The pilot was attempting to paraglide into an offshore wind from an area not generally used by local paraglider pilots in similar conditions.

The paraglider was seen to be effected by wind gusts resulting in a partial collapse of the canopy followed by a hard landing amongst rocks.

The pilot, who was a Swiss national on holiday, was not wearing a helmet and suffered fatal injuries.

Summary

Shortly before 0100 on 9 September 1992, the yacht Libra, on passage from Noumea to Brisbane, was involved in a collision with a large, unidentified, north-bound ship about 44 miles east-northeast of Cape Moreton.

Libra was dismasted and suffered damage to railings, but the water-tight integrity of the hull was not impaired. When daylight arrived, the skipper was able to cut free the mast and rigging, and the yacht was able to proceed, under engine power, to Brisbane.

A review of shipping movements ascertained that the Panamanian tanker Sanko Heron, on passage from Port Bonython to Japan, was close to Libra's position at the time of the collision.

Paint deposited on the deck of the Libra during the collision and samples of the hull paint provided by Sanko Heron were examined by the the Scientific Branch of the Australian Federal Police who formed the opinion that it appears highly probable that the samples shared a common origin.

Conclusions

It is considered that:

1. Although there was an apparent 2.5 miles difference in the positions of the two vessels, on the balance of probabilities, Sanko Heron was the ship that collided with Libra.
2. The collision was due to failure in lookout in that:
   • The skipper of Libra failed to keep a lookout as required under Rule 5 of the COLREGS.
   • The lookout aboard Sanko Heron was inadequate, in that the lights shown by Libra and the collision were undetected.
3. The skipper of the yacht was unaware that he was crossing a major shipping lane.
4. The Master of Sanko Heron had no knowledge of the collision and, therefore, could not be expected to have offered assistance to Libra.

Summary

On 1 December 1992, while engaged in a navigational training exercise off the north-west coast of Flinders Island, Bass Strait the Australian Maritime College training ship Wyuna struck a submerged object while navigating the passage between North and Mid Pasco Islands.

The Wyuna sustained damage to bottom plating and internal structure, which resulted in diesel fuel oil and sea water flooding the engine-room bilge.

There were no injuries caused by the incident, but diesel oil was pumped overboard from the engine-room bilge. After the situation was stabilised, the Wyuna was able to return to its base at Beauty Point.

Conclusions

It is considered that:

1. The Wyuna struck an uncharted underwater obstruction, later confirmed to be an uncharted rock.
2. Neither the Master nor the Second officer realised that the soundings in the areas through which they were proceeding were in "hairline" or appreciated the full significance of that fact.
3. The Master's concerns for the safety of the ship, both from the foundering and explosion/fire points of view, were justified.
4. The Master's orders to pump overboard the diesel oil accumulating in the engine room bilge was justified.
5. The Master's conclusion that the radar information was wrong and that the Wyuna had grounded on the northern shore of Mid Pasco Island was erroneous.
6. The Master's decision to make for the closest sandy beach was appropriate.
7. In taking the Wyuna back through the Pasco Passage the Master risked the ship striking the underwater obstruction a second time.
8. The reporting of the oil discharge at 0600 was in accordance with the requirements of the Marpol Convention.
9. Earlier advice to MRCC Canberra of the striking of the submerged obstruction and the ingress of water would have been prudent.
10. The Master's decision, after having made a full appraisal of the situation, to weigh anchor and return to Beauty Point, was reasonable.

Summary

In the early morning of 3 December 1992, the fishing vessel Ronda Lene was trawling for prawns to the south-east of Middle Reef in the Great Barrier Reef. At 0220, the vessel was trawling in a north-westerly direction; one of the two deck hands was on watch while the skipper and second deck hand were sleeping below.

The Bahamas flag cargo ship Fareast, north bound through the inner two-way route, passed Restoration Rock, 12 miles south-south-east of Middle Reef on a course of 330 degrees at 0218. A qualified officer was in charge of the watch, the Master was on the bridge, and a pilot of the Queensland Coast and Torres Strait Pilot Service was resting on a settee at the back of the wheelhouse.

The weather was clear, with good visibility. The Ronda Lene and other fishing vessels could be clearly seen from the bridge of Fareast.

At about 0244, Fareast and Ronda Lene collided. No one was injured and no pollution occurred. Ronda Lene suffered damage to the port fishing boom and to the vessel's structure and fittings.

Conclusions

It is considered that the collision occurred as the result of a number of factors:

1. Fareast had a duty to keep clear of Ronda Lene but failed to maintain a careful watch on the fishing vessel.

2. The Second Mate of Fareast failed to use the radar to full advantage, or other means, to ascertain that Ronda Lene was proceeding on a converging course. He therefore failed to either call the Pilot or give Ronda Lene a wider berth.

