On descent to Ayers Rock the pilot of VH-NJC contacted Adelaide Flight Service who advised that there was no other known conflicting instrument flight rules traffic. When approximately 37km from Ayers Rock, and approaching an altitude of 7,100 ft, the pilot made a broadcast on the Ayers Rock advisory frequency advising other aircraft in the area of his position. A reply was received from a visual flight rules aircraft reporting that it had departed Ayers Rock, was on a reciprocal heading, and also 37km from Ayers Rock, but at an altitude of 7,500 ft. The pilot stated that all mandatory radio calls had been made on departure. Both aircraft missed each other's calls as they were on different radio frequencies at the time the calls were made. Neither pilot saw the other aircraft.

Whilst returning from an aerial agriculture task, the Chief Pilot for the company elected to conduct some low flying over a lake. During this exercise, he misjudged his height, and the wheels contacted the water. The pilot lost control of the aircraft and it tipped over and came to rest inverted in the water. The pilot escaped without injury.

When VH-DLF was descending through 7,500 feet, 65 km from Adelaide, Adelaide Departures advised the pilot of an unidentified aircraft converging from his right. Departures continued to update the pilot of VH-DLF on the position of the other aircraft (which he was unable to sight, probably due to haze and the position of the setting sun) but were unable to advise the altitude of the other aircraft. A short time later the pilot of VH-DLF observed a Piper Pawnee aircraft, with a glider in tow, pass about 200 ft overhead.

At the time VH-DLF was descending through 6,300 ft. The pilot advised Departures of the near collision, and Departures confirmed that his aircraft was in controlled airspace. Attempts to contact the tug and glider by radio were unsuccessful. Subsequent investigation revealed that VH-IGR, a Piper Pawnee, had towed a glider (VH-IKO), cruising at about 6,500 ft, from Port Pirie to Murray Bridge at about that time. The lower limit of controlled airspace on their track was 4,000 feet and an airways clearance had not been requested by the tug/glider combination. Both pilots of the tug/glider combination advised that they had not seen VH-DLF and were unaware that they had violated controlled airspace.

The aircraft was to carry out insecticide spraying operations at a rice farm. The pilot made an approach to the airstrip from the south, with a tail wind of about 3 kts. The pilot said that, shortly after touchdown, he observed cattle straying near the edge of the strip and elected to go-around. As the aircraft became airborne the right main landing gear struck an adjacent levee bank. The impact detached the gear leg which then struck the right horizontal stabilizer, detaching the elevator. The pilot said that, by remaining in ground effect, he was able to complete a right circuit and land the aircraft back on the strip. On touchdown, directional control was lost and the aircraft ground looped, colliding with large water pipes and associated equipment.

Two B737 aircraft were tracking south on air route A464 at FL330, initially having a 10 minute separation standard, which reduced to 8 minutes before an RNAV distance standard could be achieved. Both aircraft then required diversion left of track to avoid weather, and as an RNAV distance separation standard could no longer be applied, a minimum separation of 10 minutes, or a change of cruising level for one aircraft was now required. Descent to Flight Level (FL)310 was not available due to crossing traffic, and neither aircraft could accept FL350.

A decision was made to descend the second aircraft to FL290, requiring the traffic on the crossing route to descend to FL280. Co-ordination of all possible separation methods with Brisbane Control required some time, especially as they were experiencing high workloads. The actual separation of the aircraft was continually monitored, and never less than 105km. As the lead aircraft had only been 8 minutes ahead of the other, a breakdown of separation occurred until vertical separation could be achieved.

The pilot had obtained the owner's permission for use of the private airstrip. Two trips were planned. The first flight was successfully completed with a landing at approximately 0630. The pilot then walked the length of the strip and found it to be in generally good condition, although with some shallow ruts. During the second landing on the island, when approximately 100 metres into the landing roll, the nosewheel struck a rut causing the landing gear strut to collapse. The aircraft slid for about 10 metres before coming to rest to the left of the strip.

The propeller and engine cowling had also sustained damage, and a fuel leak was evident. The pilot was not prepared to use the aircraft radio due to the risk posed by the fuel leak and as there was no other means of communication on the island, he was unable to inform air traffic services of the accident. When the pilot had not reported at the nominated time, communication checks were commenced, and an uncertainty phase was declared. Aircraft were then diverted to the island.

The pilot was en-route when he decided to land the helicopter in a clearing, near the edge of a small dam. The wind was from the north-east and gusting to about 25 knots. Temperature was about 25 degrees Celsius. As the aircraft was about to enter a hover the pilot noticed that the ground near the edge of the dam had too much slope to permit a landing into wind. He turned the aircraft slightly downwind so that the tail would be facing down the slope. At a height of about 15 feet the low RPM warning horn sounded.

