The helicopter was on a 65-min flight from Troughton Island to the drilling vessel Energy Searcher. The flight departed Troughton Island at 0717 hours Western Standard Time with thirteen passengers and two crew on board. Approximately 30 min after takeoff, while cruising at 4,500 ft, a loud bang was heard accompanied by the onset of severe airframe vibration. The pilot immediately lowered the collective pitch control and reduced the helicopter's speed, while the co-pilot transmitted a distress message and instructed the passengers to fasten their seat belts. Although the vibration made reading of the instruments difficult, the pilot was able to determine that main rotor RPM was approaching 120%. The pilot increased the collective pitch in an attempt to control the main rotor RPM but this caused the vibration level to increase. He then lowered the collective pitch control, turned the helicopter into wind, and established an autorotative descent. The pilot observed that one main rotor blade was tracking irregularly. Passing 1,000 ft, the automatic inflation system for the flotation bags was armed. The helicopter contacted the water surface at a forward speed of 10-15 kts approximately parallel to the swell. The flotation bags immediately began to inflate. At the same time the main rotor blades struck the water, causing the fuselage to roll right until inverted. During the rollover, the left and right cabin windows were forced from their frames and the left side hinged door forced open. All passengers escaped from the cabin through these openings. The pilots exited through their respective doors, the co-pilot taking a portable emergency locator beacon. The short time interval between touchdown and the rollover prevented deployment of the life rafts. However, one raft was later released by a passenger. The survivors were located a short time after the ditching by a search aircraft and were later rescued by another helicopter and transferred to Troughton Island.

Outline of incident

On the afternoon of 9 May 1987, the bulk carrier River Embley, laden with a cargo of bauxite, was making an easterly passage through the Torres Strait at maximum draught. At 1700, the vessel grounded momentarily when to the south of the Alert Patches buoy, as a result of which the vessel sustained damage to the hull & flooded the forepeak tank & No 1 void space.

The vessel was taken to a safe anchorage, where temporary repairs were effected, to enable it to proceed to Gladstone to discharge the cargo.

No one was injured & no pollution resulted from the incident.

Conclusions

• A detailed passage plan for the passage had not been prepared.
• The Pilot had not briefed the Master fully on his intentions.
• The ship's speed was excessive for the depth of water available at the time.
• It would have been prudent for the Pilot to have made an earlier alteration of course.

Outline of incident

On 21 April 1987 at approximately 0710 ships time (0810 EST) the Cypriot registered cargo vessel "RUCA CHALLENGE" of 1587.46 gross tons on passage from Haifa, Israel to Cairns, Australia, via Singapore, with a cargo of potassium nitrate, ran aground on Piper Reef in position 12° 14' 80" S 143° 14' 40" E.

(Prior to the grounding the ship's time was UTC + 9 hours. The clocks were altered at noon 21 April, to align with Eastern Standard Time (EST) being UTC + 10 hours. All times given in this report are based on the 24-hour clock and are EST).

The vessel was refloated without external assistance at approximately 1700 on 21 April and, after establishing that the vessel was seaworthy, the Master continued the voyage to Cairns, berthing at 2030 on 23 April. No pollution resulted from the grounding.

Cargo was discharged on 24 and 26 April and the vessel sailed at 1350 on 26 April for Brisbane to complete discharge of the potassium nitrate. Off Fitzroy Island, the vessel anchored to allow a Lloyds Register classification surveyor, together with a diver, to make a kore detailed hull inspection in clear water. Some hull damage was noted; however the vessel was considered to be in a seaworthy condition and continued on passage to Brisbane.

After further inspection by Lloyds Register and on completion of discharge, the vessel sailed from Brisbane on 2 May 1987. Repairs were undertaken whilst in Brisbane and are due for completion at the next drydocking, in 1988.

