When the copilot rotated the aircraft through 17 degrees on the way towards the lift off body angle of 19 degrees the stick shaker activated. Concurrent with the stick shaker activation, the leading edge flaps extend light on the forward panel extinguished and the amber leading edge flaps transit light illuminated. As soon as the stick shaker activated the rotation was stopped. Almost immediately the leading edge flaps transit light extinguished, the leading edge flaps extend light illuminated, and the stick shaker stopped. The activation period was very brief and occurred at approximately 174 knots. 

The take-off and climb were continued normally and no other discrepancies were noted. Maintenance investigation disclosed that one of the leading edge slat position micro switches had failed. The failure of the switch caused the logic system to sense that the leading edge slats were retracted rather than extended. This resulted in the stall warning system being reset and the stick shaker to activate at normal take-off speeds. The operator advised that the manufacturer is considering a change that will ensure that failure of only one switch is insufficient to cause the system to be reset.

The aircraft departed Parafield for Renmark on a private flight. He could not land at Renmark when he arrived due to low stratus cloud. He then elected to return to Parafield. En route he flew above cloud to remain in VMC. North-east of Parafield, while still on top of cloud at 3,000 ft, the pilot contacted Adelaide approach and requested navigational assistance. The controller vectored the aircraft to the vicinity of Edinburgh where the pilot was able to resume his own navigation and commenced a descent to 1,500 ft. Shortly thereafter, the pilot called 'Mayday' because the engine had failed. During the forced landing the aircraft landed heavily and crashed through a fence.

The pilot subsequently reported that before leaving Parafield, both fuel tanks had been filled to the tab. He flew with the right tank selected all the time from Parafield until the engine lost power. At no stage had he leaned the fuel mixture. Sometime during the descent from 3,000 ft the right fuel tank ran dry and the engine starved of fuel. The pilot did not realise that the engine had lost power until he tried to increase power at about 1,100 ft. He then changed the fuel selector to the left tank. He also switched on the electric fuel boost pump but the engine still did not regain power except for one quick burst while the boost pump was selected to high.

At about 200 ft AGL, he reselected the right fuel tank but the engine never regained power. After the accident engineers inspected the aircraft and reported that both the right wing tank and the right reservoir tank were empty and had not leaked fuel as a result of the accident. The left wing tank contained about 135 litres, after fuel had spilled from it due to the accident. A subsequent engine run proved that there was no fault with the engine; nor was fault found with the airframe fuel system. No evidence was found that the engine had flooded; the exhaust showed no signs of soot. It is probable that the pilot inadvertently ran the right tank dry while under stress of flying in marginal weather.

When he changed to the left tank, he probably did not persist long enough with the electric boost pump selected on for the air to be purged from the fuel lines to the engine. When the pilot reselected the right tank there was no chance that the engine could regain power.

SAFETY ACTION

After the accident, a flying operations inspector retested the pilot's knowledge of flight planning, fuel management and the Cessna 210N fuel system.

When the aircraft arrived in the Broken Hill circuit area, the pilot observed the airfield covered in fog. After failing to become visual during an instrument approach, he decided to divert to Wilcannia. The pilot declared an emergency during the diversion, as he expected to arrive at Wilcannia with less than minimum fuel. The aircraft landed at Wilcannia with about 25 minutes of fuel remaining. Investigation showed that the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) requested by the pilot prior to the flight did not include a forecast of fog or any other significant weather at Broken Hill.

At the time of issue of the forecast (1850 Z), the conditions at Broken Hill were considered to be too dry for fog to develop. Satellite images did not show any fog on the ground. At 2125Z, after receiving advice of increased moisture levels at Broken Hill and reports of fog at Mildura, the TAF for Broken Hill was amended to include a 30% probability of fog. The incident aircraft arrived overhead Broken Hill aerodrome at 2128 UTC and began an instrument approach. Another company aircraft had landed at Broken Hill approximately 30 minutes earlier, and had advised the pilot of the incident aircraft that there was no fog.

A DeHavilland Canada DHC-8 (Dash 8) had been cleared to take-off on runway 30, with a request to make an early right turn to track to Point Lookout. The aircraft was rolling when the crew heard traffic information being issued by the aerodrome controller to an inbound formation of three McDonnell Douglas F-18A (Hornet) fighter aircraft. The Dash 8 crew also heard the controller advise the formation pilots that an early "pitch" (a 180 degree turn onto downwind) was available. The Dash 8 crew subsequently commenced a right turn at about 350 ft. At an altitude of about 700 ft they saw a Hornet to their right, passing from left to right about 300 ft higher than them.

The Dash 8 crew arrested their rate of climb as the Hornet passed over them and was lost from view. It was subsequently determined that the Hornet pilots had sighted the Dash 8 prior to entering the circuit at 1,500 ft. The first two aircraft were able to "pitch" early, passing behind the Dash 8. The third Hornet commenced to "pitch" just astern of the Dash 8 but overtook that aircraft during the turn. The Hornet pilot assessed that the Dash 8 was at approximately 700 ft, with a moderate rate of climb, and that adequate vertical separation would be maintained. The aerodrome controller did not use separation assurance techniques to establish separation between the departing Dash 8 and the arriving fighters. As a result, separation became reliant on the judgement of the Hornet pilots, rather than by the use of air traffic control traffic conflict strategies.

Prior to the aircraft departing Lord Howe Island, the Terminal Area Forecast (TAF) for Norfolk Island did not require the pilot in command to arrive with fuel for holding or for diversion to an alternate airfield. During the course of the flight, the weather at Norfolk Island deteriorated. The TAF was initially amended to require 30 minutes holding and later amended to require 60 minutes of holding fuel. The pilot advised that he became aware of the deteriorating weather at his destination only after he had passed the point of no return (PNR).

