Three aircraft were scheduled to depart Melbourne via the 150 radial. VH-KDK and VH-WZI were vectored left of track to allow the faster aircraft, VH-EWL, to safely overtake both of them. A small closing speed existed between VH-KDK and VH-WZI but normal climb performance was such that vertical separation could be expected before radar separation approached minima. The Departures controller in training decided to place VH-KDK back on pilot navigation by instructing the pilot to track direct to Cowes. This resulted in VH-KDK and VH-EWL now being on gradual converging tracks. The trainee thought that VH-EWL would have drawn in front before both aircraft were back on track. In this configuration the aircraft were handed off to the receiving Inner Sector radar controller who was made aware of the converging aircraft and the possible need to alter one of the aircrafts tracks at a later stage. The Inner Sector controller knew that while the separation minima inside 30 miles was three miles, this increased to 5 miles further out. His judgement was that immediate action was not required but that separation needed to be monitored. The Inner Sector controller became distracted when VH-WZI had not made a radio call when transferred from Departures as well as being distracted by other traffic in the Ballarat/Yarrowee area. When he returned his attention to the convergence of VH-KDK and VH-EWL these aircraft were beyond 30 miles from Melbourne but with only three miles lateral separation. A turn was initiated and the required five miles separation was established. Significant Factors The following factors were considered relevant ot the development of the incident: 1. The Inner Sector radar controller was distracted by other aircraft. 2. The Inner Sector radar controllers scanning of the traffic under his control was inadequate. 3. The Inner Sector radar controller did not ensure that the aircraft remained adequately separated.

The B747 VH-OJD departed runway 34 on runway heading and was cleared to 3000 feet. On contact with Sydney Departures VH-OJD was given a left turn heading 240 and was instructed on two occasions to maintain 3000 feet. The aircraft was observed to climb to 3400 feet, and this was confirmed by the pilot. VH-MZX, a PA31 had departed from runway 07 and had been cleared to 4000 feet on a heading of 030. Horizontal and vertical separation standards were infringed as there was only two miles lateral separation by radar between VH-OJD and VH-MZX. The required separation standards was 1000 feet vertically or three miles horizontally.

After landing on runway 27 the crew of VH-TAD commenced taxiing the aircraft along taxiway echo, back to the terminal. It was necessary to obtain a clearance to cross runway 34 on the way in.

In the control tower the aerodrome controller issued a clearance to another aircraft to take off on runway 34. He also gave approval to the surface movement controller to allow VH-TAD to cross runway 34 behind the aircraft taking off.

The surface movement controller then issued a clearance for VH-TAD to cross runway 34. In doing this he omitted to say to cross behind the departing aircraft. The crew of VH-TAD saw the other aircraft taking off on runway 34 and held VH-TAD short of runway 34 until the other aircraft had passed.

Significant Factor

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The surface movement controller incorrectly issued a clearance for VH-TAD to cross runway 34, in lieu of saying to cross behind the aircraft taking off on runway 34.

The pilot was conducting a scheduled passenger service flight from Port Augusta with a stop at Innamincka. A commercial pilot, travelling as a non-paying passenger, occupied the co-pilot's seat to observe the operation. Two additional passengers were on board the aircraft for the entire flight.

After landing at Innamincka, the aircraft was refuelled by the pilot in command and the oil levels of both engines were checked by the observer, who experienced difficulty securing the combination oil filler cap-dipsticks. He asked the pilot for instructions and, although some advice was given, the pilot did not check the security of the dipsticks.

Take-off was commenced towards the north into a 10-15 knot wind with a surface temperature of about 20 degrees C. Shortly after lift-off, at the first power reduction, the observer in the co-pilot's seat advised that there was oil seeping back along the cowl from the right-side oil filler hatch. The pilot reported that he increased power to both engines but believed there was no response from the right. He began an immediate left turn to complete a circuit and attempted to secure the right engine and feather the propeller. The aircraft then began a roll to the right, the nose dropped, and the aircraft impacted the ground. As the aircraft rolled right and the nose dropped, the pilot reported that he had secured the left engine and feathered the propeller. The observer in the co-pilot seat reported hearing a continuous stall warning horn as the right wing began to drop.

All occupants, although injured, were able to vacate the aircraft through the main cabin door. The pilot provided assistance to the passengers and then returned to the airport to summon help.

Examination of the wreckage revealed that the aircraft impacted the ground in a nose down, right wing low attitude while turning right. The landing gear collapsed due to impact forces and the right wing separated. Deceleration and impact forces were severe. The right propeller was found in the fine pitch range with no damage to the uppermost blade and the other two bent backwards. The right engine oil filler cap-dipstick was found to be correctly installed in the oil filler neck. There was a pattern of engine oil over the rear of the engine and inside the cowl originating from the oil filler neck.

The left engine was partially torn from its mountings and displaced about 90 degrees to the right. Its propeller was in the fully feathered position. The oil filler cap-dipstick was on the ground adjacent to the engine. An oil spill pattern similar to that on the right engine was evident.

The pilot in command held a Senior Commercial Pilot Licence, a Command Instrument Rating, and a current Class 1 Medical certificate. He was endorsed on the aircraft type and had last been checked in emergency procedures eight months previously.

The person in the co-pilot's seat had recently qualified as a commercial pilot and had completed some flying training with the operator. He was on board the flight to observe a typical commercial operation to enhance his employment prospects as a pilot. This observer status had been previously granted to other pilots. The company management provided strict guidelines to pilots in command of such flights regarding the non-active role of these observer pilots.

The aircraft maintenance release was valid, and the aircraft had been loaded within the Flight Manual maximum weight and centre of gravity limits at the time of the accident.

