At the completion of a fire spotting exercise VH-TTZ was passing 9000 feet on descent in controlled airspace (CTA) when a glider was sighted at the same altitude.  Air traffic control had no knowledge of glider operations in the area, for which the lower level of CTA was 6,000 feet. The glider was not identified.

Investigation disclosed that a gliding competition was being conducted from Bacchus Marsh airfield and the glider was most probably one of those taking part. The competition task was a triangular cross-country flight departing from Bacchus Marsh, tracking southwest to Derrinallum, then north west to Buangor, then returning to Bacchus Marsh.

Bacchus March is situated under the 2,000 foot step of Melbourne CTA. On the day of the competition "Area Alpha", a specially released block of airspace over Bacchus Marsh with a 4,000 foot ceiling, gave pilots a higher start level over the airfield.  The south-eastern boundary of the 4,000 foot CTA step is located one mile to the west of the airfield. The competition track progressed under the 4,000, 6,000, 8,000 and 10,000 foot CTA steps.

Prior to take-off the pilots were briefed by the contest organiser who had arranged the task based on the weather forecast for the day, which indicated that thermals would go to 8,000 feet. The briefing covered task details, weather, safety and some airspace considerations. Pilots were not provided with airspace maps by the organiser, nor did the briefing involve airspace higher than 8,000 feet.

The weather for the day was much better than forecast with reports of some gliders taking part in the competition reaching 12,000 feet in thermals.

At the time of the airspace incursion the gliders were returning from the task. The incursion occurred south of Ballarat within the area of the 6,000 foot CTA step. Had the glider been observing the limitation and flying below the 6,000 foot CTA step, it would have been required to climb in thermals to have reached Bacchus Marsh. This would have slowed the glider's progress.

One aim of pilots in such competitions is to gain as much height as possible and, on the final glide, trade that height for speed to arrive over the airfield with just sufficient height to finish, conduct a circuit, and land. The pilot involved in the incursion would probably have been taking advantage of the strong conditions to maximise his competitive advantage and was either not aware of, or was not respecting, the airspace boundaries of the area in which he was flying.  Because of the smoke from the bushfire, it is doubtful that the glider pilots were able to achieve the visual navigation accuracy needed when flying close to CTA step boundaries.

Glider pilots do not receive training in airspace to the same extent as the pilots of powered aircraft. They also do not hold a licence issued by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and consequently do not receive advice from the CAA in regard to availability of airspace maps and associated information.

The gliding fraternities' understanding and respect of airspace, and the quality of briefings, has been the subject of a previous accident report. (Ref 9303898 VH-AYB, GMN, Benalla 24 November 1993).

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. Glider pilots taking part in the competition were inadequately briefed in regard to airspace requirements.
2. Glider pilots do not receive formal training in airspace considerations.
3. The pilot was either not aware of or was not respecting the airspace limitations.
4. Smoke from a bushfire would have made visual identification of CTA step boundaries difficult.
5. The glider was flown in controlled airspace without a clearance.

Safety Action

This ASOR is to be referred to the Gliding Federation of Australia to reinforce the need for increased awareness of these matters. (Ref SADN 950070).

The pilot had undertaken a private flight from Port Pirie intending to land at a property. When he arrived in the general area, he saw an airstrip with a vehicle parked nearby and believing that he had arrived at his destination commenced an approach for landing.

After the aircraft had touched down the pilot realised the airstrip was not suitable for the operation but was committed to continue with the landing.

The aircraft over-ran the end of the airstrip with the left wing striking a tree causing damage to the wingtip and displacing the spar rearwards. The pilot being the only occupant was uninjured.

The helicopter was being operated on a wildlife survey flight, and while manoeuvring near a crocodile nest the pilot reported an apparent loss of engine power, with a subsequent decay in main rotor RPM. He attempted to regain rotor RPM by opening the throttle fully, applying right anti-torque pedal, increasing forward speed and reducing collective pitch as much as possible but was unable to arrest the descent. When ground impact became inevitable, he levelled the helicopter and applied up collective to cushion the impact, but the resulting heavy landing caused the landing gear skids to collapse and the main rotor blades to strike the ground. The engine was still running and stopped by the pilot.

A brief inspection of the helicopter was made at the accident site, but with some difficulty due to crocodiles in the area. A more detailed inspection was carried out after it was recovered to Darwin. No evidence was found to suggest that it was other than serviceable prior to impact.

