After landing the pilot turned off the runway onto the taxyway leading to the apron. He then decided to refuel the aircraft and elected to taxy directly to the refuelling shed. As the aircraft left the movement area the nosewheel dropped into a drain, leading to a pipe culvert, which was on the very edge of the movement area and was difficult to see even at close range.

The pilot was manager-agent for an agricultural company. His commercial licence carried an endorsement for the aircraft type, but he did not hold an agricultural rating. He regularly carried out ferry, inspection and spray calibration flights in this aircraft and he had completed some preliminary training towards an agricultural rating. The rated pilot who normally carried out the spraying operations for the company was on vacation. On the evening before the accident the pilot accepted a telephoned request from a farmer to inspect an area of cane to determine its suitability for spraying. On the following morning the pilot loaded the aircraft with chemical and flew to the canefield where the farmer was working. After a superficial inspection of the area he commenced spraying. On the first run the aircraft entered the top of the cane crop. The pilot was unable to regain control and the aircraft crashed into an adjacent field. Fire broke out immediately and the aircraft was destroyed. The pilot suffered severe burns.

The pilot obtained area and terminal weather forecasts and submitted a flight plan for a VFR flight below 5,000 feet. Although advised that low cloud and poor visibility were expected towards Townsville, he did not nominate an alternate aerodrome, but indicated that he was aware that there were several suitable aerodromes en route. During the flight he was kept informed of the Townsville weather situation and at 0924 hours he was advised that Townsville was closed to VFR flights. Although the aircraft carried sufficient fuel for diversion to a suitable aerodrome, the pilot elected to proceed to a position 20-25 miles west of Townsville and hold outside controlled airspace. At 0942 he reported that he was beneath cloud, visual and that he had Townsville in sight. The weather at Townsville had improved slightly and he was given and acknowledged a clearance to enter the control zone with the requirement that within the zone he should maintain visual flight with reference to the ground. At 0952 the pilot reported that he was about 30 miles west of Townsville and at about this time an aircraft, believed to be VH-CVN, was seen 38 miles west of Townsville heading north in heavy rain beneath a 200 feet cloud base. The pilot was given heading information by Townsville to assist his navigation, but at 1018 communications were lost. The wreckage was found in mountainous country 21 miles west of Townsville. The aircraft had struck a timbered ridge about 150 feet below the crest while in almost level flight and on an easterly heading.

The airstrip at Tierawoomba is aligned east-west, with a prepared length of 2,480 feet and it slopes up at the eastern end towards trees which limit the effective length for a landing to the west. A gully 30 feet deep crosses the western end of the strip but this is not visible from an aircraft on the ground beyond about 200 feet from the gully. There is no ground marking to delineate the limits of the strip. The pilot had sought information concerning the strip but had been given only approximate dimensions and advised that aircraft similar to the PA24 had operated from the strip. The pilot had some difficulty in locating Tierawoomba and the aircraft arrived over the homestead some 22 minutes before last light. Notwithstanding that the flight had occupied some 52 minutes longer than was planned, the aircraft was still above the maximum gross weight permitted for landing. The weather was fine and overcast, with no wind and the pilot circled the airstrip and elected to land into the west. After approaching, the aircraft appeared to float for some distance before touching down in a position from which at least 900 feet remained in which to stop the aircraft before the gully was reached. To stop the aircraft from touchdown at the correct speed of 61.5 knots, and using maximum braking in the existing conditions, would have required 830 feet. Ground marks indicated that heavy braking commenced some 150 feet from the gully, but the pilot was unable to stop the aircraft before it plunged into the gully and struck the nearly vertical western wall.

On 28th January, 1970 at approximately 2137 hours EST, a Cessna 402 aircraft, registered VH-RIZ, struck trees and crashed to the ground on the western side of Bell Peak North, Queensland. The aircraft crashed in a heavily timbered area and the wreckage was scattered on a mean bearing of 310 degrees magnetic. Examination of the impact marks indicated that the aircraft had been under control in substantially level flight and probably descending at a shallow angle at the time of the accident.

Judging the airstrip to be wet the pilot elected to land on the sealed road adjacent to the township. During the landing the wings were damaged when the aircraft collided with traffic signs which the pilot had not observed adjacent to the road.

The flight was undertaken to provide some "unofficial" dual instruction towards endorsement of the type on the licence of the pilot under training. The aircraft was of the dual tandem cockpit type and communications between the two pilots was by means of voice tubes. At a low level during the approach for a practice forced landing the pilot-in-command took over the controls, adjusted the power and levelled the aircraft. He states that he then handed back control to the trainee pilot and accepted that the latter had control although he did not receive the usual response, "taking over". The trainee pilot states that he understood that the pilot-incommand continued to have control of the aircraft. The aircraft continued to fly in a wide shallow left turn at a low level and although each pilot thought that the other had control, each momentarily moved the controls to avoid an unsafe situation. Neither pilot observed that the aircraft was converging with a set of three power lines with which it ultimately collided. The wires did not break but the aircraft was flung sideways striking the ground with the port wing tip and rolling on to its back. There was no fire and the trainee pilot was able to vacate the rear cockpit unaided. He assisted the pilot-in-command to vacate the front cockpit.

The pilot elected to land with about an eight knot crosswind component from the right. The surface of the landing area was stoney and some stones and small rocks had been cleared and placed in a heap to the left of the chosen landing path. Towards the end of the landing roll, the pilot turned the aircraft to the right to avoid this heap of stones and, during an attempt to straighten the aircraft following this manoeuvre, the nosewheel yoke broke. The propeller and left wing tip then struck the ground. Examination of the nosewheel yoke indicated that it failed as a result of an overload to the right hand side of the wheel.

Weather conditions were fine with a 5 knot westerly wind. The pilot had completed his dual conversion training on the aircraft type and was authorised to make a solo flight. He successfully completed one solo circuit with a landing into the west, as planned, on to a grass flight strip on the southern side of the runway. When the aircraft had decelerated to about 10 knots, the pilot decided to immediately take-off again. He applied power but, after travelling about 250 to 300 feet on a take-off path which, undetected by the pilot, was diverging to the left from the heading of the strip, the aircraft struck a gable strip marker and then overturned.

Following comments that recovery from right hand spins was more prolonged than for left hand spins, the rigging of the aircraft was checked and both ailerons and an Interplane strut were replaced. The aircraft was then re-rigged and found to fly normally during take-off, level flight and landing. On the day of the accident the pilot advised that, after completing the aerial launch of a glider, he would spin the aircraft to check the right hand spin recovery. After dropping the tow line the aircraft climbed In a thermal to over 5000 feet. At least one spin to the left and two spins to the right were made and recovery effected, but the pilot believed that the recovery from the second spin to the right took longer. He decided to check this and after climbing to a height stated by the pilot to be 3600 feet he again entered a spin to the right. Full left rudder was then applied and the aircraft continued for two rotations without any change In the rate of rotation. The pilot then progressively moved the control column forward during a further two turns and maintained left rudder. He then applied left aileron, rocked the elevators backward and forward, and applied power. These actions failed to effect recovery and the aircraft continued to spin in a nose down attitude to the right until it struck the ground. An examination of the wreckage did not disclose any defects. In a later flight test the pilot demonstrated correct spin recovery technique.