Deputy Prime Minister Warren Truss today announced a new high priority underwater search area for missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370.
Deputy Prime Minister Warren Truss today announced a new high priority underwater search area for missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370.
The new search area of up to 60,000 square kilometres is located in the Southern Indian Ocean and, like previous searches, is located along the seventh arc – a thin but long line that marks where the missing aircraft last communicated with a satellite.
The new phase of the search has two elements:
a bathymetric survey of the sea floor in that area
a comprehensive search of the sea floor once it has been mapped.
The bathymetric survey—or mapping of the ocean floor— has already commenced, with the Chinese survey ship Zhu Kezhen and the Australian-contracted vessel Fugro Equator conducting operations in the areas provided by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
A public request for tender has been issued, seeking a primary contractor to bring together and manage the expertise, equipment and vessels to carry out the comprehensive search.
The ATSB has just released a new aviation bulletin containing 10 investigation reports.
The ATSB has just released a new aviation bulletin containing 10 investigation reports. The Aviation Short Investigation Bulletin Issue 32 covers short, office-based investigations.
The bulletin covers incidents, serious incidents and accidents involving helicopters, jet, piston aircraft, as well as helicopters and a balloon.
Short investigations cover incidents and accidents where the associated factors are usually well-understood and do not require more detailed investigations. Nonetheless, each investigation has the potential to produce important Safety Messages for pilots, operators and others in the aviation industry. The investigations also help the ATSB identify statistics and trends in air safety.
Issue 32 of the Bulletin features 10 safety investigations:
The ATSB has just released a new aviation bulletin containing 12 investigation reports.
The ATSB has just released a new aviation bulletin containing 12 investigation reports. The Aviation Short Investigation Bulletin Issue 30 covers short, office-based investigations.
The bulletin covers incidents, serious incidents and accidents involving helicopters, jet, turboprop and piston aircraft, as well as unmanned aerial systems.
Short investigations cover incidents and accidents where the associated factors are usually well-understood and do not require more detailed investigations. Nonetheless, each investigation has the potential to produce important Safety Messages for pilots, operators and others in the aviation industry. The investigations also help the ATSB identify statistics and trends in air safety.
Issue 30 of the Bulletin features 12 safety investigations:
The ATSB has just released a new aviation bulletin containing 10 investigation reports.
The ATSB has just released a new aviation bulletin containing 10 investigation reports. The Aviation Short Investigation Bulletin Issue 31 covers short, office-based investigations.
The bulletin covers incidents, serious incidents and accidents involving helicopters, jet, turboprop and piston aircraft, as well as helicopters.
Short investigations cover incidents and accidents where the associated factors are usually well-understood and do not require more detailed investigations. Nonetheless, each investigation has the potential to produce important Safety Messages for pilots, operators and others in the aviation industry. The investigations also help the ATSB identify statistics and trends in air safety.
Issue 31 of the Bulletin features 10 safety investigations:
ATSB report finds that Australian turbofan engine aircraft are safe and reliable and only experience engine-related safety incidents every 20,000 flight hours on average.
A new ATSB report, released today, finds that Australian turbofan engine aircraft are safe and reliable and only experience engine-related safety incidents every 20,000 flight hours on average.
As well, the vast majority of these occurrences (98%) had no risk, or a very low risk of any accident outcome and none resulted in injury to passengers or crew.
Larger modern passenger aircraft mostly have turbofan engines because of their range, speed, and fuel efficiency. Despite the complexity of these engines, their reliability is evidenced by the low rate of engine problems.
While the research found turbofan engine aircraft had very low rates of incidents as a whole, it did identify differences between individual aircraft models.
With a combined total of over five-and-a-half million flight hours for Australian registered turbofan engine aircraft between 2008 and 2012, there were only 280 safety occurrences reportable to the ATSB that related specifically to the engine systems (or approximately one occurrence every 20,000 flight hours).
While the research found turbofan engine aircraft had very low rates of incidents as a whole, it did identify differences between individual aircraft models.
In particular, the British Aerospace BAE 146/Avro RJ, the Fokker F28/F100 and the Boeing 747 classic had higher rates of engine incidents between 2008 and 2012 than any other aircraft in the study.
The report provides aircraft operators with information that will help them put their own incidents in context and further improve safety in the future.
Risks associated with the operation of road-rail vehicles on the steep railway.