The pilot stated that he had departed from Jabiru for the 58km flight with 32 litres of fuel on board the helicopter and was to refuel at a nearby airstrip for the return flight. Inspection revealed that the amount of fuel remaining in the tank at the time of the accident was 65-70 litres, and the helicopter's all up weight was estimated as being just below the allowable maximum.

The pilot later revised his statement to agree that there would have been about 65 litres of fuel on board at the time of the accident and suggested that he may have over-pitched the rotor system when distracted by outside events as he attempted to find a place to land near the crocodile nest.

The pilot was landing at a station strip which is long but has a gutter running across it. The gutter is marked by vehicle tyres. The pilot planned to land on the second section of the strip and conducted a short field approach. Just before touchdown the left mainwheel struck a tyre which was thrown up into the left hand tailplane. The tailplane was bent upwards 15 cm and rearwards 2 cm at the tip.

The student pilot was conducting solo touch-and-go landings on runway 04 left. The aircraft was observed to touch down heavily on the nosewheel and become airborne again. The aircraft then touched down heavily on the main gear. The propeller struck the runway and the nosewheel fork was bent during the landing. The pilot stated that she was distracted by a gust of wind during the landing sequence.

VH-WNI departed Wagga for Canberra with a clearance to maintain 4000 feet visual due to VH-PVX inbound to Wagga on a reciprocal track at 6500 feet. The pilot of VH-PVX called at three miles west of Tumut (approximately the CTA boundary) at 6500 feet. She was later issued with a clearance to descend to 4500 feet. The clearance was read back correctly, and mutual traffic was passed to both aircraft.

Later, VH-WNI reported crossing the Hume Highway. VH-PVX was then asked to report distance to run to the Hume Highway and altitude. The pilot responded, "two miles to run and leaving 4300 feet on climb". The two aircraft would have been passing at that time with less than 500 feet vertical separation.

Later, when VH-PVX was approaching at Wagga, the pilot was instructed to descend to 2500 feet and overfly for a right circuit runway 23. This was to maintain separation with other circuit traffic. VH-PVX was observed approaching the aerodrome from the east and in response to a request from air traffic control, the pilot reported her altitude as 2000 feet. She was instructed to climb back to 2500 feet.

The pilot reported that during take-off with a full load, and 15 knots of crosswind, he lost directional control and ground-looped the aircraft about one third of the way along the strip. The right gear collapsed, and the right wing was damaged when it contacted the ground.

The aircraft was in clear air, descending through FL165, at an indicated airspeed of 270 kts, with the centre autopilot engaged. As the speed brake handle was moved from the closed position the aircraft rolled rapidly from a wings level attitude to some 20 degrees right bank. The first officer disconnected the autopilot and recovered to wings level. The autopilot was subsequently re-engaged and operated normally. An Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) message (Spoilers), and associated spoiler indicator light, remained illuminated for the remainder of the flight. One flight attendant was slightly injured during the incident.

Flight data recorder information revealed no unusual flight control inputs associated with the event. Ground inspection revealed that a fault event had been recorded by the No.2 Spoiler Control Module (SCM), but that fault could not be duplicated during ground testing. The operator carried out extensive troubleshooting of the complete system in conjunction with the manufacturer, without detecting any faults. The SCM was replaced as a precaution and the operator plans to install upgraded modules as they become available.

The pilot reported that during the commencement of a spray run he noticed a power line in the flight path and pulled up to avoid the wires. The aircraft struck the wires but remained airborne and was flown back to Warwick and landed safely. The pilot said he was not previously aware of the power line, and it was not marked on the map given to him by the property owner. The aircraft damage was confined to the propeller and wire grazes on the right wing leading edge.

The pilot was returning from a three-hour cross county flight in an area with which she was very familiar. Although too low to complete a final glide to the airfield, the pilot continued on expecting to pick up a thermal to give her the height necessary to complete the flight. The thermal source selected, a quarry, was known to be reliable.

On this occasion the expected thermal failed to materialise, and, at a very low height, the pilot was forced to select an area to make an outlanding. The pilot selected a field, initially not realising it was too short and covered in long grass.

When she realised the field was covered in long grass, she decided to improve aileron performance by setting the flaps to full negative from the previous setting of full positive. This resulted in a significant loss of lift, culminating in a heavy landing. The long wings dipped into the grass resulting in a violent ground loop.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot descended to a very low altitude, anticipating a thermal over a known geographic feature.

2. When the thermal did not materialise, the pilot was then limited in choice of suitable areas for an outlanding.

3. The area selected for outlanding was short and covered in long grass.

4. The pilot incorrectly manipulated the flaps.

5. The glider landed heavily and ground looped.