The instructor was conducting a dual check on a licensed pilot in a Bonanza which did not have dual brakes. The pilot under check started the engine and was about to taxy when he inadvertently applied a large amount of power which made the aircraft lurch forward. The instructor immediately told him to apply brakes, but the pilot was startled and expected the instructor to apply brakes. The instructor then tried to shut down the engine by closing the throttle and selecting mixture to idle cut off, but he was momentarily hampered by the student's hand still on the throttle. The instructor simultaneously tried to steer the Bonanza to the left between parked aircraft but was unsuccessful. The Bonanza struck the front of a Cessna 172 parked almost opposite about 15 m away. The Bonanza's propeller was almost stopped when it slashed the leading edge of the Cessna's right wing. The Bonanza's right wing also struck the Cessna's lower left engine cowl below its propeller.

The pilot being checked on the Bonanza advised that he had never been in a Bonanza before and that the instructor's pre-flight briefing was mostly concerned with the performance of the Bonanza. He found that the Bonanza layout was very different to the Cessna 172 and the Piper PA28s which he had been flying recently. At the time of the accident the student was unaware that the instructor did not have brakes, and he was not expecting the large power response from the throttle setting selected.

An A320 had been cleared to line up for departure on runway 23 at Adelaide. Traffic in the vicinity at that time was a VFR aircraft transiting the control zone on the coastal route to Parafield. The aerodrome controller (ADC) had decided to orbit this aircraft clear of runway 23 to facilitate the departure of the A320. Additional traffic was a Metroliner which was being sequenced to land on runway 30 at Adelaide. The ADC instructed the VFR traffic to make a right orbit, but the pilot seemed to experience difficulty in understanding the instruction and performed a left orbit. After ensuring that the take-off direction was clear the ADC cleared the A320 for take-off. At this time the Metroliner was turning onto final approach for runway 30.

The investigation revealed that after being cleared for take-off, the ADC's perception was that the A320 had not moved in the expected time frame when the Metroliner reported on short finals. The ADC then cancelled the take-off clearance. The ADC's attention was divided between the orbiting aircraft, the A320 and the Metroliner. Following the landing of the Metroliner, the A320 was cleared to depart.

The ADC's primary focus had been to ensure that the take-off path of the A320 was clear. His attention had been diverted by two issues, the VFR aircraft which had not followed his instruction to make a right orbit and the A320's seemingly slow reaction to the take-off clearance. Furthermore, the ADC may have misjudged the speed and distance of the Metroliner from the runway 30 threshold. However, the investigation indicated that the ADC acted quickly and in the correct sequence, cancelling the A320 take-off clearance then clearing the Metroliner to land.

The pilot was conducting a scheduled freight run and earlier that day had refuelled the aircraft and departed Bankstown with full main tanks (401 litres) and 160 litres in the auxiliary tanks. The accident flight was on the Scone to Maitland sector, and the pilot reported that when departing Scone, the aircraft had about 108 kilograms of freight and 430 litres of fuel.

The pilot reported that while on descent and at about five miles from Maitland, the right engine RPM began to fluctuate with an accompanied increase in vibration. The pilot, thinking that it was a malfunction of the propeller governor, reported that he shut down the right engine and selected the right propeller to feather.

The pilot observed that the right propeller was still windmilling, the indicated airspeed was decreasing and that the aircraft was unable to maintain height, so he elected to land in a nearby field. He closed the left throttle and selected the landing gear down. The landing gear collapsed on touchdown as there had been insufficient time for it to extend and lock. The aircraft slid for about 120 metres.

Investigation of the fuel system indicated that the auxiliary tanks were empty while the main tanks each contained about 140 litres. The cockpit fuel selectors indicated that the main fuel tanks were selected.

Investigation of the engines and their systems, including the propellers and governors, could not determine the reason for the reported propeller malfunction or the inability of the aircraft to maintain height.

The pilot in command of a Metro 23 had requested an intersection departure on runway 23 at Adelaide airport. At the time of the incident, weather conditions were VFR and radio traffic on the tower frequency was increasing. The pilot in command of the Metro 23 had been instructed to line up and be ready for an immediate departure (visual) with a maintain runway heading restriction. However, the pilot recalled that there had been considerable radio traffic on frequency and the ADC had spoken to at least one other aircraft between the times when he had passed the departure instructions and the take-off clearance.

The co-pilot had received the departure instructions because the pilot in command had had his attention diverted to another pre-take-off task when the clearance was issued. The pilot stated that he was concerned that a B737 was awaiting departure instructions at the threshold of the same runway and he wanted to minimise any inconvenience to that aircraft. He stated that perhaps as a result of the traffic on the tower frequency and that the departure instructions and take-off clearance had been passed in two distinct transmissions, he had overlooked the requirement to confirm the maintain runway heading instruction with the ADC. The pilot in command stated that at the time of take-off he was sure that the only instruction which had been passed was "118.2 airborne, clear for take-off".

