The aircraft was returning to land with a glider tow rope attached when it landed heavily causing part of the tail wheel structure to collapse. The aircraft yawed rapidly to the left, but the pilot was able to regain control. Shortly after control was regained the aircraft yawed rapidly to the right. As the aircraft was heading towards a group of people on the ground the pilot deliberately ground looped the aircraft to avoid striking them. The aircraft came to an abrupt stop causing the right wing to strike the ground fracturing the wing spar.

Subsequent inspection revealed the tow rope stretched taut to a strip light at the side of the runway and both tail wheel actuating springs were detached.

 

As the aircraft was climbing through 7,700 feet, 25 miles from Wagga, the pilot gave a Mayday call and reported returning to Wagga due to a fire in the left engine. Emergency services were alerted. Shortly after, the pilot reported the fire was extinguished and the engine had been shut down. The aircraft returned for a safe landing.

An investigation revealed indications of heavy detonation in No 1 cylinder. The side of the piston was burnt, which had allowed the sump to pressurise and dislodge the dipstick. Engine oil was then pumped out of the open dipstick hole and streamed back to the turbocharger, generating a large volume of smoke. There was no evidence of fire damage.

It was reported that the engine had suffered from an episode of rough running some 15 engine hours earlier. Rubber deposits had been found partially blocking the fuel injectors, but the source was not determined. The injectors were cleaned and the aircraft returned to service. It is likely that the partially blocked injectors resulted in a lean fuel mixture being supplied to the No 1 cylinder, resulting in detonation. The detonation created localised hot spots, causing pre-ignition and the burning of the piston.

While operating in a high out of ground effect hover, the pilot heard a change in the engine noise. He noted that the engine torque needles had split by about 60% with the number two engine torque needle reading high. He also noted that the main rotor revolutions per minute (RPM) had increased to maximum (redline). He assessed the problem as a power turbine governor high-side failure and controlled engine parameters by retarding the power lever for number two engine before performing a gentle run on landing in a nearby paddock.

The air pressure line (Pr line) between the power turbine governor and the fuel control unit was found to have broken in the sleeve near the pipe flare where it was attached to the power turbine governor. The broken pipe allowed pressurised air to escape, thereby causing a governor high side failure.

The company chief engineer determined that the stainless-steel pipe broke because it was misaligned at the fitting to the fuel control unit. This placed the pipe under stress which eventually caused it to break near the other end fitted to the power turbine governor.

On descent into Devonport regular public transport aircraft, VH-WZI, made radio calls on the Flight Service (FS) frequency and on Devonport Mandatory Traffic Advisory Frequency (MTAF) prior to leaving controlled airspace at 10000 ft. There was no response from any other aircraft. When VH-WZI was approximately 18 NM north of Devonport, FS asked Air Traffic Control (ATC)for the position of VH-WZI. A short time later FS advised VH-WZI that ATC had VH-IJM on frequency 17 NM north of Devonport tracking for Hobart at 7500 ft. At this, VH-WZI terminated the descent and initiated a climb to 8000 ft in visual meteorological conditions. VH-IJM was transferred to the FS frequency and separation was effected. The crew of VH-WZI sighted VH-IJM half a mile to the right and below but it was extremely difficult to see VH-IJM due to underlying cloud cover.

The pilot of VH-IJM was flying to visual flight rules. VH-IJM had transferred to the ATC frequency at least 20 NM north of Devonport in order to obtain a clearance into controlled airspace which starts north of Devonport. The pilot was monitoring one radio frequency at a time. He was unaware of VH-WZI until he saw it.

The captain of VH-WZI believes that on routes where there is traffic climbing or descending to locations under controlled airspace, then the design of the airspace should be such that frequency separation is not encouraged; otherwise, procedures should be established to cater for such occurrences.

The manager of FS advised that where an aircraft is single very high frequency (VHF) radio equipped (or a pilot is monitoring only one frequency), with similar circumstances a similar incident could reoccur.

The current procedures for pilots and air traffic personnel, combined with the existing airspace configuration, do not prevent this type of incident from occurring.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilots of both aircraft complied with existing rules and regulations.

2. Air Traffic Services provided more than the required service.

3. The combination of existing rules, procedures and airspace does not prevent this type of occurrence.

The student pilot was on his first solo flight. During the final approach the instructor observed the aircraft pitch nose up and then down sharply as the student over-rotated and then pushed the control column forward. The aircraft touched down heavily on the nosewheel. Post flight inspection revealed nosewheel and engine mount damage.

The pilot's circuit entry procedure resulted in the aircraft joining the circuit too late and too low. The turn onto final was low and the pilot elected to land on the grass verge on the south side of the runway. The aircraft landed heavily, and the landing gear collapsed.

The flight plan for the aircraft, Sydney to Hong Kong, was received at Brisbane Air Traffic Control at approximately 1130 hours EST with a planned departure time from Sydney of 1300 hours. A departure message was received at 1325 hours. No other flight plan details were received on the aircraft by either Brisbane or Darwin Air Traffic Control.

At 1540 hours, the aircraft reported at Mt Isa, estimating position BROCK at 1600 hours. According to the flight plan, the next position reporting point should have been GOVE. There was no conflicting traffic and the aircraft was cleared via BROCK.

Twenty minutes prior to the aircraft's departure from Sydney, the aircraft commander was advised of an increase in zero fuel weight for the aircraft and amended the flight plan as a result. The handling agent for the operator failed to submit the updated plan. The reason for this omission was not determined.

The aim of the flight was to provide air experience (gliding) for a military pilot. During a loop, the instructor heard small noises but saw nothing amiss. On completion of the loop, the instructor observed a ripple on the top surface of the starboard wing and advised the other pilot to return to land. Subsequent inspection revealed a compression fracture on the top surface of the starboard wing.

During take-off a pronounced thrust lever split was noticed. The N1 was split by 5% and, after manually adjusting the power levers, the pilot reported that the number 2 engine N1 and EGT rose rapidly above maximum limits. Thrust levers were retarded at 120 knots (V1 was 138 knots) and the take-off was rejected. On the taxiway some smoke was seen coming from the tyres. An inspection showed that excessive lubrication of the landing gear brake units had caused the smoke when the brakes were overheated. No damage was evident. The number 2 engine was found to have sticky and out of adjustment variable stator vanes (VSV). These were lubricated and adjusted, and subsequent operations were normal.

Significant factors

1. The pilot rejected the take-off below V1 due to a power anomaly.

2. The number 2 engine variable stator vanes required adjustment and lubrication.

3. Excess lubrication on the landing gear brake units generated smoke after the rejected take-off.

The helicopter was being repositioned near a cliff edge. As it was lifted to a one metre hover a gust of wind tilted the tail down and the pilot felt a 'thump'. He initially raised the collective control, but the helicopter began to rotate rapidly to the right. The throttle was closed and the collective control lowered to prevent the helicopter from falling over the cliff edge. The helicopter landed heavily, after rotating through 270 degrees, bending and breaking the skid cross tubes.

Inspection revealed that the tail rotor guard had failed when it contacted the ground. It was then struck by the tail rotor causing the tail rotor drive shaft to fail at the main transmission.