Circumstances:

The pilot was carrying out a survey flight of his property to locate a vehicle. The aircraft was observed by ground witnesses, near the vehicle, to commence a descending right hand turn with the apparent intention of landing in a cleared paddock adjacent to the one in which the vehicle was located. The aircraft appeared to lose altitude suddenly after it had completed about 270 degrees of the turn and the right wing touched the ground. The aircraft cartwheeled to a stop. The pilot survived the accident but is unable to remember anything about it. It is probable that the pilot was concentrating his attention on either the ground party or the intended landing area and he allowed the aircraft to either stall or unintentionally lose height. The wing struck the ground before the pilot was able to take action to recover the aircraft to level flight.

Significant Factors:

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Possible pilot distraction leading to loss of control and ground impact.

The pilot was asked to bring some mill parts out to a Station Outcamp. He decided to fly out rather than drive. After dipping the fuel tanks the pilot boarded the aircraft and flew to the Outcamp, where he off-loaded the equipment with the engine running. The pilot then lined-up along the strip and commenced the takeoff roll. The engine failed shortly after the aircraft became airborne and the pilot was forced to land ahead. During the landing roll the aircraft hit a tree. When the pilot checked the fuel tanks during his daily inspection the left- hand tank contained 9 litres of fuel and the right-hand tank contained 31 litres of fuel. Total fuel contents were adequate for the intended flights. The pilot selected the left fuel tank for start up and taxi intending to change to the right tank prior to the first takeoff. The pilot did not change the tank selection. The engine failed, shortly after liftoff, on the second flight when the contents of the left-hand fuel tank were exhausted. There was insufficient time for the pilot to take any action other than attempt a forced landing. The terrain, in the area of the landing, was unsuitable. The Aircraft Flight Manual Pre-takeoff Check List (Vital Actions) includes a check that the fuel selector is selected to the fullest tank.

Circumstances:

The pilot conducted an aerial survey of the property to be sprayed. He observed main power lines running from east to west, and a spur power line running north to the homestead. During the final clean-up run of the paddock, whilst flying from west to east, the aircraft's fin struck the spur power line, which was across the flight path, and had been forgotten by the pilot. The wire strike severed the top of the fin and rudder which resulted in the aircraft impacting the ground and coming to rest 90 metres from the power line.

Significant Factors:

The following factor was considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot had forgotten about the spur line to the homestead.

The helicopter was chartered to transport two hydrographers to various remote sites on the Cape York Peninsula. During the two days preceding the accident, the helicopter experienced a series of engine chip warning lights. Following the third chip warning, the pilot consulted the aircraft operator. The operator in turn consulted an engineer licenced on the type of engine fitted to the aircraft. It was decided to continue operations because the size of flake was below the 0.8mm stipulated as a maximum in the engine manufacturers operations and maintenance manual. The following morning, 19 minutes after departing Coen, the engine chip warning lamp again illuminated. This was followed by a sharp mechanical noise emanating from the engine bay. A sudden yaw reaction and illumination of the engine out warning light confirmed that the engine had failed. The pilot initiated an autorotational descent from about 500 feet above ground level. His MAYDAY call indicated that the helicopter was under control. Both passengers stated that the helicopter crashed through trees without any appreciable change in the rate of descent, landing some 20 metres short of a small clearing. The helicopter struck the ground very heavily and broke into several sections. The two passengers managed to get clear of the wreckage before it was destroyed by fire. The survivors were located by searching aircraft about an hour after the accident. An inspection of the wreckage determined that the aircraft was on fire prior to impact and had suffered an engine failure following an explosive burst of the power turbine. The turbine failure resulted from the failure of the number 4 engine bearing. The primary cause of the bearing failure was masked by the extensive secondary damage to the inner race of the bearing. However, there was evidence to suggest that the failure was initiated due to spalling of the inner race. The progressive nature of the failure indicates that the engine was "making metal" for a period prior to the final failure and that this caused the illumination of the chip detector warning light. Despite the report that the size of the metal flakes picked up by the chip detector were below the maximum allowable size, the manufacturers maintenance manual does call up certain maintenance procedures to be followed after the illumination of the chip detector warning light. It is apparent that these procedures were not observed. It was determined that at the time the main rotor blade struck trees, just prior to ground impact, the main rotor rpm was below 90 . 90 main rotor rpm being the lower limit allowable during an autorotational descent. No mechanical reason could be found to explain the low rpm. The low main rotor rpm, combined with the high rate of descent and the lack of flare suggests that the pilot may have been endeavouring to stretch the glide in an attempt to reach a more suitable landing area and that insufficient rotor energy remained for a flare prior to landing.

