The pilot reported that icing conditions were encountered during the climb after departure from Sydney. The anti-ice systems were then activated. The aircraft was above cloud after reaching top of climb, and the pilot turned off the anti-ice systems after ascertaining that the left engine intake was free of ice. Approximately 2 minutes later the aircraft re-entered cloud. The pilot said he shone his torch onto the centre unheated windscreen and it was white with ice. He then turned on the wing ice light and this revealed about 15 cm of ice on the leading edge of the wing. The pilot said he then selected right engine heat and the engine flamed out. He advised air traffic control that he had an engine failure and requested a clearance back to Sydney and a descent clearance. When the aircraft reached 8,000 ft. he was able to restart the engine. He then requested a clearance to Brisbane. The remainder of the flight was completed without further incident.

The sector 2E controller was given instructions by the flow controller for an Airbus aircraft enroute from Sydney to Brisbane to lose time to pass Coolangatta at time 0918 EST. The intention was for the aircraft speed to be reduced sufficiently to lose about 3 minutes. The aircraft was in the Point Lookout area when the instruction was passed to the sector controller. A short time later the flow controller noticed that the aircraft was on an easterly heading approximately 140 NM south of Brisbane. This was queried through the sector and the flow controller was advised that the aircraft was being vectored to meet the set course time. The easterly heading effectively gave the aircraft a tailwind of 120 kts. When the sector controller turned the aircraft inbound to Coolangatta, it had lost so much time that a following Boeing 767 aircraft that would have been processed without delay, required speed control then significant vectoring, to stay behind the preceding aircraft.

The pilot of an Airbus A340 aircraft had been given clearance for a runway 01 Laravale 5 standard instrument departure (SID). The SID requires a right turn at 3 miles DME. The aircraft was observed to turn right at less than 2 DME. The pilot was asked if he was flying a 01 Laravale 5 departure, to which he replied 'affirmative'. The aircraft's flight path was 1 NM west of Fishermans Island. At the northern tip of the island the aircraft turned sharply right, and crossed the coast at Manly boat harbour at 4,300 ft. This flight path was much closer in than that normally flown on the Laravale 5 SID and was due to a high rate of climb and a low ground speed. The normal flight path usually arcs around the Brisbane control zone boundary which is a 7 nm radius. A following departing aircraft had been given a right turn onto a heading of 150 which would have kept it inside the normal SID flight path. When it was noticed that the Airbus was turning sharper than normal, the following aircraft was given a heading to pass behind the Airbus.

The aircraft ahead of VH-MML had departed from runway 01 and was being vectored in a right turn over the aerodrome to intercept a departure track of 257 degrees. MML had been issued a departure instruction to maintain 015 degrees (the runway heading) and took off two minutes behind the other aircraft. MML called approach airborne, turning right onto heading 150 degrees. This could have led to a conflict with other aircraft, so instructions were issued to maintain vertical separation.

The operator advised that the company procedure was for the non-flying pilot to set the departure heading with the heading selector knob, and for both crew members to check the selection, before the departure instruction was acknowledged.

Shortly after the take-off roll commenced, the crew aborted the take-off. The aircraft departed normally eight minutes later.

The operator advised that the crew received a take-off configuration warning (stabiliser trim) at the commencement of the take-off roll. The trim was reset using the co-pilot's control and the subsequent take-off was normal.

The aerodrome controller had cleared one aircraft for take-off. The intention was to have the following aircraft cleared for take-off when the first aircraft had gained adequate distance and was turning away from the initial departure track. The second aircraft was allowed to depart about one minute after the first. This was too soon as the controller was unable to maintain visual separation due to both aircraft being on the same track, away from the controller's view. There was also insufficient distance between the two aircraft to provide the required radar separation standard. Separation was positively established after the first aircraft turned to a new heading.

A B737 pilot reported that the crew believed they were taxying behind an A300 aircraft and were surprised to observe a Metro aircraft between the A300 and their aircraft. The Metro appeared unlit except for its fin-mounted rotating beacon. The B737 taxi lights were on but these lights are comparatively low intensity. The Metro operator advised that the white position light on the tail of the aircraft was defective. This would have made the Metro less conspicuous to the B737 crew. The B737 operator is considering the use of inboard landing lights in addition to taxi lights during night taxiing operations.

During the approach to land, just prior to crossing the runway end, the right main gear struck an earth mound. The gear leg was damaged by the impact. The mound, about three metres short of the 800-metre runway, was about 25 cm high and not easily seen from the approach path. The wind was light and there were no gusts or turbulence.

The aircraft was carrying out dusting operations and was on the second flight of the day. The pilot had done an obstacle evaluation flight prior to commencement of operations and had identified a row of mallee trees running north/south inside the eastern boundary fence. Running parallel to these trees in the paddock to be sprayed was a single power line.

The pilot made his first run to the west flying through a gateway and then under the power line as there was sufficient clearance and it provided the optimal approach for this swath run. The reciprocal run was then commenced to the east and the pilot began his pull up with a view to clear both the power line and the trees. During this manoeuvre the pilot heard a light thud and believed that he had contacted the power line. As the aircraft appeared to be handling normally, the pilot elected to return to the airstrip to inspect for damage.

Approximately 450 metres past the paddock fence, the aircraft suddenly pulled to the right in a steep nose down attitude and impacted the ground sustaining substantial damage. After evacuating the aircraft, the pilot observed that the power line was still attached to the aircraft landing gear and had not broken. He stated that the local Electricity Trust representative later informed him that the power line was of a three-strand high tensile steel construction that was designed specifically not to be cut or broken. This was evidenced by the ineffectiveness of the aircraft cable cutting devices and the severe damage that they sustained without severing the power line.

The pilot was moving the helicopter in an attempt to prevent cattle from crossing a water channel. During an attempt to reduce airspeed quickly he flared with a 15 kt tailwind, resulting in the main rotor overpitching. The helicopter was levelled but one skid entered water adjacent to the edge of the stream, and the other skid landed on the bank. The skid in the water sank into the sandy bottom and the helicopter slowly rolled on to its side. Considerable damage was caused to the rotor blades and airframe when the blades contacted the water.

An emergency locator transmitter was carried but did not activate during the impact sequence.