The pilot was operating under the remote supervision of the chief pilot who had marked the section of the field as suitable for the operation of the aircraft. The distance available for take-off and landing under the prescribed agricultural operational requirements was 1,400 feet and there was then a distance of 120 feet before a three foot high fence on the boundary of the field. The pilot was not aware of the exact length of the field nor did he check the flight manual to assess the aircraft's performance under the conditions. During earlier operations on the day of the accident the aircraft became airborne about 300 feet from the fence but as the temperature rose and the wind strength decreased.this distance became less and on the flight before refuelling the aircraft did not become airborne until about 150 feet from the fence. After adding 22 gallons of fuel and reloading the pilot realised that the wind was now only light and variable and he began his take-off run from a point 100 feet behind the previously used commencement point, thus making a total effective length of 1,550 feet. The aircraft did not become airborne until it was about 50 feet from the fence and the pilot attempted to dump the load but operated the mechanism incorrectly and the aircraft struck the fence, damaging the tailplane and elevator. The aircraft remained in the air and subsequently landed safely. According to the performance chart in the conditions prevailing at the time of the accident the take-off distance requirement was 2,300 feet.

After an uneventful flight from Merimbula the pilot overflew the strip at Paynesville and made a circuit prior to landing into the east in a south easterly wind of eight knots. Just after touchdown, he applied the hand brake and about this time the toe of his right shoe slipped into and became jammed in the hole in the centre of the rudder toe-brake pedal. After the aircraft had run straight for some yards the pilot endeavoured to free his foot by pushing with it against the pedal. He continued to use the hand brake but the aircraft veered in a gentle curve to the right and ran off the strip and the starboard wing struck a fence post against which the aircraft came to rest.

Before commencing the flight the pilot obtained information which led him to believe, incorrectly, that there was an airstrip at George Town. On arrival over George Town he could not find an airstrip so he selected a field, examined it from the air, and landed. He discussed the field with the owner who estimated its size as 2,000 feet square and, for his departure, the pilot decided to make a crosswind take-off to the south to avoid overflying several houses on the western boundary. The pilot did not consult the take-off performance charts contained in the aircraft flight manual, nor did he obtain accurate information as to the dimensions of the field. The wind velocity was westerly at 15 knots and the field dimension to the south was in fact 1,700 feet with trees 30 feet high along the boundary, reducing the effective length to 1,100 feet. In these conditions the minimum effective operating length required by the flight manual for take-off was 1,670 feet. During the take-off on a heading of 160 degrees the aircraft was retarded by dense patches of clover but the pilot elected to continue the take-off. Just before reaching the trees he pulled the nose up sharply but the tailplane and left wing tip struck the tree tops. Control became difficult and he attempted to land downwind in a small paddock but, after touching down, the aircraft ran through a fence and came to rest on a mound of soft earth. There were other take-off paths available in the field which would have provided adequate effective operational length for take-off.

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The pilot had made only one previous take-off from the Huskisson camp helipad. This was during an area familiarisation flight which he had conducted earlier in the day. Prior to the familiarisation flight he had not flown a Bell 47 series aircraft for several months. The aircraft load on take-off consisted of two passengers and 35 pounds of baggage and freight. The temperature was about 18 degrees centigrade and a light north-easterly breeze gave a tailwind component of 3 to 5 knots in the take-off direction. The flight path after take-off was dictated by the terrain and lay across a heavilytimbered gully towards a saddle slightly higher than the pad. During the lift-off and initial hover the engine operation appeared normal. Because of the tailwind an increase in power became necessary during transition to forward flight. After travelling about 100 yards, during which time he applied full power, the pilot decided that the aircraft would be unable to clear the trees ahead. He turned back towards the take-off point and, when it became apparent that the rotor speed was decaying, continued the turn and allowed the aircraft to settle towards a partly-cleared area at the bottom of the gully. At a height of about 40 feet, the main rotor struck the surrounding trees. The aircraft fell heavily to the ground and burst into flames on impact.

The aircraft had been re-built during April, 1968 and a maintenance release inspection had been carried out on 30th August, 1969. The aircraft had flown 129 hours since the re-building and had done 140 landings. At the time of the accident it had flown some 35 hours since the issue of the maintenance release. The aircraft was engaged in a period of circuits and landings and after touching down on the fourth landing, the pilot-incommand took over the controls in order to demonstrate crosswind technique. He applied full engine power for a go-around and at a speed of about 40 knots the starboard undercarriage leg collapsed, the nose of the aircraft dropped and it slewed to the right. The aircraft came to rest on its nose and starboard wing heading some 90 degrees to the right of the intended take-off path. The undercarriage had collapsed because of the fatigue failure of the lug of the eye bolt supporting the upper end of the starboard radius rod. Examination showed that the pivot bolt and probably the eye bolt itself had been tightened to an extent which prevented the pivotal movement of these components and an abnormal load would therefore have been imposed on the eye bolt lug during ground operation of the aircraft.

