On 26 February 2008, at about 1655 Western Daylight-saving Time, the pilot of a Gippsland Aeronautics Pty Ltd GA-8 Airvan, registered VH-KUZ, with two passengers on board, commenced take-off at Kalumburu Aerodrome, WA. Witnesses reported that the aircraft started to drift to the left of the runway prior to becoming briefly airborne. The aircraft settled back onto the runway strip, veering further left across the runway strip. The aircraft subsequently ran up an embankment, through low scrub, and then through small trees beyond the runway strip. The impact with the trees flipped the aircraft onto its back, where it came to rest, facing the opposite way to the direction of take-off. The aircraft was seriously damaged, and the pilot and two passengers received minor injuries.
On 1 March 2008, at about 1300 Eastern Daylight-saving Time the pilot of a Bell Helicopter 206B Jetranger III was flying over a property on a private flight with four passengers. Witnesses reported seeing the helicopter flying over the property at about 100 ft above ground level. At the completion of one pass, the helicopter was observed by witnesses on the ground to bank steeply to the left, roll out and descend into surrounding trees. The helicopter impacted the trees and was seriously damaged. One of the occupants was discovered outside the helicopter and all sustained serious injuries.
Examination of the wreckage did not indicate any mechanical defects that would have affected the safe operation of the helicopter.
The aircraft was reported to have impacted the ground during a flight to replenish the hopper for further spraying. The pilot was fatally injured.
Summary
On 9 December 2006, the pilot of an Air Tractor Inc. AT802A aircraft, registered VH-CJZ, was conducting night agricultural spraying operations under the night visual flight rules, at a property 19 km NE of Collarenebri, NSW. In conjunction with a pilot in another agricultural spraying aircraft from the same aircraft operator, the Air Tractor pilot was utilising an airstrip located on the property as a base for the spraying operation. At about 2140 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, the aircraft was returning to the airstrip when it impacted the ground 1.4 km WSW of the landing strip. The pilot was fatally injured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post-impact fire.
Earlier that evening, the pilot had made a 20-minute positioning flight from the operator's base at Wee Waa, NSW, to the airstrip. The pilot then conducted two 30-minute spraying flights, with a short period on the ground to replenish the load of chemical fertiliser. The aircraft remained running while that replenishment was conducted. The accident occurred when the pilot was returning to the airstrip at the conclusion of the second spraying flight.
Examination of the aircraft wreckage revealed no evidence of an in-flight fire or any mechanical fault with the aircraft, engine, or systems which may have contributed to the occurrence. The intensity of the post-impact fire, deformation to the integral wing fuel tank structure and ground marks, indicated that there was sufficient fuel on board the aircraft for the operation. There was no evidence that the aircraft struck trees or powerlines.
The reason for the aircraft impacting the ground could not be conclusively determined. It was possible that the pilot may have experienced a medical event that was not evident during the post-mortem medical examination. However, based on the evidence available it is probable that the pilot experienced spatial disorientation and a subsequent loss of control of the aircraft resulting in it impacting the ground.
On 23 October 2006, the Air Safety Investigation Branch (ASIB) of Papua New Guinea notified the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) of an accident that occurred on 20 October 2006, at 1200 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, involving a Bell Helicopter Co Jetranger helicopter, registered P2-HBG, that was piloted by an Australian citizen. The helicopter was reported missing and was subsequently found to have impacted rough terrain approximately 102 km north of Port Moresby. The pilot and three passengers were fatally injured.
The ATSB initially appointed an expert to the investigation into the accident, in accordance with clause 5.27 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
On 6 November 2006, the ASIB requested ATSB assistance to oversight the examination of the helicopter's engine that was to be conducted at an Australian maintenance facility. To assist in that process, it was agreed that the ATSB could appoint an accredited representative, in accordance with Clause 5.23 of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, to participate in the ASIB's investigation.
To protect the information supplied by the ASIB to the ATSB and investigative work undertaken to assist the ASIB, the ATSB initiated an investigation under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003. Subsequently, the ASIB advised the ATSB that the engine examination would not be conducted in Australia.
