turned further right to avoid it but was then confronted with trees and houses beyond. As he believed he would not clear the trees he closed the throttle and attempted to land in a clear area. The aircraft hit the ground heavily on the right wingtip and then cartwheeled, coming to rest after about 50 metres.

The pilot said that after he got out of the aircraft, he assessed the wind strength was 20 knots with gusts to 35 knots.

The pilot planned to visit a friend and land in a paddock at his property. He noticed the wind direction and speed from wind patterns on the sea, then commenced a survey of the property to find a suitable landing area.

He noticed three power lines across the selected paddock but failed to see a fourth. He then descended from 500 ft above ground level (AGL) to 100 ft AGL for a better look at the intended landing area, then continued the descent to about 25 ft AGL to check the surface conditions. The fourth power line suddenly appeared across the path of the aircraft, and with no time to take avoiding action the aircraft struck the wire with the propeller and windscreen, causing it to pitch nose down and impact the ground.

The emergency locator beacon (ELB) activated and was heard by an overflying regular public transport (RPT) aircraft.

VH-BVJ was doing circuits and landings on runway 36. Because the light wind slightly favoured runway 05, the last landing was made on that runway. In order to vacate the runway after landing it was necessary to turn the aircraft around and backtrack.

The crew of VH-BVJ then noticed that VH-AIR was lined up on runway 05. No radio calls had been received from VH-AIR. VH-AIR then commenced its take-off towards VH-BVJ. The instructor in VH-BJV turned his aircraft left to vacate the runway and called to the pilot of VH-AIR to cut his engine. There was no response from VH-AIR, which continued its take-off, passing abeam VH-BVJ about 10 feet above the ground. At this stage VH-BVJ had reached the edge of the bitumen runway but had not vacated onto the grass.

Subsequently it was established that the radio in VH-AIR had been tuned 0.02 Mhz above the correct frequency. The pilot of VH-AIR saw VH-BVJ, apparently stationary on the northern end of the runway. Thinking the pilot of VH-BVJ had pulled over to the side of the runway to let him take off, he commenced his take-off roll.

According to the pilot of VH-AIR, his aircraft passed abeam of VH-BVJ at a height of about 50 feet.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot of VH-AIR had selected the incorrect radio frequency.

2. The pilot of VH-AIR took off on a runway that was occupied.

On arrival at Devonport the crew of VH-EKD decided to make an NDB approach. Cloud was present, at or close to the minimum NDB descent altitude. Radio contact was made with two other aircraft, VH-WZJ and VH-MKQ, both of which were departing the MTAF. Separation was established VH-WZJ, but no further contact could be made with VH-MKQ, after the initial contact, when the pilot advised he was climbing to 5500 feet. After turning inbound in the approach, separation with VH-WZJ was reaffirmed.

A call was then received from VH-NIT advising this aircraft was rolling on runway 32. In response the crew of VH-EKD advised they were established inbound. VH-EKD continued descent to the minima of 830 feet which was maintained until the aircraft was over the NDB. As the crew of VH-EKD was about to commence a missed approach, visual reference was established, and VH-NIT was observed approximately 200 feet away to the right and slightly low. A roll to the left was made to increase the separation. VH-EKD continued in visual flight and landed on runway 24.

VH-NIT, which was flown by a student pilot, landed on runway 32. The operator of VH-NIT reported that their estimate of the cloud base was 1200 feet.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. Ineffective communication between the crew of VH-EKD and the pilot of VH-NIT.

2. Inexperienced pilot in VH-NIT who did not comprehend the potential conflict when VH-EKD responded to his "rolling runway 32"call.

3. The NDB approach track at the minima took the aircraft through the circuit pattern.

4. Low cloud/cloud cover resulting in the crew of VH-EKD not having the opportunity to sight the other aircraft until they were in very close proximity to it.