When the aircraft arrived in the Norfolk Island circuit area, the pilot assessed the conditions as unsuitable to land and commenced holding at low level over the water, but within visual range of the island. Approximately 45 minutes later, the weather conditions improved sufficiently for the pilot to make a visual approach and landing. The aircraft landed with required fuel reserves. Investigation of this incident did not reveal any deficiencies in the conduct of this flight. The airline has advised that as a result of this incident, they have changed their fuel policy to require the carriage of additional fuel where possible.

During take-off from runway 16 at Melbourne the pilot of the Airbus A320 aircraft experienced inadequate directional control. The take-off was rejected and the aircraft returned to the gate. The investigation determined that six days prior to this report the pilot in command's nose wheel steering transmitter had been found to be faulty. Because a spare was not immediately available, the aircraft had been cleared to operate under the conditions of the minimum equipment list. Because of that deficiency the crew did not have nose wheel steering available through the rudder pedals. Up to 70 kts nosewheel steering is through the tiller steering system, but the tiller is deactivated beyond 70 kts. The rudder becomes fully effective at about 100 kts.

Therefore between 70 kts and 100 kts pilots must apply a larger than normal rudder deflection if the rudder pedal steering system is not available to assist with directional control. The flight data recorder showed that as the aircraft commenced to diverge slightly to the left, the pilot applied right rudder. Subsequent analysis has shown that while the degree of rudder deflection applied by the pilot would have been sufficient to correct the swing had rudder pedal steering been available, without the rudder pedal steering the applied deflection was approximately half of what was required. It was determined that the pilots had not received training in the effects of the loss of rudder pedal steering. Safety action. The operator has initiated a simulator training sequence that will address the effects of failure of the rudder pedal steering system.

The pilot of the Fokker 50 was tracking the 168 degree radial from Carnarvon enroute to Perth. Whilst passing FL183 on climb to FL190, the pilot of the Fokker observed a Jetstream pass beneath and to the left on the reciprocal track. The Jetstream was enroute from Perth to Carnarvon and was maintaining FL180. FS had not provided traffic information to either pilot. Airservices Australia reported that a new manning roster was being trialled at the Flight Service Centre and that there were a small number of teething problems being experienced with staff and supervisors becoming familiar with the new hours and rotation of staff within the roster.

On this occasion, insufficient staff was available to provide relief to the operating positions. The flight service officer had just commenced duty but due to the staffing restrictions being experienced through the new roster, he did not have time to complete his normal familiarisation with the activities of the centre before he was required to assume the operating position. The workload at the time of the incident was high and the handover from the officer previously occupying the position was reported as being rushed and incomplete. The flight service officer who had assumed the operating position was, therefore, unfamiliar with the traffic situation.

LOCAL SAFETY ACTION

Airservices Australia has reported that it has identified the problems with the new roster and these will be rectified pending a review.

The owner/pilot of the Beagle Terrier aircraft, having successfully completed a biennial flight review, departed for a local flight involving formation and scenic flying. The forecast and actual wind at the time was from the north at 15 to 20 kts, gusting to 35 kts.

The pilot reported that flight conditions were "quite rough". At the completion of local flying, the pilot manoeuvred the aircraft for a landing, configuring it with full flap and an approach speed of 50 kt. A witness to the approach observed that the aircraft was being flown very slowly when it was about 400 ft above the strip. When about 50 ft above the strip the aircraft developed a high rate of sink that the pilot was unable to arrest. The aircraft landed heavily, right wing low, breaking the right main landing gear and causing substantial damage to the engine, propeller and lower fuselage. It was subsequently determined that the aircraft was not set up properly for an approach under the prevailing weather conditions. The pilot had not adequately considered of the effects of the gusting wind, or the low-level wind shear, even though he was aware of the forecast winds and prevailing conditions.

The Beagle Terrier was a development of the Auster series of aircraft which had a reputation for being able to be flown slowly. Over the years, there have been many accidents, some fatal, as a result of pilots losing control while flying too slowly, at too low an altitude, to effect a safe recovery. With the Beagle Terrier version of the Auster, the danger of flying too slowly is magnified because the aircraft is heavier than other Auster models. When flying speed is lost the Beagle Terrier abruptly achieves a very high rate of descent, as was experienced on the day of the accident. Because of the unexpected abrupt increase in the rate of descent, the pilot did not have enough time to assess the problem and apply power to recover before the aircraft landed heavily. Local safety action As a result of this and other similar occurrences the Antique Aeroplane Association of Australia prepared a "Safety Alert" to warn its members of the inherent problems with low and slow flight, particularly in Auster and Beagle Terrier aircraft. The "Safety Alert" was published in the association's magazine "Rag and Tube".

The pilot advised ATC that he was experiencing difficulties in obtaining normal extension of the landing gear and requested emergency services to be alerted for the landing. During the landing roll, the right main landing gear collapsed. The pilot and passengers evacuated the aircraft safely. Examination of the aircraft revealed that the right main landing gear retract/extend rod assembly was bent in two places.

The rigged length of the rod was critical to the correct "down" locking of the main landing gear, with any rod misalignment resulting in the possibility of landing gear collapse when weight was placed upon it. In addition to rod damage which occurred at the time of the gear collapse, there was evidence of some pre-existing damage. Such damage could result from the inadvertent placement of weight upon the landing gear whilst not correctly "down and locked".It was not possible to determine when this particular damage occurred.