The right engine was run on a test stand and assessed as being capable of normal operation. The combination oil cap-dipstick prevented oil loss when correctly inserted and clipped down. When in place but not clipped down, with the engine running above 1800 rpm, an oil leak pattern similar to that seen at the accident site occurred over the rear of the engine.

It is considered likely that the dipstick had been loose prior to impact but was correctly replaced in the filler neck after the accident. The design of the oil filler system tends to restrict oil loss with a loose dipstick. This condition would not require an immediate reaction by the pilot to prevent engine damage.

The right propeller was dismantled for inspection and found in the normal fine pitch range but capable of feathering. The uppermost blade was not damaged and backwards bending of the other two blades indicated that it was stationary or rotating slowly at impact.

Severe impact damage to the left engine precluded a test run. It was bulk stripped with no defects evident that would have prevented normal operation. The left propeller was dismantled and found to have been in the fully feathered position prior to impact. Damage sustained would indicate that it was stationary or rotating slowly at impact.

Based on the physical wreckage and impact examination and on the pilot and passenger comments, it is evident that when the pilot secured the right engine and began the left turn, the airspeed dropped, and the aircraft stalled. When the right wing dropped the aircraft entered an incipient spin. Due to the low altitude at which control was lost, the pilot was unable to effect a recovery.

Findings

1. The aircraft had a valid maintenance release and was within maximum weight and centre of gravity limitations at the time of the accident.
2. The pilot-in-command was correctly licensed and endorsed for the aircraft type.
3. Oil levels had been checked and oil added to the right engine by a non-crew member.
4. The combination oil cap-dipsticks had not been checked for correct installation by the pilot-in-command and were probably loose at take-off.
5. The oil filler design of the engine will restrict oil loss when a dipstick is not correctly secured.
6. The left propeller was feathered, and the right propeller was in the fine pitch range; both were stationary or rotating slowly at impact.
7. The right engine was capable of normal operation and was successfully run on a test stand after the accident.
8. Impact damage to the left engine precluded a test run but a strip inspection indicated that it was capable of normal operation.
9. The aircraft stalled and entered an incipient spin to the right prior to ground impact.

Significant Factors

1. The pilot-in-command reacted inappropriately to a perceived engine problem shortly after take-off.
2. Control of the aircraft was lost at a height insufficient to effect a recovery.

The pilot stated that he had just refuelled the aircraft. The subsequent engine start and take-off were normal. However, as the helicopter was accelerating through about 60 knots, the engine began to lose power, with decreasing RPM evident. As the pilot lowered the collective pitch control, the engine stopped. The pilot conducted an autorotation on to a road, but touched down in a high nose attitude and broke the right skid.

The engine had operated normally prior to the occurrence. The refuelling operation was the first from a newly opened drum but there was no indication of fuel contamination. Operation of the aircraft requires the fuel boost pump to be ON during take-off and landing and when flying below 140 metres above ground level. The pilot was not certain that he had switched the pump on before take-off. It is possible, therefore, that the engine failed due to fuel starvation.

During the landing roll the aircraft steering could not be controlled by the steering tiller. The tiller continued to drive to the full left position and directional control could only be maintained by differential braking. When the aircraft was stopped the nosewheel and tiller were locked in the full left position and taxiing was not possible. While arrangements were being made to disembark the passengers on the runway, the steering suddenly freed itself and the aircraft was then taxied to the terminal. The steering system could not be faulted on the ground at Albury but the nosewheel steering shut-off valve was changed as a precaution. The aircraft then operated the return flight to Sydney, but the problem recurred. The nosewheel steering control valve was changed and no further problems have been reported.

VH-KDB commenced descent to Whyalla at 55km and advised Adelaide Flight Service (FIS) and broadcasted on local MTAF. Adelaide FIS advised "no IFR traffic" and no response was heard on MTAF.

At 30km Whyalla, the estimated arrival time and intentions at Whyalla were broadcast and the pilots continued to monitor both radio frequencies (MTAF and Area).

At about 10km from Whyalla, when leaving 3000 feet on descent, opposite direction traffic was seen on climb straight ahead. Rate of descent was increased as an evasive action and the other aircraft passed overhead.

After passing, attempts were made to establish communications with the other aircraft on both MTAF and Area frequencies without success. A short time later, VH-LQD was heard on Area frequency, and it was established that this was the aircraft seen.

The pilot of VH-LQD, a foreign national, was flying a solo navigation exercise and although he had heard some transmissions, he had not associated them with conflicting traffic.

The crew of VH-JJT were making a straight in approach to runway 03 at Geraldton. They had made advisory calls on both the area and MTAF frequency and were in contact with four other aircraft in the Geraldton MTAF. As the aircraft joined the final approach a high wing, single engine aircraft was sighted departing from runway 08. Repeated attempts to contact the aircraft on the MTAF and area frequencies were unsuccessful.

While taking off from a forestry strip the aircraft performance achieved was less than expected. Concerned about terrain proximity after liftoff the pilot operated the dump lever. This did not prevent the landing gear from striking a log beyond the end of the strip. The aircraft continued to fly, and the pilot diverted to Albury Airport. During the subsequent landing roll, the right main landing gear leg collapsed.

Soft sand had been put on portions of the centre of the forestry strip, and it appeared this had adversely affected the take-off performance. A spreader was fitted to the aircraft to assist in distribution of the hopper load. When the dump was attempted, the spreader severely reduced the effectiveness of the dump and only about 20 per cent of the load was jettisoned.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The presence of soft sand on the strip surface.

2. The pilot did not anticipate the effect the sand would have on the take-off performance.

3. Fitment of the spreader resulted in a severe reduction in the performance of the dump system.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of this incident.

1. The cannon plug on the rear of the landing gear indicator was not securely fastened.

2. The cannon plug disconnected from the indicator.