Conclusions

1. I find that the "RUCA CHALLENGE" went aground through errors in navigation in that the Chief Mate failed to correctly establish the vessel's position at regular intervals after 0617 on 21 April.
2. Given the apparently conscientious plotting between 0400 and 0617 I was initially prepared to accept that the Chief Mate did continue to plot the vessel's position after 0617 and that these positions were subsequently erased. However, he could give no clear and satisfactory indication of what islands, reefs or light structures he was using for navigational checks and was, as is shown in his statement, very much confused as to what reef was what or where. Therefore, I have to reject his claim that he did continue to properly plot the vessel's position.
3. Given that no plotting of positions was apparently undertaken after 0617 and that the vessel was steering 170° (T) to make good a course of 175°, the course made good was in fact very close to 175° (T) allowing for the actions of the Chief mate in altering course to starboard for a short period prior to the grounding.
4. Due to confusion in his mind the Chief mate did not properly establish the vessel's position. He offered no excuses and accepted that the vessel grounded as a result of his errors.
5. No other person directly contributed towards the grounding.
6. The actions taken by the Master in refloating the "RUCA CHALLENGE" were successful. However, his initial action in trying to get the vessel off the reef before establishing the seaworthiness of the vessel does not show mature judgement of the circumstance after a grounding, despite being somewhat of a normal reaction.
7. As he was unfamiliar with the passage inside the reef and the lack of a large-scale chart of the area, the Master would have been more prudent to have utilized the services of a pilot of the Queensland Coast and Torres Strait Pilot Service.
8. In view of a pilot not being employed, the restricted passage width between Inset and Piper Reefs and the small-scale chart in use, a more prudent master may have considered that his presence on the bridge was warranted.
9. Subsequent to the grounding, the Master should have reported the incident to the Federal Department of Transport in accordance with the provisions of section 268 of the (Australian) Navigation Act 1912. This was not done, and the Department of Transport's Sea Safety Centre was only advised of the incident when a passing vessel reported the "RUCA CHALLENGE" ashore on Piper Reef.

Outline of incident

On the afternoon of 25 March 1987, the Panamanian general cargo vessel Great Brisbane was south bound, on a course of 204°, off the southern NSW coast bound for Thevenard, SA from Brisbane, where it had bunkered on passage from Sasebo, Japan. A small fishing vessel was sighted off the port bow shortly before 1600 & was pointed out at the handed over of the watch.

The Australian fishing vessel Naomi maru was making a home run, the automatic steering set to a course of WNW magnetic. The Skipper observed a southbound vessel to the north, assessed that it would pass astern, then took no further interest in it.

At about 1611, the watch Officer aboard Great Brisbane sounded one short blast on the whistle & altered course to 250°. Alerted by the whistle, the Master went to the bridge & took over the conduct of the vessel. The fishing vessel continued to close & the two vessels collided at 1625, the fishing vessel sustaining damage to its bow. Communications were not established, Naomi Maru not being equipped with VHF, but as the fishing vessel appeared to be all right, Great Brisbane continued on its voyage. Although taking in some water, Naomi Maru was able to proceed to Eden.

Conclusions

The collision was the direct result of Great Brisbane altering course to starboard.

The Watch Officer did not make use of the radar or other means to determine the risk of collision & made assumptions on scanty information.

On taking over, the Master did not assess the situation or take appropriate action to avoid collision.

The Skipper of Naomi maru made assumptions on scanty information & did not keep a proper lookout.

Outline of incident

The Danish Antarctic supply vessel NELLA DAN grounded in Buckles Bay at the northern end of Macquarie Island on the evening of 3 December 1987 in approximate position, latitude 54 degrees 29.2 minutes South, longitude 158 degrees 58.1 minutes East.

On board at the time of the incident were 33 crew & 17 expeditioners, all were disembarked safely by Australian Army light amphibious resupply craft (LARC). Some crew, expeditioners & LARC drivers sustained minor eye irritation from diesel oil spray & a certain amount of pollution was caused by the spillage of light diesel oil. The Master, four officers & the boatswain remained on board.

Conclusions

The Investigating Officers find that:

1. The NELLA DAN grounded at approximately 1846 3 December 1987 when the port anchor dragged in gale force south to south easterly winds.

