Following take-off from runway 01 at Townsville, the military aircraft, Stallion 080, was instructed to turn right and climb to flight level (FL) 120. VH-TNX departed from the same runway and was instructed to turn left to intercept the track to Cairns. When Stallion 080 reported at FL120 the Townsville controller requested the level of VH-TNX. The pilot of that aircraft replied passing FL110 and was instructed to report leaving FL130, and to climb at the best rate of climb. The controller then asked Stallion 080 to report sighting VH-TNX, after a short delay the pilot reported that the aircraft was in sight and that he would maintain separation visually.

Subsequently, Stallion 080 passed VH-TNX on the left side at about the same level, approximately 200 metres away.

The method by which the Townsville controller attempted to maintain separation between the two aircraft was not correct for the situation. The Manual of Air Traffic Services does not allow for one aircraft to visually separate itself from another aircraft at the level the aircraft were operating. However, there were a number of other techniques, that could have been employed by the controller, to maintain the required separation between the two aircraft.

The pilot of Stallion 080 reported that he was unable to manoeuvre his aircraft to pass further from VH-TNX as this would have required abrupt action and may have resulted in injury to standing passengers in his aircraft.

The aircraft was being flown on an instructor standardisation flight which included the demonstration of a precautionary landing on a grass airstrip.

Prior to landing, the pilot in command who was also the chief flying instructor, carried out an inspection of the strip from a height of 500 feet above ground level (AGL). During the first run he noticed what appeared to be a series of ruts along the strip and decided to carry out a second run at a lower height. Before descending to 50 feet AGL, the pilot lowered the landing gear as a safety precaution. During the second run, he confirmed that the surface appeared suitable for a landing. The landing gear was retracted, and the aircraft was climbed back to 500 feet AGL for the landing circuit.

The pilot reported that he carried out the before landing checks on downwind but for reasons unknown, neglected to carry out a final approach check. When the throttle was closed during the flare, the landing gear warning horn sounded. The pilot applied full power to go round but then closed the throttle almost immediately when he felt the propeller strike the ground. The aircraft settled onto the strip and slid to a halt with the landing gear retracted.

Although the pilot in command had failed to lower the landing gear this went unnoticed by two other instructors who occupied the front right and rear right seats. It was reported that sunlight shining onto the landing gear indicator lights might have created the impression that the green lights were illuminated.

The DH114 was enroute Undara-Weipa, cruising at 10,000 ft and estimating abeam Cohen at 1505. The C402, Aurukun-Cairns was estimating Holroyd River at 1505, had planned at 9,000 ft but, approaching that level, the pilot advised climbing to 10,000 ft and requested traffic. The flight service operator mentally projected the track of the DH114 on the chart (the Aurukun-Cairns track had already been marked on the chart) and assessed that, based on the respective abeam Cohen and Holroyd River estimates, there would be no traffic confliction. Shortly after reporting abeam Cohen, the pilot of the DH114 advised that another aircraft had passed close by, in the opposite direction, and at the same level. This aircraft was later identified as the C402.

The flight service operator was working area 7 and area 5 combined. The level of activity in these areas had become very busy, but not unmanageably so, in the period leading up to the occurrence. The operator said, that when the pilot of the C402 requested traffic and he had assessed there would be no confliction, the track he had mentally plotted had been incorrect. One reason for this was that the track crossed two charts which were displayed at separate parts of his console. Another was that the position of Undara used by the operator was incorrect. The operator said that he had intended to plot the Undara-Weipa track on the chart to confirm his mental calculation but had forgotten to do this in the time available.

During recovery from a stick shaker exercise, as part of an endorsement sequence, the aircraft departed from controlled flight prior to the speed reducing to the published stick shaker speed. Recovery was reported to have taken approximately 1800 feet. The aircraft was returned to maintenance for investigation.