On completion of its investigation, the ASIB of Papua New Guinea will publish the final investigation report regarding the accident.
On 19 September 2006, at approximately 1630 Eastern Standard Time, the pilot of a Boeing Stearman, registered N-73410, experienced a control problem while taxiing. The pilot reported that while conducting engine and power checks the aircraft inadvertently became airborne after hitting a bump on the airstrip that coincided with a gust of wind. He decided to continue with the take-off intending to complete a circuit and return the aircraft to the airstrip. The pilot reported that after banking to the left, he lost aileron control and the aircraft impacted the ground, flipped over and came to rest in an inverted position. The passenger received minor injuries and the pilot was uninjured. The aircraft was substantially damaged.
The pilot stated that prior to the accident he had engaged the flight controls lock on the aircraft while it was stationary on the airstrip. He reported that during the taxi runs he discovered that the flight controls lock was still engaged so he unlocked it. He subsequently believes that this action was unsuccessful and was why he was unable to control the aircraft during the take-off.
Five witnesses, who had earlier in the day assisted the pilot to move furniture, reported that they understood from the pilot that if the weather conditions were suitable, three of them would get a flight in the Stearman. The aircraft did not have a current maintenance release and was not airworthy.
The investigation was unable to reconcile the discrepancies between the pilot and witness reports.
The pilot with four passengers on board, was conducting a private flight within the station property. The aircraft was later discovered destroyed after it had impacted the ground. Two of the passengers were fatally injured.
Summary
On 1 September 2006, at approximately 1100 Western Standard Time, the pilot of a Cessna C172L aircraft, registered VH-RIL, was conducting a private, visual flight rules (VFR) flight, and together with four passengers (two adults, one child and an infant), departed from 'Bronco', a cattle mustering area on Mt Vernon station, WA. The pilot was to fly to the homestead on the property, a flight of approximately 10 minutes duration.
At the same time, members of the pilot's family and station staff left Bronco in motor vehicles to drive the approximately 30 km journey back to the homestead. Upon their arrival, it was noted that the aircraft had failed to arrive at the homestead. After attempts to contact the pilot by radio failed, a search was conducted, during which the pilot and child passenger were found walking towards the homestead. The pilot, who was disorientated and injured, reported that the aircraft had crashed in bushland adjacent to the homestead airstrip. The child had minor injuries.
After obtaining general directions to the aircraft, the search party were able to locate the aircraft wreckage. On arrival, searchers found a female adult passenger semiconscious with extensive injuries. The male adult passenger and the infant had been fatally injured.
The pilot and female passenger reported that the aircraft had entered severe turbulence during the descent to land, which resulted in a near-vertical nose down attitude of the aircraft approximately 300 to 350 feet above the terrain.
The investigation determined that the pilot had most likely flown through a strong willy-willy and was unable to recover from the in-flight upset. The investigation also found that it was likely that inadequate restraint of some occupants increased the severity of injuries sustained.
On 26 March 2006, at about 1800 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, a Cessna 188B Agwagon aircraft, registered VH-ZIP, was reported to have taken off from a field adjacent to a local water-ski area, about 59 km south-west of Narrandera, NSW, with the pilot as the sole occupant. The following morning at about 0900, the aircraft wreckage was found by a passer-by at a position 55 km south of Narrandera and about 8 km from the departure area. The aircraft was destroyed, there was no fire, and the pilot was fatally injured.
There was no evidence that the pilot experienced any physiological condition which could have contributed to the accident. Weather conditions in the area were reported to be fine with little or no wind and there were no overhead powerlines or other obstacles in the vicinity. The aircraft had impacted the ground heavily, in a nose-down, right wing-low attitude, consistent with a low-speed stall or aerobatic manoeuvre. There was no evidence of a flight control or systems problem which could have contributed to the accident and the engine and propeller were producing power at the time of impact.
The pilot was reported to have been known to conduct 'high-risk' aerial activities, including aerobatic flight in agricultural aircraft. A number of photographs taken shortly before the final flight showed him conducting low passes over the water-ski site with the aircraft's main wheels in contact with the surface of the water. During the accident flight he was reported to have conducted very low passes over a departing vehicle, more low passes over the water with the main wheels in contact with the water's surface and what was described to be manoeuvres consistent with aerobatic flight.