Circumstances:

The exercise was planned as a relative descent from an exit altitude of 6000 feet. One parachutist was equipped with a video camera, and it was planned that he take a video of the other parachutist during the descent. The exercise was thoroughly briefed and rehearsed on the ground prior to take-off. It was planned that the parachutist being filmed would deploy his parachute at 3000 feet to enable the opening sequence to be recorded on video. The other parachutist would then deploy his parachute at about 2000 feet. During the climb it became evident to the pilot that the cloud base was too low for the planned 6000 foot exit. He advised the parachutists that they would have to exit from an amended altitude of 5000 feet.

There were a total of 10 parachutists on the aircraft and the two involved in this accident were the last to exit. They exited the aircraft as briefed, and the video exercise commenced. This continued until the parachutist taking the video sensed that they were low. He checked his altimeter and thought it read 2500 feet, but he thought they were lower so checked again and said that it read 1400 feet. He later believed that he had misread 1500 feet for 2500 feet. He signalled to the other parachutist that the free fall part of the jump was complete. The other parachutist responded with a look of surprise. He then broke away from the formation by performing a backward somersault. The parachutist taking the video deployed his chute, but he said that the other parachutist kept free falling.

Witnesses on the ground said that the deceased's parachute was deployed at very low altitude and it appeared as though full line stretch (but not canopy deployment) was achieved at about the same time as he hit the ground. The nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased were consistent with hitting the ground in a feet first vertical position which was also consistent with the witness reports. Inspection of the parachute did not reveal any faults and again the inspection was consistent with the observation of the witnesses. As the descent had been recorded on video it was possible to establish elapsed times between when the parachutists left the aircraft and when certain critical events occurred. This in turn established that both parachutists initiated parachute deployment much lower than had been planned and in particular, the deceased did not initiate deployment until it was too late for his descent to be arrested.

Both parachutists were wearing altimeters. The deceased's altimeter was mounted on his chest whereas the other parachutist wore his on his wrist. It was evident from the video record of the descent that the deceased did not monitor his altimeter. The deceased's altimeter was smashed when he hit the ground. The other altimeter was thoroughly checked and found to be functioning correctly. From the video it was also evident that it took some time for the parachutist who was being filmed to formate on the jumper with the camera after they left the aircraft. The parachutist operating the video camera had made about 930 jumps at the time of this accident. The deceased was making his 103rd jump.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. Loss of altitude awareness by both parachutists due to the circumstances of the jump, probably including. concentration on video filming, exit altitude lower than planned, failure of jumpers to monitor altitude during descent, and the time taken by the jumper being filmed to formate on the jumper doing the filming.

Recommendations:

1. The Australian Parachute Federation was involved in this investigation and as a result of their involvement their investigator has recommended that in future camera jumps an audible altimeter warning device should be used to prevent loss of altitude awareness. This recommendation is supported by the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation.
2. During the investigation, both parachutist's altimeters were dismantled and thoroughly checked. The deceased's altimeter showed evidence of prior saltwater immersion in that internal corrosion of some of the working parts was evident. His log book indicated he had jumped into the sea seven months previously. It was the opinion of the investigator who conducted that examination that such corrosion, as it progressed, would cause an altimeter to fail. It is recommended that The Australian Parachute Federation advise its members of this and require that altimeters that have been subjected to saltwater immersion be thoroughly cleaned and checked prior to further use.

Circumstances:

Shortly after the aircraft passed overhead Eildon Weir in the cruise, the right engine began to run roughly. The pilot carried out appropriate trouble checks but was unable to restore full power to the engine. As he believed that some power was being delivered, he refrained from shutting down the right engine. The pilot realised that the left engine was also deficient in power output. He was in cloud and unable to maintain altitude. Trouble checks confirmed that the right magneto had failed completely whereas with the left magneto selected the engine continued to run roughly. The pilot attempted to divert to Lilydale airfield which was closer than Essendon. While still over the Great Dividing Range, where ground level was about 1800 feet above the sea, the aircraft descended through the cloud base. The pilot suddenly found himself about 35 feet above the trees with rising ground and trees ahead. He managed to carry out a successful forced landing into a ploughed paddock on sloping ground. An on-site examination of the right engine discovered that the sump was overflowing with a mixture of oil and AVGAS. The engine was removed and test run. A carburation problem caused a lean cut. The carburettor was dismantled and revealed excessive play between the float and the support spindle. The fuel valve retractor clip was loose, and the valve was scored. The loose retractor clip could move to jam between the float and the spindle support thereby restricting float movement. The scoring on the fuel valve flutes allowed the valve to jam in the valve body thereby restricting fuel flow into the float chamber. It was concluded that the restriction to the float movement, coupled with the jammed fuel valve, had reduced the fuel flow into the float chamber and delivered an increasingly lean mixture to the right engine in flight. The engine at first ran rough but as the fuel level in the float chamber dropped further, the engine ceased delivering significant power. With the throttle wide open, the mixture rich and the fuel boost pump on, it is suspected that either the float or the fuel valve became free again. This could allow fuel to flood the engine causing a rich cut. The engine manufacturer advised that this set of conditions could result in the sump containing AVGAS. A test run of the left engine discovered that its right magneto was inoperative and that the left magneto was malfunctioning. The main coil lead in the right magneto was found detached from its terminal. The lead was fitted with a flag type terminal that had lost its tension and was capable of slipping off the fixed terminal. The fixed terminal showed evidence of burning and arcing consistent with a loose fit. The left magneto condenser lead had been routed such that it had been rubbing against the magneto cam. The insulation on the condenser wire had worn through exposing bare wires which shorted out on the cam. This resulted in an intermittent spark which produced rough running and loss of power.

