The pilot of the Cessna 172 reported that after joining the circuit on crosswind for runway 10 he observed a Cessna 310 stationary on the taxiway at the eastern end. Shortly after he turned onto final approach, the Cessna 310 became airborne and conflicted with the Cessna 172. The pilot of the Cessna 172 took evasive action and estimated that the aircraft had passed within about 100 to 200 m.

He indicated that he had made all appropriate radio broadcasts, including when joining crosswind and on base leg. However, he had not heard a response from the pilot of the Cessna 310. The pilot of the Cessna 310 said he had departed on runway 28 because of equipment located off the end of runway 10 and had not heard any broadcasts from the other aircraft.

The aircraft departed the base airstrip to fly to the treatment area but did not arrive. The pilot and wreckage were located after first light by search aircraft. The aircraft had collided with trees and crashed into an empty paddock. The pilot has not provided a report. However, information provided by other sources suggests that he inadvertently entered low cloud and during an attempt to turn back collided with the trees.

Shortly after take-off for the third aerial agriculture flight of the day, the pilot reported that the engine began to lose power. The pilot dumped the load, then after several unsuccessful attempts to regain power, landed the aircraft in a paddock. During the landing roll, soft ground was encountered and the aircraft overturned. The engine was later run on a testbed, but no faults were found. The weather at the time of the accident was humid, with a temperature of 23-25 degrees Celsius, which may have contributed to carburettor icing.

The pilot was spraying a cotton crop with insecticide. Although he had not sprayed the field for about 12 months, he remembered a power line traversing it but could not remember if he had flown over or under the wire previously. On this occasion he elected to fly under it, however, as the aircraft passed under the wire it snagged the rudder. The pilot reported that the aircraft remained controllable, but the rudder was jammed to the right. He slowed the aircraft to 70 knots to reduce the effectiveness of the rudder but was unable to reduce the extreme right yaw.

He decided to return to the town airstrip where better facilities were available and advised the police of his problem by radio. He was subsequently able to land the aircraft without further incident. Inspection later revealed that the rudder horn had been severely damaged, jamming the rudder. The power line was reported to be 3 metres above ground level where the strike occurred.

After a normal approach, the aircraft touched down harder than normal. The pilot was unable to arrest the ensuing bounce, and the nose gear collapsed.

The pilot was operating over his property on a stock spotting flight with his brother as passenger. He had departed with about 2.5 hours fuel on board but, after about 40 minutes, the aircraft fuel gauges seemed to indicate a loss of fuel. The pilot headed for the station airstrip, but the engine failed when the aircraft was about 4 km south of the strip. The pilot selected an area for a forced landing, but the aircraft struck a fence and some bushes before coming to a stop.

Substantial damage was caused to the left wing and flap, left hand lift strut, the landing gear was stressed and gouges cut in the propellor blades and hub. The left hand fuel cap was missing allowing fuel to escape from the tank by siphon action. The pilot made temporary repairs to this substantial damage and later flew the aircraft to Swan Hill for repairs, a distance of over 480 km.

VH-EBR was tracking from Bali to Sydney via route A576 to Curtin (CIN) and then via route T71 at FL330 (33,000 feet). A40GP was tracking from Melbourne to Singapore via T71 at FL350 and estimating Curtin at 1805 UTC. VH-EBR reported over Curtin at 1742 and requested FL370. The duty controller (on Perth Sector 2, the sector responsible for the section of airspace) checked the distance between VH-EBR and a preceding aircraft tracking on A576 (7 minutes ahead at FL370), because he thought they may be in conflict, and then told VH-EBR to standby while weather diversions were considered. At 1746.49, the controller instructed VH-EBR to climb to FL370.

A40GP was probably slightly to the right of track due to a previous weather diversion, but the aircraft were on opposite tracks with an estimated time of passing of 1753. VH-EBR reported maintaining FL370 at 1753.33 and at 1753.55 asked the controller what separation existed with the traffic that had just passed down their left side. The aircraft would have been at the same level and about 50 miles apart at approximately 3 minutes prior to the time of passing. Vertical separation did not exist until about the time the aircraft passed.

The required standard was vertical separation of 2000 feet 10 minutes prior to the time of passing. The controller did not recognise the confliction between VH-EBR and A40GP. He had been busy in the two hours prior to the incident. 15 aircraft had passed over Curtin and there were many diversions due to weather. However, in the 20 minutes prior to the incident the workload had decreased to a moderate level. The controller indicated that he did not feel fatigued at the time of the incident. He was on his fourth solo shift following three weeks recreation leave.

He had completed three familiarisation shifts immediately after the leave but had not been able to work Sector 2 with any more than light traffic prior to the day of the incident. The initial co-ordination received from Melbourne had A40GP at FL310 but there was a level change to FL350 prior to position T71B. The new level had been correctly carried through to all flight progress strips by the controller. The evidence indicates that the controller had a "mind set" that A40GP was at FL310 and therefore below the level of VH-EBR prior to the change of level to FL370 and would not be a consideration. It is possible that a lack of familiarisation in busy traffic conditions on Sector 2 contributed to the controller's error.

The pilot reported that during take-off the left wheel sank into a soft area on the side of the airstrip. He was unable to maintain directional control and the aircraft nosed over and came to rest inverted.

Early in the take-off run, while tow launching a glider, the aircraft veered and pulled the glider to the left. The glider pilot released the towline, but the tug continued to the left, ran off the airstrip and through the boundary fence.

Just after take-off, the crew felt an impact and noticed a slight airframe vibration. The captain decided to leave the landing gear extended until the serviceability of the aircraft could be verified as he believed that the impact had been near the nosewheel. He advised the aerodrome controller who despatched a vehicle to inspect the runway and found the remains of several birds. This information was passed to the captain who contacted the engineering department of his company for advice. As all engine indications were normal and the vibration had ceased, the captain decided to continue to Adelaide as scheduled.

During the flight the engine vibration indicators showed low readings until top of descent when the right hand engine indicator increased significantly although still within limits. Inspection of the aircraft after landing revealed that a number of right engine fan blades had been damaged. The nature of the damage was consistent with bird ingestion.

A readout of the FDR revealed that vibrations were far greater in the turbine section of the engine than at the compressor. As only compressor section vibration data is displayed on the cockpit engine vibration indicators, there was no way for the crew to be aware of the extent of the engine damage.