The investigation concluded that the pilot was probably conducting an aerobatic flight manoeuvre from which collision with terrain could not be prevented.
On 21 February 2006, at approximately 0630 Eastern Standard Time, a Robinson Helicopter Company Model R44 helicopter (R44), registered VH-HBS, departed Mt Isa, Qld, with two people on board. The helicopter was to position to the Gunpowder airstrip (approximately 100 km to the north) to meet a survey party.
Upon arrival at the airstrip, two other people boarded the helicopter and it departed to begin survey operations in the area between Mt Gordon Mine and Mt Kelly Mine, approximately 30 km to the south-west (Figure 1). During the morning, the helicopter returned to the airstrip at Gunpowder on three occasions to refuel and change personnel on board. It was reported that the helicopter was refuelled to full tanks on each occasion.
Figure 1: Survey area and accident location
It was reported that the helicopter refuelled for the last time at approximately 1300 and departed shortly after with four people on board to continue survey operations in the designated area. The helicopter was expected to rendezvous with the other members of the survey team at approximately 1530. When the helicopter failed to arrive, communication checks with the helicopter pilot and the helicopter operator were conducted and, when no contact with the helicopter was established, search and rescue procedures were initiated. The search continued into the night using a forward looking infrared (FLIR) equipped aircraft. The following morning additional helicopters and aircraft joined the search. At approximately 1100, the burnt wreckage of the helicopter was located on the top of a hill, situated on the edge of the survey area. Rescuers confirmed that all four persons on board had received fatal injuries.
Examination of the wreckage indicated that the helicopter had impacted the terrain heavily, approximately rotor-disc level and in a nose-down attitude. The helicopter came to rest on its right side (Figure 2). The main and tail rotor blades displayed evidence of low rotational energy at the point of impact. Further examination of the main rotor blades revealed compression wrinkling of the upper outer surface of both main rotor blades. All components of the helicopter were accounted for at the accident site.
Figure 2: Aerial view of helicopter wreckage
A severe, fuel-fed, post-impact fire destroyed the cabin and cockpit structure and surrounding flight and engine control systems. The fixed emergency locator transmitter (ELT) and the satellite telephone carried by the pilot were destroyed in the fire. No evidence of the portable ELT, reported to have been carried by the pilot, was found in the wreckage.
The area in which the helicopter was located was not considered to be suitable for a landing area for the R44 helicopter.
Weather conditions in the area were forecast to be fine with light easterly winds. Reported weather conditions in the area were consistent with that forecast.
The pilot held a commercial pilot (helicopter) licence and was appropriately endorsed to fly the R44 helicopter.
The ATSB has recovered the engine and a number of other components for further examination. One of the components recovered is an impact and fire damaged Global Positioning System (GPS) unit. A quantity of data has been successfully recovered from the GPS unit.
The investigation is continuing and will include:
detailed examination of the engine and recovered components
examination of the helicopter maintenance records
further evaluation of the weather conditions
a review of operational factors
detailed examination of recovered GPS data.
Final report
On 21 February 2006, a Robinson Helicopter Company R44 'Astro' helicopter, registered VH-HBS, was being operated on a series of aerial survey flights approximately 100 km to the north of Mt Isa Airport, Qld. The helicopter was operating from Gunpowder airstrip and had completed three flights by 1254 Eastern Standard Time. The pilot refuelled the helicopter and at 1341 departed for a survey flight with three passengers on board. When the helicopter did not arrive at a pre-arranged rendezvous point, a search was initiated. Searchers found the burnt wreckage of the helicopter the next day. The four occupants were fatally injured.
The helicopter had impacted the ground with significant force in a nose-down, fuselage-level attitude. The main rotor displayed evidence of low rotational energy and coning. Other than impact and fire damage, there were no identified mechanical defects or abnormalities. There was evidence that the engine was rotating at impact, but the amount of engine power being developed was not able to be established.
