What happened

On 25 December 2020, a Raytheon (Beechcraft) A36 aircraft was departing from a private airstrip on a property near Pingrup, Western Australia, for a private flight to Jandakot, Western Australia, with the pilot and four passengers on board.

During the take-off to the east, when about halfway down the runway, the pilot detected a sudden and severe wind change. The northerly wind became gusty and variable, which affected the aircraft’s airspeed, resulting in a stall warning. When the stall warning sounded, the aircraft was approximately 10 ft above the runway, but the pilot was having difficulty maintaining altitude.

The pilot elected to reject the take-off and land but was unable to stop the aircraft before the end of the runway. The aircraft overran the runway and struck a fence, resulting in substantial damage to the propeller, wings, landing gear and fuselage. There were no injuries to the pilot or passengers.

Safety action

As a result of this accident, the pilot has advised the ATSB that they are planning to install a second windsock at the eastern end of the airstrip, and construct an additional flight strip running in a north/south direction.

Safety message

This accident highlights the importance of early decision making for pilots, specifically when rejecting a take-off. Instead of attempting to keep the aircraft in the air operating below safe flying speed, the pilot made the safer decision to land back on the runway. Although the aircraft was damaged, the pilot and the passengers were uninjured.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

What happened

On 23 December 2020, the pilot of a Robinson R22 helicopter was preparing to take off from a private property near Derby, Western Australia. The helicopter landing site was covered with rubber matting made from conveyor belts as a means of limiting dust when landing (Figure 1).

As the helicopter became airborne, it moved backwards slightly due to a headwind, resulting in the heel of the skid sliding between two overlapping sheets of matting (Figure 2). As the pilot attempted to gain height, the skid did not free itself and the helicopter pitched back and rolled to the left. The pilot recognised the early onset of dynamic rollover and attempted to recover by lowering the collective.^[1]While that action prevented a rollover, it resulted in a hard landing and substantial damage to the helicopter.

Figure 1: Landing site conveyor belt matting

Figure 2: Snag hazard

Source: Aircraft operator

Helicopter static and dynamic rollovers

ATSB occurrence brief AB-2020-015 included the following explanation for helicopter rollovers.  

Static rollover occurs when a helicopter is pivoted about one of its landing skids or wheels and the helicopter’s centre of gravity passes outside the in-contact skid or wheel. Once in this position, removal of the original force that raised the helicopter to that angle will not stop the helicopter from rolling further. This angle is termed the ‘static rollover angle.’

A rotors-running helicopter resting with one landing skid or wheel on the ground may, without appropriate pilot input, commence rolling. Under certain circumstances, this roll cannot be controlled, and the helicopter rolls over. This condition is known as ‘dynamic rollover’ and is a function of the interaction between the:

- horizontal component of the total rotor thrust (or lift) acting about the point of ground contact 
- weight of the aircraft, initially acting between the helicopter’s skid landing gear or wheels. This second, counter-rolling moment decreases the greater the roll.

Recovery from dynamic rollover is by smoothly lowering the collective lever while controlling any tendency to roll in the opposite direction with cyclic to re-establish the helicopter’s weight evenly on the ground. In general, the application of smooth collective inputs is more effective in avoiding rollover issues than using the cyclic control.

Safety action

As a result of this incident, the operator advised the ATSB they have taken the following safety action:

• removed rubber conveyor belt matting from all company helicopter landing sites 
• issued an internal safety alert to all pilots regarding the incident, reminding them of the requirements to ensure company helicopter landing sites are clear of any objects that could cause dynamic rollover on take-off
• reminded pilots how dynamic rollover can occur and the appropriate recovery technique.

Safety message

This was an unfortunate outcome for an operator who in addressing one problem, the potential for ‘brownout’^[2]when landing, inadvertently created another hazard that resulted in damage to the helicopter. ATSB occurrence brief AB-2020-024 illustrates the potential consequences of ‘brownout’ when operating in dry and dusty conditions.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

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1. Collective: a primary helicopter flight control that simultaneously affects the pitch of all blades of a lifting rotor. Collective input is the main control for vertical velocity.
2. Brownout condition: is an in-flight visibility restriction due to dust or sand in the air. In a brownout, the pilot cannot see nearby objects which provide the outside visual references necessary to control the aircraft near the ground. This can cause spatial disorientation and loss of situational awareness leading to an accident.