2. The investigating officers are satisfied that there is no evidence to suggest that any person was unfit through the use of alcohol or drugs.

3. It is not possible to determine the precise time at which the anchor failed to hold or the time that elapsed before the ship touched bottom. It is therefore not possible to assess whether the Second Officer, was at fault for not realising the ship was dragging before the Master arrived on the bridge, whether there was time to let go the starboard anchor so that it would have been effective or whether other action could have been taken to prevent the casualty. The actions of the Master in leaving the dining saloon at approximately 1830 without alerting the Chief Engineer to possible emergency was an error of judgement. Captain Soerensen's subsequent decision to send the Assistant Engineer, to instruct the First Engineer to start the engine rather than use the telephone or telegraph was a serious error of judgement. The Master should have used the telephone and/or telegraph and to cover any uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the First Engineer he could also have used a messenger. Valuable time was wasted in starting the engines.

4. The Master's decision to continue the transfer of oil after dry cargo operations had been suspended and to continue the operation into the afternoon was an error of judgement.

5. The Master having taken the decision to continue and complete the oil transfer and also having expressed concern for the ship's position to the Voyage Leader failed to take precautions that would have been prudent given the wind and sea conditions at the time and the proximity of shallow water

• he did not pay out extra cable to increase the theoretical holding power of the port anchor
• he did not let go the starboard anchor. (His concern that the cables might cross had the ship swung to another direction was not well founded given the persistent nature of the wind that day and the fact that, by use of engines and helm, fouling of the cable could have been avoided.)
• even though the steering motors and all necessary ancilliary equipment were running, he did not start the engines and leave them running at zero pitch so that his ship was immediately manoeuvrable
• he did not warn the duty engineer of the weather being experienced or alert the engineering staff to the potential risks of remaining at anchor.

6. The First Officer was significantly at fault in that he failed to advise the Master that in his opinion the ship was dragging anchor, nor did he bring this fact to the Master's attention at 1700. While there is no guarantee as to the Master's reaction to this information, the First Officer had a clear duty to inform the Master of the occurrence.

7. Given the southerly wind that developed on 2 December and subsequently increased in intensity on 3 December the anchorage position was too close to the lee shore and shoal water. Considerations of the LARC operation and the oil transfer were secondary to the safety of the ship.

8. The bridge management was deficient in that the Master did not ensure that his officers had read and understood the "Master's Standing Orders" and were fully conversant with and carried out the Owner's requirements as detailed in the "Master's Letters" in respect of keeping a safe navigational watch.

9. The First and Second Officers did not properly plot the ship's position whilst at anchor and apparently the Master did not require them to do so.

10. After the ship grounded the actions and decisions taken by the Master were in all respects correct. His decision to seek LARC assistance rather than use ship's survival craft minimised the potential for serious personal injury.

11. Most of the pollution caused was as a direct result of the grounding and occurred on 3 and 4 December. The Chief Engineer acted with great presence of mind in capping the oil hose before releasing it from the ship. Approximately 120 cu metres of diesel bunker oil and 5 cubic metres of lubricating oil were unaccounted for. The investigating officers concluded that after the grounding nothing could have been done to prevent the pollution that occurred from the NELLA DAN.

Introduction

The Liberian flag tanker 'MOBIL ENDEAVOUR', fully loaded with petroleum products, grounded momentarily in the eastern approaches to the Torres Strait on 24 July 1986, whilst on passage from Singapore to Port Moresby.

The vessel suffered bottom damage in the grounding, however there was fortunately no pollution as a result. The vessel was able to continue her voyage to Port Moresby.

At the time of the incident, the vessel was proceeding without the services of a licensed pilot, despite a recommendation of the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization to the contrary.

The Maritime Safety Committee:

"RECOMMENDS that ships of 100 metres in length and over and all loaded oil tankers, chemical carriers or liquefied gas carriers, irrespective of size, use the pilotage services provided by the Queensland Coast and Torres Strait Pilot Service when navigating in the Torres Strait and inner route of the Great Barrier Reef area between Booby Island (latitude 10°36' south, longitude 141°54' east) and latitude 16°40' south or through the Great North East Channel, or Hydrographers Passage."