The previous aerial survey flights were reported to have included low speed flight and occasional hovering. At the estimated helicopter weight and the prevailing air density, the helicopter did not have the performance to hover at the survey altitude, which was estimated to be about 1,000 ft above ground level. The investigation considered that the helicopter probably descended contrary to the pilot's intentions, possibly influenced by a partial engine power loss or downdraft, and induced the pilot to apply collective, which developed into overpitching and ultimately main rotor stall.
The investigation found that the helicopter was being operated at gross weights that exceeded the specified maximum take-off weight. The investigation also found that the operator's procedures did not provide a high level of assurance that a relatively low time pilot could conduct aerial survey operations safely.
At about 0712 Central Standard Time1 on 19 January 2006, a Beech Aircraft Corporation 58 Baron aircraft, registered VH-MNI, departed Darwin, NT, on a charter flight to McArthur River Mine, NT. On board were the pilot and one passenger. The flight planned track of the aircraft was at 9,000 ft above mean sea level direct to McArthur River Mine, located 385 NM south-east of Darwin. The pilot was to pick up an additional passenger at McArthur River Mine, and transport the two passengers on to Merlin Mine. He was to then return to Darwin with two other passengers.
At 0925, a Piper PA-31 Navajo aircraft, registered VH-BTD was in the circuit area at McArthur River Mine in preparation for landing on runway 06. The pilot of the Navajo reported that, at about this time, he heard a transmission on the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) from the pilot of the Baron. In his transmission, the Baron pilot advised that he was inbound to McArthur River Mine, with an estimated time of arrival of 0932, and he requested information on the weather conditions at the aerodrome. The pilot of the Navajo replied that there was scattered cloud at 800 ft, good visibility and scattered rain showers in the area. He suggested that runway 24 was the most appropriate runway, given the arrival track of the Baron and the location of the rain showers south-west of the aerodrome. The pilot of the Baron acknowledged the Navajo pilot's transmission.
In addition to the pilot, the navigator on board the Navajo also heard the communications between the two pilots. Both the pilot and the navigator reported that the content and tone of the Baron pilot's transmissions did not indicate that he was experiencing any difficulties or problems.
The pilot of the Navajo subsequently landed that aircraft at about 0928. He reported that, at some time between 0932 and 0935, while walking across the apron to the aerodrome manager's building, he observed the Baron overfly the aerodrome. He estimated that it directly overflew the aerodrome manager's building, located near the threshold of runway 06. He stated that the aircraft appeared to be at a normal circuit height (1,000 ft above ground level) and that it appeared to be tracking to a mid to late downwind position for a landing on runway 24. He also stated that the aircraft appeared to be operating normally with a normal sound from both engines. The navigator of the Navajo also saw and heard the Baron fly overhead, and noted nothing unusual regarding the aircraft's operation.
Transmissions on the McArthur River Mine CTAF were not recorded. However, a person in the terminal building reported that he could hear the aerodrome manager's VHF radio, which was selected to the McArthur River Mine CTAF. That witness heard the Baron fly over the aerodrome and did not recall subsequently hearing any transmissions from the aircraft.
When the aircraft did not land as expected, personnel at the aerodrome attempted to contact the pilot of the Baron, and then initiated a search and rescue response. The pilot of the Navajo reported that he returned to the aerodrome at the request of search and rescue personnel, and then took off at about 1040, with two passengers on board, to search for the missing aircraft. At about 1050, the wreckage was located about 4 km east of the aerodrome (Figure 1). On arrival at the accident site, rescue personnel found that both aircraft occupants had sustained fatal injuries.
Figure 1: Location of Incident
Personnel information
The pilot in command was appropriately qualified and licensed to undertake the flight. He had a total flying experience of 3,559.3 hours, and had flown 555.4 hours on multi-engine aircraft, with 166.8 hours on Barons. He was issued with a commercial pilot (aeroplane) licence in 1997, and he also held a Grade 1 instructor rating and a multi-engine command instrument rating.
In the last 90 days, the pilot had flown 141.9 hours, including 38.7 hours on Barons. His logbook indicated that he had flown into McArthur River Mine on at least two previous occasions, the last being on 29 November 2005.
