CIRCUMSTANCES: "On 16 July 1983, the pilot/owner of the aircraft, Mr Elsing, flew it from Griffith, its home base, to Hobart with Mr and Mrs Twilley as passengers. The purpose of the trip was an overnight visit to Hobart, with a return to Griffith on 17 July. Mrs Twilley suffered earache and airsickness on the flight to Hobart and decided to return on an airline flight. Initially her husband was to accompany her but finally decided to return on VH-WJC. Prior to departing from Hobart the pilot supervised the refuelling of the aircraft and had 344 litres added to the fuel tanks. After the refuelling he personally checked the security of the fuel tank caps. The pilot submitted a flight plan to the Hobart Briefing Office for a private category flight from Hobart to Moorabbin, tracking via Launceston and Wonthaggi. The plan indicated that the flight would be conducted under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) at Flight Level 120 (12000 feet on standard atmospheric pressure of 1013.2 millibars), with two persons on board. The flight plan showed that the aircraft had a fuel endurance of 220 minutes, and carried an Emergency Locator Beacon (ELB) and life jackets. There was no indication that a life raft was carried. The aircraft departed Hobart at 1352 hours and the flight apparently progressed normally until 1452 hours when the pilot advised Launceston Air Traffic Control, ""Er Whiskey Juliet Charlie we seem to have been in trouble with er fuel here the red er warning light comes and the gauge is down .."". At 1454 hours the pilot transmitted a Mayday call, indicating that he was descending from Flight Level 120 to track to Bass (a position reporting point); present position was 85 nautical miles (nm) from Launceston and he would be making a controlled ditching. Launceston Control suggested a diversion to Devonport but the pilot did not respond to the suggestion. At 1455 The pilot reported, ""We have lost an endurance of more than two two zero in flying time of seven zero minutes and when the warning light goes on this aircraft we have got three zero minutes flying left ....."". At 1456 the pilot advised that he intended to remain on track and make an emergency descent at 2000 feet per minute ""in case the pressurisation gets lost"". At that time the pilot reported his position as 92 miles from Launceston and indicated that he would stay on track and fly low ""in case we cut out"". At 1457 he asked if there was any advice available from Aero Commander experts on how to ditch the aircraft, however no information on the matter was immediately available. At 1459 Launceston Control established that the pilot intended descending to 500 feet to ""observe the situation"". The pilot also advised that the aircraft was ""DME Wonthaggi nine five"", i.e. the aircraft was 95 nm from the Wonthaggi Distance Measuring Equipment (navigation aid). In response to further enquiries, the pilot reported that the aircraft had left 4000 feet on descent and the remaining flying time was ""none whatsoever theoretically"". The last recorded transmission from the aircraft was at 1501 45 when the pilot confirmed that there were two persons on board. There was no indication from the pilot, at any time, that the fuel supply had been exhausted or that either engine had failed. It was estimated that the aircraft ditched at about 1505 hours, at an approximate position of 81 nm from Wonthaggi on the planned track. Searching aircraft subsequently sighted a fuel slick and a survivor in the water, however, contact with this person was lost before rescue helicopters and ships reached the area. No trace has since been found of the aircraft or its occupants. Subsequent investigation indicated the loss of fuel reported by the pilot was probably the result of a malfunction in the fuel system, rather than a spurious indication of fuel remaining. In the absence of the wreckage the precise reason for the fuel loss cannot be determined. Calculations relating to aircraft performance revealed that had the pilot elected to remain at the planned cruising level, the aircraft could have glided for about 35 nm after fuel expiry, with both propellers feathered. It was considered that had the pilot elected to turn back when he realised the nature of the problem and maintained altitude until the remaining fuel was exhausted, the aircraft could have reached the northern Tasmanian coast. There is no known hazard associated with a potential loss of cabin pressurisation that would have required an emergency descent from FL 120. The pilot's reason for conducting such a descent could not be established, however the effect of the decision was that the aircraft was ditched at an earlier time, and further from the Victorian coast, than was necessary. This factor increased the difficulties encountered during the subsequent search and rescue operation."

