REPCON is a voluntary and confidential reporting scheme. REPCON allows any person who has a rail safety concern to report it to the ATSB confidentially. Protection of the reporter’s identity and any individual referred to in the report is a primary element of the scheme.
Who may make a REPCON report?
Any person may report a reportable safety concern. This would include:
(a) Any person involved in the Rail Industry. An example would be an employee or contractor of a rail transport operator who may have reported a matter under the operator’s SMS but does not believe it will be properly dealt with. It may also be where that person has not reported under the SMS because they believe they will suffer retribution; or
(b) a member of the travelling public.
What may be reported with REPCON?
Each of the following concerns (reportable safety concerns) in relation to the safety of railway operations to which the Regulations apply are examples of what may be reported under REPCON. The list is not exhaustive:
(a) an incident or circumstance that affects or might affect the safety of railway operations;
(b) a procedure, practice or condition that a reasonable person would consider endangers, or, if not corrected, would endanger, the safety of railway operations,
for example:
(i) poor training or behaviour that is not consistent with the rail transport operator’s safety management system; or (ii) insufficient qualifications or experience of employees of a rail transport operator; or (iii) scheduling or rostering that contributes to an unacceptably high risk of fatigue of employees of a rail transport operator; or (iv) a rail transport operator bypassing safety procedures because or operational or commercial pressures; or (v) inadequate railway station or terminal facilities for safe railway operations; or (vi) unsafe passenger, or freight management; or (vii) inadequate operational information that could lead to an unsafe situation;
(c) any other matter that endangers, or could endanger, the safety of railway operations not reportable under a mandatory reporting scheme.
If you are in any doubt whether the matter you wish to report is covered by the REPCON scheme or a mandatory reporting scheme please call us.
What is not a reportable safety concern?
To avoid doubt, the following matters are not reportable safety concerns and are not guaranteed confidentiality
matters relating to a serious and imminent threat to a person’s health or life
industrial relations matters
conduct that constitutes a criminal offence
terrorist acts. If you wish to provide information about terrorist activity you should call the National Security Hotline on 1800 123 400.
Matters which must be reported under a mandatory reporting scheme should not be reported under REPCON. This will not discharge your reporting obligations under a mandatory reporting scheme.
If you believe it would be necessary to act on information about an individual referred to in your report then you should report this directly to the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator(Opens in a new tab/window), the appropriate regulator in your state or the rail operator.
What is confidential?
Personal information about the reporter and any person referred to in the report. If you believe it would be necessary to act on information about an individual referred to in your report then you should report this directly to the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator on 1300 550 865.
Is an anonymous report via REPCON acceptable?
REPCON does not accept anonymous reports. REPCON staff cannot contact an anonymous reporter to verify the report or to seek additional information. Further, REPCON staff must be satisfied that the reporter's motivation for reporting is rail safety promotion, and that the reporter is not attempting to damage a rival or pursue an industrial agenda.
How are REPCON reports processed?
REPCON staff will assess each report for clarity, completeness and significance for rail safety and to ensure it meets the requirements of a Reportable Safety Concern (RSC) for rail.
The report will be de-identified to remove all personal details of the reporter and any individual named in the report. This will be passed to the reporter who must authorise the content before the REPCON can proceed further.
The de-identified text is then forwarded to the relevant organisation that is best placed to address the RSC. The organisation’s response will then be forwarded to the Regulator for further action as deemed necessary.
REPCON may use the de-identified version of the report to issue an information-brief or alert bulletin to a person or organisation, including the Regulator, which is in a position to take safety action in response to the safety concern.
If the reporter has previously reported the concern to any organisations involved or to the regulator, the protection of the reporter’s identity may be jeopardised. As such, the concern may not be able to be progressed through the REPCON system. REPCON staff will assess each report and discuss options on how to best progress the safety concern.
What are the possible outcomes from a REPCON report?
The desired outcomes are any actions taken to improve rail safety in response to the identified concern. This can include variations to standards, orders, practices, procedures or an education campaign.
Why is REPCON important?