On 16 January, the pilot's duty time was recorded as starting at 0645 and ending at 2030, with a flight time of 4.8 hours. It was reported that when he returned home, he had a headache and body ache. The next day he telephoned the operator and stated that he was unable to work due to sickness. He continued to feel unwell on the 18 January and again reported in sick. However, after lunch that day, he contacted the operator and reported that he was feeling better and available for any urgent tasking if required. He went into work to conduct a flight, but the job was later cancelled. On the evening of 18 January he conducted some preparatory work for the flights the next day.
It was reported that the pilot went to sleep each night between 2100 and 2130. He normally woke up between 0530 and 0600, though had extra sleep on 17 January. On 19 January, he awoke at about 0400 and did some yoga exercises before going to work.
Aircraft information
The aircraft was manufactured in 1978 and imported into Australia the same year. It had a total time in service of 9,826.4 hours.
The operator purchased the aircraft in November 2004. The aircraft underwent regular maintenance and non-scheduled repairs over the 713.4 hours flying service with the operator. The approved system of maintenance included Check 2 inspections every 200 hours, with a Check 1 inspection conducted at the 100-hour interval between Check 2 inspections. The aircraft had a valid maintenance release, issued on 9 November 2005 following the last Check 2 inspection. The last Check 1 inspection was conducted on 6 January 2006. On 13 January, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority issued a permissible unserviceability to allow the aircraft to be operated with the combustion cabin heater unserviceable until 13 February 2006. There were no other outstanding maintenance items. Pilots who had flown the aircraft in the days prior to the accident reported no problems or concerns regarding the aircraft.
Wreckage examination
An examination of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft impacted the ground inverted in a steep nose-down attitude (Figure 2). The wreckage was contained in the immediate area of the impact crater, suggesting a mostly vertical component to the direction of flight at impact. The wreckage had been disturbed by rescue personnel prior to examination by Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) investigators. Further information obtained from the wreckage examination included the following:
The fuselage nose, to just rear of the main cabin utility door, was destroyed by extreme compression forces during the impact sequence. The rear fuselage and tail section also showed evidence of impact damage with the ground.
Both engines, nacelles and propellers had detached and were located in the impact crater.
Both wings were intact, but separated from the fuselage. The forward structure of both wings was crushed back to the rear spars and the wing fuel tanks were breached during the impact sequence. Each of the wing fuel tank bays showed evidence of skin attachment failure on the rivet lines by the hydraulic action of the fuel contents during the impact sequence. The first rescue personnel at the accident site reported a strong smell of aviation gasoline.
The ailerons, rudder and elevator flight control surfaces, with the associated trim tabs, were located within the main wreckage area. The flight controls were all connected at impact. A detailed examination of the wreckage did not identify any manual control system anomalies that would have prevented controlled flight of the aircraft prior to impact.
The landing gear was extended.
The wing flaps were extended in the approach (15 degrees) position.
The fuel selector for each engine was in the ON position.
Due to the extent of impact damage, no reliable evidence of control settings in the cockpit could be obtained.
Figure 2: Aircraft Wreckage
Examination of aircraft components
Several components of the aircraft were removed for more detailed examination. Results of these examinations included the following:
Engines: The aircraft was fitted with two Teledyne Continental Model IO-520C engines. Both engines were extensively damaged by impact forces. Although all components of the engines could not be functionally tested, a detailed examination found no mechanical anomalies within either engine that would have prevented them from operating.
Propellers: The aircraft was fitted with Hartzell three-bladed constant-speed, feathering propellers (Model PHC-J3YF-2UF). The blades of both propellers showed very little chord-wise scoring or distress on either surface, which implied a rapid cessation of rotation upon ground impact. Dominant blade distortion of both propellers was heavy out-of-plane bending to the rear. The absence of any prominent evidence of in-plane reactive bending or torsional distortion indicated that the propellers were rotating, rather than feathered, at impact. The rapid stoppage of the propellers and the pattern of blade bending implied that there was low applied torque or power at impact. Witness marks on the blade preload plates of the left propeller provided some indication that this propeller was operating in the governed speed range at impact. The damage to the right propeller pitch change mechanism prevented similar evidence being observable for that propeller. No evidence of any pre-existing unserviceability or anomalous condition was found within either of the propeller units.