When airborne and at a safe height he had queried the co-pilot whether or not they should make a left turn as they had made a visual departure. The pilot then elected to make the left turn, and they sighted another aircraft which was tracking to intercept final for rwy 30. It then became apparent to the crew of the Metro 23 that a mistake had been made. The error was later confirmed when they transferred to the approach frequency and the controller asked whether or not the ADC had stipulated maintain runway heading in the departure instructions.

Although it remains the responsibility of the pilot in command to abide by ATC instructions, this incident has highlighted the dangers associated with ATS personnel "splitting" an instruction. If ATS had repeated the requirement to maintain runway heading as part of the take-off clearance, the crew would have been reminded of the instruction at the point of departure.

A Cassuit Racer had completed a short flight in the Camden area. The pilot reported losing directional control on touch down, following a normal approach and flare. The aircraft nosed over during the accident sequence, causing damage to the lower engine cowl and propeller.

The pilot had recently purchased the aircraft, and this was his first flight on type. As it is a single seat aircraft, he was completing a self-endorsement under the supervision of another pilot.

The pilot of a Cessna 206 reported hearing an unusual noise as the nose wheel was lowered during the landing sequence. As a precaution, he increased back-pressure on the control column to keep the nose wheel off the ground for as long as possible during the landing roll. However, the nose wheel assembly subsequently collapsed, resulting in substantial damage to the propeller and engine cowling.

An inspection of the failed nose gear assembly by a LAME revealed no pre-existing defect with the unit. This occurrence was not investigated by BASI. No reason was given for the failure of the landing gear.

The pilot of a Grob 115 aircraft was conducting a series of circuits after returning from a solo flight to the training area. During the second touch and go the pilot lost directional control. The aircraft veered left and departed the runway, incurring substantial damage as it passed through a ditch. The pilot was uninjured and vacated the aircraft without assistance.

An Airbus A320 taxied at Adelaide and the crew requested an airways clearance to Brisbane. Air traffic control issued the crew with a clearance to Brisbane via UVUPU (064 AD VOR 181NM) and planned route to cruise at FL370 with a runway 23 RADAR 3 departure. This clearance was correctly read back by the crew. However, the departures flight progress strip (FPS) for this flight had been incorrectly annotated with an UVUPU 2 standard instrument departure (SID) instead of a standard radar departure (SRD) RADAR 3.

When the crew reported ready for take-off the approach east (APPE) radar controller issued an "unrestricted" instruction to the aerodrome controller (ADC). The ADC cleared the aircraft for take-off without assigning a radar heading. The flight crew did not query this instruction and the A320 became airborne, the crew electing to maintain runway heading. The crew contacted APPE and reported "tracking runway heading, climbing to FL370 left 2,800". They requested approval to track direct to UVUPU which was approved by the controller. Believing the aircraft to be tracking via the SID, a discussion between the pilot and APPE then revealed that the pilot understood that he had been cleared on a RADAR 3 Departure, while the controller understood that the aircraft was tracking via the UVUPU 2 SID.

There were no traffic conflictions. The investigation revealed that there were two contributing factors in this occurrence. The aircraft callsign had been changed on the FPS and the APPE controller was concerned that the SSR code on the strip may have been entered incorrectly. While confirming this detail he was distracted and annotated the FPS with an incorrect clearance. The technique of writing the clearance on the FPS prior to the issuance was considered a significant factor. The controller had already written UVUPU 2 on the FPS and when he was distracted during the issuing of the clearance, he had made an incorrect assumption, which had been influenced by the clearance already written on the FPS. The pilot in command had been issued with a standard radar departure clearance which required an assigned heading to be issued by the ADC with the take-off clearance. When the crew received the take-off clearance without the assigned heading, they should have immediately queried the instruction.

However, they elected to take-off and maintain runway heading. This action was consistent with the SID procedure. On first contact with APPE, the crew did not specifically mention that they did not have a heading to fly, and the controller incorrectly assumed that they were departing on a SID, in accordance with the annotation on the FPS. There were explicit instructions in the Aeronautical Information Publication, which detailed the requirements to be followed when departing on a SRD. The controller was required to assign a heading prior to issuing the take-off clearance and the pilot was required to read-back that heading. Considering that air traffic control had two clearances current for the departure, the last safety defence was the assigned heading in the standard radar departure. Had the crew queried that no heading had been assigned for their departure, APPE would have immediately queried the requirement

The flying instructor stated that he was conducting a trial instructional flight in conjunction with visiting his property with the student. A few minutes after landing, he performed a vertical take-off into an estimated 10 kt northerly wind. Engine RPM was close to the desired 2,700. The helicopter climbed vertically using 28 inches of manifold air pressure, leaving about 1.5 inches in reserve. It cleared the tops of the trees at about 40 ft AGL. The instructor then lowered the nose slightly to gain airspeed. As airspeed increased to about 10 kts the helicopter climbed to about 45 ft AGL.