What happened

On the morning of 23 November 2020, a Cessna 150 departed Peterborough, Victoria on a private flight to Deniliquin, New South Wales, with the pilot and one passenger on board. The en-route weather forecast obtained prior to flight indicated a band of marginal weather moving to the east followed by clearing weather behind. The pilot assessed that the conditions on the route chosen would be initially suitable for flight under VFR^[1] with conditions improving during the day.

During the flight, the weather began to deteriorate approaching the Ballarat area. The pilot observed increasing overcast cloud on the intended track and was forced to descend to stay in VMC.^[2] Approximately 15 NM south of Ballarat airfield, at 800 ft and now several miles right of track, the pilot received the weather from the aerodrome weather information service which was indicating a cloud ceiling at Ballarat of 5,000 ft. After the sudden appearance of wind turbines off to the right of track, the instrument-rated pilot decided to commence a climb to get above the cloud, which was believed to be 1,000 ft thick. Passing 3,500 ft the airspeed indicator became unreliable and was fluctuating significantly despite the pitot heat being on. The decision to reverse course and descend out of cloud was made. The pilot became visual with the ground about 200 ft above the trees and began searching for a suitable landing area.

As the pilot searched, it became increasingly difficult to maintain visual reference with the ground and they decided to immediately land in a paddock. Selecting a paddock, the pilot lined up on approach and on short final a wire fence was sighted which required an adjustment just prior to touchdown. This adjustment increased the ground roll and the aircraft passed through another fence before the wing tip collided with a small shed and the aircraft came to rest on an embankment.

Figure 1: Aircraft in situ post collision

Source: Operator

• Pilot comments – In hindsight the pilot suggested they could have either delayed the departure of the flight until the marginal weather had passed or planned a route further to the west to remain clear of it altogether.

Safety message

The ATSB continues to investigate weather-related general aviation accidents. VFR into IMC remains one of the most significant causes for concern in aviation safety; the often-fatal outcomes of these accidents are usually avoidable. In the 5 years prior to the occurrence, there were 57 reported VFR into IMC occurrences, 7 of which resulted in accidents, with 10 fatalities.

The ATSB SafetyWatch highlights the broad safety concerns that come out of our investigation findings and from the occurrence data reported to us by industry. One of the safety concerns is inflight decision-making.

The decision whether to proceed is the first decision the VFR pilot faces when confronted with less than visual meteorological conditions. Flight Safety Australia article '178 seconds to live' illustrates the stark reality of attempting to fly in IMC conditions without adequate training.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

__________

1. Visual flight rules (VFR): a set of regulations that permit a pilot to operate an aircraft only in weather conditions generally clear enough to allow the pilot to see where the aircraft is going.
2. Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC): an aviation flight category in which visual flight rules (VFR) flight is permitted – that is, conditions in which pilots have sufficient visibility to fly the aircraft while maintaining visual separation from terrain and other aircraft.

What happened

On the morning of 20 October 2020, a Piper PA-28-181 departed Bankstown Airport on a private flight to Gilgandra, New South Wales, with the pilot as the sole occupant. The en-route weather forecast obtained the morning of departure indicated some cloud over the Blue Mountains to the west of Sydney, but the pilot assessed that conditions would be suitable for flight under visual flight rules (VFR).

After departure, the pilot deviated off the direct track to avoid active restricted airspace before manoeuvring to resume the flight-planned track. The pilot reported that there were scattered clouds in the area at the time. While making the track adjustment, the pilot diverted their attention to the flight log and maps. When the pilot looked up, the aircraft had entered an area of low thick clouds and the pilot initiated a turn to vacate the area.

During the turn, the pilot became disoriented in cloud and the aircraft entered a spiral dive. The pilot recovered control of the aircraft clear of cloud, but the aircraft had descended over 2,000 ft and was surrounded by mountainous terrain. With low cloud over the mountains, visual meteorological conditions^[1] did not exist. To maintain terrain clearance, the pilot initiated a climbing turn, which subsequently took the aircraft back into cloud.

Once at a safe altitude, the pilot attempted to contact air traffic control (ATC) with a request but was twice asked to ‘stand by’. Approximately 2 minutes after the first radio call, the pilot made a PAN PAN^[2] call reporting that the aircraft was ‘VFR in cloud’. The controller immediately responded and provided assistance for the next 16 minutes, guiding the pilot away from high terrain and to an area of clear of cloud. Once below cloud, the pilot resumed visual navigation back to Bankstown.

