The pilot reported that the left engine RPM had been wandering slightly during the cruise. She joined the circuit at Grafton for runway 18 and when on base, selected flap to 5 degrees and switched the landing lights on. Just prior to the turn onto final approach, at about 400 feet above ground level and just prior to selecting the landing gear down, the aircraft suddenly yawed and rolled to the left. This was accompanied by a 60 percent decrease in left engine torque indication. The pilot said that, by the time she stabilised the aircraft, it was on short final. Flaps were then selected to 20 degrees and the landing gear selected down as per the pre-landing checklist, but it was obvious that the landing gear would not be fully extended before touchdown. The pilot considered overshooting the approach but decided she was committed to land. The aircraft touched down with the landing gear partially extended.

Attempts were made to obtain from the pilot further information regarding the approach flown and when various checks were done as well as the reported torque loss. However, these attempts were unsuccessful.

The left engine was removed from the aircraft and subject to a strip examination. No reason for the torque loss could be identified.

There was a busy traffic sequence into Sydney with aircraft being required to hold at Bindook. At 0745 hours the crew of VH-RMD, which was cruising at Flight Level (FL) 390, were told by Sector 7 air traffic control to descend to FL 290 by Bindook. Due to the heavy traffic Arrivals control advised Sector 7 at 0746 hours that Bindook was full and that all arriving aircraft were to be held outside Sydney arrivals control airspace.

At 0747 hours the Sector 7 controller told the crew of VH-RMD to descend to FL 350 by 100 miles Sydney, for holding at 100 miles Sydney in a left hand two minute pattern. The aircraft had about 10 miles to run to the 100 mile point and the aircraft systems required re-programming to meet the new clearance limit.

There was not enough time allowed by the air traffic control instruction for the crew to be able to meet the requirement. Just one and a half minutes after being advised of the new clearance limit the crew advised air traffic control that they were at 100 miles Sydney and were still at FL 390. The pilot was instructed to turn left onto a heading of 300 degrees and the aircraft was monitored as it descended. No loss of separation occurred.

VH-SAI departed Sydney Airport for aerial work east of the coast in the Victor 1 transit lane. The helicopter was later observed following the coastline contours, within the Sydney Control Zone. The pilot subsequently reported that the flight path of the helicopter had been affected by the southeasterly wind, resulting in the aircraft inadvertently straying into controlled airspace.

The flight was planned from Launceston to Hobart via Clark. This requires that the aircraft track via the 149 degree radial from Launceston to Clark. From Clark, the inbound track to Hobart is 122 degrees. When the pilot requested a taxi clearance at Launceston, the air traffic controller responded with a taxi clearance and an airways clearance in the same transmission. The airways clearance was 'Hobart One 7000'. This is a standard instrument departure (SID) which involves tracking direct from Launceston to Hobart, not via Clark as planned. The clearance was not prefixed with the word 'amended' as it should have been, to reflect that the aircraft was being cleared on a route different than the one planned by the pilot.

The pilot read the clearance back and a short time later departed. After departure, the pilot made the required departure report including advice that he was tracking via 'Hobart One'. Later, when the pilot called Hobart Control Tower, it was found that he had tracked via his planned route and not via the route cleared by air traffic control.

The pilot, returning to his home base, decided to conduct an inspection of the paddocks around a property with which he was familiar. He completed two higher level circuits before selecting a suitable landing area. He had noted wires along the edge of the chosen paddock and elected to conduct an approach and a low-level inspection. After satisfying himself that the approach and landing area were suitable, the pilot commenced a missed approach with the intention of continuing the flight to his destination. He planned to return by car to inspect the paddock at ground level for suitability at a later date. As the pilot applied power, the landing gear caught on a wire across the paddock. The wire, which had a span of 400 metres, did not break immediately and the aircraft was pulled to the ground.

During the low level inspection, the pilot had removed his shoulder harness so that he would have a better view of the edges of the paddock as he flew along it. In the ensuing impact, he suffered serious injuries which were considered to have been potentially fatal, because of the lack of upper body restraint.

The Aero Commander was cleared to descend to 5,000 ft, on track from Richmond to Bankstown. Shortly after, the pilot was instructed to contact Sydney Approach, who then gave him a radar vector to track south of Richmond direct to Westmead.

The controller subsequently observed the radar height display of the aircraft indicated 4,400 ft and informed the pilot that he had descended below his assigned altitude. After being instructed to maintain 4,000 ft the aircraft was processed normally to Bankstown. The pilot later reported that he descended below his assigned altitude when he misread his assigned altitude indicator, whilst changing frequency to Sydney Approach. He was also expecting a requirement to be at 2,000 ft by 22 DME Sydney, as he had experienced on previous approaches into Bankstown.