On 4 June 2013, track workers were preparing a road-rail vehicle to travel to a worksite near Rinadeena Station on the West Coast Wilderness Railway, Tasmania, when the vehicle unexpectedly started to roll backwards down a 1:20 grade. The driver was unable to slow the vehicle, so he and the passenger jumped clear, sustaining minor injuries.
The now unmanned out-of-control vehicle continued to accelerate down the steep grade, heading towards a second road-rail vehicle containing four track workers. Two passengers of the second vehicle jumped clear, sustaining minor injuries, but a third passenger and the driver were still inside when the unmanned road-rail vehicle collided with theirs.
The passenger sustained minor injuries, but the driver was trapped and seriously injured in the collision. He was subsequently removed from the vehicle and air lifted to hospital. Both road-rail vehicles were extensively damaged.
The ATSB found that the vehicle’s rear road tyres were lifted from the track to examine a suspected problem with the rear rail guidance wheels. As a result, the braking force provided by the rear road wheels was lost and the vehicle began to roll down the incline. The rail guidance wheel electric brake controller had not yet been set correctly and, as a result, little braking effort was applied through the rail guidance wheels.
... the driver was trapped and seriously injured in the collision. He was subsequently removed from the vehicle and air lifted to hospital.
The investigation also found that the West Coast Wilderness Railway had not considered all of the risks associated with the operation of road-rail vehicles on the steep railway. As a result, documented operational procedures had not been developed and locations where vehicles could be safely on and off railed had not been defined.
Other findings related to the effectiveness of the training provided to the road-rail vehicle operators, road-rail vehicle procurement standards, acceptance testing and commissioning of road-rail vehicles, reliability of the very high frequency (VHF) radio network in the Rinadeena area and radio communication protocols.
West Coast Wilderness Railway has reviewed its risk register and implemented operational procedures covering the safe operation of road-rail vehicles on the network. This has led to the development and implementation of an updated training package, procurement specifications and documented on/off tracking points. The company has also taken action to improve radio reception in the Rinadeena area and to ensure reliable communications at the station.
Fume and smoke incidents in Australian aviation are usually appropriately managed by flight and cabin crew and generally result in minor safety consequences.
Fume and smoke incidents in Australian aviation are usually appropriately managed by flight and cabin crew and generally result in minor safety consequences, according to a new report released today.
The report, jointly released by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and the ATSB, reveals that there were more than 1,000 fumes and smoke events reported over five years (between 2008 and 2012).
While the vast majority of these incidents were minor in nature, one event resulted in a single flight crew incapacitation and a further 11 events contributed to minor injuries to crew. In the higher risk occurrences, precautionary defences (most commonly diversions to nearby airports) were found to be effective in avoiding escalation of the event.
The report encourages aircraft operators to continue reporting fumes/smoke incidents to the ATSB and CASA to ensure the ongoing risks are effectively monitored.
The report shows that the most common source of fumes and smoke was a result of aircraft systems issues, primarily relating to failure or malfunction of electrical and auxiliary power unit systems. Equipment and furnishings also featured highly as a source of fumes and smoke. Within this category, air conditioning and galley equipment were the most common sources of fumes/smoke. External sources of fumes/smoke and cargo/baggage related events were relatively rare.
The British Aerospace BAe 146 was the aircraft type most commonly involved in fumes/smoke events when taking into account flying activity. The Embraer EMB-120 Brasilia, Fokker 100, and Bombardier DHC-8-100/200 series aircraft also had a higher than average rate of fumes/smoke occurrences over the period.
The ATSB and CASA conducted the study to further understand the nature and impact that fumes and smoke have on aviation safety. The report also addresses recommendations from a 2011 report from an expert panel on aircraft air quality that aviation safety agencies work together to provide a comprehensive study of cabin air contamination incidents.
The report encourages aircraft operators to continue reporting fumes/smoke incidents to the ATSB and CASA to ensure the ongoing risks are effectively monitored.
From today, (19 May 2014) most Victorian rail operators will have new mandatory reporting regulations that change the way they report accidents and incidents.
All Category A occurrences (serious incidents and accidents) will need to be reported immediately to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) by telephone on 1800 011 034.
This must be followed up within 72 hours by a written report to the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR). In addition, all Category B occurrences will also need to be reported, in writing only, to the ONRSR within 72 hours.
The changes to reporting regulations are part of historic reforms to rail safety legislation that see Victoria’s railways having both a national rail safety regulator (ONRSR) and a national rail safety investigator (the ATSB).
All Category A occurrences (serious incidents and accidents) will need to be reported immediately to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) by telephone on 1800 011 034.
