Introduction

About 0134 on 20 June 1985 the Australian registered bulk carrier River Boyne of 51994 gross tons, on passage from Weipa to Gladstone with a cargo of bauxite, collided with the Australian registered fishing vessel Babirusa, on passage from Cairns to the Gulf of Carpentaria, in approximate position 14° 18' S 114° 39' E. There was no injury to any person and the only damage sustained was to the starboard outrigger boom and the stern light on the Babirusa.

Having established that the Babirusa required no assistance, the River Boyne continued its voyage to Gladstone. The Babirusa returned to Cairns for repairs.

Conclusions

(The Rules referred to in this section of the report are those contained in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 as amended).

As noted above there are some differences in the versions of the event as recalled by the principal witnesses. In the absence of independent evidence, these differences have not been resolved, therefore the full facts of the events leading up to the incident can not be determined. Nevertheless it may be concluded that:

1. the collision would appear to have been immediately caused by the action of Mr Lawson on the Babirusa in altering course into the path of the River Boyne and that Mr Lawson: (a) failed to keep a proper lookout as required by Rule 5, in that he did not make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision; and in particular (b) failed to determine if risk of collision existed as required by Rule 7. In the prevailing conditions the simplest and probably most effective means of determining risk of collision would have been for Mr Lawson to watch the compass bearing of the River Boyne;
2. even if risk of collision had existed prior to the Babirusa's first alteration to port, which almost certainly was not the case, an alteration to port was entirely inappropriate avoiding action;
3. Mr Lawson's failure to properly determine risk of collision and take appropriate action can be attributed to his lack of knowledge and experience. However, Mr Lawson should have been aware of his own limitations and called the Skipper earlier.
4. the Babirusa was improperly exhibiting lights impaired the visibility and distinctive character of its navigation lights;
5. Mr Woodfield, Second Officer of the River Boyne failed to keep a proper lookout as required by Rule 5 in that he failed to ascertain by radar the course and speed of the approaching vessel and thus neglected "by all available means in the prevailing circumstances and conditions ... to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision". Although Mr Woodfield, by watching the compass bearing of the Babirusa, properly determined that risk of collision did not exist up to the time he went to fix the River Boyne's position by radar observation, I consider that, had he determined that the Babirusa was heading towards him rather that in the same direction, he probably would have continued to observe the Babirusa carefully and would thus have detected its alteration of course earlier;
6. that the positions plotted on the River Boyne's chart at 0100 and 0111 were substantially correct and that the collision occurred in the vicinity of, latitude 14° 18'.4S longitude 144°39'.2E;
7. the Second Officer of the River Boyne was properly qualified and competent to be left in sole charge of the watch. No blame for the collision rests with the Master or the pilot for leaving him in sole charge of the watch;
8. that both vessels were seaworthy at the time of collision
9. following the collision the Master of the River Boyne took appropriate measures to ascertain the Babirusa was not in need of assistance.

Introduction

TNT Alltrans sailed from the Port of Gladstone, Queensland, at 2238 on 24 March 1985, bound for Bluff, South Island, New Zealand, with a cargo of alumina in bulk. The vessel cleared the fairway buoy at midnight, when the main engines were rung full away, course was set at 092° & the autopilot was engaged. The 12-4 bridge watch consisted of the Watch Officer & an AB as lookout.

The course lines drawn on the chart indicated a course alteration, to 101°, north of Bustard Head, this to take the vessel south of Lady Musgrave Island & then north of Lady Elliot Island.

At about 0340 on 25 March 1985, TNT Alltrans groudned at full speed on Lady Musgrave Island, the engine not being stopped until the change of watch at 0400.

TNT Alltrans was refloated, with tug assistance, on 26 March 1985, having suffered extensive bottom damage, but no pollution had resulted.

Conclusions

The grounding was directly caused by the failure of the Watch Officer to control the navigation of the ship over an extended period, from about 0030 on 25 March to the time of the grounding. Specifically it was brought about by his failure to alter course when off Bustard Head & also by the failure of the Lookout to appreciate that the ship was standing into danger.

A Court of Marine Inquiry (No 162) into the grounding was held at Sydney during June 1986.

Sequence of events

On 18 August 1985, while on a laden, northbound passage through the inner two-way route of the Great Barrier Reef, the Liberian bulk carrier Maritime Gardenia grounded on Alert Patches, at the eastern end of Torres Strait. The Master had not engaged a licensed coastal pilot for the passage and, with the 3rd Mate on watch, the Master had absented himself from the bridge for about half an hour just before the grounding. The vessel suffered extensive bottom damage, four port double bottom ballast tanks & three centre double bottom fuel tanks being breached.