A Preliminary Investigation into the incident was conducted by Captain WA Chadwick, Chief, Investigation Division, Office of the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs, and published by the Republic of Liberia.

The Preliminary Investigation included Findings of Fact established by Captain DN Pritchard from Mobil Shipping Company Ltd.

The Federal Department of Transport Australia is grateful to the Republic of Liberia for permission to reproduce in full, in the interests of marine safety, the Report of the Preliminary Investigation and the Decision of the Commissioner of Maritime Affairs RL into the grounding of 'MOBIL ENDEAVOUR'. 

Conclusions

1. The Proximate cause of the grounding of the MOBIL ENDEAVOUR was that the Master ignored the Passage Plan drafted by his Navigator and followed the leading lights on the East Strait Island, which led him North of "East" buoy. He should have passed to the South of "East" buoy.
2. The Master failed to calculate and allow for the effect of squat.
3. The Master ignored the cautionary note on Aus Chart 293 that warned that "rocky outcrops occur in the channel between the patches".
4. The Master failed to appreciate the 11 metre soundings recorded on Aus Chart 293 that he would confront on his intended track.
5. The Master failed to heed the implied warnings by his Chief Mate and the Deck Watch Officer, when he confirmed that he intended to pass to the north of "East" buoy.
6. The Master failed to employ a Torres Strait Pilot, which would have minimized the risk of grounding and pollution in an area of great ecological sensitivity.

Introduction

On 26 April 1986 at 1735 hours local time the Indian flag bulk carrier Jhansi Ki Rani of 42141 gross tonnes, on a passage from Newcastle, Australia to Higashie Harima, Japan, ran aground on Frederick Reef in position 21°01.5'S 154°22'E.

At the time of the investigation on 2 May 1986 there had been no injury to any person, the ship was still aground, and a salvage team was onboard with a tug standing by. Preparations were underway to attempt to refloat the vessel.

A minor quantity of oil pollution was sighted after the grounding. This pollution was apparently the result of the forward oil fuel deep tank which held 1 tonne of fuel oil, being holed on grounding.

All other fuel tanks were situated aft and were intact at the time of the investigation. The danger of further pollution was negligible.

Conclusions

The grounding was caused by an accumulation of factors:

1. No definite position fixes were obtained since 1736 hours on 25/4/86.
2. Both the Master and Chief Officer showed an unseamanlike complacency in their navigational duties when approaching a hazard of this nature in the prevailing weather conditions. While the light tower is normally a good radar target in good conditions, it should have been realised that rain clutter could obscure the echo return. Slowing or stopping the vessel would have been prudent under the circumstances. (a) Both officers were relying on picking up the light tower at 22 miles on the radar, as this was the distance that the light tower was picked up on the way south. No consideration was given to the fact that the rain showers and drizzle could affect radar propagation, or that the tower was located on the northern tip of the reef. (b) Both expected to see the light at a specified time. Even when the Chief Officer picked up a target on radar on the starboard bow, he assumed it was a ship, because the light was not expected until later. (c) Even though the visibility was down to 2-3 kms. (1-1.6 miles) the Chief Officer did not call the Master.
3. The Master did not properly assess the significance of the data concerning the prevailing currents, particularly as published in the sailing directions, Australia Pilot Volume 3.
4. The Master's assessment of the current and ships expected speed was wrong. The vessel was apparently set to the West while the speed made good was hardly affected. The master and officers seriously underestimated the speed of the vessel. Given that the last definite position of the vessel was obtained within 50 miles of the coast, it would have been reasonable to assume that any adverse current experienced then, may have dissipated when the vessel was virtually in the open ocean. Had the dead reckoning positions been run up at the vessel's service speed, the solar position line obtained at 0800 hours on the 26th of April would have indicated that the vessel was to the west of her intended course.
5. The degree to which the concentration of the Chief Officer was affected by the presence of the Chief Engineer is not known.
6. Although it is realized that the deck log and bridge notebook would have been written up some time after the grounding, there is still doubt over the times and distances given for the interval between first visually sighting the reef and running aground. While these anomalies are not considered significant in relation to the cause of the grounding, it does call into question the accuracy of the officers statements as it has been established that the ship's average speed for the previous day had been 11.54 knots.
7. The engines were run astern intermittently between 1736 hours and 1913 hours, without a full assessment of the damage to the vessel being made. This action may have increased the damage to the hull and, in the worst case, if the ship had come off the reef, it may have sunk immediately. Subsequent to the grounding the seriousness of the situation and potential danger to the ship was compounded in that:
8. The design of the duct keel and engine room cofferdam system as an integral unit, with no provision for subdivision, made the engine room vulnerable in the event of bottom damage. Water entered the engine room, from the duct keel and cofferdam, through sounding pipes, the duct keel venting system and leaking manhole covers.
9. The cofferdam sounding pipe caps were left uncapped.
10. There would appear to have been an excessive amount of rags and jute in the engine room bilges which caused the pumps to become blocked.

