When the pilot of VH-SWT requested start approval and clearance at 0535 EST, the callsign was not that which had been flight planned. Processing of the new callsign and the allocation of a transponder code, along with other arrivals and departures, delayed the departure of SWT for about 20 minutes. The aircraft was to depart from runway 01 at the taxiway A7 intersection.

At 0557, at B747 aircraft landed on runway 19. At this time, the high intensity runway edge lights, as well as the runway centreline lighting, were selected for runway 19. The B747 was still on the runway but south of the A7 intersection when SWT was cleared to line up. Because of this, the runway 19 high intensity edge lights were left on as were the runway 19 centreline lights. (The high intensity edge lighting and the centreline lighting cannot be selected for both runway 01 and runway 19 at the same time.) This meant that the only runway lighting illuminated for runway 01 was the white omnidirectional runway edge lighting. The green taxiway centreline lights were on.

These extended from taxiway A7 to the runway 01 centreline. When SWT was issued with a transponder code and cleared for an immediate departure, the aircraft was at the holding point at A7. The pilot read back the incorrect code and was again given the correct code. To enter the code into the transponder, he had to lean across the cockpit to the right side of the instrument panel. He did this as the aircraft entered the runway. When he looked forward again, he saw a line of white lights directly ahead and commenced the takeoff roll. Almost immediately, he heard a noise from the left side of the aircraft and rejected the take-off. 

The left propeller had struck one of the high intensity runway edge lights. The propeller was damaged and the light housing destroyed. It appears that when the pilot leaned across the cockpit to enter the transponder code, he veered left of the taxiway lights leading to the runway centreline and then assumed that the omnidirectional edge lighting depicted the runway centreline. As a result of this incident, Airservices Australia has written to the airport operator proposing that the lighting system be modified so that the centreline lights for runways 01 and 19 are omni-directional.

A letter supporting this proposal has been sent from BASI Brisbane Field Office to Brisbane Airport Corporation Limited. The operator is issuing a memo to all pilots advising them of the incident and the runway lighting arrangements which can apply when one runway is being used for arrivals and the other for departures.

The pilot of the Piper Seminole reported that he was involved in a near-miss with another aircraft while conducting a practice instrument approach to the Yarrowee navigation aid. As the Seminole was approaching Yarrowee, the pilot established communications with the pilot of a VFR Cessna 177RG conducting Airwork over the aid. After each pilot had advised the other of his intentions, the pilot of the Seminole understood that the Cessna was concluding its Airwork and departing the area for Ballarat. Subsequently, during the inbound turn of the instrument approach, the pilot of the Seminole reported seeing the Cessna very close to his aircraft and initiated a rapid descent to maintain separation.

The pilot of the Cessna later reported that he had the Seminole in sight at all times and did not believe that there was a breakdown in separation. He was unable to recall the details of the communications between the aircraft and could not explain why the pilot of the Seminole understood that the Cessna had departed the area.

In the absence of any independent corroboration, such as radar tapes, of either of the two conflicting versions of events, the following is a likely scenario. Based on his communication with the pilot of the Cessna, the pilot of the Seminole believed that his aircraft was the only aircraft in the area. When the Seminole pilot suddenly observed an aircraft close to his own, he may not have had sufficient time to assess the relative flightpaths and thus believed that a collision was imminent. The investigation was unable to determine if the Cessna pilot informed the pilot of the Seminole that he was still in the area and that he was maintaining visual separation.

SAFETY ACTION

The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation is currently investigating a perceived safety deficiency that has been identified as a result of this and similar occurrences. This deficiency involves the lack of a published requirement for aircraft conducting airwork over a navigation aid not associated with an airport to alert other aircraft prior to arriving overhead the aid. This requirement would provide the opportunity for aircraft to arrange mutual separation.

Any recommendation issued as a result of this investigation will be published in the Bureau's Quarterly Safety Deficiency Report.

The pilot of an amphibious Cessna 206 had been chartered to fly two passengers from an aircraft landing area at Warnervale to Berowa Waters on the Hawkesbury River.

A gusty 20 kt westerly wind was blowing in the Warnervale area at the time of aircraft departure. The pilot recalls being concerned about making an approach into Berowa Waters and encountered turbulent and uncomfortable weather conditions enroute.

After making a normal approach to the landing area, the pilot closed the throttle and flared the aircraft. As the floats touched the water, the aircraft tipped forward and the nose of the aircraft dived under water, which caused the windscreen to shatter. Water flooded the cabin and the aircraft came to rest inverted. The pilot and the two passengers were not seriously injured and evacuated the submerged cabin through the door on the left side of the aircraft.

Immediately following this occurrence, the pilot observed that the float mounted landing gear was in the extended position and not correctly positioned for a water landing. He cannot recall any actions specific to the landing gear following the departure from Warnervale or on arrival at Berowa Waters.

Following recovery of the aircraft to dry land, the landing gear selector was observed to be in the neutral position.

The pilot of an arriving aircraft requested that emergency services be placed on standby, as his aircraft was experiencing engine surging in the right engine and he did not expect to make a normal approach. A short time later the aircraft made an uneventful landing and taxied to the general aviation terminal accompanied by a fire tender. An investigation was subsequently carried out by a maintenance organisation with no fault found. This included draining and testing 20 litres of fuel from both main tanks. No contamination problem that may have attributed to the engine surging could be identified. After engine ground runs to verify operations were within limits, the aircraft was returned to service.