Safety message

The ATSB SafetyWatch highlights the broad safety concerns that come out of our investigation findings and from the occurrence data reported to us by industry. One of the safety concerns is inflight decision-making.

The decision to proceed is the first decision the VFR pilot faces when confronted with less than visual meteorological conditions. Flight Safety Australia article ‘178 seconds to live’, illustrates the stark reality of attempting to fly in IMC conditions without adequate training.

The ATSB strongly urges pilots to seek assistance from ATC as soon as conditions deteriorate. Controllers are trained to handle such an occurrence and providing them with accurate information on your situational awareness and in-flight conditions will allow them to provide the best possible assistance.

The ATSB continues to investigate weather-related general aviation accidents. VFR into IMC remains one of the most significant causes for concern in aviation safety; the often-fatal outcomes of these accidents are usually avoidable. In the 5 years prior to the occurrence, there were 56 reported VFR into IMC occurrences, 7 of which resulted in accidents, with 10 fatalities.

The ATSB publication Accidents involving Visual Flight Rules pilots in Instrument Meteorological Conditions provides investigation findings, case studies and further reading on managing the risks of flying in reduced visibility.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

__________

1. Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC): an aviation flight category in which visual flight rules (VFR) flight is permitted – that is, conditions in which pilots have sufficient visibility to fly the aircraft while maintaining visual separation from terrain and other aircraft.
2. PAN PAN: an internationally recognised radio call announcing an urgency condition which concerns the safety of an aircraft or its occupants but where the flight crew does not require immediate assistance.

What happened

On 31 October 2020, at 0605 Eastern Daylight-saving Time, the pilot of a Kavanagh Balloons B425-581 balloon was preparing for launch near Maitland, New South Wales, with 20 passengers on board. The balloon was to operate in company with another seven passenger-carrying charter balloons and was the second to launch.

The pilot inadvertently released the launch restraint with sufficient heat being applied to the envelope only to become airborne (due to false lift) but not to climb. The balloon then travelled approximately 100 m downwind at 50 ft above the ground before coming into contact with the trees (Figure 1). This resulted in damage to seventeen panels of the balloon envelope. The pilot and passengers were uninjured.

Figure 1: Approximate balloon track

Source: Operator, annotated by ATSB

Safety message

The Australian Ballooning Federation’s Pilot Training Manual Part 5 Aerostatics and Airmanship describes the effects of false lift and the importance of ensuring the flight path is clear of obstacles during launch.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

What happened

At about 0945 Eastern Standard Time on 20 September 2020, the pilot of a Robinson Helicopter Company R44 was conducting a 15-minute scenic flight from Archerfield Airport, Queensland with two passengers on board. The route flown departed Archerfield to the east, then headed north past the Brisbane CBD (B in Figure 1) before tracking south via Mount Coot-tha (A in Figure 1). The departure used a helicopter-only procedure known as a ‘University departure’ via the ‘Univat VFR Route’ (Figure 1) to remain clear of surrounding controlled airspace.

The R44 departed Archerfield at 1,000 ft and after passing the Brisbane CBD, climbed to 1,500 ft until reaching Mount Coot-tha. At Mount Coot-tha, the pilot conducted a descent to 1,000 ft as required by the Univat VFR route to remain clear of controlled airspace, and broadcast on the area frequency.

At about 1000, an Aerospatiale Industries AS350 departed Archerfield Airport for Mount Coot-tha via the published northern departure procedure. This procedure required aircraft to maintain 1,000 ft until reaching a VFR tracking point with the radio selected to the Archerfield Tower frequency until the control zone boundary. On reaching the boundary, the AS350 pilot conducted a slow climb and gentle turn towards Mount Coot-tha. Shortly after the AS350 commenced the turn, pilot of both helicopters reported seeing the other helicopter in close proximity on a converging track and immediately manoeuvred to avoid a collision.

The AS350 pilot reported, as the aircraft passed each other, Brisbane Centre made a broadcast on area frequency advising of a collision risk between two aircraft at Mount Coot-tha to which the pilot replied, confirming they were clear. Both pilots reported not hearing any calls from the other helicopter pilot and were probably on different frequencies prior to the proximity event.