Dual engine tachometer: The speed of both engines was indicated on a single gauge with two needles, one for each engine. The indicator needles were found stuck in a position indicating about 2,100 RPM. Witness marks on the back of the rear needle indicated that the two needles were providing the same reading at impact.
Autopilot system: The aircraft was fitted with a S-Tec System 50 Autopilot (Model ST-224-50) on 9 November 2005. Components of the system were identified and removed from the wreckage for detailed examination. Not all of the components were able to be functionally tested. However, no evidence was found to indicate that there were any problems with the functioning of the system. The filament of the "ready" light globe was examined and exhibited signs of filament stretch. This indicated that the filament was stretched while hot, and therefore the light bulb was illuminated at the time of impact. The "ready" indicator light on the system illuminates when the autopilot has completed a self check and verified that the turn and bank gyro is up to speed, and the system is therefore ready for a mode to be selected. After a mode has been selected, the "ready" globe extinguishes. No evidence of filament stretch was found in any of the light globes which indicated a mode of operation.
Stall warning system: The stall warning switch was substantially damaged during the impact and could not be functionally tested.
Weather information
The Bureau of Meteorology reported that, en-route from Darwin to McArthur River Mine, the aircraft would have encountered scattered showers and possibly isolated storms, embedded in extensive areas of cloud. Upper level winds were favourable for the development of moderate turbulence, as stated in area forecasts. The Terminal Aerodrome Forecast for McArthur River Mine, issued at 0348 on 19 January 2006, forecast broken2 stratus cloud at 1,000 ft, light rain, and light north-east winds. The forecast had a temporary holding (TEMPO)3 for operational requirements due to storms for the whole day. However, a review of satellite and radar pictures by the Bureau of Meteorology concluded that there did not appear to be any storms in the area at the time of the occurrence. The McArthur River Mine automatic weather station recorded the following observations on the day of the occurrence:
0900 local time: wind from 050 degrees at 4 kts, temperature 25.9 degrees, QNH 1007.5 hectopascals (hPa), no rainfall recorded in last 10 minutes, 0.2 mm rain recorded in previous hour.
1000 local time: wind from 360 degrees at 4 kts, temperature 26.4 degrees, QNH 1007.6 hPa, no rain recorded in previous hour.
The automatic weather station did not have the capability to record cloud amount or type. However, the pilot of the Navajo which landed at McArthur River Mine at 0928 reported that, when he was in the circuit, there was scattered cloud at 800 ft, which he described as 'very isolated' and no potential threat to maintaining visual contact with the runway. There was no wind or turbulence, good visibility, and no rain in the circuit area, although there were showers about 5 NM south-west of the aerodrome. These showers eventually moved to the north-west of the aerodrome.
Medical and pathological information
Post-mortem examination and toxicological testing found no evidence to indicate a pre-existing medical or physiological factor that could have influenced the pilot's performance. A review of aviation medical records and interviews with the pilot's work colleagues and family also did not identify any medical conditions likely to have influenced his performance.
The injuries received by both occupants were consistent with a high speed, rapidly decelerating impact. The accident was not survivable.
Other information
The pilot and the navigator of the Navajo reported that they did not see any birds when they were in the circuit, after they landed, or when they undertook the search flight. Another witness at the aerodrome also reported that he did not observe any birds in the vicinity at the time that the Baron overflew the aerodrome. No evidence of a birdstrike was found in the wreckage.
On the morning of 19 January 2006, 462 litres of fuel was added to the aircraft, resulting in the aircraft being fully fuelled with a total of 737 litres for the flight to McArthur River Mine.
The aerodrome chart for McArthur River Mine aerodrome noted that, when using runway 06, pilots were required to use right-hand circuits. There were no notes for circuits to runway 24, which therefore meant that pilots were required to use a left-hand circuit for that runway. The location of the aircraft wreckage was consistent with a late downwind or early base leg position using a left circuit for runway 24.