A group of four aircraft was inbound to Brisbane on the same air route. Three of the aircraft were in close proximity with the lowest cruising at Flight Level(FL) 270 and the other two cruising at FL 350 and FL 370. The fourth aircraft was about 20 miles ahead cruising at FL 330.

The aircraft cruising at FL 370, a Douglas DC-10, requested a clearance to descend when the aircraft was clear of traffic. The air traffic controller immediately cleared the aircraft to descend. The pilot did not respond to the transmission by the controller and the controller again cleared the aircraft to descend. The pilot advised the controller that there was another aircraft three miles ahead at FL 350. The controller apologised to the pilot and issued an instruction to the aircraft, a Boeing 737, cruising at FL 350 to turn right. The pilot of the aircraft at FL 370 then advised that he had the other aircraft in sight and that his aircraft had left FL 370 for FL 350. The controller immediately instructed the aircraft to maintain FL 370.

Examination of the radar recording revealed that the higher aircraft had descended to FL 368 before commencing a climb to FL 370. At that time the aircraft were laterally separated by between four and five miles. As a result there was an infringement of the required separation standard of either 2,000 feet vertical or five miles horizontal separation between the two aircraft.

The controller who issued the descent instruction was a trainee air traffic controller under training for the issue of her initial sector rating. At the time of the occurrence she was being supervised by a rated controller. The rated controller had instructed the trainee to issue the descent instruction to the aircraft and advised that he believed that when doing so the aircraft at FL 350 was in fact at FL 330. He was unaware why he had made that assumption as the altitude of the aircraft was correctly labelled by use of a 'shrimp boat'.

VH-HPL was on track from Perth to Rottnest Island, maintaining 2000 ft when VH-EAJ departed Perth for Singapore. The pilot of VH-EAJ had requested a clearance to enable the aircraft to initially track north along the coast, visually, at 2000 ft. VH-EAJ was cleared initially at 3000 ft. When the aircraft reached 3000 ft the pilot advised that they "would like 2000 if its available .....3000 is just above cloud". VH-EAJ was then cleared to descend to 2500 ft which was the lowest assignable altitude to keep the aircraft 1000 ft above the base of controlled airspace.

At this time VH-EAJ was on radar vectors, heading 280 deg, which was keeping the aircraft to the south of VH-HPL but on a converging track. VH-EAJ was then asked to "report sighting a Britten Norman Islander (VH-HPL) in your two o'clock.....four miles maintaining 2000 ft.......". The crew of VH-EAJ were unable to sight VH-HPL. They were then instructed to climb to their planned cruising level of flight level 350. They were then asked again if they had the traffic sighted but reported "negative we're in cloud". They were then asked their present level and reported they were at 3100 ft.

Separation between the two aircraft reduced to two miles with less than 1000 ft vertical separation.

Both pilots had extensive time on DC3 aircraft earlier in their flying careers. The First Officer had been re-validated on type after recent asymmetric checking. On Saturday 20 March the Captain flew the aircraft to Warrnambool with 24 passengers and an engineer on board. A normal landing was made on runway 13 with a crosswind of about 10 knots. The following afternoon the crew went to the airport at about 1415 hours for the return flight to Melbourne. They loaded the luggage and completed a preflight inspection. There was plenty of time to do these tasks prior to the planned departure. The passenger load was similar to that on the previous day's flight. The First Officer was to fly the aircraft from the left seat. The wind was from about 020 degrees at 12-14 knots and the weather was fine. Runway 31 was selected for take-off. The tail wheel lock was engaged and the take off commenced with into wind aileron and leading with the into wind throttle. Initially the aircraft was tracking straight down the centre of the runway. As the tail was lifted a mild swing to the right developed. This was corrected with left rudder but an over correction followed with the aircraft veering towards the left side of the runway. Approaching the runway intersection, the Captain came on the controls and checked that the autopilot was switched off. A correction was made and the left wheel was in the air. The aircraft left the sealed area and leap frogged gables at the runway intersection. The Captain took full control and closed the throttles. The aircraft was steered back onto the runway where it was brought to a stop. On taxy back to the terminal area it was noted the tail wheel steering and brakes functioned normally. An inspection showed that the left wingtip and aileron had been damaged by ground contact. The First Officer had not done a cross wind take off on the type for 24 years.

The student was conducting supervised solo circuits. Runway 09 was in use, with a wind of 090 degrees at 10 knots. During the third session of solo circuits the student approached the runway higher than normal. The aircraft was subsequently observed to contact the runway in a nose down attitude, the nose gear collapsed, and the propeller struck the runway.