Both helicopters were fitted with ADS-B traffic warning systems reported as serviceable and switched on, but neither pilot received a traffic alert. The pilots estimated the helicopters passed 50 m apart.

Figure 1: Archerfield arrivals and departures

Source: Google Earth, annotated by ATSB

Guidance material

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) Visual Pilot Guides and online program, OnTrack, which provided recommended procedures for pilots operating in busy metropolitan airspace, are no longer available. However, CASA is developing large wall charts designed for flying schools in metropolitan areas, including Brisbane.

Airservices Australia safety publication Tips for flying at Archerfield details operating procedures and considerations when planning a flight. This supplements information provided in the Aeronautical Information Publication – En Route Supplement Australia section Archerfield – Flight procedures.

Safety action

As a result of this occurrence, the R44 operator has advised the ATSB that it has commenced a trial to make additional calls approaching outbound waypoints and to reverse the flight path flown on the scenic flights. This will keep their helicopters to the east of traffic tracking north to Mount Coot-tha.

Safety message

Archerfield is a busy control zone between Brisbane civil class C and Amberley military class C airspace. Published flight procedures facilitate aircraft movements and assist air traffic control co-ordinate local traffic.

Following a national review of class D airspace in 2010, aircraft operating under visual flight rules no longer need to use published inbound reporting points, provided two-way communication is established with the Tower prior to entry to the control zone. This allows aircraft to approach from any direction, which may result in conflict with traffic adhering to the recommended procedures. When there are multiple frequencies in use and traffic are operating close to control zone boundaries, this increases the likelihood of pilots being unaware of conflicting traffic.

The ATSB recommends pilots operate in accordance with published procedures wherever possible.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

What happened

On 1 October 2020, an instructor and student pilot in a Robinson R22 helicopter were conducting exercises in the helicopter training area at Jandakot Airport, Western Australia. In the pre-flight brief, the plan for the flight was to conduct some revision circuits and then cover flight control emergency recovery procedures. Having completed the circuit revision portion of the flight, the instructor demonstrated and monitored the student successfully completing the first of the practice emergency procedures.

At about 1145 Western Standard Time, the instructor assessed that the wind had increased to about 20 kt and the conditions were therefore unsuitable to continue the lesson. The instructor informed the student that they would conclude the training at that point. The student lifted the helicopter into the hover in preparation to return to the parking area.

While hovering 3 ft above the ground, there was a momentary uncommanded yaw to the right and the instructor questioned the student as to the cause. The aircraft then commenced a further uncommanded and uncontrolled right yaw and the instructor took over the controls. The yaw continued and the helicopter rapidly went through 2 to 3 rotations. The instructor assessed that the situation was unrecoverable, closed the throttle and raised the collective^[1] to cushion the helicopter onto the ground. This resulted in a heavy landing and substantial damage to the airframe, however, no injuries to the student or instructor (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The helicopter in situ after the heavy landing

Source: Airport operator

Safety action

As a result of this occurrence, the operator has advised the ATSB that a staff safety meeting was conducted following the heavy landing incident and prior to resumption of flight training activities, with the focus on mitigating future risks during hovering operations. The instructor and student also completed additional training.

Safety message

This incident is a reminder for instructors to be aware of, and respond quickly to, situations that develop during training. These may be due to the student’s limited experience, decision-making, aircraft performance limitations or changing weather conditions, which pose risks to the safe conduct of the flight.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

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1. Collective: a primary helicopter flight control that simultaneously affects the pitch of all blades of a lifting rotor. Collective input is the main control for vertical velocity.

What happened

On 4 September 2020, the crew of a Diamond Industries DA 40 were on a dual training exercise and conducted a stop-and-go landing at Adelaide, South Australia. After landing, air traffic control (ATC) cleared the aircraft to taxi to reposition for take-off advising there was a Boeing 737 on the holding bay ahead of them. As the DA 40 approached the taxiway adjacent to the holding bay, the instructor noted the grass moving but continued as instructed.

The taxi clearance required the aircraft to make a left turn and as the crew initiated the turn, the aircraft entered the jet blast^[1] of the 737 (Figure 1). The instructor was unable to manoeuvre as required with differential braking^[2] and made the decision to attempt a turn to the right to exit the jet blast. Upon releasing the brakes and applying right rudder, the pilot reported the DA 40 abruptly turned to the right and the pilot then taxied back towards the runway.