Significant Factors:

1. The right engine failed because of a faulty carburettor.

2. The left engine produced diminished power because both magnetos were faulty.

3. There was insufficient engine power for the aircraft to maintain altitude.

4. The pilot was committed to a forced landing in unsuitable terrain.

Recommendations:

1. During the investigation it was discovered that the manufacturer of the carburettor, applicable to the PA44, had not provided overhaul agencies with data specific to:- (a) acceptable wear limits for the float assembly (b) the method of setting up the valve retractor clip It is recommended that the CAA review the data available from the carburettor manufacturer.

2. The investigation into the magneto failures showed that the manufacturer's data did not adequately define the way in which the wires were to be routed within the magneto case. It is recommended that the CAA publish explanatory drawings showing the correct routing and highlighting the potential consequences of incorrect routing. It is further recommended that the CAA approaches the manufacturer to have magneto wire routing information distributed, world-wide if appropriate.

3. During the interview with the pilot it was learnt that he had never shut down an engine or feathered a propellor on a twin engine aircraft, even in training. It has been ascertained that there is no legal requirement to shut down an engine or feather a propeller during twin engine endorsement training. It is recommended that the CAA considers engine shut down and propeller feathering as a mandatory exercise in multi-engine endorsement training.

While returning to the airfield the glider experienced a deterioration of lift and the pilot decided to carry out a landing on the Stuart Highway. The pilot observed two vehicles on the road and attempted to warn them of his intention to land. The first vehicle stopped but a bus following, continued along the roadway. The pilot decided to land before reaching the bus. After touchdown the pilot moved the glider to the side of the road but the left wing struck a road sign then a tree. The glider slewed off the road and the landing gear was torn off. The pilot was forced to accept a collision with known obstructions in order to avoid the bus. The countryside in the vicinity of the highway was considered unsuitable for an outlanding.

The aircraft was observed to head in a northerly direction after take-off. About 20 minutes later, the witness saw the aircraft, which was flying at an altitude of about 80 feet, returning. As he watched, the aircraft appeared to turn to the right and roll inverted, before disappearing behind trees and buildings. The aircraft struck the ground in a steep nose down attitude. The aircraft impacted the ground at about the base turn position. An inspection of the aircraft did not reveal any fault which may have contributed to the occurrence.

The pilot was competing in the Hinkler Bi-Centennial Air Race. Earlier in the day the aircraft had made a forced landing near Roma due to a propeller oil seal failure. Following repairs by the owner/pilot the aircraft departed Roma for Charleville. At approximately 1740 hours the pilot made a PAN call and advised he was shutting the engine down due to another propeller oil seal failure. During the subsequent forced landing the pilot had to swing the aircraft left to avoid a tree. The aircraft hit an anthill, causing the landing gear to collapse. The pilot received facial lacerations. Investigation revealed that the moulded leather propeller seal had failed in the area of the moulding. It could not be determined if the second propeller seal failure was associated with the change of the seal following the first propeller seal failure. This accident was not the subject of an on-scene investigation.

At the time of the attempted take-off, the night was dark, with overcast cloud conditions and light rain falling. Wind conditions were light and variable. The pilot reported that initial acceleration was normal, and the aircraft became airborne at about 95 knots. A positive rate of climb was established and the landing gear was selected up. The pilot subsequently advised that the speed then decayed to 90 knots. At this time there was nothing unusual in the engine noise and the controls felt normal. Shortly afterwards the propellers struck the ground 116 metres beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft then struck an embankment and passed through a fence before coming to rest 247 metres from the initial ground strike. Although wind conditions were light and variable when the engines were started, shortly after the accident the wind was moderate from the west/south-west. A detailed analysis conducted by the Bureau of Meteorology indicated that while the pilot was preparing for take-off, a cold front with winds in excess of 20 knots had probably passed over the aerodrome. As the pilot had conducted the take-off on runway 08, there was probably a substantial tailwind component. Conditions were also assessed as suitable for the development of microbursts, but the lack of recording instruments in the area prevented confirmation that this type of phenomenon had in fact occurred. The pilot had been deprived of the opportunity to observe changing wind conditions at the aerodrome. The wind direction indicator adjacent to the threshold of runway 08 was not lit, and the illuminated wind direction indicator was not visible from the point where the aircraft was lined up for take-off.