Soon after takeoff the crew were alerted to a pitch computer fault in the aircraft. As other indications were normal the pilot elected to investigate the problem when the aircraft was further away from the terminal area. The fault indication was reset. A short time later the same fault re-appeared in relation to another pitch computer, together with all other associated fault indications. The crew also became aware that the aircraft control mode had changed to alternate law. As weather conditions in the departure area were good, they decided to return for a landing at the departure aerodrome.

The pitch computer involved in the first fault indication was removed and tested. No fault was found. After further checking the pitch trim control actuator (the component common to both pitch computers in normal operations) was replaced. No further faults were found, and the aircraft was returned to service.

The pilot reported that he obtained a safe landing gear indication prior to landing. During the landing roll the right landing gear collapsed. The aircraft slewed to the right and the left and nose landing gear collapsed. There were no injuries. Subsequent investigation revealed that the landing gear extension mechanism was worn and out of adjustment. This was preventing the over centre downlock on the right main gear from positively locking the gear in the down position.

The aircraft was incorrectly co-ordinated whilst transiting Amberley military CTR. Amberley ATC are required to co-ordinate an estimate for Brisbane for traffic transiting their airspace for landing at Brisbane. The pilot is then assigned a standard transfer level of 4,000 ft. prior to his transfer to Brisbane approach.

The first co-ordination from Amberley in this case, was an attempt to handoff FIS to Brisbane departures when the aircraft was west of Amberley at flight level 150. The departures controller accepted the aircraft to avoid delays. The aircraft continued on an east/ south-easterly heading from Amberley and entered approach south's airspace without co-ordination from Amberley. The pilot eventually contacted departures, and was turned back into the departure controller's airspace for processing for a right circuit on runway 19. There was no breakdown in separation.

A Boeing 767 aircraft, VH-RME, departed Hamilton Island for Sydney at 1348 EST and was assigned an initial flight level (FL) 270 due to crossing traffic over Hamilton Island, which was climbing through FL280. Further along the aircraft's intended route there was another possible confliction with another Boeing 767, VH-OGM, tracking from Cairns to Brisbane at FL370. The tracks of the two aircraft crossed at a point approximately 95 NM south of Mackay.

As RME approached Mackay from the north, the Sector 7S controller asked the pilot at what distance south of Mackay the aircraft would be on reaching FL390. The pilot advised that he would reach FL390 by 40 NM south of Mackay.

The two aircraft would not be in conflict until approximately 80 NM south of Mackay, and the controller therefore issued a clearance to the pilot of RME to climb to the planned level of FL 410, with a requirement to reach FL390 by 70 NM south of MacKay. The pilot read back the clearance correctly. The controller subsequently noticed the aircraft at approximately 67 NM south of Mackay, climbing through FL350.

The controller asked the pilot to confirm that the requirement would be met. The pilot replied in the affirmative, but shortly after advised that he could not meet the requirement. The controller instructed the pilot to turn left 30 degrees for separation, and issued traffic information on OGM. The aircraft came to within 10 NM on parallel tracks. When RME had left FL 390, the pilot was cleared to resume tracking via the flight planned route.

The pilot of a SAAB 340 aircraft which had been cruising at flight level 170, had been assigned flight level 130 for descent into Coffs Harbour, and was told to expect further descent at 45 miles. The aircraft was later observed on radar, 45 miles south of Coffs Harbour descending through flight level 127. Attempts were made to contact the pilot but there was no reply. After liaising with Coffs Harbour tower, the sector controller was informed that the pilot had reported on descent to flight level 110. The pilot had not been authorised for further descent nor had he received a frequency change instruction. There was no breakdown in separation.

The pilot reported that icing conditions were encountered during the climb after departure from Sydney. The anti-ice systems were then activated. The aircraft was above cloud after reaching top of climb, and the pilot turned off the anti-ice systems after ascertaining that the left engine intake was free of ice. Approximately 2 minutes later the aircraft re-entered cloud. The pilot said he shone his torch onto the centre unheated windscreen and it was white with ice. He then turned on the wing ice light and this revealed about 15 cm of ice on the leading edge of the wing. The pilot said he then selected right engine heat and the engine flamed out. He advised air traffic control that he had an engine failure and requested a clearance back to Sydney and a descent clearance. When the aircraft reached 8,000 ft. he was able to restart the engine. He then requested a clearance to Brisbane. The remainder of the flight was completed without further incident.

The sector 2E controller was given instructions by the flow controller for an Airbus aircraft enroute from Sydney to Brisbane to lose time to pass Coolangatta at time 0918 EST. The intention was for the aircraft speed to be reduced sufficiently to lose about 3 minutes. The aircraft was in the Point Lookout area when the instruction was passed to the sector controller. A short time later the flow controller noticed that the aircraft was on an easterly heading approximately 140 NM south of Brisbane. This was queried through the sector and the flow controller was advised that the aircraft was being vectored to meet the set course time. The easterly heading effectively gave the aircraft a tailwind of 120 kts. When the sector controller turned the aircraft inbound to Coolangatta, it had lost so much time that a following Boeing 767 aircraft that would have been processed without delay, required speed control then significant vectoring, to stay behind the preceding aircraft.

The pilot of an Airbus A340 aircraft had been given clearance for a runway 01 Laravale 5 standard instrument departure (SID). The SID requires a right turn at 3 miles DME. The aircraft was observed to turn right at less than 2 DME. The pilot was asked if he was flying a 01 Laravale 5 departure, to which he replied 'affirmative'. The aircraft's flight path was 1 NM west of Fishermans Island. At the northern tip of the island the aircraft turned sharply right, and crossed the coast at Manly boat harbour at 4,300 ft. This flight path was much closer in than that normally flown on the Laravale 5 SID and was due to a high rate of climb and a low ground speed. The normal flight path usually arcs around the Brisbane control zone boundary which is a 7 nm radius. A following departing aircraft had been given a right turn onto a heading of 150 which would have kept it inside the normal SID flight path. When it was noticed that the Airbus was turning sharper than normal, the following aircraft was given a heading to pass behind the Airbus.

The aircraft ahead of VH-MML had departed from runway 01 and was being vectored in a right turn over the aerodrome to intercept a departure track of 257 degrees. MML had been issued a departure instruction to maintain 015 degrees (the runway heading) and took off two minutes behind the other aircraft. MML called approach airborne, turning right onto heading 150 degrees. This could have led to a conflict with other aircraft, so instructions were issued to maintain vertical separation.

The operator advised that the company procedure was for the non-flying pilot to set the departure heading with the heading selector knob, and for both crew members to check the selection, before the departure instruction was acknowledged.

Shortly after the take-off roll commenced, the crew aborted the take-off. The aircraft departed normally eight minutes later.

The operator advised that the crew received a take-off configuration warning (stabiliser trim) at the commencement of the take-off roll. The trim was reset using the co-pilot's control and the subsequent take-off was normal.