VH-EXF which had been operating on a low-level training exercise was cleared by Darwin Approach for a visual approach and instructed to track to a left base for runway 36, and to contact the tower. The aircraft joined left base at about 800 feet AMSL and contacted the tower as instructed.

After completing prelanding checks the pilot became aware of another aircraft on a converging track at a similar attitude. The separation between the aircraft was about 200 metres horizontally and less than 100 feet vertically. The other aircraft, VH-AHX, had just become airborne from runway 18 and was making a right turn, as instructed, onto a heading 240 degrees and climbing to 1000 feet.

Two helicopters were engaged on frost prevention activities during the night. One helicopter was on the ground, its engine running with the pilot standing some distance away. The second helicopter was approaching to land to refuel. The pilot reported that he approached his selected landing point and entered the hover, facing east into the sun which had just risen. After touchdown, the main rotors of both helicopters collided and resulted in the destruction of both aircraft.

Significant Factors

1. The landing pilot misjudged the clearance between his rotor disc and that of the helicopter on the ground during landing.

2. Sun glare may have affected the landing pilot's vision.

VH-OGI, a Boeing 767, was tracking for left base runway 19 at Brisbane when the TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision-avoidance System) alerted the crew of the presence of another aircraft. The Boeing 767 was on descent to 1,500ft and passing 2,000ft when the TCAS Traffic Alert indicated the unknown aircraft was 900ft below and ahead. The crew levelled the Boeing 767 and notified the Approach Controller who was monitoring the airspace by radar.

A short time later, the Boeing crew saw a high-winged light aircraft about half a mile left and indicating 600ft low on their TCAS which gave a TCAS Resolution Advisory at the same time. They took no further avoiding action because they had sighted the light aircraft in question. The area of the reported confliction consists of a control area step which commences at 1,000ft, with uncontrolled airspace below.

The applicable separation standard is 500ft vertically, and with the jet being cleared down to 1,500ft other traffic could be operating quite legitimately up to 1,000ft. This was the case in this instance. There was no breakdown in the separation standards. The incident was initially reported as a confliction due to the alleged penetration of the control area by the light aircraft. The Approach Controller at Brisbane did not have a height readout capability on his radar equipment. However, his colleague at Coolangatta does and was asked for an altitude readout on the light aircraft.

The Mode C label attached to the light aircraft read 1,600ft. Later, it became evident that this was incorrect. A system limitation is that when two aircraft are in close proximity, typically less than one nautical mile, the Mode C information from the two aircraft can be corrupted or switch altitude labels between aircraft. This apparently occurred on this occasion.

The TCAS operated effectively and within its parameters. The jet was in a descent, virtually pointing at the light aircraft at a lower altitude. The system could not predict that the crew were about to level off at an altitude which would have given an adequate separation from the lower traffic.

At about 40 kts during the take-off run the nose of the aircraft lifted off the runway and then sank, allowing the propeller to strike the runway. The aircraft skidded to a stop with the landing gear partly retracted. The pilot then noticed that the landing gear lever was in the "up" position. The pilot stated that he had not selected the landing gear up during the take-off run and was unsure of the lever position prior to commencing the take-off.

The pilot had been spraying a plantation of fully developed banana trees which had vertical irrigation sprinklers protruding about 1 m above the canopy. The next area to be treated was in a hollow and consisted of half-grown trees with the sprinkler heads protruding about 2.5 m. The pilot reported that as he attempted to arrest the rate of descent after flying down into the hollow, the left wing struck one of the sprinkler heads. The aircraft immediately rolled left and struck a number of other sprinklers. The pilot was unable to regain control, and the aircraft struck the ground. The engine was torn from the airframe and both wings separated during the impact sequence. The cockpit area remained largely intact. There was no fire.

The pilot reported that, before starting the engine, he completed a routine daily inspection and found no defects. Approximately three minutes after startup, as the engine was being accelerated for take-off, the pilot heard a loud noise and felt the aircraft start to vibrate. The throttle was closed and the engine shut down.

