

**Aviation Safety Investigation Report
199301358**

**Beech Aircraft Corp
Travel Air
de Havilland Canada
Dash 8**

30 April 1993

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NOTE: All air safety occurrences reported to the ATSB are categorised and recorded. For a detailed explanation on Category definitions please refer to the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au.

Occurrence Number: 199301358 **Occurrence Type:** Incident
Location: 17 nm N Devonport
State: TAS **Inv Category:** 4
Date: Friday 30 April 1993
Time: 0930 hours **Time Zone:** EST
Highest Injury Level: None

Aircraft Manufacturer: de Havilland Canada
Aircraft Model: DHC-8-102
Aircraft Registration: VH-WZI **Serial Number:** 014
Type of Operation: Air Transport Domestic Low Capacity Passenger Scheduled
Damage to Aircraft:
Departure Point: Melbourne VIC
Departure Time:
Destination: Devonport TAS

Aircraft Manufacturer: Beech Aircraft Corp
Aircraft Model: E95
Aircraft Registration: VH-IJM **Serial Number:** TD-718
Type of Operation: Charter Passenger
Damage to Aircraft: Nil
Departure Point:
Departure Time:
Destination: Cambridge TAS

Approved for Release: Wednesday, October 26, 1994

On descent into Devonport regular public transport aircraft, VH-WZI, made radio calls on the Flight Service (FS) frequency and on Devonport Mandatory Traffic Advisory Frequency (MTAF) prior to leaving controlled airspace at 10000 ft. There was no response from any other aircraft. When VH-WZI was approximately 18 NM north of Devonport, FS asked Air Traffic Control (ATC) for the position of VH-WZI. A short time later FS advised VH-WZI that ATC had VH-IJM on frequency 17 NM north of Devonport tracking for Hobart at 7500 ft. At this, VH-WZI terminated the descent and initiated a climb to 8000 ft in visual meteorological conditions. VH-IJM was transferred to the FS frequency and separation was effected. The crew of VH-WZI sighted VH-IJM half a mile to the right and below but it was extremely difficult to see VH-IJM due to underlying cloud cover.

The pilot of VH-IJM was flying to visual flight rules. VH-IJM had transferred to the ATC frequency at least 20 NM north of Devonport in order to obtain a clearance into controlled airspace which starts north of Devonport. The pilot was monitoring one radio frequency at a time. He was unaware of VH-WZI until he saw it.

The captain of VH-WZI believes that on routes where there is traffic climbing or descending to locations under controlled airspace, then the design of the airspace should be such that frequency separation is not encouraged; otherwise procedures should be established to cater for such occurrences.

The manager of FS advised that where an aircraft is single very high frequency (VHF) radio equipped (or a pilot is monitoring only one frequency), with similar circumstances a similar incident could reoccur.

The current procedures for pilots and air traffic personnel, combined with the existing airspace configuration, do not prevent this type of incident from occurring.

Significant Factors

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the incident:

1. The pilots of both aircraft complied with existing rules and regulations.
 2. Air Traffic Services provided more than the required service.
 3. The combination of existing rules, procedures and airspace does not prevent this type of occurrence.
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