REPCON reports can serve as a powerful reminder that, despite the best of intentions, well-trained and well-meaning people are still capable of making mistakes. The de-identified stories arising from these reports may serve to reinforce the message that we must remain vigilant to ensure the ongoing safety of ourselves and others.
If you require assistance, advice or further information, please call REPCON on 1800 020 505.
Submission of information known by the reporter to be false or misleading is a serious offence under section 137.1 of the Criminal Code. Aiding, abetting, counseling, procuring or urging the submission of false or misleading information is also a serious offence.
The ATSB collects, holds and uses a range of information for the purposes of improving transport safety. The ATSB is a part of Australia's aviation safety system and the information gathered by the ATSB may be provided to other agencies for the specific purpose of maintaining and improving aviation safety. It is an additional legislative function for the ATSB to cooperate with these agencies.
Mandatory reporting
A principal source of safety information is the mandatory reporting scheme established under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act). The scheme gathers information on occurrences which endanger or could endanger aviation safety. The information is gathered so that it can be used by those with responsibilities within the safety system to discharge their responsibilities to maintain and improve aviation safety.
The scheme requires 'responsible persons' (including aircraft crew, owners, operators, air traffic controllers, licensed aircraft maintenance engineers, ground crew and airport operators) to notify the ATSB of accidents and safety incidents ('safety occurrences').
Where the duty to report rests with an individual, it can be fulfilled by the individual notifying the operator who employs them. The operator then has a duty to pass the information on to the ATSB.
Use of safety information by the ATSB
The ATSB uses safety information to assist in its determination of what to investigate for the purposes of improving safety.
Any information that is the subject of an ATSB investigation will only be used in accordance with the provisions of the TSI Act which provides significant protections to information acquired by the Bureau in the course of its investigation.
The ATSB also uses safety information for the purposes of safety research and analysis. The results of research and analysis are generally made public, but in such a way that either the information is either de-identified or is otherwise protected.
ATSB and CASA information sharing
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is constituted under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (CA Act). The primary object of the CA Act is to establish a regulatory framework for maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation, with particular emphasis on preventing aviation accidents and incidents. CASA's primary function under the CA Act is to conduct the safety regulation of civil air operations in Australia and the operation of Australian aircraft outside Australian territory.
Consistent with the objective of maintaining and improving aviation safety under the Australian aviation safety framework, the ATSB recognises CASA needs access to a range of information about aviation safety occurrences that is collected and held by the ATSB.
What information is shared
The ATSB informs CASA about accidents and serious incidents as soon as the ATSB is informed. The information may contain details such as operator names, registration numbers, times, dates, locations and a description of the event. The ATSB aims, wherever possible, to avoid directly identifying individuals.
CASA is also provided daily with a redacted report of all occurrences entered into the ATSB database. The report contains standard information about occurrences notified to the ATSB, including aircraft registration, so that CASA has enough detail to gather its own information about the occurrence. It does not contain a detailed narrative.
An automated weekly transfer of summaries of information entered in the ATSB's database during that week is also provided to CASA. The aggregate summary does not include identifying information such as aircraft registration, but provides enough information for CASA to be able to analyse safety trends, and to identify actual or potential safety risks to which more immediate attention needs to be directed.
Purpose of information sharing
CASA uses safety information from the ATSB principally for two purposes: to have sufficient information about an occurrence to decide whether to initiate its own, independent regulatory inquiries; and to maintain a database of occurrence information so that trends in aviation safety can be detected and, where necessary, safety action can be taken.
Limits on use of information by CASA
CASA may use information reported under the mandatory scheme as the basis for informing its need to initiate its own inquiries in the interests of safety. However, CASA will not rely on the report in taking action unless it is necessary to do so in the demonstrable interests of safety and where there is no alternative source of the information practicably available to CASA.
CASA will not normally recommend the institution of criminal proceedings in matters which come to its attention only because they have been reported under ATSB's mandatory reporting scheme. The exceptions will be in cases of conduct that should not be tolerated, such as where a person has acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with gross negligence.
In taking any action, CASA will afford affected individuals and organisations natural justice.