The crew notified the controller they had lost rudder control and ATC responded that the jet was conducting 50 per cent power ground runs.

Figure 1: Location of jet blast

Source: Aerodrome diagram excerpt provided by operator and annotated by the ATSB

Jet blast and effect on controls

Many manufacturers provide information on predicted velocities and safe distances from jet engine exhausts. Figure 2 shows the predicted exhaust gas velocity using breakaway thrust power settings behind a 737-400 similar to the aircraft in the occurrence. It should, however, be noted that breakaway thrust is approximately 35 per cent power under normal circumstances and this aircraft was conducting maintenance ground runs using 50 per cent, meaning the exhaust velocity would be significantly greater than those indicated in this diagram. The DA 40 passed approximately 80 m behind the 737. At breakaway thrust, the DA 40 would be expected to encounter winds in excess of 30 kt, which is beyond the DA 40 maximum demonstrated crosswind limit of 20 kt. This contributed to the handling difficulties experienced while taxiing.

A review by the airside manager of Adelaide Airport found that the 737 maintenance ground runs were conducted in the appropriate location. The controller believed the level of power being used would not affect the DA 40 given the distance from the 737 and therefore there was no requirement to issue a caution to the DA 40 crew.

Figure 2: Predicted exhaust gas velocity for 737-400 aircraft

Source: Boeing annotated by the ATSB

Operator’s investigation

The operator conducted an investigation that included a review of radio transmission transcripts. Their investigation found that there was no advice or warning given to the DA 40 crew by ATC that the 737 was performing ground runs, or that these were being conducted at 50 per cent power. This was despite the controller being aware of the power setting be used. Although the pilot observed the grass moving along the taxiway, they took no action and it was determined that the crew were unfamiliar with the hazards associated with jet blast. The aircraft was exposed to the jet blast for approximately 1 minute.

Safety action

Airservices Australia advised the ATSB that the unit tower supervisor issued a ‘lessons learned’ to raise awareness of the event.

This was the first jet blast occurrence for the operator and as a result of this occurrence, the operator has advised the ATSB that it is taking the following safety actions:

• a review of theoretical training relating to identifying and managing jet blast
• a review of actions to be taken in the event of a jet blast occurrence including initial actions and inspections to be carried out by crew and maintenance personnel.

Safety message

This incident highlights the importance of situational awareness for pilots of smaller aircraft operating around larger aircraft. Jet blast is a hazard at all airports where high performance or transport category aircraft operate. While the risks are generally recognised within the ramp environment, jet blast can be encountered anywhere greater than idle power settings are used.

Avoiding a jet blast hazard requires pilots of light aircraft to be aware of the following:

• the potential danger area behind large jets
• the increased risk potential when aircraft may be about to move or use higher than idle power settings
• being attentive to, and taking cues from, indicators in the operational environment, such as wind socks and grass at the edge of a taxiway.

Notwithstanding the need for pilots’ situational awareness, ATC also needs to be aware of the effects of jet blast on light aircraft. When there is a specific hazard, the requirement for controllers regarding jet blast is detailed in the Manual of Air Traffic Services section 12.1.1.2. Airservices Australia Aeronautical Information Publication stated that ATC should provide a caution to the aircraft. Additionally, taxi clearances should facilitate movement of light aircraft away from jet blast hazards.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

__________

1. Jet blast: the hazard associated with the blast force generated behind a jet engine, especially at high engine power settings when taxiing, before and during take-off, and during engine maintenance activity.
2. Differential braking: The use of independent braking systems installed on the left and right wheels of an aircraft to assist in steering.

What happened

On 6 August 2020, the pilot of a Cessna 172RG was conducting a private flight under visual flight rules from Noosa Airport to Thangool Airport, Queensland.

The pilot had not previously landed at Thangool Airport and chose to overfly the airfield in order to observe the windsock and assess the crosswind for a landing on runway 28.^[1] The pilot perceived the windsock to indicate a steady but manageable crosswind that was consistent with the Thangool Airport aerodrome weather information service.^[2]

The aircraft then joined the circuit for a landing on runway 28. The pilot elected to cross the runway threshold slightly faster and higher than normal, to gauge the effect of the crosswind and conduct a go-around if necessary. During the flare, just prior to touching down, the pilot felt the aircraft encounter a strong gust of wind from the right. The pilot was unable to maintain control of the aircraft and it touched down heavily, veered left, and exited the left side of runway 28 (Figure 1). The pilot was the only occupant on board and was uninjured in the occurrence. The aircraft sustained substantial damage (Figure 2).

