At the conclusion of a local flight the pilot carried out a practice touch and go landing, and then positioned the aircraft for a full stop landing. Wind conditions at the time were light. Shortly after touchdown the aircraft commenced to veer to the right. The pilot was unable to stop the swing, and elected to go around. However, the aircraft was no longer aligned with the strip and during the attempted go-around the aircraft struck an embankment and a small tree. The pilot closed the throttle and the aircraft came to rest about 100 metres to the right of the strip.

The pilot had initiated a climb from a baulked landing. On application of the power he found that the engine was not responding correctly. He elected to turn towards the takeoff area in order to reduce the distance of the aircraft from shore. During the turn the aircraft stalled and side-slipped into the water from about 100 feet above the surface. Examination of the engine disclosed a binding throttle cable which prevented the throttle slide from opening fully when full power was demanded.

The pilot reported that the engine stopped following the failure of the ignition coil. During the subsequent approach to land, the aircraft struck a powerline before impacting the ground heavily. The pilot received a fractured vertebrae. One landing gear leg and the wooden propeller of the aircraft were damaged. The pilot stated that the powerline was difficult to see against the backdrop of the rolling hills, and that the supporting poles were situated one and a half kilometres apart and hidden behind the terrain.

The pilot had arrived at the strip the previous day to continue learning to fly the gyrocopter. He flew one circuit during which the craft was observed to porpoise a number of times. After landing, the pilot complained to his adviser that there was something wrong with the aircraft. The adviser then flew the craft and reported that it behaved perfectly. He counselled the pilot that he was overcontrolling in the pitching plane and suggested flying low runs along the strip as practice to overcome the problem. The pilot did this a number of times and showed good pitch control. On the morning of the accident, the pilot flew some further strip runs, again showing good control. He then began flying circuits at about 50 feet above ground level. On the third circuit, as the gyrocopter was turning base with about thirty degrees bank applied, the following sequence occurred in rapid succession - nose pitch-up 15`, nose pitch-down 20`, nose pitch-up 40`, nose pitch-down 50`. The gyrocopter remained in this latter attitude until ground impact. Although the pilot had owned the gyrocopter for some six months, he had flown it only once previously. This was some six weeks before the accident when other instances of pitch control difficulties occurred. There was no evidence of any fault with the gyrocopter. The engine sounded normal up to the time of impact and the shattered propeller blade was evidence of the engine being under power at impact. The gently undulating terrain over which the craft was seen to fly might have given the pilot the illusion that he was descending as he flew the base turn. The porpoising of the gyrocopter as described by witnesses was indicative of the pilot overcontrolling in the pitching plane. When the craft pitched nose down the second time, the airflow through the rotor disk would have been reversed from the normal upwards flow to a downwards flow. Once this condition arises, recovery to normal flight is impossible. It was noted during the investigation that there was no part of the gyrocopter in the pilot's normal forward field of view which could assist him in judging the in-flight attitude of the craft. Such information is particularly important for control in the pitching plane, especially during the learning phase.

The pilot was taking part in a gliding race. About 3 kilometres from the destination the pilot realised that he would not reach the aerodrome and that an outlanding would be necessary. He selected a small paddock with trees on the approach boundary, but sink was encountered and he found he was unable to clear these trees. The aircraft stalled either just before or coincident with colliding with the tree tops. The right wingtip then struck the ground 22 metres beyond the trees and the glider rotated through about 140 degrees to the right before the fuselage impacted heavily with the ground. The decision to outland was left too late.

The student pilot was being checked on the Motorfalke powered glider. At about 50 feet above ground level after takeoff, the instructor shut the engine down to simulate an engine failure. The student elected to land the glider straight ahead on the remaining runway, and the instructor being satisfied with the students initial actions directed his attention to stopping the propeller in the horizontal position. The student fully opened the spoilers and a high rate of descent was set up. The instructor took control of the glider but was unable to arrest the high rate of descent and a heavy landing resulted.

During the take-off roll the left mainwheel struck a tyre which was being used as a strip marker. The tyre deflected into the tailplane, however the pilot did not feel the impact and discovered the damage at the conclusion of the flight. An inspection indicated that the tyre had been moved from its normal position prior to the impact, and was hidden from the pilot's view by the long grass on the strip.

The student was undertaking his first instructional flight. At about 2000 feet during the climb towards the training area, the engine failed completely. A successful forced landing was carried out, however during the landing roll the gear struck a number of rocks. Initial investigation revealed a defect in the fuel cock selector mechanism, in that, irrespective of the cockpit indication, the fuel supply cock remained closed. The cable connecting the fuel shut off control in the cockpit to the fuel cock was deformed to the extent that the cock remained in the closed position. A note in the aircraft Flight Manual requires the cockpit control to be lockwired, as the manufacturer had evidently not intended that the control would be frequently manipulated. However, the instructor was not aware of the Flight Manual requirement, and had demonstrated the shut off control on numerous occasions over the past two years. He stated that he had not used the control before the flight in question, and enquiries did not reveal who might have operated the control in the period following the previous flight of the aircraft.

The pilot reported that shortly after take-off the elevator control jammed. He then noted that the horn end of the left elevator was hanging about eight centimetres below the horizontal stabiliser. The load was jettisoned as the pilot prepared to land but increasing difficulty was experienced in keeping the aircraft nose-up. On short final approach the left elevator separated from the aircraft but despite the lack of elevator control the aircraft was landed without further damage. Investigation revealed damage to the leading edge of the left elevator horn. It was probable that this area had been struck by an object while the elevator was in the full nose-up position, i.e. with the horn pointing downwards. The object which caused the damage was not identified, however the impact allowed the outboard hinge pin to become dislodged from its bearing. This in turn led to the jamming of the elevator controls and to the subsequent detachment of the left elevator.

The glider was launched by being towed behind a motor vehicle. After the glider became airborne, the pilot signalled to the vehicle driver to slow down. The vehicle driver slowed the vehicle too quickly, the tow rope slackened and the rope drogue deployed. The tow rope then released from the glider. Because of the position of the tow rope, below the glider, the pilot did not immediately lower the nose, the glider stalled at about 15 feet agl and landed heavily.