Outline of incident

On 14 August 1986, the Dutch Antilles heavy lift cargo ship Gabriella, moored starboard side alongside the wharf, was discharging a 237.95 tonnes lift onto a low loader at Port Kembla, NSW. The effect of the heavy lift suspended outboard to starboard was counteracted by the movement of fuel & ballast to port side tanks.

The low loader was positioned under the suspended lift & when lowering of the lift onto the low loader commenced, the runner wire of the forward derrick parted, causing the lift to drop onto the low loader. This sudden release of weight from the derrick, caused the vessel to roll violently to about 45° to port, away from the wharf. This caused the submersion of the open hatch & rapid flooding of the hold. The vessel continued to roll to port & sank, on its port side, within 15 seconds of the wire runner breaking, the starboard side of the vessel remaining just clear of the water.

Two cargo/hull insurance surveyors had been within the accommodation & lost their lives. The vessel was declared a constructive total loss.

Conclusions

The wire runner broke due to considerable strength reduction caused by corrosion & abrasion.

The corrosion & abrasion were causedd by the protective lubricant not penetrating the rope, evidently due to ineffective application.

The examination of the rope prior to & during use in Port Kembla was ineffective.

The continued working of the wire runner after one strand reportly broke before lowering commenced. The required lowering could have been achieved by a combination of tide & list, or by lowering the derricks.

Outline of incident

On the 2nd September 1986 at 0205 hours Eastern Standard Time the Malaysian general purpose Freedom type cargo vessel ALAM INDAH of 9094 gross tons, on passage from Penang, Malaysia, to Mackay, Australia, ran aground on Chapman Island Reef in position 12 degrees 53 minutes South 143 degrees 36 minutes East. The vessel was refloated, without assistance, at about 0527 hours Eastern Standard Time and, after an inspection for damage and seaworthiness by the ship's Officers, resumed passage to Mackay at 0606 hours Eastern Standard Time on the 2nd September 1986. There was no report of injury to any person nor of any pollution occurring as a result of the grounding.

At the time of the investigation on the 4th September 1986 the vessel was berthed at the Sugar Terminal at Mackay. A Bureau Veritas classification surveyor and a team of divers were in attendance to assess the damage to the vessel. The vessel was found to have sustained no material damage and was seaworthy. The Alam Indah sailed from Mackay at 2015 hours 5 September 1986 for the port of Kelang.

