A clearance to line up on the runway had previously been given. The crew reported that after they were cleared for take-off and were applying take off power a vehicle was seen approaching the runway on taxiway alpha. They observed the vehicle continue and cross the runway in front of them. The take-off was rejected from a relatively low speed.

A different version of events was presented by control tower staff. A clearance was given for the vehicle to cross the runway. They said that as the aircraft was on the taxiway approaching the runway it was judged that the vehicle would be clear of the runway. The Manual of Air Traffic Services allows a take-off clearance to be given if, in the opinion of the controller, no collision risk exists and there is reasonable assurance that separation will exist when the aircraft commences take-off roll. A take-off clearance was given under this provision when the air traffic controller assessed it was safe to do so. Although the situation may have been tighter than expected the vehicle was seen moving away from the runway when the take-off was rejected.

It has not been possible to resolve the discrepancies between these two versions of the events.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to development of the incident:

1 It was not possible to assign factors to this incident.

VH-EKD was approaching the circuit and about to join downwind at 1000 feet when a Cessna aircraft was sighted ahead at the same altitude. A left turn was made and the other aircraft was passed some 300 metres away.

The pilot of VH-EKD had made all the required calls on the MTAF frequency but no response was received. He also made calls after he incident but was unable to establish contact. The registration of the other aircraft could not be established.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilot of unidentified aircraft did not make the required radio calls.

On arrival overhead Minlaton, at the lowest safe altitude of 1600 feet above mean sea level, the pilot identified the town and airport. A visual descent to 500 feet above ground level was continued as the aircraft joined the circuit for runway 33. The pilot flew a tight circuit and after aligning the aircraft on final looked into the cockpit for a final check of the power settings. When he looked out, he had lost sight of the runway lights and before he could take corrective action the aircraft struck the ground about 800 metres before the runway threshold.

The left outer wing struck the ground and then a fence and was broken off, the landing gear was torn off and the aircraft came to rest after a ground slide of about 75 metres. The pilot was uninjured and vacated the aircraft unaided.

A second aircraft which arrived overhead Minlaton a short time after VH-CRT, advised Adelaide of the accident. The pilot of this aircraft then held in the area for about 20 minutes because of poor visibility and light before a landing could be accomplished.

The aircraft was engaged in a shooting operation at the time of the accident. Whilst in a shallow descent about 180 feet above scrubby trees, the pilot applied power to fly away. The engine failed to respond and the main rotor RPM reduced. The pilot was forced to land the helicopter amongst the trees. It was reported that the power reduction may have been caused by a faulty fuel control unit.

The student pilot was conducting his second period of solo flying involving three circuits and Airwork in the training area. On approach after returning from the training area the aircraft was high and fast, but the pilot persisted with the approach. He then forced the aircraft onto the runway causing it to bounce. The aircraft was substantially damaged in the ensuing very hard touchdown. The training organisation has revised its procedures to give more adequate instruction covering this type of occurrence.

Significant factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident.

1. The pilot had very low experience.

2. The pilot persisted with an approach that was high and fast.

3. During the landing attempt the pilot made inappropriate control inputs.

4. The training organisation had not given the pilot adequate instruction on how to handle this type of event.

Circumstances

At 0341 hours the driver of Qantas tug Red Charlie requested permission to tow a Qantas B767 aircraft from the Qantas Maintenance Area to the International Terminal Bay 30. The driver was cleared by ATC to tow the aircraft via taxiway foxtrot and hold short of runway 16. This instruction was acknowledged by the driver.

VH-AMB was arriving at Sydney on a flight from Armidale and was on final approach to runway 16.

As the tug approached the holding point for runway 16 the Aerodrome Controller [ADC] issued the hold short instruction a second time which was again acknowledged by the driver. The ADC had decided that VH-AMB would land before the tug would be given permission to cross runway 16 and issued a landing clearance to that aircraft at 0345 hours.

It had been common practice during the night shift, for tug drivers to receive a clearance to cross runway 16 at the point at which the ADC issued the second hold short instruction. With this expectancy in mind, the tug driver thought he had received a clearance to cross runway 16 when he acknowledged the second hold short instruction.

The holding point for runway 16 on taxiway foxtrot is not easily recognised from the tower at night and controllers therefore had to rely on pilots/drivers complying with any instruction received. As Red Charlie was approaching this holding point, it was not possible for the ADC to accurately determine the position of the tug and aircraft.