REPCON is a voluntary and confidential reporting scheme. REPCON allows any person who has a rail safety concern to report it to the ATSB confidentially. Protection of the reporter’s identity and any individual referred to in the report is a primary element of the scheme.
Personal information will not be disclosed. Only de-identified information will be used for safety action. You may be contacted for additional information.
The following matters are not reportable safety concerns and are not guaranteed confidentiality: a) matters relating to a serious and imminent threat to a person’s health or life b) terrorist acts c) industrial relations matters d) conduct that may constitute a serious crime.
NOTE 1: REPCON is not an alternative to the mandatory reporting requirements detailed in sections 18 and 19 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.
NOTE 2: Submission of information known by the reporter to be false or misleading is a serious offence under section 137.1 of the Criminal Code. Aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or urging the submission of false or misleading information is also a serious offence.
Since March 2013, the Multicultural Access and Equity Policy(Opens in a new tab/window) requires that all Australian Government departments and agencies under the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997, with the exception of the Departments of the Parliament, have an Agency Multicultural Plan in place and available on their websites in mid-2013.
ATSB research reveals that accidents and incidents are not always reported to the ATSB when they should be. When something goes wrong in transport safety, it is the duty of a ‘responsible person’ (defined in the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003) to report it to the ATSB.
As the national transport safety investigator, the ATSB is the Australian Government agency you should notify in the event of an accident or incident.
While we use your notification to determine whether to investigate an occurrence, looked at as a whole, notifications also give us a bigger picture of aviation safety trends and patterns.
Like a jigsaw piece in a bigger puzzle, certain notifications can often be joined together to reveal a broader, systemic safety problem. Once we've identified an accident or incident trend from your notifications, we can make tangible improvements to safety through safety advisory notices, recommendations and further safety investigations.
Besides the obvious safety benefits of reporting an occurrence, there are also legal requirements to report certain accidents and incidents to the ATSB. Even if there are no injuries or there is minimal aircraft damage, you must still let the ATSB know. Remember that the ATSB does not investigate to lay blame or apportion liability—we investigate to improve safety and prevent an accident from happening again.
You can report an accident or serious incident (an Immediately Reportable Matter — IRM) to the ATSB 24 hours a day, seven days a week:
call 1800 011 034 (you can also use this number if you need advice or clarification on reporting matters)
The ATSB has investigated several accidents that have occurred when maintenance work was being carried out on or near railway tracks. Conducting work on or near a railway track can be dangerous if safeworking rules and procedures have not been correctly implemented to protect the worksite. Trains cannot stop quickly and any breakdown in the communication or management of a worksite can leave workers extremely vulnerable to dangerous situations.
What can you do?
Operational safe working on track requires a high level of preparation and organisation. Whenever there is work taking place on or near a track, coordination and communication are essential. Before authority is granted to occupy or work near a track, it is essential that all information is clearly communicated and verified between the Protection Officer and the Network Control Officer.
An adequate briefing about the work site and effective communications equipment must be made available to the track workers. For track workers, it is vital to ensure that all levels of worksite protection have been fully implemented before commencing work on or near the track.
More information
The following ATSB investigations into accidents involving work on railway tracks, shows the importance of good work practices, coordination and communication:
It is difficult for pilots to spot another aircraft through visual observation alone.
The ATSB often receives reports from pilots that another aircraft is flying too close to them in uncontrolled airspace. Not surprisingly, three quarters of these reports involve pilots flying within 10 nautical miles (18.5 kilometres) of a non-controlled aerodrome.
Twice as many near-collisions are reported to the ATSB where pilots had no prior warning of other aircraft in their vicinity, compared with situations when a pilot received an alert by radio or a traffic alerting system like TCAS.
Insufficient communication between pilots operating in the same area is the most common cause of safety incidents near non-controlled aerodromes.
Get a radio, and always make sufficient broadcasts so that other pilots know your intentions – even when you think there is no nearby traffic.This will increase your chance of detecting other aircraft before it's too late. Making at least the minimum radio broadcasts and using good radio practice alerts other pilots to nearby aircraft and help to reduce the risk of a mid-air collision or a near miss.