The pilot advised Flight Service (FS) that the engine had failed, and he was attempting a landing at the Mittagong airstrip. The aircraft subsequently landed approximately 2 km short of the airstrip damaging the left-wing tip and landing gear during the rollout. The pilot advised FS of the situation and that there were nil injuries. The initial maintenance investigation discovered that the crankshaft accessory drive gear positioning dowel had sheared. This in turn had ceased the drive to all the engine accessories and the camshaft, resulting in the engine stopping. The initial reason for the failure of the dowel could not be positively determined. 

Subsequent to the initial investigation, a detailed failure analysis of the failed engine components was carried out. This examination revealed that a significant factor in the failure of the crankshaft gear/crankshaft attachment had been a manufacturing irregularity on the bearing surface of the head of the attaching bolt. The manufacturing irregularity resulted in a reduced clamping force, between the gear and the crankshaft, being established during assembly. The loss of the clamping force had allowed relative movement between the gear and the crankshaft mounted gear positioning dowel. This eventually led to the fatigue failure of the dowel and the loss of integrity of the accessory gear drive assembly.

The pilot of FDP had been instructed to taxy to the holding point at taxiway A2 for departure. The Surface Movement Controller then diverted his attention to other traffic. The Aerodrome Controller then noticed that FDP was holding at the intersection of runway 15 and taxiway A3 , partially inside the holding point.

The pilot advised that the aircraft was slightly inside the holding point and asked for approval to conduct engine checks in that position. As there was no immediate traffic, the aircraft was cleared onto the runway. The pilot reported that he did not see the holding point marking until he had passed over it. He added that the marking did not extend across the full width of the taxiway, and felt that this contributed to the incident. In addition, he had not operated into Cairns for more than 2 years, so he was not completely familiar with the aerodrome layout.

The comments by the pilot on the holding point marking were discussed with the local Airservices manager and the airport owner. Both these agencies indicated that there had been other instances of pilot confusion concerning taxiway markings in the same area. It was agreed that Airservices would arrange for a 'Caution' note to be inserted in the En-route Supplement advising pilots to exercise caution when approaching the taxiway A3 holding point. The airport owner was completing arrangements to repaint the holding point marking to extend the full width of the taxiway, and to repaint the holding point and frequency information on the associated gable marker.

The aircraft was being prepared for a freight flight with newspapers included as part of a standard load for this service. Normally the newspaper publisher informed the operator of the weight of the consignment and the newspapers would arrive at the airport in sufficient time to ensure an on time departure. However, on this occasion, the consignment was delayed. The duty manager decided to delay the flight's departure to await the arrival of the newspapers.

The aircraft's upper deck and Compartment 1 of the lower deck had been loaded, and the manager intended to load the newspapers in the rear compartment of the lower deck in which 670 kg of weight allowance was available. The duty manager had the newspapers weighed and found them to be heavier than normal at a weight of 1,070 kg. He reported that he had informed the captain that the consignment was 400 kg overweight but the captain later stated that he had not been told of the discrepancy. The newspapers were loaded and the aircraft departed 20 minutes later than its scheduled departure time. The loading crew at the destination opened Compartment 1 and noted the Universal Loading Device (ULD) tag as showing the weight of an item of cargo as 87 kg.

The crew did not believe this figure and checked the weight at 277 kg. The loading crew then opened the rear compartment and noted a ULD tag showing a cargo weight of 607 kg. They again checked the weight and found 1,172 kg of newspapers and 78 kg of other freight. The net effect of these discrepancies was that the aircraft was heavier than its maximum zero fuel weight limit and that the centre of gravity was aft of its computed position, although within limits. The flight crew reported that the flight was normal and free from any noticeable abnormalities in aircraft performance or handling.

Since the occurrence, the operator has replaced the ULD tags with new "user friendly" tags designed to reduce the probability of error. The reason the crew were unaware of the excess load could not be determined.

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The pilot reported that he descended to approximately 150 ft AGL as he was approaching Bellburn airstrip, and decided to overfly the windsock. He noted that the wind was an easterly breeze of about 7 knots. The pilot then intended to carry out a left turn, fly a downwind leg, and terminate into wind. He then rolled on about 50 degrees of bank, and shortly afterwards the helicopter began shaking violently. The helicopter then rotated through 180 degrees and adopted a nose down attitude. The pilot said he applied full power and full collective control, but was unable to prevent the helicopter striking the ground.

A witness located near the parking area saw the helicopter bank steeply and then begin to descend. The tail rotor then hit a patio attached to an office building and the main rotor struck a tree just before the helicopter impacted the ground.

When the pilot entered the cockpit of the Fletcher, he observed the loading vehicle near the chemical dump. The pilot started the engine and allowed it to warm up for approximately four minutes. Unbeknown to the pilot, during this time, the loading vehicle moved to a position on the right side of the aft fuselage of the aircraft in preparation for loading. When the pilot commenced taxiing, the tailplane collided with the loading vehicle, causing substantial damage to the aft fuselage. No person was injured.

A significant factor in this accident was the driver positioning the loading vehicle near the aircraft without the approval of the pilot.