3. The deck hand aboard Ronda Lene failed to keep a proper lookout and was unaware of the presence of Fareast until just before the collision.

It is further considered that:

4. The Pilot taking a rest at that point, given that the Master was on the bridge and the vessel was on a steady course, was not unreasonable.

5. The Master, finding it necessary to leave the bridge, albeit for an intended short period, should have advised the Pilot that he was doing so.

6. The deck handheld no marine qualifications and did not understand the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, therefore should not have been left in charge of the watch.

7. The exhibiting of the powerful deck lights when they were not needed was in contravention of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, in that the glare obscured the navigation and fishing signal lights and interfered with the keeping of a proper lookout.

8. The glare of the powerful working lights, particularly those of the fluorescent type, required for processing the catch, appears to cause difficulty in visual assessment of the distance of fishing vessels showing them.

Summary

Pierre LD, a bulk carrier of 165,239 tonnes deadweight, registered in French Antarctic Territory, sailed from the Western Australian port of Dampier on 21 November 1992 with a full cargo of iron ore. While transiting the departure channel, the ship suffered a major electrical failure together with a failure of the emergency steering system. The ship veered out of the departure channel and grounded to the east of East Malus Island.

The ship remained fast aground for 48 hours and suffered damage to bottom plating, including being holed in four places. Temporary repairs were carried out at anchorage off Dampier, and the ship was permitted to sail to Fos sur Mer, France on 19 December, accompanied by the escort vessel Pacific Taipan.

Conclusions

It is considered that:

1. Although a sequence of failures occurred, the grounding was the result of the failure of the emergency steering system.
2. The failure of the emergency steering system was due to a faulty electrical connection to the starboard solenoid control valve.
3. The loose electrical connection is reflective of the quality control measures in the shipyard.
4. The power failure was due to a 24V DC voltage stabiliser unit tripping out on overload, activating the emergency stops to the main engine and diesel generators.
5. The 24V DC stabiliser unit was not fail-safe and was therefore a weak link in an otherwise fail-safe system.
6. The lack of a stabiliser unit remote alarm indicator in the control room is a design fault.
7. Even had it been possible to let go the anchors from the bridge, at the speed at which the ship was proceeding, in all probability both anchors and cables would have been lost.

Summary

The crane barge Titan, under tow by the former research ship Rapuhia, left Sydney at 1700 on 22 December 1992, bound for Singapore. Titan was unmanned.

The tow progressed slowly northwards off the eastern Australian coastline. Throughout 23,24 and 25 December, the tow experienced strong head winds and sea from the north or north-east, and a strong counter current.

By 2200 on 25 December, the tow was making good a speed over the ground of about 1 knot, into a head wind of about 26 knots. At about 2250, those on Rapuhia felt a pronounced jerk and a seaman reported the towing line had parted. No trace could be seen of Titan's riding lights, nor could the barge be seen silhouetted against the sky. Rapuhia was immediately slowed and turned to relocate the tow. A target was seen on the radar and a subsequent sweep by Rapuhia's searchlight showed the barge, floating bottom up. A general call was put out to shipping and the capsize reported to the Australian Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, Canberra. The vessel's principal in Singapore was also told. On 27 December, divers and people acting on behalf of the owner boarded Rapuhia to assess the damage. The emergency towing bridle was secured to Rapuhia.

It was found that the crane assembly, including the jib and crane tower had fallen off the central lattice work mast. The central mast was bent towards Titan's bow and the slew ring, upon which the crane rotated, was resting at an angle against the central mast.

The upturned barge was towed to a position off Camden Head, out of the strong south-going current to allow work to be undertaken on the upturned hull.

After assessing the situation over a number of days, it was decided that the barge could not be salvaged. The only alternative was to sink it in a controlled manner.

Work to prepare the barge for sinking was carried out off Camden Head. The barge sank at about 2100 on 29 December.

Conclusions

The reason for the capsize of the crane barge Titan is a matter of conjecture but, in the Inspectors opinion, it is probable that a series of events, each one in themselves insufficient to cause a capsize, combined to change the initial stability characteristic of the barge:

