Canberra Approach received coordination from Sydney Flight Information Service (2) (FIS) concerning VH-OFF estimating Shelleys at 0541 and cruising at 10,000 feet. Subsequently no call was received from the aircraft, but another aircraft which was conducting training at Canberra advised that VH-OFF was attempting to call Canberra. Instructions were passed to VH-OFF through this other aircraft that clearance through Canberra control area would not be available unless satisfactory two-way communications could be established. Shortly after this a code 7600 transponder squawk (Radio Failure) was observed on radar over Lake George inside controlled airspace. VH-OFF was instructed by FIS2 to call Canberra Approach but the aircraft did not establish contact and was instructed through FIS2 to leave controlled airspace.

The pilot of VH-OFF reported that he was able to communicate with other aircraft on Canberra Approach frequency, and Canberra Approach was the only station not reading VH-OFF. The pilot said that he had expected to establish communications with Canberra Approach and had decided initially to continue as per flight plan. He was then instructed to leave controlled airspace tracking 270 degrees and acknowledged this with two clicks of the microphone button. He advised FIS2 that he was able to descend clear of controlled airspace and remain visually clear of high terrain. No further communications problems were experienced for the remainder of the flight.

At 0758 EST, VH-OUD contacted Brisbane Approach 28km north of Brisbane at 3,000 feet requesting an airways clearance. Approach answered that a clearance was not available and that the aircraft was required to remain outside controlled airspace. Approach also told the aircraft to contact the Redcliffe common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) and to call Approach again at 0805 EST.

Another aircraft, VH-HEI, was on descent inbound to Brisbane and had been assigned 3000 feet. As the progress of this aircraft was being monitored on radar, the Approach Controller realised that VH-OUD had penetrated the control area. Attempts to contact VH-OUD were unsuccessful so VH-HEI was vectored clear of VH-OUD. The separation standard of 5 miles was infringed during this sequence.

The pilot of VH-OUD contacted Approach again about 5 miles north of Brisbane Airport and was processed for landing. The pilot later said that he heard the instruction to remain outside controlled airspace. A short time later, however, he had been told to squawk ident on the aircraft transponder and was informed that VH-OUD had been radar identified. He interpreted this to mean that he could continue into controlled airspace at 3,000 feet.

The pilot was carrying out dual instruction for a student helicopter pilot. He reported that on the second practice "engine off landing", as the helicopter was sliding along the ground at about 20 kph, the aircraft encountered some rough ground. The front section of the left skid was torn off and the helicopter slewed to the left and tilted nose-down. The forward section of the right skid then separated and the main rotor blades contacted the ground before severing the tail boom.

After departing Essendon the aircraft climbed, as cleared by air traffic control, to cruise altitude 9,500 feet. A radar return and label were observed by the Sector 3 Radar Controller in the vicinity of Cowes, on the basis of which a Sartime for clearance to cross controlled airspace at Devonport was calculated. At or about the Sartime, Sector 3 contacted Flight Service 15 to ascertain if the aircraft was listening out on 120.7 (Area frequency). Contact was subsequently established with VH-PZP on 123.8 (Melbourne Control) and the pilot reported his position as 7 nautical miles (by Distance Measuring Equipment) south of Devonport. The aircraft had passed through the north western tip of Launceston controlled airspace without a clearance. No breakdown in separation occurred.

This flight was the pilot's second charter flight. He was unfamiliar with the area. Because this was his first Bass Strait crossing and because he did not hold an instrument rating he co-opted the assistance of another commercial pilot, who holds a current instrument rating, to act as the safety pilot. When he was flight planning, the pilot-in-command did not notice that the route would infringe controlled airspace. The safety pilot subsequently did not detect the penetration.

The engine lost power soon after take off due to the failure of the welds securing the airflow straightener vane located in the hot air box. The liberated vane was sucked into and blocked the airflow through the carburettor throat. The CAA airworthiness branch is investigating the need for these vanes as they are not fitted to all Pawnee aircraft and their failure can have catastrophic results.

The initial clearance passed to the crew of VH-TJB was for cruise at FL 350. Sector 3E contacted Launceston Tower with an amendment for the aircraft to cruise at FL 330. After departure the crew reported on climb to FL 350.