Conclusions

No allowance was made in the courses steered for the influences of the tide & the following sea.

The Master did not return to the bridge in sufficient time, in which to fully assess the situation, before the course alteration was due.

The 3rd Mate did not utilise all the shipboard & shore navigational aids available to him & did not sufficiently monitor the ship's position, so that the ship overshot the course alteration position.

Outline of incident

On the evening of 6 July 1985, the bulk carrier Iron Cumberland, in ballast, was on a northbound passage of the inner two-way route of the Great Barrier Reef. A licensed Coastal Pilot had been embarked off Cairns for the passage.

After the vessel had rounded Clack Reef & was steadied on the 270 course across Princess Charlotte Bay, the Pilot left the bridge, to rest for about 45 minutes. Hearing the pilot leave the bridge, the Master left his cabin & went to the chartroom, where the Watch Officer informed him that there were a number of fishing vessels up ahead.

The Master went through to the wheelhouse, looked at the radar & saw that there were two targets, one on each bow at two miles distance. He asked the watch officer to inform him of the situation. A whistle signal was made & course was altered to port, to provide a greater passing distance from the fishing vessel to starboard. However, as Iron Cumberland came up on the fishing vessel, the fishing vessel was seen to sheer towards Iron Cumberland. Despite evasive action being taken, the fishing vessel came in contact with Iron Cumberland in way of holds 5 & 6.

The Skiupper was on watch in the wheelhouse of the fishing vessel Saltfiord, which was trawling on a course of around 225. Using the VHF, he was talking to another fishing vessel. His first awareness of the close proximity of another vessel was after his vessel shuddered & he went out on deck to see what was happening. Although Saltfiord suffered damage to the port fishing boom & deck fittings, it did not require assistance from the Iron Cumberland.

Conclusions

Those on the bridge of Iron Cumberland did not keep a proper lookout in that proper use was not made of the radar, assumptions were made on scanth information & timely, substantial action was not taken to avoid a close quarters situation.

The absence of a passage plan & the failure to properly interpret information on the chart were factors which contributed to inappropriate avoiding action being taken.

The Skipper of Saltfiord did not keep a proper lookout.

The bridge working lights used by the fishing vessel impaired the visibility of the prescribed fishing lights.

Sequence of events

On the evening of 20 June 1984, the Port of Melbourne Authority's hopper barge Charles H McKay was proceeding from the spoil ground to Appleton Dock. The Master was keeping the barge to the west of the Port of Melbourne Channel, on a northerly heading.

The Panamanian cargo ship Yue Man had sailed from Victoria Dock, bound for sea under the direction of a Port Phillip Sea Pilot & passed Breakwater Pier as Charles H McKay was approaching the Pier from the south.

The two vessels collided westward of the dredged channel, the bow of Yue Man striking the hopper barge on its starboard quarter. Charles H McKay settled on the bottom within five minutes of the collision, while the Yue Man suffered only minor indentation of plating.

No lives were lost, but four crew members aboard Charles H McKay received minor injuries.

Conclusions

The Pilot of Yue Man & the Master of Charles H McKay made assumptions as to the intentions of the other &, acting on those assumptions, failed to take the proper precautions as required by the Colregs or the ordinary practice of seaman.

The apparently common practice of light draught departing vessels leaving the channel beyond Breakwater pier, & of some hopper masters coming up the channel from behind the seaward side of the pier, is hazardous.

The use of separate radio channels by different classes of ship to communicate movements to Harbour Control, & the absence of requirements for Port Authority vessels to report their positions & intentions in good time, were contributory factors to the casualty.

On 21 January 1984, Cape Pillar, an Australian Government navigation aids support vessel, was engaged in bathymetric survey work at the eastern extremity of the Recherche Archipelago, southern Western Australia. The survey required the vessel to run parallel courses on headings of 150º and 330º, 3000m apart, between the 300m depth contour and the shoreline. A survey boat was utilised for the insg\hore portion of the survey, where it was too shallow for cape Pillar to proceed with safety.

At 1158, Cape Pillar commenced a survey run on the 150º heading, but as this survey line passed through Cooper Island, when the vessel was 1.1 miles from the island, course was altered to 060º, to take the vessel to the previous survey line. Shortly after the helm was put to starboard, to bring the vessel back to the 150º heading on the previous survey line, the echo sounder showed rapid shoaling of the seabed. The helm was put hard to port, but shortly afterwards Cape Pillar struck a submerged object. A few minutes later, three rock pinnacles were seen close by, about two metres below the surface.