1. Given the evidence available, it is probable that during 24 and 25 December, with the working in the seaway, rivets failed in the after starboard section of the barge, allowing a volume of sea water, probably between 500 and 700 tonnes, to ingress into the starboard after spaces. This reduced the intact stability of the barge;
2. The shipping of seas on deck and the probable immersion of the deck edge had the effect of reducing the barge's reserves of stability;
3. The following factors were present and if they coincided may have contributed to the capsizing moment,
   (a) The plunging of the barge, due to a loss of buoyancy at its towed end,
   (b) The periodic rolling,
   (c) Wind heel effect in wind gusts,
   (d) The effect of the crane block and small movement of the jib contributing to the roll;
4. There is no evidence that the chocks welded to the slewing ring to prevent the crane from moving failed before 2300 on 25 December;
5. There is no evidence that the conduct of those on the Rapuhia or the actions of the towing vessel contributed to the capsize;
6. The stability information computed from the inclining experiment of 19 November was substantially correct;
7. The stability criteria adopted by AMSA were appropriate and allowed reasonable reserves of stability. Notwithstanding the fact that Titan immersed its deck edge at an angle of heel of 9.6 degrees, there was a large reserve of stability at this angle;
8. The AMSA surveyors followed the Authority's Instructions to Surveyors. However, the Titan was not typical of tows normally envisaged in these instructions and it would have been appropriate to consider more fully the engineering aspects of stresses imposed by the crane structure on the securing arrangement and the hull of the barge;
9. The fact that the Rapuhia was unseaworthy by virtue of false certification and the false certificates carried by the Mate and Chief Engineer were not contributory factors to the capsize and loss of the barge.

Summary

At about 1830 local time on 1 September 1992, the Australian yacht Champers, while on a voyage from Gladstone to Tweed Heads, was involved in a collision with a ship in a position 18.5 miles east of Bustard Head.

The ship involved in the collision failed to stop and render assistance, and Champers, which was dismasted m the collision, was eventually assisted by the fishing vessel Star Track. After the mast and rigging had been cut free, the yacht was able to return to Gladstone under engine power.

As a result of the collision paint and rust from the unidentified ship fell on to the Champers deck.

An exhaustive check of shipping in the area found that only one ship was known to be in the area of the collision at the time, the Russian flag tanker Antares.

Although the tankers reported position at the time of the collision was at least two miles from the charted position of the yacht, samples taken from the paint and rust that had fallen to the Champers deck and samples subsequently taken from the hull of the tanker established that it was very likely that the samples had a common origin. It was therefore considered probable that the Antares was the ship involved.

Conclusions

It is considered that:

1. Although the ship with which Champers collided was unidentified at the time and, although the evidence of the positions and the skipper's observations indicate the contrary, on the balance of probabilities Antares was the ship with which Champers collided.
2. The combined visual and radar lookout by the Chief Mate and seaman on board the Antares proved inadequate, in that it failed to pick up the presence of Champers.
3. The skipper of Champers failed to keep a proper look out, particularly in the known blind sector on the port bow caused by the yacht's sails.
4. Had Champers carried a radar reflector at the masthead, this would have increased the likelihood of the yacht's detection by ship's radars.
5. The carriage of the lights provided for by either 25(b) or 25(c) of the COLREGS would have increased the likelihood of visual detection of Champers.
6. The VHF equipment on board Antares was deficient for the purpose for which it was intended under the SOLAS Convention.

Summary

The South Korean bulk ore carrier Daeyang Honey sailed from Koolan Island, Western Australia on 14 October 1992, with a crew of 28. The ship was loaded with a full cargo of about 122,300 tonnes of low-grade iron ore, bound for the Japanese port of Mizushima.

In the afternoon of 22 October, a signal from a float-free emergency position indicator radio beacon (EPIRB) was detected by the search and-rescue polar orbiting satellite system (COSPAS-SARSAT), about 300 miles east of the Philippine Islands, close to the area of the typhoon Colleen. The EPIRB was identified as coming from the Daeyang Honey.

An initial air search by the United States authorities based on the Island of Guam was hindered by bad weather associated with the typhoon. On 25 October, in better flying conditions, a life raft was located and ships in the area were requested to search for survivors and wreckage.

On 26 October the life raft was relocated and a little later the EPIRB, surrounded by debris, was also sighted. The motor vessel Azalea Everett was diverted to the position of the EPIRB, where debris and the beacon were found, but no survivors. At about the same time, the motor vessel Bum Ju located the life raft and positively identified it as belonging to the Daeyang Honey.

The Daeyang Honey had loaded iron ore on a number of occasions at the Australian ports of Dampier and Port Hedland.

Conclusions

1. Nothing occurred at Koolan Island that contributed to the loss of the vessel.
2. The cargo loaded contained no characteristic that would have involved an increased risk over the normal ore shipped from Koolan Island.
3. The failure to supply the master with a written loading declaration had no bearing on the loss of the ship. The information on Koolan Island iron ore, contained in such a declaration, would not have altered or modified the loading of the cargo.
4. The Daeyang Honey encountered a severe tropical storm (typhoon) during 21 and 22 October. It would seem that the ship foundered from whatever cause in the early afternoon of 22 October 1992. The storm must be considered to have significantly contributed to the loss.

