The pilot and the helicopter were involved in a training exercise for trainee fireman. The task was to teach safety around helicopters, especially relating to fire fighting activities. The State Fire Commission provided new sling equipment, purchased from a ship chandler. Experienced fire fighting personnel had prepared several sling loads in advance for the pilot. The strop chosen to lift the 500kg water bladder was 20 metres long. The purpose of the long strop was to enable the helicopter to lower the water bladder to firemen working in low scrub. The strop had been assembled by passing each end of the rope around a metal eyelet and whipping it because the polyester rope was not suitable for splicing. Visually the whipped ends looked satisfactory.

The helicopter lifted the load to about 150 feet above the ground and was accelerating through about 20 knots when the pilot heard a loud bang, felt a vibration through the airframe and realised that the load had detached from the helicopter. He made a precautionary landing nearby. The rope of the strop had slipped through the whipped section at the eyelet where it attached to the water bladder with a shackle. The rope had recoiled, damaged one of the three main rotor blades, ripped the right hand horizontal stabilizer and wrapped around the tail boom.

The known safe working load limits for the individual items comprising the strop were more than adequate for the intended sling loads. The new strop had never been proof tested; nor was there any indication that the helicopter company or the Fire Commission had instructed the manufacturer to proof test the strops.

The pilot was taxying the aircraft along a gravel path in the direction of a run-up area for runway 36. The duty runway was 29, and the pilot's request to depart into the North was not approved. A gentle turn was made to join a marked taxyway, but before the aircraft reached this taxyway the left wing struck a metal sign. The pilot was aware of the location of the sign, but had inadvertently overlooked its presence.

The pilot reported that he intended to carry out a touch and go landing. The approach was normal but after touchdown, the aircraft started to drift to the left. The pilot advised that because of his familiarity with hang glider operations, he used the wrong rudder in an attempt to correct the situation. The nose swung rapidly to the left and the nose gear collapsed. The aircraft came to rest at the edge of the runway.

Circumstances:

The pilot was assessing a new powered trike hang glider which had greater performance capabilities than his own aircraft. He successfully completed several circuits before landing for a short period about one kilometre from the witnesses. The aircraft became airborne again, climbed to about 100 feet and performed a series of short climb and descent manoeuvers. It then entered a very steep angled climb, described by the witness as 80 degrees. At about 300 feet, the sound of the engine ceased, the nose pitched down, and the aircraft entered a series of three "tuck and tumbles", similar to an uncontrolled outside loop. On the third tuck and tumble, both wings failed and came together, and the aircraft fell straight to the ground. At some point, the emergency parachute handle was pulled but there was insufficient altitude remaining and the parachute did not deploy from the container. No pre-existing defects were found with the aircraft. The investigation determined that during the break-up sequence the seat area separated from the section containing the engine, which was still running at ground impact. Ground testing of the engine revealed no defects and the engine continued to run satisfactorily up to simulated angles of 35 degrees of climb. This, together with the 50 degrees freedom of movement for the control bar, would allow a very steep apparent angle of climb to ground observers. It is most likely that the pilot, once the aircraft attained this attitude, closed the throttle, and pulled back on the control bar. This probably initiated the tuck and tumble sequence. It was found that the parachute was attached to the engine, not the seat frame, and that the parachute's performance rating did not match the performance rating of the aircraft.

Significant Factors:

The following factors were considered relevant to the development of the accident:

1. The pilot's experience was on considerably lesser powered and lower performing ultra-light aircraft. 2. Whilst attempting a very steep climb, the pilot applied incorrect recovery technique.

Recommendations:

1. It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the Australian Ultralight Federation (AUF) review training standards and experience requirements for ultra-light pilots intending to upgrade to aircraft with significantly enhanced performance characteristics.

2. The AUF should encourage manufacturers of trike aircraft fitted with parachutes to ensure that the emergency parachute is attached to the seat frame and is compatible with the performance of the aircraft.

The pilot stated that the wind was blowing directly across the strip and he joined the circuit for a landing on runway 29. He reported that when the aircraft was on final approach it encountered a significant tailwind, and a missed approach was carried out, followed by a "tear-drop" style turn to align the aircraft on final for runway 11. The pilot stated that after touching down on the mainwheels, the nosewheel was lowered and he heard a bang before the nose of the aircraft contacted the runway. The aircraft slid along the runway before coming to rest just off the sealed surface. An inspection of the landing gear assembly revealed that the nosegear downlock linkage failed due to overload forces causing the nosegear to retract. The landing gear mechanism was also bent by overload forces. No evidence could be found to indicate that defects in the landing gear system existed prior to this landing. The nature of the failure of the nosegear is consistent with heavy nosewheel runway contact.

The aircraft had completed several successful flights during the day. At the completion of a power off descent, the pilot rapidly opened the throttle. The engine began running roughly and then failed completely. During the subsequent glide approach, for a forced landing, the aircraft collided with powerlines which crossed a gully about 350 feet above the ground. One line contacted the pilot's throat, inflicting severe lacerations, and the aircraft descended to the ground out of control. An inspection of the engine did not reveal any defects that could have contributed to the occurrence. This particular type of engine, which has inverted cylinders , floods quickly with rapid advance of the throttle. This flooding with unburnt fuel, swamps the spark plugs causing the engine to fail.

Before departing from his home base for his first operation from the particular agricultural strip, the pilot had been briefed not to land down the slope unless there was a strong headwind component favouring that direction. A normal landing was made, and the pilot was then given details of the task to be performed. He departed for an aerial inspection of the area, and on return noted that there appeared to be a headwind of about 25 knots for landing down the slope. However, on late final approach to land in this direction, the pilot realised that the wind strength had decreased to about 10 knots. He continued with the landing, but was unable to avoid over-running the end of the strip. A groundloop was initiated, during which the left gear assembly collapsed. The strip was only 340 metres in length, and had a downslope of about 6 degrees. The over-run area was about 100 metres long, with a downslope of 9 degrees. While the pilot was conducting the inspection of the area to be treated, a shower of rain made the strip surface wet and slippery. The strip appearance was deceptive from the air, and probably influenced the pilot to continue with the approach after the headwind component reduced.

During the landing roll both mainwheels entered soft areas in the strip surface. The aircraft swung through 120 degrees to the left then slid sideways for 17 metres before the right maingear collapsed. The wing struck the ground and was bent upwards. The condition of the strip surface was unsatisfactory because the first 500 metres contained soft spots. The positions of the soft spots were not marked, nor was the strip threshold displaced. The pilot had used the strip previously but on this occasion he did not check its serviceability before the flight.

The pilot had been ridge-flying not far from the glider field, along a range of hills oriented north/south. The coastline was located just west of the range of hills, and a north-westerly wind was providing good lift along the ridge. When a sea breeze developed, the wind changed to a south-easterly and the pilot was unable to maintain altitude or reach the glider field. During the subsequent outlanding the glider sustained damage when the pilot induced a ground loop to avoid striking a fence.

The pilot reported that after commencing the takeoff run, when he applied forward pressure on the control column to raise the tail, the tail rose more rapidly than normal. He was unable to correct the situation and the propeller struck the ground several times before the aircraft overturned. It was likely that the takeoff had been commenced in light tailwind conditions. The aircraft had travelled a distance of 22 metres from the start of the takeoff roll to the point where the propeller initially struck the ground. The pilot had only limited experience on the aircraft type. It was possible that he had applied excessive forward movement of the control column, or that he had moved the column too rapidly.