The operator's pilots reported that their normal practice for operating the Baron was to have an engine speed of 2,300 RPM during the cruise, and then maintain that setting until landing. The manifold pressure would be reduced during the descent until, when the aircraft levelled out at the circuit height of 1,000 ft above ground level, there was typically a manifold pressure of 18 inches. The first stage of flap and the landing gear would be selected during the downwind leg, with the aircraft turning on to the base leg with a speed of about 110 to 120 kts. The second (and last) stage of flap would be selected when the aircraft was turning on to final approach or during final approach.
The 24-hour clock is used in this report to describe the time of day. Central Standard Time was Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)+ 9.5 hours.
Broken refers to 5 to 7 eights of the sky obscured by cloud.
TEMPO is used to indicate a change in prevailing conditions expected to last for a period of less than one hour.
Final report
At about 0712 Central Standard Time on 19 January 2006, a Beech Aircraft Corp 58 Baron aircraft, registered VH-MNI, departed Darwin Airport, NT, on a charter flight to McArthur River Mine Aerodrome, NT. The flight was conducted under the instrument flight rules. On board were the pilot and one passenger. During the flight, the pilot advised air traffic control that his expected arrival time at McArthur River Mine was 0915. At about 0915, the aircraft was observed to fly overhead the aerodrome at a normal circuit height (1,000 ft above ground level) and it appeared to be tracking to a mid to late downwind position for a landing on runway 24. The aircraft did not land at the aerodrome at the expected arrival time and a search was commenced.
The wreckage was located about 4 km east of the aerodrome. An examination of the wreckage indicated that the aircraft impacted the ground inverted in a steep nose-down attitude. The accident was not survivable. The wreckage was consistent with a loss of control situation, but the likely reason for the loss of control could not be determined.
Although not related to the accident, during the course of the investigation it was identified that AusSAR had initially cancelled the uncertainty phase associated with the aircraft. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority within which AusSAR is located, has advised that it is planning to review some aspects of its search and rescue procedures.
At about 1040 Australian Eastern Standard Time on 2 January 2006, the pilot of a Cessna Airplane Company U206 aircraft, registered VH-UYB, took off from the parachuting centre at Willowbank, QLD. The aircraft was being flown by one pilot as a private flight, carrying three sport parachutists (jump masters) and three passengers who had paid for the proposed tandem parachute jump. Witnesses reported that during the initial climb, the aircraft did not gain height as expected. It impacted a 23 m (75 ft) high tree approximately 1,200 m from the end of the runway before descending from view. Of the seven persons on board, all but two were fatally injured.
Summary
At about 1040 Eastern Standard Time on 2 January 2006, a Cessna Aircraft Company U206 aircraft, registered VH-UYB, took off from the parachuting centre at Willowbank, Qld on a tandem parachuting flight. On board the aircraft were the pilot and six parachutists.
The surviving Tandem Master parachutist, who was also a private pilot, reported that, at about 100 ft, the aircraft performed as if the power had been 'pulled back'. The aircraft was observed to bank right, before it impacted a tree and became submerged in a dam.
The aircraft was destroyed and five persons on board received fatal injuries or were drowned. The two survivors received serious injuries.
Technical examination and test of the aircraft's engine and its associated components did not reveal any anomalies with the potential to have individually contributed to the partial engine power loss. However, the investigation could not discount the potential that:
a number of less significant anomalies that were identified during the engine and components examination may have coincided to reduce the available engine power, or
there may have been an anomaly of the engine, or its components present during the accident flight that was not apparent during the subsequent disassembly, examination and testing of the engine and its components.
As a result of this investigation, the Australian Parachute Federation (APF) has addressed a number of safety concerns. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) initiated safety action to clarify Airworthiness Directive AD/ENG/4 and the intent of Airworthiness Bulletin AWB 02-003 Issue 2. In addition, CASA is reviewing elements of the various training syllabi and supporting documentation affecting the management of engine and partial engine power loss after take-off.
As a result of this investigation, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau has issued seven safety recommendations related to airworthiness bulletins, regulations, parachutists' safety and survivability, aircraft maintenance documentation and pilot training in emergency procedures.