The hull plating was ruptured in way of the cargo hold and adjacent double bottom tank, both of which flooded. The Master took the vessel to anchorage in Goose Island Bay, where portable salvage pumps were delivered to the vessel and a Navy damage control team boarded to provide assistance. The vessel was eventually able to proceed to Esperance and then onto Fremantle.

Conclusions

Cape Pillar struck an uncharted rock pinnacle.

The incident could have been avoided had an aerial reconnaissance been conducted beforehand and had the vessel been equipped with a forward scanning sonar.

Early on 12 January 1984, Flinders Range was proceeding south off the east coast of South Korea. The weather was fine, with clear visibility and light airs. At about 0125, the Officer of the Watch (OOW) observed a target on the radar, about one point to port at a distance of between four and five miles. He then saw the lights of a vessel, a single red light above and well clear of a row of small "accommodation" lights.

The OOW kept an eye on the other vessel from a position on the centre line in the wheelhouse, and observed the relative bearing to be increasing. At about 0133, he saw a green sidelight and assumed that the other vessel had altered course to pass under the stern of Flinders Range. However, he suddenly realised that the other vessel had altered course to port, to cross ahead. He put the wheel hard over to starboard and stopped the engines, but the two vessels collided.

Contact was made with the other vessel, which was the Korean fishing vessel Han Gil No 105, which was returning to its home port from fishing grounds, on a course of 350º. One of the deckhands was alone on watch. The red light was an all round light.

Flinders Range suffered a puncture on the starboard side of the bulbous bow, at the 4m draught level, while the fishing vessel suffered a 20cm split in the hull plating, 5m from the stern on the starboard side. Both vessels were able to proceed without assistance.

Conclusions

The fishing vessel was not showing the correct navigational lights and, as the give way vessel, did not take appropriate action to avoid collision.

The OOW did not take action to avoid a close quarters situation and did not make use of the navigation equipment available to him, to determine the course and speed of the other vessel and to ascertain if risk of collision existed.

Summary of events

On the evening of 7 April 1984, and while on passage from the drilling rig Maersk Valient to Port Hedland, the offshore supply vessel Maersk Handler suffered a fire in the engine room. The engines were stopped using the remote shut down controls, engine room was sealed, and the halon flooding system activated, which extinguished the fire. However, the vessel was disabled and had to be towed to Port Hedland.

Conclusions

The cause of the fire was traced to a failed blank on the outboard fuel rail of the starboard engine. The blank, on a superfluous nipple, was a 20mm length of rod, held in place by an olive and a compression cap. The compression cap was found to be still firmly in place. As the distortion caused by the olive on piping does not occur with rod, that type of blank is unsuitable where the blank is under pressure.

Summary of events

On Friday 1 September 1983, the jack-up rig Key Biscayne was under tow off Lancelin, Western Australia, by two offshore supply vessels, Lady Sonia and Atlas Van Dieman, bound for Cockburn Sound from a drilling location off Darwin. Gale force winds were causing rough seas and a heavy swell.

At 0644, the tow line to Lady Sonia parted and attempts to pass a new tow line were unsuccessful.

During the day, Key Biscayne settled by the stern and developed a starboard list, so that seas started breaking over the deck. Therefore, all 52 persons on board the rig were evacuated by helicopter, this being accomplished by 1620.

At about 1840, the tow line to Atlas Van Dieman also parted, shortly after which Key Biscayne sank in 41 m of water, in a position 10 miles off Ledge Point.

Conclusions

The absence of "insurance" towing equipment and a marine crew aboard Key Biscayne resulted in the failure to connect a new tow line to Lady Sonia.

The break in the tow line resulted in the loss of directional control over the rig, allowing the rig to wallow in the heavy seas and swell.

Sea water entered the after section of the rig by way of the shale shaker return line, flooding the mud pits and pump room, and later other compartments as the rig settled lower in the water, causing a loss of stability and eventual capsize.

At approximately 2145 hours on 28 August 1983, in the course of a planned charter, Instrument Flight Rules night flight from Windorah to Toowoomba, Beech 200 Super King Air aircraft VH-KTE broke up in flight and crashed to the ground 3.5 kilometres south of Adavale, 201 km from Windorah, and on the aircraft's planned track. The pilot-in-command and the 11 passengers were killed when the aircraft fuselage, devoid of wings and empennage, impacted the ground, inverted. The Adavale police officer reported the accident to the duty officer of the Department of Aviation, Queensland Region. An investigation team from the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation assembled at Adavale on the morning of 29 August 1983.