CIRCUMSTANCES: "The aircraft was planned to conduct a regular freight service to Brisbane and Cairns. After an evidently normal take-off from Runway 16 the crew contacted DEPARTUREs Radar, advised that the aircraft was climbing to Flight Level 370 and requested the direct track to Brisbane. Approximately two minutes later the crew did not respond to calls from the radar controller, and the aircraft faded from the radar screen. Witnesses subsequently reported that the aircraft was seen diving steeply towards the water. The evidence obtained from eye witnesses, recorded radar information and the Flight Data Recorder indicated that the aircraft entered a rapid turn to the right and rolled, probably to a nose-down inverted position, before entering a steep descent. The pilot in command intended to use the flight to assess the performance of the co-pilot, who was being considered for up-grading to command status. He was known to simulate emergency instrument flight conditions while checking company pilots. These simulations took the form of failures to the Flight Attitude Indicators on the left instrument panel, and the masking of the indicator on the right by covering or the removal of instrument lighting. It was likely that on this occasion that the simulated failures referred to above were given shortly before the aircraft commenced a planned turn to the left to take up the track towards Brisbane at a height of about 5000 feet. At this time the pilot in command had no external reference by which to monitor the attitude of the aircraft in relation to the horizon. The pilots did not recover control of the aircraft before impact with the water. NOTE A full report on this accident has been prepared and is available from the Australian Government Publishing Service in each Capital city."

PLT NON-NVMC RATED BECAME UNSURE OF POSN IN POOR WX CONDITIONS IN REMOTE AREA.ACFT BROKE APART AS ARESULT OF OVERLOAD FORCES IN A STEEP DIVE.PLT'S OF SEARCHING ACFT REP WX CONDITIONS IN AREA WERE IMC

The pilot was completing an air test following work on one propeller. During the base leg for runway 21 at Perth the aircraft appeared to stall and the pilot did not regain control. It crashed in the back yard of a house in Bassendean causing some roof damage. The out-of-control descent was described as a "falling leaf" indicating the aircraft had little forward speed. Also there was no wreckage trail. The aircraft caught fire on impact. The reason for the loss of control was not determined however, the post-mortem examination of the pilot indicated a possibility of incapacitation resulting from heart failure.

MERCY FLT.ON ARR KALGOORLIE CCT,PLT ENCOUNTED SEVERE STORM CELLS,INTENSE WIND GUSTS & TURBULANCE.ONFINAL AFTER A NUMBER OF SUDDEN ATTITUDE CHANGES A/C COLLIDED WITH A MINE POPPET HEAD.L WING TORN OFF

PLT HAD NOT FLOWN AT NGT 21 MTHS.NO STRIP LGTS.DID NOT MONITOR FLT INSTRUMENTS UNTIL JUST BEFORE IMPACT.PLT MOTIVATED TO RESCUE STRANDED PEOPLE.SAR MISSION CO-ORD DIDN'T MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL CONTROL.

ARRIVAL REPORT WAS NOT RECEIVED FROM ACFT AT SARTIME.PLT ADZ HAD RADIO PROBLEMS.

GRD ENGINEER USED PORTER'S TUG.GEAR SELECTOR OPERATES IN REVERSE TO ENGINEERS TUG.NIL SAFETY GATE ON GEAR SELECTOR.REALISING HE HAD SELECTED REVERSE,ACCIDENTLY PRESSED ACCELERATOR & BACKED INTO PROP.

FOLLOWING AN APPARENT LOSS OF PWR BY RH ENG,THE PLT DID NOT OPERATE THE ACFT IN THE CONFIGURATION &AT AIRSPEED REQD FOR SAFE ONE-ENG FLT.PLT'S RESPONSES INFLUENCED BY OP UNDER IFR WHEN NOT QUALIFIED.

AUW EXCEEDED, C OF G REAR AFT LIMIT, GUSTY WIND CONDITIONS.ONE ENG FLD ON TKOF.PLT INITIALLY FLD FEATHER PROP, ATTEMPTED TO REMAIN AIRBORNE, UNABLE TO MAINTAIN HEIGHT.ACFT CRASHED & BURST INTO FLAMES.