Maintain a lookout for other aircraft at all times. There may be a variety of aircraft of different sizes and performance levels all operating at the same time in the same airspace, and some aircraft may not have a radio that is working or is tuned to the correct frequency. Do not rely solely on monitoring your radio to achieve traffic awareness.
Achieve radio alerted see-and-avoid by making all the recommended broadcasts within 10 nautical miles of a non-towered aerodrome. A search for other traffic is eight times more effective when a radio is used in combination with a visual lookout than when no radio is used.
Use the same procedures at all non-towered aerodromes, unless otherwise stated in the En Route Supplement Australia. Following known, standard traffic procedures helps pilots to anticipate the likely position of other aircraft.
Be aware that any radio-equipped aircraft could be conducting base leg entry or straight-in approaches at non-towered aerodromes. Large commercial jet aircraft landing at non-towered aerodromes often make straight-in approaches, but any VHF radio-equipped aircraft are allowed to make these types of approaches.
Avoid overflying aerodromes where possible, and take note of instrument flight rules inbound and outbound routes. Aircraft traffic is relatively dense near aerodromes, particularly on the final approach path to an active runway and on the runway itself.
R44 helicopters with all-aluminium fuel tanks have proven susceptible to post-accident fuel leaks increasing the risk of a potentially fatal post-impact fire following a collision with terrain.
What can you do?
The manufacturer has issued a Service Bulletin SB-78B(Opens in a new tab/window) requiring R44 helicopters with all-aluminium fuel tanks be retrofitted with bladder-type tanks as soon as practical, but no later than 30 April 2013.
The ATSB urges all operators and owners of R44 helicopters fitted with all-aluminium fuel tanks to replace these tanks with bladder-type fuel tanks as detailed in the manufacturer's Service Bulletin 78B as soon as possible.
The fitment of bladder-type fuel tanks to R44 helicopters is a very important safety enhancement that could save lives. The ATSB has also suggested that regulators and investigation agencies in other countries consider what steps they can take to increase compliance with the manufacturer’s safety bulletin.
More information
The ATSB issued a Safety Advisory Notice on 9 March 2012, advising of the potential dangers of the all-aluminum fuel tank.
As part of its preliminary report release on a fatal R44 accident at Bulli Tops in NSW, the ATSB issued a Safety Recommendation to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) on 5 April 2013. The ATSB recommended CASA take further action to ensure R44 helicopter operators are aware of regulatory requirements for retrofitting the fuel tank with the bladder-type tank.
In response CASA issued an Airworthiness Bulletin(Opens in a new tab/window) to ensure that all owners, operators and maintainers are aware of the requirements to comply with the manufacturer’s service bulletins.
The ATSB also highlights Service Bulletin SB-82(Opens in a new tab/window) that aims to reduce the chance that the rotor brake switch will act as a possible ignition source in the event of a fuel leak.
Three fatal helicopter accidents also illustrate the potential danger:
Navigation through confined waters under pilotage is a high-pressure situation where errors can easily lead to serious incidents.
What can you do?
The clear and open exchange of information between the ship’s master and crew and the pilot is vital, both during the pilotage passage and before it even commences. This helps to ensure that all members of the bridge team have a shared mental model of the pilotage passage and, as a result, a good understanding of how it should proceed.
This pre-passage information exchange should always include:
the courses or tracks to be followed
speeds at critical points during the pilotage
limits in relation to planned tracks and speeds.
It should also include information on the ship’s handling characteristics and the state of critical equipment such as navigation systems, steering gear, main engine and bow thrusters.
Clear communication is also essential during the passage itself. This is to ensure that the members of the navigation team—including the pilot, bridge team and engineers on duty in the engine room—understand their roles and responsibilities and that instructions are fully understood and correctly actioned. Every member of the team must be free to speak up or “challenge” if they notice something abnormal or they feel that something is amiss.
In addition, a pilotage situation represents a complex environment. This complexity, combined with long hours and the need for precision, can cause fatigue. Precautions must be taken to prevent errors. Especially useful is a fatigue management plan that predicts potential fatigue levels at key positions in the pilotage task and that allows for strategic preparation.