The pilot reported he had commenced a take-off roll on runway 08, after completing pre-take-off checks and receiving a take-off clearance. At a speed of about 40 knots, as he pushed forward on the control column to raise the tail, his seat slid fully aft on the seat rails. Although his feet could no longer reach the rudder pedals to maintain directional control, he was able to close the throttle and abandon the take-off.

The aircraft subsequently ground looped to the left, collapsing the right landing gear, before coming to rest on the side of the runway.

It was reported that the aircraft was being used for endorsement training. On the second approach it was observed to land heavily and bounce back into the air. The aircraft then touched down again, nosewheel first, before the nosewheel collapsed and the aircraft slid to a stop.

It is probable that the pilot, who was undergoing endorsement training, misjudged the final part of the approach and allowed the aircraft to land heavily. His recovery action, following the bounce, was inappropriate as he allowed the aircraft to touch down nosewheel first. The instructor-pilot did not take over in time to prevent the bounced landing or the misjudged recovery.

A post-accident inspection indicated that whilst the nosewheel had folded back, following separation of the retraction/extension rod, neither of the main landing gear legs were locked down at the time of the final touchdown. The pilots reported that the gear lights were green, indicating that they were down and locked, prior to the first landing and that the landing gear warning horn had not sounded during the approach. The evidence indicates that the landing gear may have been inadvertently selected up during the attempted recovery from the bounced landing.

From an inbound track on the 007 degrees radial, the aircraft was cleared to track via the 22 nautical mile distance measuring equipment (DME) arc to intercept the localiser for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 12.  The aircraft was cleared to descend to 4000 feet not below the DME steps.  Shortly after the aircraft turned left to intercept the localiser, a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) terrain warning occurred.  The aircraft was immediately climbed to 5000 feet.

After stabilising the aircraft at 5000 feet, localiser capture occurred and the aircraft recommenced descent to 4000 feet.  After passing Tea Tree locator, it became obvious to the crew that the electronic navigation picture was inconsistent with the relative bearing from Tea Tree. The captain ordered a go-around. The aircraft flew another ILS procedure without incident.

The digital flight data recorder (DFDR) showed that the GPWS had activated as the aircraft approached/overflew a 2953 foot spot height while turning to intercept the localiser and maintaining 4000 feet.  DFDR information also showed that the aircraft was maintaining a track well to the left of the localiser until the go-around was initiated. The electronic navigation picture falsely indicated that the aircraft was on track.

The investigation determined that the aircraft's track across the 2953 foot spot height caused the GPWS to activate. However, no reason was found as to why the electronic navigation picture was giving a false indication.  No fault was found with either the ground installation or the aircraft equipment and there have been no further similar problems in this aircraft. The operator suspects that the faulty navigation picture was probably caused by a passenger operating an electronic device in the cabin.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The GPWS was activated because the combination of aircraft altitude, spot height elevation, terrain closure rate and track fell within GPWS activation parameters.
2. The reason for the faulty navigation picture was not determined but the most likely reason was operation of an electronic device in the passenger cabin.

Safety action

1. Electronic Navigation Picture.

In regard to the faulty electronic navigation picture, the company now makes a PA announcement at the top of descent warning passengers not to use any electronic devices from that point for the remainder of the flight.

2. Ground Proximity Warning System.

Since this occurrence, the minimum altitude permitted by air traffic control for an aircraft on the 22-mile DME arc, prior to localiser interception, is now 5000 feet.  There have been no further GPWS activations over the subject spot height since the 5000 feet minimum altitude was implemented.

VH-UPS was doing circuits and landings on runway 17 left. VH-APF was departing from runway 17 right for local flying. Both aircraft had just taken off and were climbing out to the south. As the student pilot of VH-UPS was about to commence the turn onto the crosswind leg, the instructor noted that VH-APF was above them with only 20 to 30 feet of vertical separation. He took appropriate avoiding action.

The investigation revealed that the pilot of VH-APF had allowed his aircraft to drift into the runway 17 left circuit during the climb after take-off. The pilot of VH-APF did not see the other aircraft.