The recorded automatic weather for Thangool Airport, for the period 15 minutes before and after the occurrence, indicated a wind direction between 020–060° true, a wind speed between 7–11 kt, and wind gusts between 8–14 kt.

Based on the recorded wind direction, when landing on runway 28 with a 14 kt wind gust, the aircraft would have encountered a crosswind of 10–14 kt and a tailwind component of 0–9 kt. The aircraft’s maximum demonstrated crosswind was 15 kt.

The pilot had 46.5 hours of experience on the aircraft type and a total aeronautical experience of 141.2 hours.

Figure 1: Marks on the runway and grass leading to the aircraft’s final position

Source: Provided to the ATSB

Figure 2: Aircraft damage

Source: Provided to the ATSB

Safety action

As a result of this occurrence, the pilot advised the ATSB that they will pursue additional crosswind landing training.

Safety message

This occurrence highlights the importance of exercising caution when operating in conditions that have the potential to exceed the maximum demonstrated crosswind speed of an aircraft. It also illustrates the need for pilots to establish a personal minimums checklist that is commensurate with the flying experience of the individual. If the conditions do not meet these criteria, or if there is any doubt, pilots should not attempt the activity.

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.

[1]     Runway number: the number represents the magnetic heading of the runway. The magnetic variation at Thangool was 10° east.

[2]     Aerodrome weather information service (AWIS): actual weather conditions, provided via telephone or radio broadcast, from Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) automatic weather stations, or weather stations approved for that purpose by the BoM.

What happened

On 21 September 2020, two Cessna 208Bs departed Proserpine, Queensland, for scenic charter flights. The lead Cessna had one pilot and 12 passengers on board and the trailing Cessna had a pilot and 13 passengers on board.

After departing Proserpine, both aircraft climbed to 1,000 ft and began to track towards Hamilton Island. The pilots reported that they would normally transit the area between 1,500 ft and 2,000 ft, but elected to maintain 1,000 ft as the cloud base was at 1,500 ft. When 10 NM west-south-west of Hamilton Island Airport, the pilot of the lead Cessna broadcast on the Hamilton Island common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) to advise their intentions to track via the northern tip of Dent Island and Hamilton Island at 1,000 ft for Whitehaven Beach (Figure 1). No replies were heard from any other aircraft in the area.

At approximately 0800 Eastern Standard Time, the lead Cessna was approaching the northern tip of Dent Island and a Eurocopter EC130 departed Hamilton Island Airport climbing to 1,000 ft for a ferry flight to Shute Harbour. The EC130 then turned left to track towards Shute Harbour. The pilot of the helicopter reported making entering runway, take-off and departure radio calls on the Hamilton Island CTAF but did not hear any replies. The helicopter pilot then sighted the lead Cessna on a crossing track at the same height. The pilot of the lead Cessna also sighted the helicopter.

Both pilots manoeuvred to avoid a collision. The two aircraft came into close proximity, with the lead Cessna passing under the EC130, resulting in an estimated separation of 50 ft vertically and 100 m horizontally.

Figure 1: Extract of Google Earth showing relevant positions

Source: Google Earth – annotated by ATSB

Safety message

Research for the ATSB report Safety in the vicinity of non-towered aerodromes (AR-2008-044) found that insufficient communication between pilots and breakdown of situational awareness were the most common causes of safety incidents near non-controlled aerodromes. The report advises pilots to avoid transiting circuit areas where possible and highlights the importance of transiting circuit areas at least 500 ft above circuit height to maintain vertical separation with departing aircraft.

Further information can be found at:

• A pilot's guide to staying safe in the vicinity of non-controlled aerodromes
• See and Avoid
• Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle
• Operations at non-controlled aerodromes

About this report

Decisions regarding whether to conduct an investigation, and the scope of an investigation, are based on many factors, including the level of safety benefit likely to be obtained from an investigation. For this occurrence, no investigation has been conducted and the ATSB did not verify the accuracy of the information. A brief description has been written using information supplied in the notification and any follow-up information in order to produce a short summary report, and allow for greater industry awareness of potential safety issues and possible safety actions.