Conclusions

I find that:

1. The 2nd Officer, Mr Kyaw Myint Oo, failed to alter course at 0142 when abeam of Wye Reef light or at some time subsequent to 0142 to avoid Chapman Island Reef and to keep the vessel on the track laid down. After 0142 Mr Oo displayed poor seamanship in that he failed to fix the ship's position in a proper and accurate manner and to keep a visual check on the ship's progress. He also failed to call the Master when unsure of the ship's position.
2. The Master absented himself from the bridge for a prolonged period from 0130 hours to the time of the grounding. He failed to supervise the alteration of course at 0142, which would have been proper for him to oversee given the absence of a pilot and the relatively narrow waters in this area.
3. At a time, said to be 0147 the helm was applied 10 degrees to port instead of to starboard to keep the ship to the recommended two-way route. The Second Officer either gave the wrong helm order or he failed to observe that the rudder had been applied in the wrong direction. In view of the position of the grounding, and the evidence of the Master, Chief Officer and Quatermaster which is in conflict with the evidence of the 2nd Officer, it is probable that an order for port helm was given by the 2nd Officer.
4. The voyage had apparently proceeded in a routine manner until 0130 hours 2 September 1986. At 0130 the Master left the bridge and failed to ensure that the bridge was manned in accordance with the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978, in that no separate lookout was kept.
5. The times given in evidence do not alter the basic cause of the grounding, and under the circumstances it would be unreasonable to expect precise times from the witnesses. There are however inconsistencies that should be noted. Most of the reported times and therefore the positions of the helm orders, to which they relate, are not consistent with the time of grounding. It is probable, given the trim and ballasted state of the ship, that had the helm been applied at the times stated the vessel would not have grounded on Chapman island but would have passed to the north of the reef. It follows that the vessel probably remained on the course of 152 degrees until some time after 0150. The statement of the 2nd Officer, that he ordered and saw 10 degrees of starboard helm and confirmed that the compass was showing a course of 176 degrees true, is not consistent with grounding on Chapman Reef. The account of the degree and timing of helm applied provided by the Quartermaster, should have allowed the ship to pass north of the reef given the ship's trim.
6. There is no evidence to suggest that there was any gyro compass error of sufficient magnitude to cause this casualty.
7. The Master did not engage the services of a pilot from the Queensland Coast and Torres Strait Pilot Service in line with his understanding of the preference of the Ships Managers, Pacific Ship Managers Sbn. Bhn., of Subang Jaya, for ships under their management to engage a pilot for loaded passages only. This practice is contrary to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Maritime Safety Committee, circular MSC/Circ 430, which has been issued pending adoption of a draft resolution by the IMO Assembly in November 1987. The circular recommends that ships of 100 metres in length and over, and all loaded oil tankers, chemical carriers or liquefied gas carriers, irrespective of size, use the pilotage services provided by the Queensland Coast and Torres Strait Pilot Service when navigating in the Torres Strait and inner route of the Great Barrier Reef area between Booby Island (latitude 10°36' south, longitude 141°54' east) and latitude 16°40' south or through the Great North East Channel, or Hydrographers Passage.
8. The action of the Master subsequent to the grounding and the precautions taken in refloating his ship were carried out in a proper, prudent and seamanlike manner.
9. The light on Chapman Reef was fully operational.

Outline of incident

On the evening of 16 December 1985, Lysaght Endeavour was proceeding northwards, in ballast, along the southern NSW coast. Shortly before 2200, the Watch Officer saw a single, small white light one point to port & the lookout reported the light shortly afterwards. No target was depicted on the radar screen & as the light remained on a steady bearing, the officer assumed that he was overtaking a small vessel, which was on a converging course. He therefore made a broad alteration to port, then gradually came back to the original course, keeping the other vessel fine to starboard. The white light suddenly disappeared under the starboard bow & Lysaght Endeavour collided with the fibreglass yacht Grunter, which was sailing on a southerly heading & stated to be displaying a tricoloured lantern at the masthead.

Grunter suffered only minor damage & was able to proceed to port unassisted.

The red section of Grunter's tricoloured lantern was found to have degraded to such an extent that it showed a white light. However, doubt was raised as to whether the bulb in the red section was working & that in fact the yacht was displaying the all-round white anchor light.

Conclusions

Grunter was not showing the correct navigation lights, in that it was not displaying a red port sidelight.

Although there was one on board, Grunter did not carry a radar reflector in a prominent position, to enhance detection by radar.

The Watch Officer aboard Lysaght Endeavour misjudged the distance of the white light & resumed the original course too soon.