The instructor then allowed the helicopter to accelerate without increasing power when suddenly, after about 30 metres, the engine RPM commenced to decay. He immediately applied full throttle and lowered the collective slightly but RPM continued to decay and the helicopter lost height. He immediately turned the helicopter 90 degrees left towards a downhill path through the trees and lowered the nose hoping to gain more airspeed and rotor RPM. Engine RPM had decreased to approximately 2,450 and continued to decay. The instructor then tried to reach the junction of his driveway and a road but the engine stopped completely and the helicopter crashed into a tree right side first.

The main rotor blades severed the tree trunk several times and struck a smaller tree before the helicopter impacted the ground on its left side. At the time of the accident the helicopter's gross weight was about 22 kg below maximum. The accident site was about 496 ft above sea level. The outside air temperature was 17 degrees Celsius and the weather was fine. The instructor reported that the carburettor air temperature gauge read 15 degrees Celsius during the pre-take-off checks. As this reading was out of the yellow band on the gauge, he did not apply carburettor heat for the take-off.

The estimated relative humidity at the accident site was 50 to 55%. Subsequent concerns were expressed by the company operating the helicopter that carburettor icing may have caused the engine failure. The operator reported experiencing symptoms of carburettor icing and the engine stopping in this helicopter during past practice autorotations with the engine idling. Prior to the accident, the operator had prompted company pilots to be very vigilant of carburettor icing and diligent in the use of carburettor heat, particularly during practice forced landings.

The operator was also concerned at the higher-than-expected fuel usage in their 269C-1, which had the standard non-fuel-injected engine, compared to their 269C helicopters with the standard fuel-injected engine. (The Schweizer 269C-1 is also commonly known as the 300CB, whereas the 269C is commonly known as the 300C.) The operator reported that their 269C-1 used about 48 litres per hour, whereas their 269C helicopters averaged about 41 litres per hour. The operator wondered if the additional fuel used by the C-1 model may have made it more prone to carburettor icing.

The damaged helicopter was retrieved to a hangar and subsequently inspected. An engineer/investigator from Schweizer Aircraft Corporation assisted in the investigation. No fault was found with the airframe or the engine which may have contributed to the accident. No evidence was found to prove that carburettor icing had occurred. Carburettor icing is not normally encountered at or near full engine power unless high humidity or visible moisture is present. The reason the engine failed could not be determined.

The Precision Airmotive Corporation, HA-6 10-6030 carburettor was originally fitted to Schweizer 269C-1 helicopters. On 5 March 1998, the manufacturer issued Service Information Letter - Fuel Systems, SIL MS-3, Revision 1, for the mandatory conversion of carburettors in all Schweizer 269C-1 helicopters to the HA-6 10-6030-1. Helicopters with airframe serial numbers 0001 to 0073 were to be retrofitted, whereas all subsequent factory models will be equipped with the modified carburettor before sale. The conversion involved installing a new secondary nozzle, a new power jet, a new idle tube, adjusting the air metering valve and adding an acceleration pump circuit.

As well as the reconfigured carburettor, the retrofit included an air straightener, removal of one engine baffle, relocation of the cylinder head temperature probe and relocation of the optional exhaust gas temperature probe, if so equipped. The intention of the reconfigured carburettor, combined with the air straightener was to establish improved fuel distribution and better fuel economy.

Soon after some parachutists had exited the aircraft and the pilot had commenced descent the lower section of the left engine cowl came free of the aircraft. The upper section of the cowl remained attached at its trailing edge and wrapped around the wing leading edge outboard of the engine.

Speed at the time of the failure was between 150 and 160 kt. The parachute drop had been conducted from 12,000 ft and the pilot thought that the cowl was lost around 10,500 ft.

The pilot reported that full aileron and almost full rudder deflection were required to maintain control of the aircraft during the descent. A speed of 120 kts, and full power on both engines was required to achieve sufficient control to land the aircraft.

The maintenance organisation responsible for the aircraft had conducted an inspection prior to the flight. One person had experienced difficulty in securing the cowl screws on the outboard side of the propeller spinner and had omitted to secure the inboard side. This error had not been detected by the supervising engineer nor the pilot during subsequent inspections.

The maintenance manual contains a warning about the need to maintain indicator patches on the cowls to indicate the locked position of the cowl fastener screwdriver slot. These indicators were not fitted to the aircraft. The cowl fasteners also include an indicator pin which protrudes into the screw slot when the fastener is locked. The pilot was not aware of this feature at the time of this occurrence.