The pilot attempted to reject the landing. He applied power, at the same time lowering the collective slightly and moving the cyclic forward to gain speed. The helicopter had insufficient forward speed or height to recover and landed in scrub, skids level, about 200 feet beyond the dam. It bounced twice, rolling onto its side after the second impact, severing the tail cone and destroying the main rotor blades.

The aircraft had been operating normally except for a report that the airspeed indicator was under-reading in cruise and the engine had been difficult to start for a number of days. On the morning of the accident the aircraft was flown from Karratha to Nanutarra in support of another aircraft. The pilot had been told that the Nanutarra strip was in good condition. However, this proved not to be the case as the surface was covered with brush up to one metre in height and the landing area was only ten metres wide.

The landing was uneventful, but the pilot had to remove some brush from the landing gear after landing. Prior to departure on the accident flight the pilot discussed the condition of the strip with the pilot of the other aircraft. This second pilot, who owned VH-WMV, paced out 500 metres of reasonable strip and indicated the pilot should use this for take-off. The pilot, still concerned, paced out a further 150 metres giving 650 metres in all. Although neither pilot referred to it, the take-off distance chart in the Pilots Operating Handbook (POH) indicated that 426 metres of ground roll was required in the prevailing conditions.

The pilot was also concerned about a shed at the end of the strip and decided that, in the event of an emergency during the take-off, he would steer the aircraft to the left of the shed. The aircraft was again difficult to start, and the owner's assistance was needed. During the taxy for take-off, the pilot had to use the auxiliary fuel pump, on several occasions, to keep the engine running. Although he completed the pre-take-off checks the pilot did not complete a magneto function check as he believed the strip surface was inadequate and he wanted to keep the use of high-power settings to a minimum.

The pilot did run the engine up to full power, against the brakes, before commencing the take-off roll. At that point all engine indications appeared normal. During the take-off roll the pilot concentrated his attention on keeping the aircraft in the centre of the very narrow section of reasonable strip. At the end of the 650 metres, he selected the normal climb attitude and lifted off at, what he believed was, about 75 knots. Immediately after liftoff the stall warning sounded and the pilot lowered the nose slightly, at the same time turning left to avoid the shed.

The aircraft continued to descend until it collided with trees. The aircraft came to a stop 150 metres to the left of the strip centreline and 1400 metres from the start of the take-off roll. The pilot reported that after liftoff he felt that the aircraft was not performing to expectations and that the engine had lost power. A post-accident inspection of the engine disclosed that the compression on two cylinders was probably below serviceable limits at the time of the take-off.

Also, the bottom plugs in two other cylinders may have been contaminated and not been working efficiently. The engine had been serviceable during the periodic inspection completed 87 hours prior to the accident. The reports that the airspeed indicator under-read in cruise, the engine was difficult to start, and the difficulty encountered by the pilot in keeping the engine running during taxy may also have been indications of poor engine performance.

The lack of normal acceleration, during the take-off roll, was probably the result of the less than optimum performance from the engine. The drag caused by the brush on the runway may have also been a factor. The pilot was forced to liftoff at the 650-metre mark as the condition of strip, after that point, was poor. Although the pilot reported that liftoff speed was 75 knots, the onset of a stall immediately after liftoff indicates that the speed was below this figure. The POH gives a power-off stall speed of 62 knots.

The power-on stall speed would have been something less than this. Once the aircraft had encountered the onset of the stall condition the pilot was left with no alternative other than to lower the nose and accept a forced landing. Although the pilot had a valid reason for not completing a magneto function check prior to take-off, the contamination of the spark plugs would have shown up during this check had one been carried out.

VH-COG was cleared to take-off from runway 11, to make a left turn and depart not above 1000 feet. On initial climb the pilot was advised that VH-UDB was on mid right downwind for runway 36. The pilot of VH-UDB was also advised that VH-COG had departed from runway 11. The pilot of VH-COG scanned the downwind leg of runway 36 for VH-UDB without sighting it, and as VH-COG passed the entry point for the downwind leg of runway 36, while climbing through 800 feet, he assumed that VH-UDB would now be approaching right base and therefore well clear.

VH-UDB then passed directly over his right wingtip with a vertical separation of about 150 feet. The instructor and student in VH-UDB, who were also looking for VH-COG, saw it at the same time. As both aircraft were being operated in the VFR category, in accordance with MATS Chapter 4, Para 10, RAAF ATC were not obligated to provide separation in the CTR, and therefore not monitoring the progress of the two aircraft.

The instructor advised that they had been approaching to land at 55 - 60 kt when the aircraft encountered a wind shear of about 20 kt. The aircraft began to sink rapidly, and the student pulled back on the control column and applied power. The subsequent landing on the main wheels was heavy. The aircraft bounced and another circuit was flown.

After landing it was found that the nose gear had been distorted forward. There were dust devils in the area and the pilot considers that they had encountered one, although there was no dust to make it visible. The wind had been a south-easterly at 10 - 20 kt but it was a north-easterly after they had landed.