The error happened because the Launceston Aerodrome Controller became pre-occupied with another task and omitted to pass the amended level details onto the crew. The situation was recognised and resolved before the aircraft reached FL 330.

Prior to departure the pilot had calculated that there was sufficient fuel onboard for the flight. About 11km from Alice Springs aerodrome, with the left tank selected, the engine failed. The pilot selected the right tank, the engine restarted, and the flight continued towards the field.

Shortly after the aircraft entered downwind for runway 06 at 3200 feet, about 4km from the aerodrome, the engine failed again. The pilot advised the tower controller that the aircraft "was out of fuel" and was cleared to land as required.

After the aircraft landed safely on runway 24, the pilot visually checked the tanks. The right tank appeared empty but there was 30-40 mm depth of fuel in the left tank. The left tank was selected and the engine started normally, the aircraft was then taxied to the parking area.

When the aircraft was refuelled 156 litres of fuel was added to the right tank and 122 litres to the left tank. Each tank holds 150 litres of useable fuel. All the fuel drains were checked by an engineer and were contaminated by dirt and water.

The pilot of VH-MGW requested taxi clearance for take-off and reported in receipt of automatic terminal information service (ATIS) "Echo". The runway nominated by the ATIS was runway 35. The aircraft was cleared to taxi, but shortly after, the pilot requested runway 30 for departure. The Surface Movement Controller (SMC) then issued the following instruction: - "Mike Golf Whisky taxi for change of runway 30, hold short of runway 35." A Boeing 737 VH-CZD had been cleared to land on runway 35 and was beginning to flare for landing. VH-MGW was then observed to cross the holding point for runway 35. After repeated calls from the SMC the pilot of VH-MGW finally stopped his aircraft close to the edge of the flight strip. The Boeing was not instructed to go-around as it was at the point of touchdown and considered by ATC to be committed to landing.

The pilot of VH-MGW stated he did not see the holding point markings until he had been instructed to stop by the SMC. He said the holding point markings had been changed and was planning to stop at the "old" holding point position. He also stated that he was aware of the landing Boeing 737.

The aircraft departed Sydney at 0752 hours EST on a scheduled commercial air transport flight, landing at Cowra and Young before terminating at Forbes at 0940 hours. The aircraft subsequently departed Forbes at 1545 hours for the return flight to Sydney via West Wyalong, Forbes, Young, and Cowra, departing Cowra at 1815 hours with six passengers on board.

During the flight the pilot was monitoring the fuel state, and became concerned that there may not be sufficient fuel on board to reach Sydney. When the aircraft was overhead Camden, the pilot saw the right hand fuel contents gauge indicating near empty and immediately decided to divert to Bankstown. Sydney Approach advised the pilot that the aircraft was closer to Hoxton Park. As a result, the pilot elected to divert to Hoxton Park, landing at 1856 hours at an estimated weight of 2765 kg. The aircraft was refuelled, departed Hoxton Park and landed safely at Sydney. Hoxton Park has a pavement restriction which restricts normal aircraft operations to aircraft up to a maximum take-off weight of 1350 kg.

Prior to departing Forbes, the pilot had calculated the aircraft fuel requirements, and was satisfied that adequate fuel remained to complete the flight without refuelling. However, he had made an error in his calculations, and had omitted to take into account fuel consumed during take-off and climb as required by the company fuel policy.

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident.

1. The pilot failed to accurately determine the total fuel required for the flight from Forbes to Sydney.

2. During the sector from Cowra to Sydney, the pilot realised there was insufficient fuel in the aircraft to safely complete the flight.

3. As a result of the late appreciation of the aircraft's critically low fuel state, the pilot was forced to divert to an aerodrome suitable for Piper PA 31 operations only in emergency situations.

The pilot reported that the helicopter's engine lost power during normal cruise flight. A forced landing was conducted into small trees resulting in the helicopter catching fire and being destroyed. Later inspection of the wreckage by an aircraft engineer revealed a hole in the crankcase caused by a connecting rod which had separated from the crankshaft.