Inspection found that one of the stainless-steel abrasion strips from a tail rotor blade had delaminated causing a serious imbalance of the tail rotor drive system. The out of balance situation caused the tail rotor gearbox to separate from its mounting. The particle separator (airbox) was also damaged by the abnormal flexing of the tail rotor drive.

The aircraft was engaged in dropping parachutists. Prior to commencing the flight the pilot reported that he inspected the airstrip and calculated, from the performance charts for the aircraft, that adequate take-off distance was available. After lift off the aircraft did not climb as the pilot expected. He then turned the aircraft left to avoid trees at the end of the strip. In doing so the left wing struck a dead tree that the pilot had not seen.

A 10cm wide hole was torn in the undersurface of the wing from the leading edge to the aileron. As the aircraft continued to perform adequately the pilot decided to divert to the more suitable airfield at Coolangatta, 30 km to the north. The subsequent landing was without incident. The wind velocity was south-south-easterly at 10-15 knots and the take-off was conducted into wind. 

here is high ground to the north-west of the strip and under certain conditions downdraughts are present in the area of the strip. However, on this occasion the prevailing wind was not conducive to their formation. The reason for the lack of climb performance was not determined.

A Bandeirante aircraft, VH-XFL, was parked in the western run-up bay and facing into an 8 to 12kt wind. A maintenance engineer was at the controls conducting an engine run. A Tiger Moth aircraft, VH-BXF, landed on runway 33 and commenced taxiing via taxiways YANKEE and ALPHA. This entailed taxiing behind the Bandeirante. As BXF taxied behind XFL, it was blown over onto its nose and left wing tip.

The engineer did not respond, over a period of one minute and forty seconds, to radio calls from the Surface Movement Controller (SMC) telling him to shut down the engines. The engines were eventually shut down following signals from ground personnel. The pilot of the Tiger Moth aircraft later indicated that he was not aware that the area occupied by the Bandeirante aircraft was a designated run-up area and he assumed that the aircraft was waiting for a take-off clearance at a holding point.

He also indicated that he had taxied behind other turbo-prop aircraft which had their engines running, without problem. When the engineer in charge of the Bandeirante asked for taxi clearance to the run-up bay, there was no mention of an engine run. The SMC was thus unaware that an engine run was the purpose of entering the area. The engineer reported that power greater than 50 percent was not used and that he regarded this as low power.

However, the propeller wash was strong enough to drastically affect the Tiger Moth some 50m behind. The severity of the propeller wash was exacerbated by the local wind conditions.

The pilot decided to divert to Mudgee when deteriorating weather conditions were encountered near Narrabri. Upon arrival in the Mudgee circuit, he positioned the aircraft for a landing on runway 04. On the downwind leg, the before landing checks were completed by reference to a checklist. The aircraft was established on the final approach with all prelanding checks completed. At a height of about 200 feet, both engines lost power simultaneously. The aircraft touched down heavily in a field about 100 metres short of the threshold to runway 04 and was substantially damaged as a result of ground impact forces. The reason for the simultaneous double engine failure was not positively established. However, it is possible that when the pilot carried out the before landing checks, both auxiliary electric fuel pumps were inadvertently selected to the high setting rather than low. Consequently, when the throttles were moved towards the idle position on the final approach, both engines lost power due to an over rich mixture.

During an approach in mild crosswind conditions, the pilot misjudged the flare for landing by rounding out high. She held a level attitude until the aircraft sank onto the runway. This resulted in a heavy landing followed by a bounce. She held a level attitude again until the aircraft stalled, which resulted in the nose gear striking the runway first. The nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest on the runway. The pilot later said that she had not had any training in bounced landings.

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS

1. The pilot applied the incorrect recovery technique following a bounced landing.

2. Inadequate training of pilot by relevant flying school.

SAFETY ACTION

The information concerning her lack of training in bounced landing recovery was relayed to the Archerfield Flying Operations Inspectors of the Civil Aviation Authority.