The scheme also allows any person to confidentially report a safety concern about a rail operation to the ATSB by calling 1800 011 034.
The information the ATSB gets from mandatory and confidential reports helps determine whether we need to investigate a rail safety matter or alert the relevant people in the event of a safety concern. Ultimately, reporting can save lives and prevent injuries.
This accident highlights the fact that while pilots may be competent in the use of pilot ladders, it should not be assumed that other personnel are proficient in climbing or descending a pilot ladder, or fit to do so.
On 3 July 2013, a company representative was boarding the bulk carrier Atlantic Princess via the ship’s pilot ladder when he fell and landed on the deck of the pilot launch below. At the time, the ship was at anchor off Whyalla, South Australia, loading iron ore from an offshore transhipment barge.
The injured man was provided with immediate first aid and transported to the local hospital. However, he died later that day as a result of his injuries.
The ATSB found that while Atlantic Princess’s pilot ladder had been rigged in accordance with the relevant international requirements, no further risk assessment was carried out for the personnel transfer. The investigation also found that the company’s safety management system provided no guidance relating to actions that should be taken when less experienced personnel were to use a pilot ladder to board or disembark the ship.
This accident highlights the fact that while pilots may be competent in the use of pilot ladders, it should not be assumed that other personnel are proficient in climbing or descending a pilot ladder, or fit to do so.
In addition, there were no facilities on board the transhipment barge that could be used to provide a safe means of access between the barge and the ship for personnel transfers with the barge operator’s procedures prohibiting such transfers.
The investigation also identified safety issues relating to the content and implementation of the pilot launch operator’s safety management system.
The ship’s managers have issued a fleet safety circular noting that helicopters should be used for transfers of persons other than pilots wherever possible. When this is not possible, they are required to use a safety harness while climbing a pilot ladder. These requirements are to be advised to the ship’s agent in advance.
The pilot launch operator’s safety management system has been audited and the company is working to improve the system and its implementation. The company’s personnel transfer procedures have also been updated.
This accident highlights the fact that while pilots may be competent in the use of pilot ladders, it should not be assumed that other personnel are proficient in climbing or descending a pilot ladder, or fit to do so.
Flag States and port administrations should consider the risks associated with operating a vessel when determining regulatory compliance requirements, rather than making such determinations based on the vessel’s mode (commercial or private) of operation.
On the afternoon of 8 February 2013, the 42 m Cayman Islands registered motor yacht Calliope departed from the Sydney Superyacht Marina in Rozelle Bay for a cruise around the harbour.
As Calliope transited the Glebe Island Bridge, it was off course and veered towards the bridge structure. To minimise any damage to the vessel, the crew attempted to walk a fender between the yacht’s hull and any possible points of contact. During this process, a crew member, leaning over the side of the yacht positioning the fender, was caught between the yacht and one of the bridge mounted fenders. The crew member was pulled over the yacht’s side and into the water.
The crew member was retrieved from the water shortly afterwards but died as a result of the injuries he had sustained.
The ATSB found that a passage plan for the voyage had not been completed and, therefore, the risks associated with the voyage were not appropriately assessed or communicated to the crew. It was also determined that the yacht’s master could not reference any navigational aids from his conning position in front of the navigational bridge. Hence, he was not in a position to properly monitor the yacht’s progress.
Flag States and port administrations should consider the risks associated with operating a vessel when determining regulatory compliance requirements...
The ATSB also concluded that while Calliope was in voluntary compliance with elements of the Large Commercial Yacht Code (a United Kingdom instrument which had been adopted by the Cayman Islands), the yacht did not have to comply with these requirements because it was deemed to be a pleasure yacht. Similarly, the yacht did not have to carry a pilot while operating in Sydney Harbour because it was considered to be a recreational craft.
Calliope’s management company has advised that the ship’s safety management system procedures have been updated to require the completion of a passage plan for all voyages. Procedures for transiting bridge openings will be also be issued. A specialist consultant will also be engaged to conduct on board audits of the safety management system.
The Cayman Islands Shipping Registry has advised that the effectiveness of the Large Commercial Yacht Code in meeting the fundamental requirements of a documented safety management system will be raised with the United Kingdom as the authors, publishers and custodians of the Code.
The harbour master for the Port of Sydney has highlighted the details of this accident as part of a review of the NSW Marine Safety Act.
Flag States and port administrations should consider the risks associated with operating a vessel when determining regulatory compliance requirements, rather than making such determinations based on the vessel’s mode (commercial or private) of operation.