The pilot, who was not licenced, did not ensure that the design, construction and maintenance of the aircraft, and the manner in which it was operated, met standards which provided an adequate margin of safety.

The pilot had never received any formal flying training. He did not hold a pilot licence and it is probable that he did not meet the medical standards laid down for the holders of such licences. He had flown gyro craft over a period of 4 years and on the day of the accident he was flying a self built, unregistered, unapproved aircraft of the type within the close environs of the airstrip. His own sets of rotor blades were unserviceable and he had fitted a borrowed set of wooden blades which he had not previously used. The performance characteristics of this set varied from his own blades and were significantly different to a set of borrowed metal blades he had used exclusively for some months before the accident. He flew for 30 minutes on a series of brief flights, adjusting the tracking of the borrowed blades and when he was satisfied that they were tracking accurately, he took off and then made a low run along the airstrip. The aircraft then climbed to a height of about 70 feet, turned to the left through some 250 degrees and straightened when it was headed obliquely towards the centre of the strip. The manoeuvres were controlled, were made at a slow speed and were consistent with the flying habits of the pilot. Soon after the turn was completed there was a noise similar to an engine backfire, a puff of smoke or vapour appeared and the craft entered a steep nose down descent. The descent angle was reduced, but recovery was not effected before the aircraft impacted heavily on an upslope.

On 20 November, 1970 a Cessna 320D "Skyknight" aircraft, registered VH-CPP, disappeared on a flight from Bankstown, New South Wales to Coolangatta, Queensland, and no trace has been found of the aircraft or its two occupants.

Search operations commenced early on the morning of 21 November and continued for 6 days, during which helicopters and fixed wing aircraft flew a combined total of more than 203 hours. Numerous sighting and hearing reports were checked by aircraft and ground parties but no trace has been found of the aircraft or its occupants.

The pilot planned a flight from Bankstown to Wollongong and return with landings at Sydney and Camden en route. The aircraft touched down in an open grassed area 500 feet beyond the airport fence and slightly to the left of the extended centre line of the runway. The nose landing gear was torn off as the aircraft ran across a ditch 30 feet after touching down. The aircraft slewed to the left through 150 degrees, both main landing gears collapsed, and the aircraft came to rest in a level attitude 114 feet from the point of touchdown.

Whlie the aircraft was in flight at some 3000 feet above the Hawkesbury River, the VHF communications radio failed. After a few moments the pilot was aware of a smell of burning and he switched off the radio. Shortly after the radio was switched off, pungent smoke originating from the area of the radio installation under the instrument panel began to enter the cockpit and the pilot was compelled to open the canopy. He decided to land immediately and commenced an approach to a fairway on the nearby golf course. The approach was high and fast and the aircraft overshot the fairway. The pilot lowered full flap at approximately 90 knots and after crossing a line of trees proceeded to land on another fairway. Prior to touchdown he turned off the ignition, fuel and master switch and warned his passenger to leave the aircraft as soon as it stopped. When on short final the pilot noticed some golfers near the far end of the fairway and he applied full brake and full right rudder before touching down. The aircraft made contact with the ground initially on the right wing tip, bouncing on to the main wheels and nose before falling back on to the main undercarriage and tail wheel. The total ground run was 180 feet. Subsequent bench testing of VHF radio equipment revealed that in the circumstances of the filter capacitor breaking down, the overheating of the filter inductor produced smoke from the insulating substance.

The pilot, who was the general manager of the irrigation property on which the accident occurred, and his passenger, who was the farm manager of the same property, were on an inspection flight to observe accumulations of water from recent rain. The aircraft circled and manoeuvred over various sections of the property at a height of about 500 feet for approximately fifteen minutes and was then seen to make a shallow descent towards the homestead buildings. It flew towards a position where two employees were working adjacent to the property workshop and at a height of some 28 feet while still approaching the workshop area, it struck power cables. The forward movement of the aircraft was retarded, it nosed up steeply, then rolled to the left and dived to the ground steeply nose down. Several seconds after impact, the aircraft burst into flames and was completely destroyed by fire.