At 0346.10 hours the pilot of VH-AMB informed the tower that he had an aircraft in front of him on the runway. The ADC immediately cancelled the landing clearance and established that Red Charlie was clear of runway 16, having crossed that runway. As VH-AMB was still in a position to land, a second landing clearance was issued at 0346.55 hours.

VH-AMB continued the approach and landed safely.

Significant Factors

1. The driver of Red Charlie had an expectation that he would be given a clearance to cross runway 16 at the time the second hold short instruction was issued.

2. The position of the taxiway foxtrot holding point is difficult to visually judge at night from the control tower. 3. The driver of Red Charlie did not read back the instruction to hold short of runway 16. 4. There is no ATC requirement for the read back referred to in 3 above.

Safety Actions

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation issued a Safety Advisory Notice [SAN930310] to Qantas Airways, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Federal Airports Corporation. It stated that:

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation advises that formal radio procedures instruction should be included in all airside driver training and suggests that ATC could have an input into such training.

The pilot departed Moorabbin and conducted a practise instrument flight rules flight, including an instrument landing system approach at Essendon and a practise non-direction beacon approach at Cowes, before returning to Moorabbin. For most of the flight the pilot experienced communications problems with his very high frequency radio. He called inbound to Moorabbin Tower at Carrum and advised of his radio problem. Moorabbin Tower noted that the aircraft's transmissions were readable but there was a loud background squeal. Moorabbin Tower cleared the aircraft for a straight-in approach for runway 35 left and instructed the pilot to report at three miles. At the three miles inbound call the radio appeared to be working fine. At about two miles the pilot was given a clearance to land on runway 35 left.

The pilot thought that he checked that the landing gear had been selected down during the final approach, but he cannot remember whether or not the three green "gear down and locked" lights were illuminated. He first became aware of a problem when he heard a grinding noise during the touch down.

Engineers have subsequently found nothing wrong with the landing gear systems. The aircraft was equipped with a landing gear extender which could have automatically extended the gear under low airspeed/low power conditions, but the pilot had disengaged this system.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. For most of the flight the pilot had been distracted by radio problems.

2. The pilot forgot to select the undercarriage down prior to landing.

3. The pilot had disengaged the backup, automatic landing gear extension system.

The helicopter had been used for mustering throughout the day and had been refuelled from drums.

When the mustering was completed the last 15 litres from a partly used drum was pumped into the auxiliary fuel tank of the helicopter. Fuel samples were taken from the main tank and filter and the helicopter flown to nearby stockyards.

After a short time on the ground, the helicopter departed for the station homestead, about 37 km away. Approximately 10-15 minutes after refuelling, while cruising at 200-250 feet above ground level, the engine began to run roughly, and the rotor RPM began to decay. The pilot lowered the collective control and the engine stopped.

The helicopter was flying downwind in a 20-30 knot wind and the pilot was committed to a downwind autorotational landing. Touchdown was at 20-30 knots on rough ground made heavy by recent rains. The skids dug in and the helicopter nosed over and was substantially damaged. The pilot was uninjured and walked to the homestead for assistance.

Subsequent inspection by recovery personnel revealed water and dirt in the fuel filters.

VH-TJE was enroute Adelaide to Perth. After passing Esperance the pilot requested a change of level to flight level 290. Because the aircraft was less than 15 minutes from the Air Traffic Services (ATS) boundary with Perth, the request for level change was co-ordinated with Perth (ATS). It was during this co-ordination that it was realised that the Esperance position report had not been passed to Perth ATS by Melbourne ATS as required.

The Melbourne air traffic controller on duty when it was realised that the position report had not been passed to Perth ATS had taken over from two other controllers, a training officer and a trainee, who had just been involved in a separate incident and were relieved to explain to the ATS Centre Co-ordinator what had happened.

It has not been determined whether the relieving air traffic controller inherited the problem or whether he failed to pass on the position report. There was no breakdown in separation. Perth ATS was expecting the aircraft. Had the request for change of level not been co-ordinated with Perth, Perth ATS would soon have asked for the position report anyhow.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The air traffic controller had just taken over the position.

2. A previous controller may have failed to pass on the position report.

3. An air traffic controller did not comply with laid down procedures.

The pilot had landed at the island strip on several previous occasions. A normal approach and landing was made on strip 27. Near the end of the landing roll the nose wheel struck a small rock, collapsing the nose gear leg.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Obstacle on strip surface.

2. The pilot did not take adequate steps to ensure the strip was free of obstacles.