During the maintenance investigation, three minor leaks were found from butt straps on the left-wing leading edge. Advice from the manufacturer was that such leaks could definitely affect the stalling behaviour of the aircraft. The leaks were rectified and a subsequent test flight confirmed stalling characteristics were normal.

After completing a short flight to check water points on his farm the pilot returned to his 3000 ft landing strip and conducted a low-level inspection to identify any sheep near the strip and frighten away those he saw. This was his normal arrival practice when there were sheep in the home paddock. During the aircraft's landing flare, a single sheep bolted across the landing strip. This happened too quickly for the pilot to take avoiding action. The aircraft hit and killed the sheep whilst the aircraft was still rolling at about 40 knots.

Whilst in cruise at FL310 the cabin altitude commenced to rise. A check of the Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) showed the cabin was rising at 500ft/min, and all air-conditioning packs were off. The check list was actioned, but no packs were able to be reset. The system fault light remained on. At about 8000 feet cabin altitude, which was still climbing at 500ft/min with no packs on, the aircraft was descended to the lowest safe altitude and a diversion to Karachi initiated. A PAN call was made, and Tehran and Karachi were informed.

The Pack Temperature Controllers (PTC) were removed and inspected by the manufacturer who subsequently reported that a capacitor failure on the printed circuit board of the PTC in position 'A' caused all three pack flow control valves to close. The 'B' position PTC took control of the packs, as designed, but could not override the flow control valve closure commands from PTC 'A'. The manufacturer has instituted a modification program to the PTC to eliminate the problem.

The student was performing a dual practice forced landing on to an airfield. Strong winds and gusty conditions prevailed. It was the instructor's intention to allow the student to continue the practice forced landing to a low height for realism. The student forgot to lower the landing gear, and the instructor missed the oversight. On short final the aircraft encountered windshear. The instructor was late in nominating the go-around. The aircraft struck the ground wheels up.

The pilot reported hearing a snapping sound during landing gear retraction and subsequently confirmed that the nose gear had not fully retracted. Flight Service were advised of the problem and the aircraft diverted to Bankstown. An uncertainty phase was declared and emergency procedures implemented. The aircraft subsequently made an emergency landing, during which the nose gear collapsed.

Subsequent investigation determined that the nose gear actuating rod end had failed from fatigue cracking. The fatigue had initiated from a pre-existing crack. It is likely that the original crack had originated from a previous nose gear collapse in October 1993 when the aircraft had collided with a kangaroo.

The pilot flew three passengers out of Geelong on a private pleasure flight. Upon return he performed a normal circuit and approach with the intention of a full stop landing. On touchdown the aircraft bounced slightly. The pilot applied slight forward pressure on the control column. A second slightly higher bounce occurred. A third and final bounce resulted in a heavy landing which broke off the nosewheel.

Both balloons were departing from the same area and commenced inflating their envelopes at about the same time. VH-HJA, the smaller balloon, was ready for launch first and after take-off initially drifted in a south-westerly direction before reversing direction and drifting back towards the take-off point, at about 200 feet above ground level.

At about this time VH-AJB was ready for launch, and after take-off it began to drift to the south-west toward the approaching VH-HJA. The pilot of VH-AJB signalled to the other pilot to climb. Despite the pilot of the smaller balloon operating the burners, the envelope of VH-AJB collided with the basket of VH-HJA. The basket was tilted to an acute angle, but all the occupants managed to maintain hold and remained in the basket. The envelope of VH-AJB became snagged on the basket but was released by a passenger in VH-HJA. Both balloons then separated and continued their respective flights without further incident.

In general, the procedures governing ballooning require that the higher balloon give way to the lower balloon. However, it is also a requirement that aircraft (including balloons) on the ground give way to those that are airborne.

In this case, it would have been prudent for the pilot of VH-AJB to have delayed his take-off until the other balloon was well clear. Equally, the pilot of VH-HJA should have climbed his balloon when he saw that it was drifting back towards the departure point where the other balloon was preparing for take-off.