Summary

The Australian registered tanker Australian Achiever, of 127,575 tonnes summer deadweight, cleared the New Zealand port of Whangarei for the port of Brisbane at 2030 on 7 November 1992. The ship had part discharged and retained on board about 35,000 tonnes of crude oil.

At 2230, the exhaust gas uptake high temperature alarm sounded, and the temperature reading was seen to be 10 degrees Celsius above the alarm setting. The engine was slowed to reduce the temperature and the waste heat unit was inspected for hot spots. None were found and the engine speed was increased at 2345.

At 0115 on 8 November, when about 11 miles from the nearest land, the exhaust gas alarm sounded again, and the main engine revolutions were reduced. A further inspection of the waste-heat unit revealed a small area glowing red at the forward, inboard corner. The main engine was stopped, and the crew were alerted.

The fire within the waste-heat unit could not be fought directly and the main firefighting effort concentrated on boundary cooling. After fire burnt a hole through the casing, several portable C02. extinguishers were discharged into the unit through the hole, without effect.

The ship's engineers initiated the proper established procedures and stopped the engine. Although the weather was favourable and the current tended to take the ship offshore, given the proximity of the land and the nature of the cargo, the Master requested that a tug be made available to tow the vessel back to Whangarei.

The fire in the waste-heat unit had reached such an intensity that areas of the generating section's steel tube banks, and a small section of the steel casing reached fusion temperature with resulting meltdown of the materials.

At daybreak, the crew prepared for the tow by hanging off the starboard anchor and ranging the anchor cable. A tug arrived at 0955 and the tow was connected at 1132. By 2100, the ship had been brought safely to harbour and it subsequently anchored in Bream Bay.

The fire was contained throughout 8 November and into 9 November by boundary cooling. It was extinguished by 1515 on 9 November, but it was considered prudent not to open up the unit until the area had cooled further. in all the fire burnt for some 39 hours.

Officers of New Zealand's Ministry of Transport, Maritime Transport Division, were appointed by the Inspector to undertake an initial investigation on behalf of the Australian Department of Transport and Communications.

Conclusions

1 The fire occurred as a result of a combination of factors:

(a) The washing process failed to remove all soot deposits

(b) The dampers isolating the tube banks from the mainstream of exhaust gas did not dose properly, allowing hot low velocity gas to ignite the soot deposit

(c) The lack of water circulating in the generating section may have contributed to the loss of the tubes, as there was no water to carry away the surface heat generated by the soot fire on the external surfaces of the tubes.

2 The original decision to isolate the waste-heat unit tube banks and run with the economiser dry was reasonable and not open to criticism.

3 Design problems related to cleaning of waste-heat units have been known for some years, nevertheless, the unit had operated without a fire since about 1984. The importance of regular washing was well understood by the ship's staff and there was accepted criteria, based on inlet and exit exhaust gas temperatures. governing the necessity of washing the unit. But temperature differential would not indicate the presence of isolated areas of soot compaction.

4 There is no evidence that the failure to wash the unit at Ras Tanura resulted in excessive soot deposits. The only evidence is that sufficient soot remained or had compacted in one area after washing at Whagarei to cause a soot fire. However, the strong possibility that more soot than normal had accumulated cannot be discounted.

5 Neither the maker's nor the owner's/operator's instructions reflected the reality of cleaning the waste-heat unit under operational conditions, but this deficiency is not considered to have contributed to the cause of the fire.

6 The actions taken by the Master to alert the New Zealand authorities and to place tug assistance on stand-by was timely and correct.

7 The actions taken by the Chief Engineer and the engine room staff in stopping the engine and blocking associated apertures was correct and in accordance with the makers instructions.

8 The firefighting operation was efficient and effective, reflecting credit on the organisation of all the ship staff involved.

9 The Master's decision to pump the ship's bilges direct to the sea was a proper decision given the circumstances and priorities relating to Australian Achiever at that time.

Summary

While engaged in seismic operations in Tayabas Bay, Luzon the Philippines, the Australian registered research vessel Rig Seismic grounded on an uncharted reef. The vessel was refloated without assistance. No pollution occurred and the vessel suffered only minor damage.

Conclusions

It is considered that:

1. The reef in which the Rig Seismic grounded was uncharted.
2. The Assistant Manager, Ships Operations and the ship's Master made every reasonable effort to collect available information and to familiarise themselves with the operational areas.
3. The Master's use the African Queen 11 to sound ahead of the Rig Seismic was a sound precautionary measure.
4. The African Queen 11 did not locate the reef on which the Rig Seismic grounded due to its different turn track.
5. The actions of all personnel after the grounding were all carried out in a professional and timely manner.
6. Although the Master, due to his prolonged periods on the bridge, would have been tired to some extent, fatigue is not considered a contributing factor to the grounding.